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INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE AND
THE SOVIET UNION
by
Y assam an Saadatm and 
University o f New Hampshire, May 1988
How should one analyze the economic relations between advanced 
ca p ita lis t system s and other econom ic system s? So far the 
econom ists have mainly concentrated their efforts on studying the 
re la tions betw een developed cap ita lis t countries (henceforth DCs) 
and the less developed countries (henceforth LDCs) of the world. 
T here has no t, how ever, been a significant effort in devising a 
systematic theory of economic relations between DCs and the socialist 
countries. I intend for my dissertation to be a contribution in that 
direction. It is concerned with investigating the role o f international 
trade and investment in the countries of Eastern Europe.
In the process of observing the economic relations of the DCs and 
LDCs, two m ajor schools of thought have emerged: the dependency 
school and the diffusionist (m ainstream  neo-classical) school. The 
latter, in general, sees the positive aspects of the links between DCs 
and the poor countries. The dependency perspective, on the other 
hand, argues tha t the problem s o f the poor (peripheral) countries 
are, in  fact, the ir econom ic relations with the DCs (center). The 
exp lo ita tion  by the cen ter draw s off m ost of the surplus that
otherwise might have been used in the process of industrialization of 
the poor countries.
My dissertation begins by examining how these two schools of 
thought have been theore tica lly  successfu l in incorporating  yet 
another dim ension o f the econom ic relations betw een d iffe ren t
economic systems- the relations between the DCs and the socialist 
countries. In addition, my dissertation will also focus on another 
approach which I w ill refer to as the ’Eastern European” approach. 
In the final chapter I will try to empirically verify the validity of the 
theoretical investigations of these schools. My conclusion is that 
although all the approaches discussed in my dissertation make some
contribution to understanding East-W est economic relations, none are
en tire ly  successfu l in  p resen ting  an accurate p ic tu re  of such
econom ic relations.
INTRODUCTION
How should  one analyze the econom ic re la tions between 
advanced capitalist countries and other economics systems? So far, 
the econom ists, as well as sociologists, have m ainly concentrated 
their efforts on studying the relations between advanced capitalist 
countries and the less developed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin 
A m erica. In this process, two m ajor schools o f thought have 
emerged: the dependency school, and the m ainstream  neo-classical
school (or the diffusionist school as it is often referred to in the 
developm ent lite ra tu re1).
My dissertation begins by examining how these two schools of 
thought have been theore tica lly  successfu l in incorporating  yet 
another d im ension of the econom ic relations betw een d ifferen t 
econom ic systems — the relations between the Developed Capitalist 
Countries (henceforth DCs) and the socialist countries. In addition, 
my dissertation w ill analyze another approach which I will refer to 
as the 'Eastern European* approach. It is a less emphasized view in 
W estern literature, but it is among the dom inant views in Eastern 
Europe, in particu lar in the more reform  oriented  countries of 
Eastern Europe. In my opinion, the inclusion of this school is crucial 
in understanding how some o f the Eastern European econom ists
1 Throughout this dissertation, I will refer to these two schools as the 
dependency school and the neo-classical school.
2in terp ret the econom ic relations between E ast and W est and how 
they view  the impact of such relations on their countries.
This dissertation w ill be divided into six chapters. In chapters 
two and three I will concentrate on the two dominant schools' views 
on the economic relations between the DCs and the socialist countries. 
In the fourth chapter I w ill exam ine the Eastern European countries' 
view on the subject of East-W est economic relation, and in the fifth 
chapter I will try to verify  em pirically the validity of some of the 
theoretical investigations o f these schools of economic thought. The 
emphasis will, however, be on the dependency school since it is the 
only school am ong the three w hich has vigorously attem pted to 
theorize the East-W est economic relations. M oreover, since it was 
m ainly  in the 1970s th a t the E ast-W est econom ic rela tions 
flourished, I w ill lim it my em pirical investigation to that period. 
Table (I) shows the amount of exports and imports of Eastern Europe 
with the W estern Industrial Countries for the period of 1970-1980.2
M y dissertation, however, will not be an ''empirical" one, in the 
sense tha t it does not attem pt to generate elaborate econom etric 
models and then try to test them. It deals primarily with the area of 
m ethodology of economic thought applied to the understanding of
2 In the same period, in addition to conventional trade, new forms and 
methods o f economic cooperation came into existence. Industrial Cooperation 
Agreements between the East-West cover a wide range o f  activities including: 
licensing, turnkey contracts, subcontracting, production cooperation and 
joint ventures. There will be a more detailed discussion of Industrial 
Cooperation Agreements later in the dissertation.
3East-W est interaction. In other words, I am merely interested in 
searching for methodologies adopted by different schools of thought 
in the investigation of East-West economic relations and to locate the 
consequences resulting from adopting such methodologies.3 In the 
process I have to conduct a substantial literature survey, since it is 
only through such a survey that I will be able to ascertain each 
school's method of analysis.
At the end of each chapter, I will include a brief criticism of the 
school discussed in that chapter. I do not intend to present a 
comprehensive criticism of these school’s arguments, since most of 
the problems associated with their discussion of East-West economic 
relations stems from their method of analysis and their world 
outlook in general, which in most cases have in turn been mentioned 
and criticized by others. I will argue, however, that none of the 
schools' (approaches) discussed here, have been com pletely 
successful in presenting an 'accurate' and comprehensive picture of 
East-W est interactions. By bringing these schools' (approaches) 
together in my dissertation and examining their problems, I hope to 
contribute to both a better understanding of East-W est economics 
relations, and to devising a possible "theory" of such interactions.
3 Certainly, one can choose to study how these schools of thought have 
employed their methodologies in investigation of other phenomenon. My 
interest is, however, in the East-West interactions.
4Table (I)
Foreign Trade o f Eastern European 
Countries and the Soviet Union with 
the Western Industrial Countries
(millions o f U.S. $)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 19804
Eastern
Europe:
Exports 4287 4707 5812 8297 10961 10775 12179 12652 14258 19847
Imports 4944 5495 7061 10850 16141 17259 18666 18759 20563 22813
Soviet
Union:
Exports 2393 2758 2944 5093 8269 8511 10392 11974 12735 26981
Imports 2822 2890 4150 6333 8116 13452 14357 13459 16064 24265
Source: Eastern European Economics 1981
The neo-classical approach in general sees the positive aspects
of the links between advanced capitalist countries and other
4 Herold and Kozlov (1983)
5economic systems. For instance, in investigating the economic 
relations between DCs and the poor nations of the world, the neo­
classical approach argues that the latter do not possess sufficient 
production, technology, skills, and values to provide their people 
with goods and services necessary for raising their standard of living. 
These countries, it is argued, should seek the advanced industrialized 
countries' capital, technology, training, and values. This approach 
tends to see underdevelopment as a situation which all nations have 
historically experienced. Some have already overcome it, and the 
rest eventually w ill, with the help of industrialized countries. 
(Chilcote et al. 1974 and Stevenson 1980)
In fact, the existence of a dichotomy which constitutes the 
polar ends of an evolutionary development path is one of the basic 
assumptions of the neo-classical approach. At one pole, there are 
traditional societies; at the other, the modern (advanced) societies. 
The neo-classical approach maintains societies move along this path 
from traditional to modern. Moreover, since in the process of 
m odernization all societies w ill experience essentially similar 
changes, the history of the modern nations is taken as a source of 
useful generalization. (Valenzuela 1976, Chilcote et al. 1974, Preston 
1982 and Bernstein 1979) The definition of modernity constitutes a 
set of characteristics which can be applied to all societies. Modernity 
conceptualized in this way, then, may be used as a yardstick to 
measure the degree of advancement of any society. Such reasoning 
leads this school to define an underdeveloped country as having
6either a per capita income below $300-$400 or as having other 
characteristics including illiteracy, hierarchy, lack of social mobility, 
low level of technology and productivity as well as other specific 
economic and institutional features.5 (See, for example, Chilcote et 
al., 1974)
In the perspective of this school, a major impetus to modernize 
in the now advanced (developed) countries resulted  from 
technological progress which permitted the creation of agricultural 
surplus and its transportation. Thus, improvem ent in both 
technology and in long distance trade were essential stimuli in 
cultural and institutional transformation and eventually the progress 
of now advanced (developed) countries. Since the nature of the 
development (modernization) process is identical for every society 
and only its pace and intensity differs, it logically follows that 
economic growth and development in the poor nations (late 
developed) can largely be generated and sped up by an inflow of 
foreign aid, investm ents, and culture from the industrialized 
countries (early modernizers). Just as technological progress brought 
forth a new form of production and economic organization hundreds 
of years ago in the now developed countries, the capital and
5 The specific elements included in the definition of 'modernity' and 
'traditional* vary substantially in the literature. For a survey of the literature 
see (47).
7technology introduced by these nations into the underdeveloped 
nations will transform the poor countries.6 (Bernstein 1979)
The neo-classical economic also stress the positive and 
beneficial aspects of East-West economic relations. I will argue that 
such a conclusion is mainly due to the fact that these economists 
establish their model at a highly abstract level. In other words, in 
their model, the behavioral assumption governing the conduct of 
economic actors are postulated to be uniform in all economic systems 
including economies of Eastern Europe. Consequently, when free 
trade is conceptualized to be advantageous to all parties involved it 
will be irrelevant if one of these parties is an Eastern European 
country with a com pletely d ifferent institu tional persuasion. 
Therefore, these economists maintain that Eastern Europe countries 
and the Soviet Union conduct their trade with the DCs based on the 
principle of "comparative advantage". I will devote a part of the fifth 
chapter of this dissertation to ascertaining the validity of such a 
claim. If these countries are taking advantage of the gains from 
trade, stemming from the differences in comparative costs, then one
6 A branch of the modernization approach stresses the differences in values, 
outlooks, culture and norms between two polarities. Some authors go so far as 
to argue that modernization is possible only when individuals transform 
themselves by adopting modem values. (Portes 1976) The stress on such
differences has important implications in regards to the concept of human 
nature. The modem developed societies are characterized by the 'rationality' 
of their members, where as individuals in the developing countries behave 
"irrationally" on economic grounds. As such, this particular branch differs 
from transitional economics in the assumption that rational behavior is a 
universal human characteristic. (See Valenzuela (1976) which cites an 
argument by W. Moore who has pointed out the differences in the human's 
nature in these two polarities.) For a general critique of this school see 
Nafziger (1976) & Mohun (1979).
8should witness a rise in import-domestic supply ratios of those 
products for which DCs maintain a "comparative cost advantages" in 
their production. In other words, Eastern European countries and the 
Soviet Union should rely increasingly on imports to satisfy a growing 
share of domestic demand. (Brainard 1979) At the same time, one 
should observe an increase in the export-domestic supply ratios of 
those products in which these countries possess "comparative cost 
advantages" in their production. I believe by calculation the ratio of 
net imports and net exports of different categories of products to 
actual domestic production of these products, one can more or less 
determine whether these countries are conducting their trade based 
on the principle of comparative advantage.
Contrary to the neo-classical approach, the dependency 
perspective stresses the negative aspects of the links between DCs 
and other economic systems. For instance, in investigating the 
economic relations between the DCs and the poor nations of the 
world, the dependency school stood much of the neo-classical, 
diffusionist tradition on its head. In general, according to this school, 
the links to the advanced countries (center, core) were the problem, 
not the solution, since the exploitation by the center drew off the 
surplus that otherwise might have been used in the process of 
industrialization of the poor peripheral countries. Instead of 
hypothesizing the underdevelopment as an original state, it asserts 
that the developed societies were never underdeveloped and the 
present condition of underdevelopment was created. It argues that
9the development of any region must be understood in connection 
with its historical insertion into the worldwide political economic 
system which came into existence with the European colonialization 
of the world. (Valenzuela 1976, Chilcote et al. 1974 and Stevenson 
1980) In this view, therefore, the traditional modernity polarity has 
no value in conceptualizing the relations of developed and less 
developed countries. The presence of traditional and modern 
features may or may not help to differentiate societies, but it does 
not explain the origin and existence of modernity in some areas and 
its lack in the other areas of the world. (Valenzuela 1976 and 
Chilcote et al. 1974) Instead, it argues the most important and 
significant defining characteristic of the underdeveloped areas is 
economic dependency. Such dependency has given a particular form 
to the economic, social and political systems of the periphery and has 
produced features and characteristics by which underdevelopment is 
perceived and recognized. (Stevenson 1980)
Contrary to the assumption that the international division of 
labor, through comparative advantage, leads to parallel development, 
the dependency school argues that the different functions of center 
and periphery have led to the gain of the former at the expense of 
the latter. The same process which brought progress for the center 
in v o lv ed  a p ro cess  of 'su b o rd in a te  d ev e lo p m en t' or 
underdevelopment for the periphery.7 (Stevenson 1980)
7 Both underdevelopment and development are aspects of the same 
phenomenon, both are historically simultaneous, both are linked functionally 
and, therefore, interact and condition each other mutually. This results in the
10
The general view is that the incorporation of peripheral 
countries into the emerging world capitalist economy, first through 
direct colonialization and then, more subtly, through free trade, 
resulted in gearing the production of these countries towards 
producing exports for the center. It also structured the social and 
political systems of the subordinate areas in a way that ensured the 
gains from this process flowed mainly to the dominant countries. 
This, coupled with their concentration on primary product exports, 
prevented these countries from development of an autonomous 
capacity for growth and change. (O'Brien 1975)
In recent decades, and with a new transformation in the center, 
a new form of dependency came into existence. With the emergence 
of multinational corporations which sought new markets and cheaper 
production sites for their growing technological manufacturing 
process, the dependency of the periphery acquired a new character. 
In this phase, the drainage of surplus from periphery to the center
division of the world between industrial, advanced or "central'' countries, and 
underdeveloped, backward or "peripheral" countries..(cited in Valenzuela 
(1979))
While the dependency perspective views the center as having a dynamic 
development responsive to its internal needs, it believes that the economy of 
the periphery is shaped by and responsive to the requirement or the 
expansion of the center. (Ibid. and Stevenson 1980) When the center of the 
system needed to acquire raw materials and sell finished goods, the periphery 
responded as both supplier and market. The prime mover of this process was 
capital seeking profits. The capitalists accumulated capital where this could be 
done cheaply, and invested it where the return to investment was highest, and 
this led to the surplus drainage from some parts of the world to others. The 
precise mechanism of dependency, of course, will vary and it is associated with 
the different periods in the expansion of the world capitalist economy. The 
dependency theorists generally distinguish three identifiable periods in the 
process of the world capitalist expansion: colonial, competitive capitalism and
monopoly capitalism.
11
continues, though it now takes such forms as repatriation of profits, 
royalties, other commissions, interest and transfer pricing. (O’Brien 
1975) At this stage a new international division of labor has arisen 
in which periphery acquires capital goods, technology, and raw 
materials from the center and exports its traditional raw materials 
and a few m anufacturing items produced by m ultinational 
subsidiaries. (Valenzuela 1976) Although in some countries in the 
periphery a kind of 'dependent industrialization’ is taking place, the 
social and economic costs of this are high and do not eliminate the 
dependency of these societiess . (O'Brien 1975)
Viewing, therefore, the link with the core countries as the 
source of underdevelopment of the periphery, some authors in the 
dependency school tradition suggest breaking the chain with the 
center and initiating an independent industrialization. However, 
some demand more, and argue that development requires profound 
alteration of the political social and economic system of peripheral 
countries including, in particular, change of the market system and 
mobilization of the domestic population in nationally oriented efforts.
In the second chapter of this dissertation I will attempt to 
demonstrate that the dependency school's proponents employ the
8 Based on the dependency approach, while previously the outside control was 
mainly applied to the underdeveloped countries' exports, at the present stage 
outside control is exercised over their imports. Moreover, the multinational 
corporations tend to centralize research, planning and deployment of natural, 
human, capital resources, and development o f science and technology as well 
as decision making in the developed countries while they concentrate the 
assembly and routine production of goods in the periphery. (Sunkel (1972) 
and Sunkel (1973))
12
same type of methodology, in their investigation of the economic 
links between DCs and LDC's and in their analysis of the economic 
relations between DC’s and socialist countries. Consequently, they
recognize and concentrate on only the ill-effects of these economic
relations. The ill-effects which range from socialist countries'
complete dependency on the import of Western technology to their 
import of capitalism itself: "the countries of Eastern Europe and
Soviet Union will (are) importing not only Western technology...(but) 
will be and are already importing capitalism." (Frank 1977)
Furthermore, the dependency school asserts that the manner in 
which socialist countries insert themselves into the international 
division of labor is similar to that of the intermediate countries, i.e. 
Brazil and Mexico. In other words, socialist countries import 
manufactured goods from DCs and export primary goods to them; at 
the same time socialist countries import primary goods from Third 
World countries and export manufactured goods to them. I will 
attempt to empirically verify this claim in the fifth chapter of the 
dissertation.
The E astern  E uropean  ap p ro ach ,9 in contrast to the 
dependency school, but like the neo-classical school, tends to focus on 
the positive aspects of the economic relations between East and West. 
In particular, the imports of Western technology are highly praised
9 I have chosen this particular view of East European economists, since it has 
chiefly emerged in the economic relations, and it almost dissipated with the 
gradual decline of such relations at the end of the 1970s.
13
and considered to be crucial for further development of Eastern 
European countries. It in large treats technology as a neutral and 
impartial element which can be easily selected off the shelf in the 
shopping-centers of Western countries and then be installed with no 
foreseeable problems in the Eastern European enterprises. In 
contrast to the dependency school, the Eastern European economists' 
analysis is devoid of any consideration for any existing or potential 
conflict between two different economic systems. Therefore, 
although Eastern European economists do not employ the neo­
classical school’s tools, their method of analysis leads them to almost 
the same conclusion.
The E astern  European econom ists, how ever, like the 
dependency school, assert that Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
occupy intermediate positions in the international division of labor. 
In other words, they import Western technology while in return they 
export raw materials and fuels. They argue that such a pattern of 
trade, however, does not make Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
dependent on the West. Moreover, in most cases the governments of 
these countries are able to mitigate the ill-effects of economic ties 
with the West.
The following table summarizes the methodology adopted by 
the dependency and neo-classical schools as well as the Eastern 
European approach. It also indicates some of the consequences of 





Extends his method of 
analysis of the DCs' and 
LDCs' economic relations 
to those of the capitalist and 
socialist-economic systems.
b-Wallerstein:
Since there exists only one 
world embracing mode of 
production, the capitalist 
mode, there is no need for 









Conclusions and Relevant Points 
for "Empirical" Verification
The economic relations 
between the East and the West 
have resulted in the con­
version of Socialist countries 
into the functioning part of 
the capitalist system.
International investment inten­
sifies the dependency of the 
socialist countries on the world's 
market. Therefore, it can only 
produce harmful effects for the 
socialist countries.
The mere existence of the 
world capitalist system implies 
the impossibility of the pres­
ence of any other economic 
system.
Socialist countries occupy an 
intermediate position in the inter­
national division of labor, a 
position similar to those of "semi- 
peripheral" capitalist countries.
In some cases useful information 
is produced. In other cases either 
contradictory statements are pro­
duced or illegitimate conclusions 




Ignores the differences in the 
socio-economic systems of 
capitalist and socialist countries, 
and/or believes such differ­
ences are irrelevant and play an 
insignificant role (as far as 
assumptions of economic theory 
are concerned) in the investi­
gation of economic relations of 
the East and the West
ID Eastern European Approach
Acknowledges the existence of 
two different economic systems 
in the world, but suggests that 
some form of coexistence 
between them is possible.
Consequences
Conclusions and Relevant Points 
for "Empirical" Verification
Consumers and firms in the 
socialist countries are max­
imizing their utilities and 
profits, respectively.
East-West economic relations 
help to solve a number of 
common problems. Movements 
are in the direction of mutually 
advantageous trade and co­
opera tional foster forces of 
peace and socialism in the 
world.
Socialist countries conduct 
their trade according to the 
principle of comparative 
advantage.
Socialist countries in their 
economic relations with the West, 
in particular in their establishment 
of joint ventures with Western 
firms, are "profit maximizers."
In general, their analyses are void 
of any consideration for the 
potential conflicts of interest 
between Eastern Europe and the 
Western firms.
Although the socialist countries 
occupy an intermediate position in 
the international division of labor, 
they are not dependent on the 
Western countries.
CHAPTER II
The D ependency School
In exploring how the dependency school has viewed the 
economic relations of the industrialized capitalist countries and the 
socialist nations, one from the outset faces difficulty. The difficulty 
arises because the proponents of this approach were and are mainly 
concerned with studying and investigating the relations between the 
advanced capitalist countries of the world and the less developed 
countries, in particular those in Latin America, and inquiring into the 
cause of underdevelopment of the periphery. The difficulty is 
further compounded when one considers that in recent years the 
dependency school has dominated the research in the social sciences 
including development economics which makes it literally impossible 
to discuss the overwhelming mass of writing by its advocates. 
Added to these difficulties are the complex roots of the dependency 
analyses which draw inspiration from a variety of intellectual 
traditions ranging from Marxism to the post-1948 ECLA critique of 
the neo-classical theory of international trade and economic 
d eve lopm en t.1
1 These difficulties plus several more have been recognized by Gabriel 
Palma. (1978) His superb survey of dependency literature appeared in 
World Development. ECLA is the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America, which aimed to show that the prevalent international 
division of labor in contrast to the conventional wisdom was of much 
greater benefit to the center than to the periphery. There were two
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The existence of such difficulties makes the process of 
generalization and classification inevitable for almost any study of 
this school, especially if one wants to analyze the dependency school 
view of the relations between advanced capitalist countries and 
socialist nations. Due to the deficiency of explicit references of the 
dependency school’s adherents to the relations between capitalist 
and socialist countries, one should mainly rely on the process of 
deduction. By the process of deduction I mean, with the help of this 
school's extensive writing on the subject of the relations of advanced 
capitalist countries and less developed countries, one tries to infer 
how it might view the relations among advanced capitalist countries 
and socialist ones. In other words one attempts to explore the 
underlying methodology and reach by reasoning the conclusion at 
which they themselves would have arrived, if they had chosen to 
investigate the relations of advanced capitalist countries and socialist 
nations. This logical conclusion can then be supported by reference 
to their scattered writings on the subject of my study.
Palma (1978) has distinguished three major approaches and 
categories in the dependency analyses.2 The first is that begun by
reasons for this: First, the factor and commodity markets were
oligopolistic in the center, which lead to a long-term decline in the terms 
o f trade for the periphery; and the center's income elasticity of demand 
for the periphery's imports from the center was increasing. While the 
periphery's income elasticity of demand for the imports from the center 
was increasing, the result was a chronic balance of payments problem. 
Second, there were a number of benefits associated with concentration in 
industrial production, such as increase in productivity, which lead to the 
higher wages and other factor prices in the center. Palma (1978) and 
O'Brien (1975)
2 It should be mentioned that Palma uses this classification in regards to the 
dependency writers who are concerned with Latin America; but since the
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Frank, and its essential characteristic is its efforts to build a theory of 
underdevelopment. The second approach is found in the works of 
Sunkel and Furtado and is distinguished by its attem pts to 
"reformulate the ECLA analyses of Latin American development from 
the perspective of a critique of the obstacles to 'national 
development'.” (Palma 1978, P. 898) The third approach does not 
attempt to construct a theory of dependency; rather it concentrates 
on studying the "concrete forms in which dependent relationships 
develop" and examines the distinct and unique forms in which the 
economics and politics of each country in the periphery are
articulated with those of the advanced capitalist countries.3 (Palma
1978, p. 898)
In my study I will use the Palm a’s classification, with 
concentration on the first and second approaches, and for the reasons
which will be stated later, in particular on the first one. I will not
deal with the third category of authors in the dependency tradition.
bulk of the writing in this tradition is concentrated on Latin America's 
underdevelopment and others who are interested in studying the 
underdevelopment of other parts o f the periphery more or less follow the 
general line adopted by the former, it seems to be accurate to accept that 
Palma's classification can be applied to the dependency school as a whole.
3 I do not wish to imply that the third approach is atheoretical; rather, as 
Palma has stated it "deliberately attempts not to develop a mechanico- 
formal theory of Latin America underdevelopment based on its dependent 
character." (Ibid., P. 898) In brief, the third approach argues that: 1)
Latin American societies are part o f the world capitalist system, as a result 
"a basic element for the understanding of these societies is given by the 
general determinants o f the world capitalist system." (Ibid., P. 909) 2)
Latin American countries exhibit "social asymmetries" which is in part due 
to their internal conditions. Consequently, understanding their "internal 
determinants" is extremely important. 3) Finally, it is only through a 
study of "how the general and specific determinants interact in particular 
and concrete situations" that one can get an accurate picture of the Latin 
American economic development. (Ibid., P. 910)
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The reason is not that 1 believe they are unimportant or their 
contribution is insignificant, but rather that they have concentrated 
their study on the concrete situation of underdevelopment, and 
hence it is impossible to deduce what would have been their 
conclusions if instead they had analyzed concretely the relations of 
each Eastern European country with the advanced capitalist nations.
From the first categories, I will discuss the work of A.G. Frank, 
and J. Wallerstein, and from the second category the work of O. 
Sunkel. This selection is not arbitrary. I have chosen Frank, since he 
is one of the founders of the dependency schools and his works are 
widely known among and cited by the development economists4. 
And the discussion of dependency school is so closely associated with 
Frank's name and his work that some condsider him the creator of a 
new paradigm 5. Wallerstein was chosen since I agree with Gulap, 
Haldun (1981) who argues that Wallerstein's world system approach 
has cleared up some of the inconsistencies which exist in Frank's 
arguments, especially the inconsistency in regards to the transfer of 
surplus from the periphery to the center and the attribution of 
underdevelopment of the periphery to such transfer. Wallerstein's
4 Some even call Frank the founder of the dependency school. (Gulap, 
Haldun). (1981) Whether he or Baran is the founder of this school is not a 
point of my concern; however, it should be mentioned that Frank has 
acknowledged profusely his debt to Paul Baran's The Political Economy of 
Growth. (Baran 1957)
5 Fosten-Carter (1976) by using the Kuhnian Concept o f  scientific 
revolution, argues that Frank's writing represents a new paradigm which 
is increasingly challenging the predominant paradigm exemplified by the 
works of Rostow. If one agrees with Carter, then the study of Frank's 
writings becomes a must.
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framework of analysis, however, is different from Frank's,6 but 
since he has sim ilarly  attem pted to develop a theory of
underdevelopment, 1 believe exploring his world system under the 
same category as Frank's is appropriate. 7 In the following sections of 
this chapter, I will first discuss the underlying points of argument of 
each one of the previously mentioned dependency analysts in
regards to the relations between the "center" and the "periphery."
This is going to be a painstaking and rather lengthy process, but it 
has to be done in order to take the second step. Second, in light of 
their methodology and with the help of their writings (if any) on the 
trade and investments of advanced capitalist countries with the
socialist countries, I will try to distinguish how they would observe 
such economic relations. Finally, I will review the major critical 
points of their arguments. 8
6 In the following section, it will become clear to the readers that Frank and
Wallerstein each employ a different framework of analysis.
7 This action contrasts with some views which maintain that the world
system approach is not another variation o f the dependency "theory,"
since "the question of exogenous effects on development is no longer 
phrased in terms of the strength or weakness o f links between the center 
and a given peripheral country. Rather, the issue is phrased in terms of
the consequences of occupying a given structural position within the
world system as a whole." (Evans 1979)
8 My purpose is not to critically evaluate these authors. They have been
criticized elsewhere. I am merely exploring their ideas. In the process, I 
will attempt to show that their methodology leads them to reach the same 
conclusion in both cases of LDCs-DCs economic relations and East-West 
economic relations.
2 1
P a r t  One*. D e p e n d e n c y  &£ Ui£ " T h eo ry . i l l
U n d e rd e v e lo p m e n t :
2.1. Frank.
Frank has declared his task as participation in constructing a theory 
of capitalist developm ent and underdevelopm ent.9 "My general 
purpose is to contribute to the building of a more adequate general 
theory o f cap ita lis t econom ic developm ent and particularly  
underdevelopment." (Frank 1969, P. 13) In doing so in his analysis 
of underdevelopment of Chile, he attributes this underdevelopment 
to the four centuries of capitalist development in Chile. In order to 
show that underdevelopment is a result of capitalism, Frank starts 
with the proposition that the Chilean economy (and for that matter 
all of Latin America) has been capitalist since its insertion into the 
world economy: "Capitalism began to penetrate, to form, indeed fully
9 Whether constructing such a theory is possible has been questioned. For 
example Henry Bernstein (1979) using Hirst's (1976) definition o f theory as 
“a logical structure o f concepts which designates an object to be explained 
and which provides a mechanism of explanation for that object" argues that 
a theory of underdevelopment is impossible to construct, since 
underdevelopment does not "constitute a coherent object of explanation." 
Arguing against a diffusionist model o f development, he states "the dualism 
established by the conceptual couple, modernity-tradition embodies a 
circularity which cannot produce any theoretical advance, any explanation 
other than that already given by definition of the terms." He then argues 
the same is also true for underdevelopment theory. Based on this theory 
development is associated with a 'normal* capitalist development of the 
center which cannot occur since the capitalist development of the center 
requires the underdevelopment o f the periphery. "This is an effect of the 
lack of an adequate theorization and problematization of the concept of 
capitalism." The underdevelopment theorists' statement that no country in 
the Third World can become another United States in fact is "a negative 
theology: stating what cannot occur provides no means of investigating what 
does occur." (Bernstein, 1979)
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characterize Latin America as early as the Sixteenth Century 
conquest." (Frank 1969, P. xii)
2.1.1. C on trad ic tions of C apitalism  and  U nderdevelopm ent: 
One may then ask what it is in capitalism which has generated 
underdevelopment in these economies. To answer this question, 
Frank enumerates three contradictions of capitalism to which the 
causes of underdevelopment should be traced. These contradictions 
are "the expropriation of economic surplus from many and its 
appropriation by few, the polarization of capitalist system into 
metropolitan centers and peripheral satellites, and the continuity of 
the fundamental structure of capitalist system throughout its history 
of expansion." (Frank 1969, P. 3) To explain the first contradiction 
"the expropriation/appropriation of economic surplus" he employs 
the definition of economic surplus as has been used by Paul Baran.
(1975) Baran makes a distinction between "actual" and "potential" 
economic surplus. The "actual" is the part of current production 
which is invested, and "potential" is part of economic surplus which 
has not been made available to the society because the monopoly 
structure of the economy has either prevented its production or has 
wasted it in luxury consumption. "Therefore, the nonrealization and 
unavailability for investment of 'potential* economic surplus is due 
essentially to the monopoly structure of capitalism." (Baran 1975, P. 
7) He then goes on to argue that the external monopoly describes the 
manner in which Chile has been integrated into the world economy. 
And since then "the external monopoly has always resulted in the
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expropriation (and consequently unavailability to Chile) of a 
significant part of the economic surplus produced in Chile and its 
appropriation by another part of the world." (Baran 1975, P. 7) Such 
an "exploitative relation" in a chain-like manner spread the capitalist 
link from the capitalist world to the rem otest regions of the 
periphery. The extraction of surplus or this "exploitive relation" 
takes place not only between regions but also between individuals 
due to the exertion of the monopoly power by one region over 
another or by an individual over another individual. The implication 
is then that a merchant is a capitalist who due to his (her) monopoly 
power exploits a small peasant by expropriating his/her surplus. 
And at the same time the capitalists at various levels may be both 
exploiting and exploited. (Gulap, Haldun 1981, P. 172) The 
expropriation and appropriation of the periphery's surplus by the 
center is  one o f the m ajor causes if  not the cause of 
underdevelopm ent of the periphery. "The satellites remain 
underdeveloped for lack of access to their own surplus." (Frank 1969, 
P. 9)
The second contradiction of capitalism which Frank regards as 
a cause of underdevelopment is that "the capitalism takes the form 
of polarization10 into metropolitan centers and peripheral satellites." 
(Frank 1969, P. 8) The same historical process which has created 
d ev e lo p m e n t in  the  c e n te r  s im u lta n e o u s ly  g e n e ra ted
10 Why does such a polarization take place? Frank's answer is due to the 
"imminent centralization of capitalist system." (Frank 1969, P. 8)
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underdevelopment in the periphery. "The metropolis expropriates 
economic surplus from its satellite and appropriates it for its 
economic development." (Frank 1969, P. 9) It should be understood, 
therefore, that it is the inevitable consequence of the world capitalist 
system that the development of the center takes place at the expense 
of the periphery. Frank also argues this process of polarization 
extends to the internal structure of the underdeveloped country 
itself. "Once a country or a people is converted into the satellite of an 
external capitalist metropolis the contradictions of capitalism are
created on the domestic level and come to generate tendencies 
tow ard developm ent in the national m etropolis and toward 
underdevelopment in its domestic satellites..." (Frankl969, P. 10) 
From the above analysis Frank reaches one of his major conclusions 
or solutions for the ’problem' of underdevelopment. He presents a 
"subsidiary thesis" which is "If it is satellite status which generates 
underdevelopment, then a weaker or lesser degree of metropolis-
s a te ll i te  re la tio n s  m ay g en e ra te  le ss  deep s tru c tu ra l 
underdevelopm ent and/or allow  for more possibility  of local
development." (Frank 1969, P. 11) Then he goes on to argue that at
any period of capitalist development during which the link between 
center and periphery momentarily weakened, such as during periods 
of world wars and global depressions, there were temporary 
outbursts of development in the periphery. Frank's delinking thesis 
is both one of the weakest and at the same time the most important 
point of his argument. It is one of the weakest, since it is probably
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the most critized aspect of his argument. 11 It has been constantly 
attacked by the Marxist critics; and it is one of the most important 
points of his argument, because although Frank takes advantage of 
every opportunity to assert that the simple process of delinking from 
the world is not sufficient 12 for the development of the periphery 
and it has to be accompanied by the radical changes in both economic 
and political systems of these countries. Nevertheless the simple 
delinking process has haunted his work and, as it will be discussed 
later, its ghost has even appeared in his discussion of economic 
relations between socialist countries and the world market economy.
The final major contradiction of the capitalist system based on 
Frank is the "contradiction of continuity in change." By this he means 
"the continuity and ubiquity of the structural essentials of economic 
development and underdevelopment of the capitalist system at all 
times and places." (Frank 1969, P. 12) This is a rather simple thesis 
which states that, regardless of any transformation that capitalism 
has undergone, it has maintained its essential characteristics and 
generated the same fundam ental contradictions. Applying this 
feature to the periphery means "emphasis on the continuity of 
capitalist structure and its generation of underdevelopment..." (Frank 
1969, P. 13) This "continuity in change" clearly is not one of the 
contradictions of the capitalist system. It however allows Frank to 
concentrate his em phasis on the tw o previously m entioned 
contradictions.
I will discuss the points raised by Frank’s critics later in this chapter. 
However, I will argue later that Frank believes that such delinking is a
necessary condition for the development of periphery.
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Based on what has been mentioned so far it can be seen that 
Frank's theoretical scheme involves three major assertions. The first 
is that Latin America and other areas of periphery have been 
integrated into the capitalist world economy since the early period of 
colonial conquest. The second is that this incorporation has 
transformed these societies immediately into capitalist economies 
and finally the dependent nature of such insertion into the capitalist 
w orld m arket, which has been accom panied by an endless 
metropolis-satellite chain through which the surplus is successively 
drawn off toward the center, is the cause of underdevelopment of 
the periphery. (Palma (1978) & Laclau (1971))
If one agrees with Frank's theoretical assertions and then tries 
to expand them to the economic relations between socialist countries 
and the capitalist world economy, then the following conclusions 
should be expected. Since it is the integration in the capitalist world 
economy which is the determinant in defining a country's economics 
system, then those socialist countries which are incorporated into the 
capitalist world market are not socialist at all.
Frank, himself, does not deal extensively with the question of 
socialist countries until he starts to analyze the recent crisis of the 
capitalist world economy and emergence of a new international 
division of labor. To understand the connection one must first step 
back and delineate the theoretical content of his treatment of the 
international division of labor in general, and the new international 
division of labor in particular.
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2.1.2* S tages o f  C a p ita lis t  D ev e lo p m en t and th&_
International Division of Laborr
Frank distinguishes three main stages in the world embracing 
process of cap ita lis t developm ent: m ercan tilist (1500-1770),
industrial capitalist (1770-1870), and im perialist (1870-1930), with 
each stage dem onstrating a particular pattern of international 
division of labor. As will be discussed later, Frank in fact considers 
the period of 1930 up to the present time as the neoimperialist 
period. Whether he considers this period as a new stage in the 
process of world capitalist development is not clear in his writings. 
The first stage was dominated by the marked increase of European 
commercial activities and growth of colonial production for export. 
(Frank 1979, P. 13) In this period the world division of labor and 
the pattern of trade can be "divided into two major triangles, the
Asian or Oriental and the Atlantic." (Frank 1979, P. 13) The Oriental
triangle involved fundamentally the export of spices and textiles to 
Europe, and "their payment in bullion of European origin." In the 
Sixteenth Century with the incorporation of parts of Africa and the 
New World into the mercantile capitalist system, part of the exports 
from Asia were re-exported by Europe to America and Asia; "and an 
increasingly part of the Oriental goods was paid for by Europe with 
American slaves." (Frank 1979, P.13) In the Atlantic triangle the 
African slaves were purchased by British (and Asian) manufacturers; 
transported to the plantations, they produced sugar, cotton, and
other raw materials which were then shipped back to Europe. To this 
major triangle, Frank argues, others must be added such as the
Spanish American gold and silver trade, which fed the Asian trade.
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In short, the stage of mercantile capitalism  is marked by the 
European search for foreign products. (Frank 1979, PP. 14-16)
According to Frank, the second stage of the world capitalist 
development included a wide expansion of world trade as well as 
significant changes in the international division of labor. During this 
stage, which began with the Industrial Revolution in Europe, the 
search for foreign products was shifted to exploring for outlets for 
E uropean  m anufactu rers. E urope com m enced to export 
manufactured goods, in particular textiles, in exchange for raw 
m aterials from the colonies. This fundamental change in the 
international division of labor had far reaching effects on the 
economies of the colonial countries. Frank believes, however, that 
these changes did not take place simultaneously everywhere. For 
example, at the end of the Eighteenth Century, when in Latin
America the growth of raw materials export coupled with the
increase in imports of manufacturing goods led to the destruction of 
local manufacturing, India was still exporting large quantities of 
textiles to Europe. The process of deindustrialization of India did not 
happen until the first half of the Nineteenth Century when the 
country became an importer of manufactured goods and exporter of 
raw materials. (Frank 1979, PP. 76-78) 13
Frank concludes that in the second stage of world capitalist 
development the changes in the international division of labor were 
strongly to the detriment of the present underdeveloped countries.
During this period while Britain and later on the other European
For more information on deindustrialization o f India, see Amiya Bagcbi
(1976).
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countries and the United States were industrializing, the rest of the 
world became specialized in the production of food and raw 
materials to feed the workers and industry of these countries. (Frank 
1979, P. 131)
Frank's discussion of changes in the international division of 
labor in the third stage of world capitalist development seems closely 
linked with his analysis of such changes in the neoimperialist period, 
which according to him started in the 1930s and extended to the 
present time. (Frank 1972) In his discussion of these changes one 
can notice once more, the importance of the concept of "delinking” 
from the capitalist world market and the central role which the 
concept plays in his general argument. He continuously tries to show 
how such "delinking" brought about the developm ent o f the
productive forces of the underdeveloped countries and this, in turn,
helped them to gain a new and im proved position in the
international division of labor.
2,1.3, -The Imperialist Stage and the Semi-Peripherv:
The imperialist stage is characterized by the domination of monopoly 
capital in the metropole. During this period, Frank argues the high 
demand for raw materials and the lure of the protits in producing 
and exporting them encouraged investment in the infrastructure in 
the satellites. The metropolis invaded the agricultural sector of the 
underdeveloped countries and if they did not get the land they 
obtained its products, since they "monopolized the merchandising of 
agricultural -and most other- products." (Frank 1972, P. 69) To get
these products out of the periphery, the m etropolis stimulated
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construction of ports and railroads and public utilities to service all 
these activities. The conversion of most of the LDCs to a primary 
monoproduct export economy was implemented in the colonial epoch 
and consolidated by the imperialist policies.
The first World War caused a temporary cessation of foreign 
trade and investment penetration in the satellite which led to some 
industrial development there. Immediately after the War, however, 
the metropolis expanded its grip to include precisely those sectors of 
industry, i.e. consumer goods, which had been recently initiated by 
the local capital and turned out to be profitable. Frank then goes on 
to discuss another important period of isolation of the LDCs from the 
world market. The 1929 crash brought another respite from foreign 
trade and investment which was continued by World War II and 
lasted up to the early 1950s. Such weakening of the economic ties 
with the metropole created a condition for implementing the policy 
of import substitution in some of the satellite countries. These 
countries began to produce consum er goods which they had 
previously imported. To continue the process of import-substitution 
these countries were obliged to import industrial equipment from 
abroad. "That is, they simply substituted one type of import for 
another, which renewed their dependence on the metropolis and 
ultimately led to a renewal of foreign investments.” (Frank 1972, P. 
85)
As a result of the adoption of an import-substitution policy the 
nature of imports of some peripheral countries changed and led to a 
significant degree of substitution of nationally produced consumer 
goods for imports. The national industry, however, began to import a
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greater volume of raw materials and capital goods as inputs for the 
manufacturing sector. As a result of choosing the import substitution 
policy the external vulnerability of these countries did not diminish. 
Indeed, these countries becam e more vulnerable and more 
dependent, because of the strategic nature of their imports. (Frank 
1972, P. 86) Moreover, they had to pay for such capital goods 
imported through their exports. In order to pay for these imports 
they borrowed and eventually invited the multinational corporations 
to set up operations in their country in the hope that they would 
bring the capital and capital equipment into the country.
N evertheless, according to Frank some of these countries 
underwent a certain kind of industrial developm ent and have 
become to a certain extent, "economies that could be classified as 
intermediate, or semiperipheral." These countries participated in the 
international division of labor in a different way; they exported not 
so much raw materials and simple manufactured goods but industrial 
goods produced by the heavy industrial sector and especially the 
armaments industry. (Frank 1979, P. 55) Therefore, a process of 
differentiation has been happening among the countries of the 
periphery, a process which has intensified with the emergence of a 
new international division of labor.
2.1.4. The New International D ivision o f Labor and— Ul£
Scmi-P.eriph.fiQ.;
In Frank's account another "fundamental" development has been 
occurring in the international division of labor since the mid 1960s. 
And it is in his discussion of these "fundamental" changes that Frank
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links the process of world capitalist development to the socialist 
countries. Therefore, a more detailed analysis of his discussion of 
these recent developments is essential for continuing our discussion. 
Frank’s explanation of the recent changes in the international 
division of labor is rooted in his analysis of world economic crisis.14 
"The periods of crisis in the process of capital accumulation have in 
the past brought with them important qualitative changes in the 
international division of labor.” (Frank 1981, P. 25) And there is no 
exception in the present crisis which started in the mid-1960s. The 
crisis itself means that the process of capital accumulation, in other 
words growth, "no longer functions as it did in the past." (Frank 
1981, P. 25) Frank's explanation of the causes of the present crisis 
centers around the increase in capital-labor ratio, and the increase in 
the cost of production and in particular the wages. "Since the mid 
1960s in the industrial economies the increase in the capital-labor 
ratio, as well as the associated increase in workers bargaining power 
and militancy have led to a decline in the rate of profit" and 
consequently in the rate of growth. (Frank 1981, P. 114)
In order to repeat a long boom, such as that of the post war 
period, the rate of profit has to increase and new technology must be 
developed. For this to happen, Frank argues the old industries have 
to be replaced by new ones, "the capital needs to take investment
Frank's discussion at this point creates some confusion. It is not clear 
whether each stage of capitalist development brings a particular pattern 
of international division of labor, or whether the economic crises do so. It 
is also possible he means that it is in the third stage of capitalist 
development that with any economic crisis one can see a new international 
division of labor. For criticism of his theory of crisis see (Bernstein and 
Nicholas, 1983)
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out of textiles and automobile and put it into new technology.” (Frank 
1981, P. 51) Moreover, there has to be a significant modification in 
the international division of labor, a process which has already 
started.
Among the manifestations of this new transformation in the 
international division of labor is the role played by the intermediate 
or subimperialist economies. These countries are able to take 
advantage of the new situation and try to find a new place in the 
international division of labor. And they are becoming increasingly 
the producers and exporters of machinery and capital goods. (Frank 
1981, P. 21 & 47 )15 These changes imply further capitalist 
development for these countries. From the point of view of 
industrialized countries, moving labor intensive and some very 
capital intensive industries, such as steel, shipbuilding, and 
automobiles to the Third World is advantageous, since it releases 
capital from the industries which are deeply in trouble ^  and makes 
it available for investment in development of technology needed for 
creation and expansion of new leading sectors. (Frank 1981, P. 112 & 
129) The development of new sources of energy, exploitation of the 
oceans and ocean floors for minerals, and advances in the field of 
biochemistry and genetics are among the possible list of leading 
sectors. (Frank 1981, P. 18 & 19)
15 Mansred Bienfeld and Martin Godfray (1982) argue that the newly 
industrialized countris were able to take advantage o f very unique world 
conditions in the late 1960s.
16 Because o f problems in demand and high cost o f production. (Frank 1977, 
P. 112)
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Another major change in the international division of labor 
according to Frank is the resettlement of labor-intensive industries 
from developed countries to some of the underdeveloped economies. 
The transferred industries have included textiles, clothing, and 
footwear, as well as manufacturing processes such as the fabrication 
of electronic components. (Frank 1977, P. 112) These are industries 
which have become relatively labor intensive, labor intensive with 
high cost, and they are displaced to low-wage areas. From the point 
of view of the Third World, this move represents a policy of export 
promotion. In these countries, foreign capital has mainly set up 
manufacturing facilities to produce solely for export, rather than for 
domestic markets. South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore 
were among the first Third World countries to adopt the export 
promotion policy. These economies offer cheap labor and compete 
with each other in providing any forms of tax relief to attract foreign 
capital.
The export prom otion policy has led to some internal 
consequences which are significantly different from those of import 
substitution. In the period of import substitution, maintenance and 
expansion of the internal market for selling locally produced goods 
aimed at the local market were essential, and import substitution 
policy in turn required more or less an equal distribution of income. 
The new industrial production is now to a great extent geared to 
exports. The workers are not the consumers anymore, and as a 
result it is not in the interest of capital that the workers have an 
income sufficiently great to provide an effective demand. The natural 
consequences will be the intensification of misery and intolerable
35
living conditions for the majority of the population of these countries. 
(Frank 1981, P. 49)
It is important to notice that it seems for Frank the role of less 
developed countries in response to the crisis of capital accumulation 
in the center is primarily as suppliers 17 of cheap labor. This kind of 
argument does not distinguish between the role of less developed 
countries in the period of crisis and their role during the periods of 
boom in the world capitalist economy. What is demanded of them 
now is essentially the same as always. (Bernstein and Nicholas 1983, 
P. 11) Frank himself has expressed the same idea: "new dependent 
export-led growth of manufacturing and agribusiness production for 
the world market are in no way significantly different from the old 
raw materials export-led growth which underdeveloped the Third 
World in the first place." (cited in Bernstein and Nicholas 1983, PP. 
1 1 - 1 2 )
2.1.5. The New International Division of Labor and Socialist 
C ountries:
According to Frank, among the most important elements of the 
new international division of labor is the "reintegration of the 
socialist economies into the world market." He argues that the 
socialist countries were only temporarily relatively isolated" from 
the world market. This isolation was only partly due to their choice,
17 As was mentioned earlier, Frank believes that LDC's are also recipients of 
some capital-intensive industries, but their role is primarily the suppliers 
o f cheap labor.
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it was mainly forced upon them by the capitalist world in reaction to 
the socialist countries' internal policy of transformation of property 
rights. The adoption of isolation policy (delinking policy) is one of 
the major reasons that these countries now can participate in the 
world capitalist economy on a basis which is "remotely equal” to that 
of the industrialized capitalist countries.
Only some 'socialist' economies can now knock on the door 
o f or challenge the capitalist inner sanctum, because they 
were temporarily relatively isolated from the capitalist 
international division o f labor. (Frank 1981, P.138)
There were two reasons for the reintegration of the socialist 
countries into the world market. One is the pull of the West which is 
in crisis; the other is the push of economic and political crisis in the 
East. (Frank 1981, P. 113) As was mentioned earlier in Frank’s 
account, to restore the period of growth, the developed capitalist 
countries have to transfer some of the "sick" industries and some of 
the labor intensive ones to the other parts of the world. The other 
parts of the world include some of the Third World countries as well 
as socialist economies. In the socialist countries as well as these 
Third World countries the wages are lower and the labor discipline 
is higher than in the advanced capitalist economies.
The most politically sensitive mass-production are moved 
out and in this way capital can control labor in the 
imperialist countries, while it can produce in the Soviet 
Union not only at low wage but also with disciplined labor 
and no strike. (Frank 1981, P.37)
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For this reason the automobile and steel industries are moving their 
facilities to Brazil, South Korea, and the Soviet Union. Some internal 
reasons have also led to the reinsertion of the socialist economies 
into the capitalist international division o f labor. The most 
significant of these is the economic fluctuations in investment and 
income which seem to assume a pattern of cycles of about eight 
years' duration. Frank argues that an entirely satisfactory answer 
for the cause of these cycles is not available. There is some 
suggestion that ambitious plans lead to upswings in investment. 
These in turn cause supply bottlenecks, lags of wages behind 
productivity, shortage of consumer goods, which will all eventually 
lead to political pressure with the result of lowering the pace of 
investment. (Frank 1977, PP. 109-110)
In the down phase of their economic fluctuations the socialist 
countries are under great pressure to import from abroad. Such 
imports supplement the supply of goods, and in particular help to 
maintain investment in machinery and equipment. The contact with 
the capitalist world and the importation western technology are 
therefore partly due to the "inability of the socialist countries to 
continue satisfactory industrial development without becoming far 
more integrated into the imperialist economy." (Frank 1981, P. 34)
As a result of these reinforcing elements the socialist countries 
are reintegrating into the world capitalist economy. The manner in 
which socialist economies insert themselves into the international 
division of labor is sim ilar to tha t of the interm ediate or 
subimperialist countries. According to Frank, then, one witnesses
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the emergence of a kind of "social subimperialism of the Soviet Union 
and a subsocial imperialism of the East European countries." (Frank 
1981, P. 34)
In other words, the socialist countries occupy an intermediate 
position in the international division of labor which means these 
countries and in particular the Soviet Union im port the most 
advanced technology 18 possible from the center. They use this 
technology to develop their own industries and to produce goods for 
both the domestic market and for export particularly to the Third 
World. Despite the socialist countries' payment with raw materials 
and light manufacturing to the advanced capitalist economies, the 
socialist economies are increasingly showing unfavorable balances of 
payments with respect to the advanced capitalist countries. To 
overcome this problem they are expanding their exports to the 
poorer countries, whose production forces are not developed enough 
to participate at the same level in the international division of labor. 
Since the socialist countries are increasingly running a favorable 
balance of payments with the poor countries they can redress their 
deficit with the imperialist countries through the foreign exchange 
earned from LDCs. (Frank 1981, P. 35)
The socialist countries occupy an intermediate position in the 
international division of labor, in this regard not unlike the most 
developed 'sub-im perialist' underdeveloped countries like Brazil. 
"They im port advanced technology m anufactures from the
18 According to Frank these countries cannot get access to most advanced 
technology; "but they import what we might call second-level technology.” 
(Frank 1981)
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industrially developed capitalist, paying for them with raw materials 
and incurring growing trade deficit. And they export less 
sophisticated manufactures to the underdeveloped countries, with 
whom the socialist countries run up a trade surplus, part of which 
they use to reduce their trade deficit with the imperialist countries, 
also not unlike the sub-imperialist capitalist countries. (Frank 1977, 
P. 101)
2.1.6. Econom ic R elations Between Socialist C ountries and 
LDCs:
Frank presents in some detail the economic relations and in 
particular pattern of trade between the socialist economies and the 
less developed countries. 19 In doing so he tries to show how these 
relations have adversely affected the underdeveloped economies, 
and how similar are these relations to those of advanced capitalist 
economies and the less developed countries. Frank argues that 
socialist exports to the underdeveloped countries consist of industrial 
commodities, while their imports from the underdeveloped countries 
are raw materials. This pattern of trade is similar to the trade 
between the advanced capitalist countries and the underdeveloped 
ones. The socialist countries also have a "growing balance of 
payment surplus” with the underdeveloped countries. And since the 
less developed countries run a balance of payment deficit with both 
the im perialist countries and the socialist countries, the growing
19 Trade is the most important aspect o f economic relations between East-West 
and East-LDCs, I will come back to this point later in chapter four.
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trade relations with socialist countries only aggravate their balance 
of payment problem. (Frank 1981, P. 11)
The economic and political advantages that East-South 
economic relations confer on the underdeveloped countries 
are not significantly different from the 'advantages' o f  
imperialist and neo-colonialist economic relations between the 
capitalist underdeveloped and the capitalist developed  
countries. (Frank 1977, P. 118)
These relations tend to reinforce the existing  position of 
underdeveloped countries in the international division of labor, and 
may even propel them further toward the new direction which is 
required by the present process of world capitalist accumulation. 
The economic relations between the socialist economies and less 
developed ones therefore do not further the liberation of the latter 
from the grip of economic dependence. Indeed, in too many cases by 
lending support to  the most reactionary regimes, (for example, 
Bolivia after Banzer's military coup and Suharto regime in Indonesia) 
such relations even hinder the achievement of political and economic 
independence of these countries. And in as much as these relations 
strengthen the states which are at the sevice of the private capital, 
the socialist countries are "giving support and protection to capital 
and capitalism in the 'Third World' and in the world as a whole." 
(Frank 1977, P. 118)
In summary, Frank does not see any significant difference 
between the exploiting relationship which exists between advanced 
capitalist countries and the less developed ones, and the exploitive 
relations which exist between the socialist countries and the less 
developed ones. He in fact argues that the socialist countries extract
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surplus value from the Third World. For instance, in his discussion of 
"conversion deals” between the Soviet Union and India, Frank 
contends that, since in these deals the Soviet Union purchased cotton 
from Sudan and then shipped it to Indian textile mills in return for 
textiles the Soviet Union was extracting "the surplus value of Indian 
labor." (Frank 1977, P. 118)
In Frank’s account the countries in the international division of 
labor occupy different levels, but the intermediate countries are in a 
peculiar position. On the one hand they are exploiting the countries 
at the lower levels; on the other hand they are being exploited 
themselves by the advanced capitalist countries which hold the 
upper rungs. The pattern of trade of the intermediate countries is an 
indicator of such hierarchical exploitive relationships. While these 
countries export m anufacturing goods to the underdeveloped 
countries and import raw materials from them, the intermediate 
countries export raw materials, in particular fuel, to the imperialist 
countries and import industrial products from them. Frank, who 
considers socialist countries as intermediate countries, believes the 
above criteria are applicable to their case.
2.1*7. The Ul-Effects of Economic Relations with DCs:
Turning to the socialist countries' economic relations with the 
advanced capitalist countries. Frank argues that the western expons 
to the eastern countries in the recent decade have mainly included 
m achinery, equipm ent and whole plants em bodying advanced 
technology. The exports of East to West have been raw materials, 
fuels and food exports as well as manufacturers produced in part
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with the im ported equipment em ploying cheap labor through 
thousands of "bipartite and tripartite" production agreements with 
the western firms and the underdeveloped countries. (Frank 1981, 
PP. 136 & 20) As trading partners, therefore, "the socialist countries 
are to the developed capitalist ones as the capitalist underdeveloped 
ones are to them or vice versa!" (Frank 1977, P. 99)
In their trading relations with the West the socialist countries 
show growing balance of payment deficit which are covered by the 
official and supplier credits, by Soviet sales of gold and increasingly 
by borrowings from Euro-currency market. As was mentioned 
before, Frank argues that the socialist countries partially redress 
their deficit with the West through their trade surplus with the 
underdeveloped countries. (Frank 1977, P. 98) The mounting debt is 
not, according to Frank the only harmful effects of growing 
participation of the socialist countries in the international division of 
labor. Such participation has far reaching implications for the 
domestic policies of these countries and more importantly for the 
structure of socialist societies.
For instance, the socialist countries are more and more 
importing inflation from the West. Admitting that the state absorbs 
price increases through increasing subsidies on the consumer goods 
in order to keep their prices stable, Frank believes that continuation 
of this policy in the face of price hikes in the west has proven to be 
impossible and has led to increases in the consumer goods prices in 
some of the socialist countries. (Frank 1977, P. 122) Moreover, the 
socialist countries cannot escape the effects of the current economic
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crisis in the W est and its impact is being felt throughout these 
countries.
The increasing dependence of socialist countries on trade with 
the advanced capitalist countries has made them vulnerable to any 
recession in the West. This dependence can easily block the path of 
industrial development and increase in the living standards in the 
East. And, in as much as the domestic production has been more and 
more diverted into the production exports in order to pay for the 
imports and to repay the mounting debt and credits, the socialist 
countries are becoming more and more "dependent on the West and 
on the economic and political stability in the West." (Frank 1977, P. 
127)
The ill-effects of economic fluctuations and inflation of the 
West on the East and the dependence of the latter on the former 
seem to be minor, if one considers the major effects of socialist 
countries' reintegration into the world market, that is importing the 
capitalism itself. Frank believes "the countries of Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union will be importing not only western factories, 
technology, and products, but the capitalist relations embedded in 
them, including speed-up of production, capitalist organization and 
criteria of decision-making and capitalist wage structure and income 
differentials...and capitalist class structure. In short, the 'socialist* 
countries of Eastern Europe will be and are already importing 
capitalism.” (Frank 1977, P. 127)
Indeed, Frank argues that the economic integration of the 
socialist countries into the world international division of labor, and 
the related political compromises "call into question the extent to
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which the socialist world is any way separate or different from the 
capitalist world." (Frank 1977, P. 93) And the more the practices of 
these countries are examined "under the plain light of day, the more 
undistinguishable" their policies become from those of national- 
development" practiced by the capitalist countries. (Frank 1981, PP. 
137-138) 20
It seems to Frank, then, the practical difference between the 
socialist countries, and 'progressive' capitalist less developed 
countries is only matter of degree. "Attempts by the latter to de-link 
are nipped in the bud sooner, and re-integration with the world 
economy imposed on them more easily." (Bernstein and Nicholas 
1983, P. 18)
It is the peculiar definition of socialism used by Frank which 
enables him to arrive at such conclusions. For him socialism appears 
to involve two major steps: one is de-linking from the world 
economy, and the other is the redistribution of the political power 
coupled with popular participation. "A break with capitalism and the 
transition to socialism requires a revolutionary process, an internal 
transfer of power and popular participation, and the achievement of
2° It should be mentioned that here and there Frank tries to upgrade the 
importance of the internal factors in the socialist countries which have 
distracted these countries from the "true path" of socialism, as the 
following quotation indicates. However, he does not in any way 
demonstrate what these internal factors are and what is so peculiar about 
the socialism which generates these destructive factors. "Of course, the 
international relations between the socialist and capitalist worlds are by no 
means the only or even the most important factor in this question. On the 
contrary, the international relations, real and desired, are only the 
reflection of internal relations o f production and other factors in the 
socialist world, which themselves raise questions about.degree of shift 
over time toward or away from 'socialism' in that part of the world that goes 
by that name.” (Frank 1977, P. 93)
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a greater degree of external independence." (Frank 1983, P. 342) 
Without any of these socialism is not possible. These steps have 
been only taken for a short period of time in some of the countries 
which "we today call socialists." The recent process of rapid 
integration or "re-linking" by these countries into the capitalist 
international division of labor indicates that if  the capitalist relations 
have not yet dominated the entire structure of these economies, they 
are certainly important factors in leading them into the path of 
transition to capitalism. A process which according to Frank has 
already started in the Eastern European countries. Originally, 
socialism was understood to be a process of transition to communism. 
It seems extremely difficult if not impossible today to sustain the 
thesis that the ’really existing socialist societies' in Eastern Europe 
are in any transition to anything today; they are more likely to be in 
transition to capitalism. (Frank 1983a, P. 345)
2.1.8. F ra n k  and the C ritics:
Frank's model, his methodology, and his conclusions have been 
criticized by Marxists and non-Marxists alike. Here, I will only 
emphasize his Marxist critics; although I am well aware that Frank in 
fact emphatically claims that he is not a Marxist. I do believe,
however, that M arxists both have a valid point and have most
effectively criticized him. As Bernstein and Nicholas (Bernstein and 
Nicholas 1983) argue, Frank enters into the realm of Marxism by
proposing a theory of the history of capitalist development and
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m aintaining that socialism  is the only avenue open for the
development of less developed countries. Frank also uses Marxist 
terms in a completely different conceptual framework, which gives 
Marxists another legitimate right to try to clarify any confusion
which may arise from Frank's action. Since there is almost no single 
issue raised by Frank which has escaped Marxist criticism, I will 
have to confine my review to those issues which I consider to be 
essential and most relevant to the study on hand.21 Those issues, I 
believe, are Frank's definition of capitalism, socialism and his concept 
of new 'international' division of labor.
For Frank capitalism is synonymous with a system of exchange 
relations and in particular international exchange. It is a system of 
production for market, in which the motive of production is profit 
appropriated by non-producer agents. (Laclau 1971, P. 24)
Capitalism is therefore an exploitive system. However, Frank does 
not specify the exploitive relations peculiar to capitalism; rather he 
defines these relations as extraction of surplus. Such a broad
definition permits him to define the capitalist exploitive relationship 
as applicable to both the economic agents within a single nation and
21 Marxist critics of Frank are numerous; however, the most severe blow to 
Frank's model was struck first by Laclau (1971) who pointed out that the 
concept of capitalism used by Frank is erroneous from a Marxist point of 
view. Brenner (1977) also demonstrated that the Frankian model by 
concentrating on the market forces, sets aside the central role which class 
struggle plays in economic development and underdevelopment. Gulap 
(1981) has summarized some of the im- portant Marxist terms which are 
used by Frank in completely different conceptual frameworks. Bernstein 
and Nicholas (1983) have criticized Frank's concept of crisis as well as his 
definition o f socialism. My review in this part mainly relies on these 
important studies. There are other Marxist critics who do not primarily 
deal with Frank, but with the dependency school in general. The examples 
include Colin Leys (1970).
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to relations among countries on the international level. The lack of 
specificity is due to his disregarding capitalism as a mode of
production. By doing so he ignores the fundamental economic
relations peculiar to capitalism: the existence of free labor divorced 
from ownership of means of production, and forced to sell their labor 
power in the market. His neglect of capitalist particularities allows 
him to include different exploitive relations (such as slavery, and 
relations between peasants and merchants) in capitalism.
This loose definition of capitalism adopted by Frank permits 
him to conclude that the Latin American countries have been 
capitalist from their inception, since they were fully incorporated 
into the world market in the colonial period. His proof relies on the 
examples of participation of even the remotest region of Latin
America in the process of commodity exchange.
As Frank has chosen to replace the capitalist exploitation with 
the process of surplus expropriation, he can emerge with the
conclusion that at the international level the relation between 
countries are capitalist exploitation. It is the continuous drain of 
surplus from the bottom to the top of the hierarchy of the 
"metropolis-satellite" relationship which causes underdevelopment in 
the satellite and development of the metropolis. Therefore it is the 
capitalist exploitation of the periphery by the center which is the 
cause of underdevelopment.
Brenner (1977) argues that the origin of capitalism does not lie 
in the rise of trade, and market expansion, but in the class structure 
that resulted  from  class struggles which em erged from the 
contradiction in the pre-capitalist economic structure (mode of
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production). In some cases when these struggles weakened the pre­
capitalist class structure conditions became ripe for the rise of 
capitalism. In contrast, in instances, such as what we observed in 
some of the Third World countries, these contradictions and class 
struggles induce the heightening of the pre-capitalist exploitation, 
which prevents the extended reproduction of capital and retards the 
development of capitalism. Surplus drain could be a symptom, 
rather than a cause of underdevelopment. A useful model is the one 
which deals with the essence and not the phenomenon. Frank’s 
theory does not provide any means to study the essence, to 
investigate the specificity of class struggles in any given social 
formation. His model observes a particular phenomenon which 
appears at the level of social formation and then generalizes these 
particular events into the law of motion o f capitalism.
C o n c ep tu a l d u a lism  such as m e tro p o le /s a te l l i te ,  
cen ter/periphery  w ith the fundam ental continuity  over five 
centuries denies any specificity and predicts a condemned destiny 
for the less developed countries. A ll of these countries are 
ultim ately trapped in the blind alley of underdevelopment and 
dependency. (Herold, Burbak, Kozlov 1983) and (Berstein and 
Nicholas 1983)
The implications of his theory for the socialist countries are 
even more telling. If it is exchange relations which determine the 
nature of a country's economic system, the definition of socialism 
therefore becomes synonymous with autarky. And the socialist 
countries which have established economic relations w ith the 
capitalist countries became capitalist themselves. His assessment of
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socialism is limited by his inability to take into the account the 
importance of class struggle and contradictions. 22 Frank's obsession 
with the delinking from the world system has led him to ignore that 
socialism is a complex transitory process with specific "contradiction 
both 'external' and internal', antagonistic (class contradictions) and 
non-antagonistic (contradictions among the people)." (Bernstein and 
Nicholas 1983, P. 19)
With de-linking as the major test of socialism, Frank reaches a 
point where he rejects all socialist countries, and considers them as 
failu res either on the "voluntarist or determ inist grounds." 
Determinist grounds of failure are exemplified by cases of countries 
which have failed in the face of hopeless odds and the overwhelming 
power of imperialism; e.g., the case of Nicaragua. Voluntarist failure 
of socialism includes cases such as Angola, Mozambique and Guinea- 
Bissau which "have renounced any substantial delinking of their 
economies from the world capitalist system." (Frank 1983a, P. 341) 
The v o lu n ta ris tic  exam ples c ited  by F rank  suggest his 
disappointments with the leaders of these countries and his lack of 
awareness about the severe contradictions facing these countries in 
the process of construction of socialism. His concept of the 
deterministic version of failures also represents his inability to grasp
22 Frank's ignorance o f the importance of class struggle is not explicit, at least 
not in his recent works. (See for example (Frank 1979) & (Frank 1972)) Yet 
when he incorporates such analysis o f his study, he continues to treat 
classes as a phenomenon of market and profit maximization. "The relations 
of production and the class structure developed in response to the 
predatory needs o f the overseas and the Latin American metropolis."
(Frank 1972, P. 22 cited in Brenner 1977) For more detail discussion of this 
point see (Frank 1972).
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the importance of class struggle and contradictions in these countries. 
(Bernstein and Nicholas 1983, PP. 20-21)
Frank’s concept of a new international division of labor has also 
been criticized by his opponents. It is by the use of this concept that 
Frank is able to explain the economic integration of socialist 
countries, in particular the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, into 
world capitalism. Frank, who, like most Marxists, attributes the 
changes in the international division of labor to the qualitative 
changes in the capitalist development, is not able to show that the 
occurrence of such qualitative changes has led to the new 
international division of labor. Instead, he ascribes its rise to the 
economic crisis. Frank's critics believe that in fact such changes have 
occurred in capitalism in the recent years. And, ever since World 
War II, the expansion of capital beyond the national boundries on 
the global scale has been shaped by the internationalization of 
productive capital in the stage of state monopoly capitalism. "The 
runaway shops and the export industries that have sprung up must 
be viewed as an integral part of the process of capital accumulation 
on a world scale that emerged in the past war era. What is occuring 
is simply a deepening of the international division of labor that has 
existed since then." (Herold, Burbuck and Kozlov 1981, P. 9)
Frank 's categorization of countries as periphery, sem i­
periphery and center based on the composition of their trade is 
another symptom of his lack of emphasis on the social relations of 
production . He lum ps a ll countries together, makes an 
undistinguishable pile out of them, with only the composition of 
exports and imports as the major device for distinguishing one
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country from another. He regards the composition of a country's 
exports as the factor determining the position that country obtains in 
the hierarchy of centers-periphery. The larger the amount of raw 
materials the more indication that the country is dependent or has a 
peripheral situation. And according to him the arrangement of 
socialist countries' exports causes them to occupy an intermediate 
position in the international division of labor. Clearly, here as in 
other major points of his discussion, Frank dismisses the analysis of 
social relations as determining factors in the distinction of different 
economic systems. His argument hence is a 'naturalistic' one: he 
emphasizes the use value not the exchange value or the social 
relations of production.
Frank's utopian concept of socialism, everything or nothing at 
all, is rooted in his search for an ideal state of affairs. Such a utopian 
conception contains the seeds of its own disappointment, to a point 
where he sees no alternative in abolishing the dependent conditions 
of the less developed countries.
The Achilles' heel of these conceptions of dependence has 
always been the implicit, and sometimes explicit, notion of 
some sort of independent alternative for the Third World.
This theoretical alternative never existed, in fact, certainly 
not on the noncapitalist path and now apparently not even 
through so-called socialist revolution. (Frank 1981, P. 127)
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2.2. -WallferstfiiiL-.
W allerstein, in contrast to Frank, has extensively dealt with the 
questions of the economic relations between socialist countries and 
the capitalist nations. Yet, in order to have a comprehensive grasp of 
his analysis, one must start with the discussion o f his general 
framework of study, since his propositions about the economic
relations of East and West are closely linked to and are part and 
parcel of his premises of "the world system" approach.
W allerstein's aims are to establish the origins of capitalist
development and underdevelopment and locate the genesis of their 
subsequent evolution. Just as Frank has sought to discover the
sources of underdevelopment of the satellite and the role which the
center has played in creation of such underdevelopment, Wallerstein 
has endeavored to find out the roots of development of the center 
and its relationship to the periphery. (Brenner 1977, P. 31)
2.2.1. Social Systems;
Wallerstein's focus is the concept of "social system." A societal 
unit qualifies as a social system if it contains within itself a "single 
division of labor" in that the essential needs of the economic actors 
within the social system are fulfilled by production within the 
boundaries of this social system. We take the defining characteristic 
of a social system to be the existence within it of a division of labor,
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such that various sectors or areas within are dependent upon 
economic exchange with others for the smooth and continuous 
provisioning of the needs of the area. The regions outside of such a 
system exchange only goods which are considered luxuries with it. 
(Wallerstein 1974, P. 390) In Wallerstein’s scheme there are three 
types of such systems: one "mini system" and two types of "world 
systems."
A "mini system” is an entity that has within it a complete 
division of labor, and a single cultural framework. Such systems are 
found only in very simple agricultural or hunting and gathering 
societies. (Wallerstein 1974, P. 390) A "world system" is a unit with 
a single division of labor and with multiple cultural units. Of the two 
varieties of the world system one is characterized by a single 
political system. W allerstein calls it world empire and it is 
exemplified by the Persian empires, Chinese empires, etc. The 
second type of world system designated by him as the world 
economy contains several political units which may be city states, 
nation states, areas, etc. The capitalist world economy which began 
in Western Europe in the Sixteenth Century is one example of this 
type of social system.
What is common to all the social systems is that each contains 
only one kind of 'mode of production' and not a combination of 
different modes of production. A mode of production is defined by 
Wallerstein as "the way in which decisions are made about dividing 
up productive tasks, about the quantities of goods to be produced 
and labor time to be invested, about quantities of goods to be 
consumed or accumulated, about the distribution of the goods
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produced." (Wallerstein 1979d, P. 155) The mini-systems embody a 
mode of production which was based on limited and elementary 
specialization of tasks called the reciprocal lineage mode.
Although world empires had many variations in regards to 
their political superstructure, (i.e. Persian em pire's and Chinese 
em pire's political adm inistrations w ere different) the mode of 
production was universal among them. It was a mode of production 
which produced enough agricultural surplus to not only support the 
artisans who produced non-agricu ltural goods, but also an 
overarching bureaucracy. The major difference between this mode 
and the reciprocal lineage mode was that in the former a class which 
did not produce any goods was supported. In this mode, while the 
producers of artisanal and agricultural goods "in some sense 
exchanged goods, either reciprocally or in local markets” goods 
transferred from the direct producers to the "administrators" were 
appropriated forcefully. (Wallerstein 1979d, P. 156) Despite these 
differences between the "pre-modern" modes of production, there 
was a principal similarity between them: neither of them made 
possible maximum production.
W allerstein indeed argues that the world empires prevented 
economic development. The prevention occured mainly through the 
effects of the encompassing bureaucracies of world empires which 
appropriated the economic surplus and hindered its accumulation in 
the form of productive investments. W allerstein claims that the 
essential condition for economic development was the collapse of the 
world empires. (Brenner 1977, P. 29) This had happened by the 
Sixteenth Century and the onset of the world economy. Wallerstein
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attributes the collapse of the world empires to the "conjunctural 
crisis" of cyclical, secular and climatological factors. The cyclical 
crisis was grounded in the fact that when expansion reaches its 
optimal point within a given technology, stagnation is bound to 
happen. The secular crisis was produced by the "diminishing return 
on the land,” and this factor limited the capacity of the system to 
"achieve the requisite level of surplus appropriation required by its 
population.” The third element according to W allerstein was the 
changes in climate which took place during the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Centuries in Europe. In his view this "conjunctural crisis” 
therefore created  a condition  w hich necessita ted  European 
expansions. (Amowitz 1981) It was the expansion of trade in the 
Sixteenth Century which led to the establishment of world economy 
with capitalism as the only mode of production. Wallerstein argues 
that the world empires "bred clusters of merchants who engaged in 
economic exchange, but such clusters were a minor part of total 
economy and not fundam entally determ inative of its  fate." 
(Wallerstein 1974, P. 391)
2.2*2.World Economy:
It was only with the emergence of the world economy in the 
Sixteenth Century that full development and the predominance of 
market trade could be observed. The development of trade induced 
international division of labor through the establishment of a world 
"structure of unequally powerful nation states" led to development in 
certain regions and backwardness in others. (Brenner 1977, P. 30)
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W allerstein, by pointing to the rise of trade as the major 
stimulus in the creation of capitalism, enters into an ongoing debate 
concerning the transition from feudalism. The debate centers around 
the question of whether the rise of capitalism can be attributed to 
causes external to the feudalist economic system, such as expansion 
of world trade, or whether the emergence of capitalism primarily 
depended on the internal contradictions of the feudalist economic 
system, in particular the struggle over appropriation of social surplus 
between lords and serfs. Wallerstein follows the former argument, 
in which the capitalist system embarked out of a series of 
autonomous factors which were purely extrinsic to the feudal social 
relations. For him, therefore, the emergence of capitalist economics 
in Western Europe on the center of world capitalism was due to 
technical and natural factors exterior and mainly not peculiar to 
feudalism. As we shall see later, he follows the same line of 
argument and takes it a step further by maintaining that whatever 
happens in a country is explained by the contradictions that appear 
in the system as a whole; in other words it is forces external to a 
country which determine what takes place within that country.
The new world system is a "world economy" since the basic 
linkage between different parts of the system are economies, 
meaning exchange and trade. This is in contrast to the world empire 
where the basic linkage between different parts of system was 
political, that is over-arching tax-collecting bureaucracy. (Arnowitz 
1981, P. 53) The mode of production which is dominant in the world 
economy today is capitalist. This mode "took definitive shape as 
European world economy in the Sixteenth Century and came to
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include the world geographically in the N ineteenth Century." 
(Wallerstein 1979b, P. 66) 3
Wallerstein’s conviction about the worldwide ascendancy of the 
capitalist mode of production is one of the major analytical tools he 
uses in investigating the position of the socialist countries in the 
world economy, as well as in their relations with the capitalist 
countries. 23 He is indeed emphatic in his claim regarding the 
existence of only one encompassing worldwide mode of production, 
that is the capitalist mode of production in the modern time: "the 
only system in the modem world that can be said to have a mode of 
production is the world-system , and tha t...is  capitalist mode" 
(W allerstein 1979b, P. 74); the "so-called reciprocal nexus we 
identify with feudalism , the exchange of protection for labor 
sevices...is contained w ithin a capitalist world economy, its 
autonomous reality disappears. It becomes rather one of the many 
forms of bourgeois employment of proletarian labor to be founded in 
a capitalist mode of production." (Wallerstein 1976, P. 278)
W allerstein believes that expansion of trade brought in chain 
like linear fashion accumulation and econom ic growth. The 
expansion o f trade introduced the profit m otive and the profit 
motive led to the development of the division of labor which through 
increasing productiv ity  induced innovation, accum ulation and 
economic growth. And this is capitalism. Capitalism is a mode of 
production in "which production is for exchange, that is, it is
23 Because most of Wallerstein's conclusion about socialist countries are
derived from his conviction about existence of only one mode of production 
throughout the world, I will repeatedly refer to this point.
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determined by its profitability on a market, a  market in which each
buyer wishes to buy cheap...but each seller wishes to sell dear."
(Wallerstein 1979d, P. 15a) 2A>
W allerstein 's concept of capitalism  relies heavily on the 
proposition that self-interested individuals motivated by profits are 
connected and interdependent through the exchange relations, or the 
existence of a single division of labor. He defines what exactly he 
means by a single division of labor: "We can regard a division of
labor as a grid which is substantially interdependent. Economic 
actors operate on some assumption that totality of their essential 
needs-of sustenance, protection, and pleasure-will be met over a 
reasonable time-span by a combination of their own productive
activities and exchange in some form.” 25
It is therefore logical for W allerstein to conclude that any
regions which are part of this interdependent system of division of 
labor, regardless of its form of 'labor control' is capitalist. "(...I)n the 
era of agricultural capitalism, wage labor is only one of the forms of
24 "if capitalism is a mode o f production, production for profit in a market, 
then we ought, I should have thought, to look to whether or not such 
production was or was not occurring. (In sixteenth century Europe) It 
turns out in fact that it was, and in very substantial form. Most of this 
production, however, was not industrial production.through Europe.there 
grew up a world-economy with a single divi-sion o f labor within which 
there was a world market, for which men produced largely agricultural 
products for sales and profit.to call this agricultural capitalism."
(Wallerstein 1974, P. 399)
25 Wallerstein's concept of grid of exchange assumes a distinction between 
essential exchanges and luxury exchanges. "This distinction is crucial if  
we are not to fall into the trap of identifying every exchange activity as 
evidence o f a system. Members of a system.can be linked in limited 
exchanges with elements located outside the system.that is, each can export 
to the other what is in its system socially defined as worth little in return 
for import o f what in its system is defined as worth much." (Wallerstein 
1974, P. 398)
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organizing production or the modes in which labor is recruited, 
slavery, coerced cash-crop production...share cropping, and tenancy 
are all alternative modes.” (Wallerstein 1974, P. 401)
Once embedded within the world economy, all areas of the 
world are conceived of as a single ongoing division of labor in which 
fundamental commodities, not luxury goods, are exchanged. Each 
area of the world becomes part of a world economy when its 
material livelihood is affected by interaction with the larger network. 
This world economy has no overarching political system. The surplus 
product can only be redistributed through the markets; hence the 
mode o f production according to W allerstein  is capitalism , 
"Capitalism  as a system of production for sale in m arket for 
profit...has only existed in, and can be said to require, a world system 
in which the political units are not coextensive with the boundaries 
of market economy." (Wallerstein 1979b, P. 66 )
2.2.3. The Capitalist System's Basic Dichotomies:
According to Wallerstein the operation of the capitalist system 
revolves around two basic dichotomies. One is the dichotomy of 
bourgeois versus proletarian; the second is the dichotomy between 
core and periphery. (Wallerstein 1979d, P. 162)
The first basic dichotomy is a division between classes in which 
the ruling groups operate 'primarily through lineage rights...not 
through weapons of force...through access to decisions about the 
nature and quantity of the production o f goods (via property rights, 
accumulated capital, control over technology, etc.)." (Wallersteon 
1979d, P. 162) This control is not necessarily exerted only on the
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free laborers who have lost the ownership of the means of 
production, and have no choice except to sell their labor power; 
rather it may take different forms. W allerstein conceptualizes 
classes as existing within the world system as a whole, so there exists 
a world proletariat which includes wage laborers as well as other 
categories such as sm all commodity producers. The world 
bourgeoisie, the controllers of the major means of production, is a 
class rife with interclass conflicts. In the conflict, the power of the 
state, militarily or politically is used to modify and further the 
economic position of various fractions of the bourgeoisie. (Chase Dunn 
1982)
The other basic dichotomy is the "spatial hierarchy of economic 
specialization" between different regions of the world, in particular 
differences between the core and the periphery. The core of the 
world economy is composed of societies in which are concentrated 
high-profit, high technology and high wage diversified production. 
The periphery is characterized by low-profit, low-technology, low 
wage, and less diversified production. (Wallerstein 1979c, P. 97) The 
levels of productivity and wages are therefore, the two important 
factors in analyzing the core and the periphery.
According to Wallerstein in both the Sixteenth Century and the 
present time "the core and periphery of the world economy were not 
two separate 'economies' with two separate 'laws' but one capitalist 
econom ic system  with d ifferent sectors perform ing different 
functions." (Wallerstein 1979b, P. 68) However, the performance of 
different functions has led the core and periphery each to exhibit 
"different internal socio-economic profiles and hence distinctive
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politics." But to understand these differences one must first start by 
situating them in the world economy. This conclusion is reached 
based on W allerstein's premises that the national states are not 
societies that have "separate and parallel histories, but they are parts 
of a whole reflecting that whole." (Wallerstein 1979a, P. 53) The 
similarities of W allerstein's argument with Frank's on this point is 
obvious; the only difference is that the former has replaced the 
terms metropolis and satellite by the terms core and periphery. 26
According to Wallerstein, regardless of differences in the mode 
of labor control in the core and periphery, both are part of the 
world-economy and thus are capitalist economies. "Free labor is the 
form of labor control used for skilled work in the core countries, 
whereas coerced labor is used for less skilled work in the peripheral
26 According to Wallerstein the international division of labor was due to 
different responses o f each country to the European commercial expansion 
of the sixteenth century. Some countries like England responded by 
creating an industrial base, while some others like Eastern Europe 
responded by developing "coerced cash-cropping.” These responses were 
not arbitrary ones, and were determined by profit maximization 
considerations as well as the existing technical conditions o f each country. 
These technical conditions include: "land/labour ratio, the extent of
internal market, the geographical location o f the country, etc.” in each 
area. (Gulap 1981, P. 176) Given their objective conditions, Western 
European landowners chose to turn their land to pasture or lease it and 
invest the money in trade and industry; landlords in the Eastern European 
countries on the other hand given their conditions responded in a way 
which maximized their profit and that was by intensifying the production 
o f staples and increasing the investment in trade. Given objective 
conditions of each country the choice of product which maximized the 
profit of the ruling elite determined the pattern of the labor control in 
these countries: "Northwest Europe was better suited in the sixteenth
century to diversify to agricultural specialization and add to it certain 
industries.Northwest Europe emerged as the core area o f this world 
economy, specializing in agricultural production of higher skill levels, 
which favored tenancy and wage-labor as the modes o f  labor control. 
Eastern Europe.become peripheral areas specializing in export of 
grains..which favored the use of slavery and coerced cash-crop labor as 
the mode of labor control." (Wallerstein 1974, P. 401)
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areas." (Wallerstein 1974, P. 127) "Western Europe, at least England 
from the late Seventeenth Century on had primarily landless wage- 
earning laborers. In Latin America, then and to some extent still 
now, laborers were not proletarians, but slaves or 'serfs'...but is 
England, or Mexico, or the West Indies a unit of analysis? Does each 
have a separate 'mode of production'?" And his answer is no, since 
England, Mexico and the West Indies are all part of the world 
economy and, therefore, their mode of production is the capitalist 
mode of production. (Wallerstein 1974, P. 394)
In Wallerstein's accounts, it is the position of countries in the 
international division of labor which determines the class structure 
of each country. "In the Sixteenth Century, some monarchs achieved 
great strength, others failed. This is closely related...to the role of the 
area in the division of labor within the world economy. The different 
roles led to different class structures which led to different politics." 
(Wallerstein 1974, P. 157) Therefore, in Western Europe we witness 
the rise of the bourgeoisie, since that region was specialized in the 
production of industrial goods. In the case of Eastern Europe the 
expansion of the wheat-exporting economy "meant also the rise of 
the political strength of the nobility." (Wallerstein 1974, P. 304) 
W hatever happens in a country thus essentially depends on the 
contradictions that appear in the system as a whole. Consequently, 
the forces external to a country determine what happens within that 
country. W allerstein grants some autonomy to the internal forces, 
but in the "exterior-interior relationship, the former are determinant 
over the latter." In other words, the articulation of the countries
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within the world system is the "primary determinant" of what 
happens within a given country. (Navarro 1982)
The development of core and periphery has occurred in the
contex t of unequally pow erful nation-states. A ccording to
Wallerstein, in the core areas the interest of various local groups
converged and led to the creation of strong states, while in the
periphery the interest of the local groups diverged and caused the
development of very weak states. (Wallerstein 1974, P. 401) In the
core countries the bourgeoisie got stronger and the landlords became 
weaker and the former dominated the state; in the periphery the
opposite happened. (Wallerstein 1974, P. 302) "While the Sixteenth
Century was a period of rise of state power in Western Europe, it was 
an era of decline for state power in Eastern Europe...As the landed 
aristocracy of Poland grew stronger...and the indigenous bourgeoisie 
grew weak, the tax base of the state frittered away which meant that 
the king could not afford to m aintain an adequate army." 
(Wallerstein 1974, P. 309) Thus, in the West a strong state arose 
which was capable of pursuing an aggressive expansionary policy. 27
27 As Amowitz (1981) argues: "At times, Wallerstein seems to argue for a
position that ascribes these differences to the existence of a strong 
bureaucracy (especially in China) whose tenure of power depended on its 
ability to retard development, and was content to keep the state weak and 
unresponsive to economic expansion; at other times he tries to show that 
shortage of hard currency in the West spurred the drive for exploration of 
precious metal beyond national border. A third factor was the inflation of 
the Sixteenth Century that, in several centuries, amounted to a 
redistribution o f income and a source o f primitive capital accumulation, 
while in other trading centers, strong workers' organizations managed to 
prevent accumulation by keeping wages abreast of prices...His model relies 
heavily on factors determining the configuration o f trade relation for 
explaining both the transition from feudalism to capitalism and the 
configuration of the world system."
Once the system of unequally powerful states is established, 
"we get the operation of 'unequal exchange' which is enforced by 
strong states on weak ones." (W allerstein 1974, P. 401) The 
mechanism of 'unequal exchange' implies the transfer of "surplus 
from the producers of low-wage (but high supervision), low profit, 
low capital intensive goods" to the "producers of high wage (but low 
supervision), high profit, high capital intensive goods." (Wallerstein 
1979d, P. 162) In other words, the workers in the periphery must 
work many hours, at a given level of productivity, to purchase a good 
produced by a worker in the core in one hour. (Wallerstein 1979b, P.
71) Capitalism then not only involves "appropriation of surplus 
value by an owner from a laborer, but an appropriation of surplus of 
whole world economy by core areas." (Wallerstein 1974, P. 401) 
This is the final step in Wallerstein's gradual conceptualization of 
development of capitalism. Capitalism, as Wallerstein sees it, is a 
system o f production for market in order to make profit; it is an 
economic system which embraces various forms of production. It 
includes commodity producers employing wage labor in the core 
areas and coerced labor in the periphery. The periphery is not 
viewed as pre-capitalist, rather as "integrated, exploited, and 
essential parts of" the world economy. It is precisely the articulation 
of these different forms of production which constitutes capitalism. 
W ithout them W allerstein 's capitalism  is non-existent. This 
articulation is accomplished not only by the world market exchange 
of commodities, but also by the political coercion exercised by the 
states in the core countries. This political coercion can take such 
forms as colonialism, neo-colonialism, etc. The system of competing
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unequally powerful states is therefore essential for the operation of 
relations of production. (Chase Dunn 1982)
The above exposition makes clear that for Wallerstein, just as 
for Frank, capitalism is the "hierarchical structure of monopolistic 
powers to extract surplus." (Gulap 1981, P. 180) It is hierarchical 
since the exchange which occurs within the division of labor is based 
on "differential appropriation of surplus produced." (Evans 1979) 
The only difference is that while for W allerstein only countries
compose the "layers” of this hierarchical structure, for Frank the 
individual economic actors also fit into this hierarchical structure. 
Similarly both authors view capitalism as a universal system that is 
responsible for both development and underdevelopment; and since 
the possibilities open to a given country for capital accumulation and 
as a result development are constrained by its structural position 
within the division of labor, the peripheral countries which occupy 
the low er ranks in the hierarchy are deprived o f capital
accum ulation and consequently developm ent. (Evans 1979) and 
(Bernstein 1979)
Yet, according to Wallerstein the position of no country in the 
in ternational division of labor is perm anent, and capitalist 
competition creates the rise and fall of different areas within the 
system. Hegemonic core powers, such as Britian, have lost their
relative domination to more efficient producers. As the core
countries exhibit a form of "circulation of elites" in which hegemonic 
powers rise and fall so do the peripherial countries; these countries 
especially during the periods of economic stagnation and conflict
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within the core find the possibility of moving up in the hierarchical 
division of labor.
2 .2 .4 . Sem i-Periphery:
W allerstein recognizes as does Frank, a third category of
countries that occupy the m iddle layers in the hierarchy of
international division of labor. It is indeed part of the normal 
operation of the world-systems to have a "three-layered structure." 
(Wallerstein 1974, P. 404) The semi-peripheral countries are this
third category in the modem world-system. If the core production is
predom inantly capital intensive and utilizes high wage skilled 
workers and the peripheral production is labor intensive relying on 
low wage unskilled workers, in the semiperipheral areas there is a 
balance of both core and peripheral types of production. Although 
the products which are produced and exchanged at each zone 
maintain the above criteria, they do not remain the same, and are a 
function of world technology. "If in the Sixteenth Century, peripheral 
Poland traded its wheat, in the mid Twentieth Century, peripheral 
countries are often textile producers whereas core countries export 
wheat as well as electronic equipment. The point is that we should 
not identify any particular product with a structural sector of the 
world economy but rather observe the wage patterns and margins of 
p rofit of particular products at particlar moments of time to 
understand who does what in the system." (Wallerstein 1979b, P. 71)
In a system of unequal exchange, the semiperipheral countries 
stand in between in regard to the kinds of product they export and
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in terms of wage levels and profit margins. (Wallerstein 1979b, P.
72) 28 They also act as a peripheral zone for the core countries and 
"in part they act as a core country for some peripheral areas." 
(Wallerstein 1979c, P. 97) The semi-periphery thus exploits and 
appropriates part of the surplus of the periphery, and in turn is 
exploited and its surplus is transferred to the core countries. Again, 
at this point W allerstein resembles Frank by asserting the surplus 
transfer as a main element in conceptualization of the notion of 
capitalism. To view capitalism as a hierarchical division of labor 
between core, peripheral and semi-peripheral zones led them to 
understand imperialism "as a basic dimension of capitalism rather 
than as a stage or force that merely transforms precapitalist areas 
into capitalist ones." (Chase Dunn 1982)
The semi-peripheral countries are essential for the operation of 
the world-economy both economically and politically. Their role is 
economically essential since:
"For individual capitalists the ability to shift capital, from a 
declining leading sector to a rising sector is the only way to survive 
the effects of cyclical shifts in the loci o f the leading sectors. For 
this there must be sectors able to profit from the wage-productivity 
squeeze o f the leading sector. Such areas are what we are calling 
semi-peripheral areas." (cited in Evans, Wallerstein, 1973, P. 3)
28 Wallerstein is vague in defining precisely what he means by semi­
periphery, and as Peter Evans (1979) argues this lack o f preciseness is part 
of his general framework of study: "Indeed, the possibility of using the 
world systems approach to provide an interpretative frame for almost any 
conceivable historical sequence might be considered one of its weaknesses. 
Even the concepts most central to the approach are hard to pin down with 
precision. The idea o f the 'semi-periphery' provides a good example of both 
suggestiveness and the frustrating lack of definition that characterize 
Wallerstein's key concepts." (Ibid.)
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More importantly is, however, the political role played by these 
countries; by performing this role they help the system to run more 
smoothly. Because of the unequal distribution of surplus, in the 
world economy the majority o f those who are exploited may 
overthrow the minority who "draw disproportionate benefits.” The 
use of three mechanisms enables the world system "to retain relative 
political stability." "One obviously is the concentration of military 
strength in the hands of the dominant forces. (The) second is the 
degree to which the staff or cadres of the system feel that their own 
well-being is wrapped up in the survival of the system." The third 
mechanism is the existence of the semi-periphery.
"One might make a good case that the world-economy would 
function every bit as well without a semi-periphery. But it would be 
far less politically stable, for it would mean a polarized world 
system. The existence o f the third category means that the upper 
stratum is not faced with the unified opposition o f  all others" 
because the middle sector is both exploiter and exploited. However, 
it primarily views itself as better off than the lower sectors rather 
than as worse off than the upper sectors. (Wallerstein 1974, PP. 404- 
405)
2.2.5. Socialist Countries;
Semi-peripheral countries in W allerstein's account comprise 
such countries as the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe; therefore, the 
semi-periphery includes two "very different varieties of states," the 
capitalist states and the 'socialist states,' that is "those with 
governments ruled by Marxist-Leninist party, which has nationalized 
the basic means of production." (Wallerstein 1979c, P. 100) In his
scheme, however, there is no need to differentiate between these 
two varieties of countries, and to analyze their economic relations 
sep ara te ly .29 In his world-system perspective, there is only a single 
universal mode of production, that is the capitalist mode of
production.. Under this mode different juridicial forms of ownership 
and kinds of class relations and forms of production (labor control) 
are articulated by the system  of exchange and unequal and 
competing states. In the different zones of this world-wide system, 
the relations between the immediate producers and their direct 
controller differs, but this is not important in the sense that the 
internal relations and in particular the class relations in any part of
the world "can only be understood by taking into account the
relations that exist at the level of the world _system." So, in the same 
manner that slavery and serfdom, as forms of labor control, were 
integral parts of the earlier period of the capitalist world economy, so 
are the Soviet Union's "juridically collective forms of property and 
centrally determined investment decisions and income distribution" 
integral parts of the capitalist system at the present epoch of the
capitalist world economy. (Chase Dunn 1982, P. 34-35) "There are 
today no socialist systems in the world-economy any more than 
there are feudal systems because there is only one world-system and 
it is by definition capitalist...” (Wallerstein 1974, P. 415)
29 One o f the major factors which distinguishes capitalism from feudalism in 
Wallerstein's scheme is capitalism's ability to integrate the disparate levels 
or elements that constitute it but may be antagonistic to it. This is in 
contrast to feudalism which generally was unable to integrate the systems 
potentially antagonistic to it. (Amowitz 1981)
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Once the world-system is accepted to be capitalism  what 
appears as different forms of production are in fact capitalist in 
essence. As long as the market exchange between the production 
units in the system continues, the relations of production and 
distribution as well as the division of labor and rewards to labor will 
be influenced and determined by the larger market. (Chase Dunn 
1982, P. 27)
(T)o emphasize that the nationalization or socialization of all 
productive enterprises within the bounds o f  a nation-state is not 
and theoretically cannot be a sufficient defining condition of a 
socialist system,..as long as these nations remain part o f a 
capitalist world-economy, they continue to produce for this world 
market on the basis o f the same principles as any other producer. 
(Wallerstein 1979, P. 73)
Such nationalization or socialization "does not make the participation 
of these enterprises in the world-economy one that does not conform 
to the m ode of operation o f a cap ita list m arket system ."30 
W allerstein uses a hypothetical example of U.S. Steel suddenly 
becoming "a worker’s collective in which all employees without 
exception received an identical share of the profits and all stock 
holders were expropriated without compensation." This action would 
not stop U.S. Steel from acting as a capitalist enterprise operating in 
a capitalist world-economy. (Wallerstein 1974, P. 413) The internal 
egalitarian distribution of the firm 's profit, wages and salaries 
eventually would cause managers and skilled workers who could
30 The conformity to the operation o f the capitalist market system implies: 
"seeking increased efficiency of production in order to realize a maximum 
price on sales, thus achieving a more favorable allocation o f surplus o f the 
world economy." (Wallerstein 1974, P. 413)
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obtain higher income in other firms to leave U.S. Steel. Productivity 
which at first due to workers' enthusiasm would go up in the long 
run would decline, due to both the loss of skilled workers and the 
dampening of the early enthusiasm. The decline in productivity 
coupled with the higher wages at U.S. Steel would give competing 
firms a cost advantage. The cost of production and thus the price of 
U.S. S teel's products would go up relative to the other firm's 
products. U.S. Steel would then either go bankrupt or return to the 
current standard of capitalist strictness with respect to its internal 
division of rewards. (Chase Dunn 1982, P. 29)
The position of a socialist country in the world system is more 
or less similar to this hypothetical example.31 A revolutionary 
society sooner or later will face a situation which forces it to 
recognize the distribution of rewards along lines more compatible 
with the capitalist labor market, since in these countries the 
attem pted equalization of income distribution creates a wage 
structure which does not correspond to the large labor market of the 
capitalist world-economy. And eventually the possessors of valuable 
skills seek employment in the parts of the world where they can 
receive the greatest reward. Such techniques as moral incentives and 
legal restrictions are only partially effective in preventing the labor
31 Chase Dunn (1982) uses C liffs (1974) discussion that, during the stalinist 
period, production in the Soviet Union is best understood as centralized 
administrative production on a national scale equivalent in its main 
features to that which is organized within a single capitalist firm, except 
that most products were produced for allocation and consumption within 
the 'firm.' The production was for 'use* not for commodity exchange on the 
world market, but the existence o f the capitalist world-economy and its 
aggressive interstate system determined in important ways the nature of 
the 'use,' the social needs, of the production. (Chase Dunn 1982, P. 37)
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migration, and their associated costs are heavy. All together "these 
factors, create a tendency to restratify the distribution of rewards 
along lines more comparable with the world labor market." (Chase 
Dunn 1982, P. 37)
W allerstein 's w orld-system  defin ition  im plies that the 
components o f the system are related and connected by the relations 
of exchange, and indeed the world-system is the world market with 
the predominance of the exchange relations. In the cases of the 
socialist countries the market involvement is not the only way to be 
integrated in the world economy; their participation can result from 
interaction with other states. For example the participation of the 
Soviet Union in the interstate system, at first as defensive victim, 
"later as ally in the balance of power and still later as superpower 
has been its most determinant dimension of interaction with the 
capitalist world-economy." (Chase Dunn 1982, P. 40)
The existence of the cap ita list world-econom y and its 
aggressive interstate system determines in im portant ways what 
product should be produced even for internal use.32 Therefore, in 
addition to devoting a substantial amount of the economical, political 
and social resources to the expenditure necessary for prevention of 
capital and labor migration, the Soviet Union was forced to put a 
considerable effort into producing goods which were necessary for
32 For Wallerstein, the production for use and not for profit is one of the basic 
aspects of any socialist system. (Wallerstein 1979b, P. 91)
33 According to Chase-Dunn, the most important developments in the recent 
period "which support the thesis that there was never a separate socialist 
world-system, are the recent return o f the socialist states to commodity 
production for the world market and their extensive dealings with the 
capitalist multinational corporations." (Chase Dunn 1982, P. 42)
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military survival.33 The autarky cannot prevent the stranglehold of 
the capitalist world-economy. "Everywhere, that reality has been 
that fact that a movement proclaims the unlinking of a state's 
productive processes from the integrated world-economy has never 
in fact accomplished the unlinking. It may have accomplished 
temporary withdrawal which, by strengthening internal production 
and political structures, enabled the state to improve its relative 
position in the world-economy.” (Wallerstein 1984, P. 107)
Wallerstein believes within the global system a social
revolution within country can only contribute to the faster
development o f productive forces o f that country and make 
possible the movement of that country toward a higher level in the 
international division of labor. The Russian Revolution, in 
Wallerstein's account occurred in "a semi-periperal country whose 
internal balance o f  forces had been such that as o f  the late
Nineteenth Century it began on a decline towards a peripheral 
status. This was the result o f the marked penetration o f foreign 
capital into industrial sector which was on its way to eliminating 
all indigenous capitalist forces, the resistance to the mechanization 
o f the agricultural sector, the decline o f relative military 
power.the Revolution brought to power a group o f state-managers 
who reversed each one o f these trends by using the classic
techniques o f mercantilist semi-withdrawal from the world
economy...At the end o f the second World War, Russia was 
reinstated as a very strong member o f the semi-periphery and
could begin to seek full core status." (Wallerstein 1974a, P. 41)
For the U.S.S.R. as for any other semi-peripheral state, there exists 
the possibility of promotion within the hierarchy of the world
system. Wallerstein on occasion seems to suggest that such upward 
mobility has been achieved by the Soviet Union: "Cannot the 
deteriorating relationship of the U.S.S.R. with the 'revolutionary' 
forces, particularly in semi-peripheral regions, be the same as the
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simple consequence of the promotion of U.S.S.R. from semi-periphery 
to core and hence a change in its interest within the framework of 
capitalist world economy?" (W allerstein 1979b, P. 90) Following 
Frank, Wallerstein argues that the role played by the socialist semi­
peripheral countries is essentially similar to that of the capitalist 
semi-peripheral countries. Its manifestation in the present period is 
the transfer of some "older industrial hardware" from the core 
countries with the "high wage bill" to the semi-peripheral countries 
including the socialist ones with the lower wage bill. (Wallerstein 
1984, P. 64)
Within the global system, no country can become socialist, it 
can only move from the periphery to semi-peripheral status.34 The 
fact that the means of production in the socialist countries are not 
privately owned and belong to the public is irrelevant. The capitalist 
system is composed of owners who sell for profit. The fact that an 
owner is a group of individuals rather than a single person makes no 
essen tial d iffe rence .35 Unless the entire world-system changes
34 This transition from periphery to semi-periphery status is not going to 
happen immediately, since "some o f the less industrialized socialist states 
are still playing essentially peripheral roles in the world-economy and 
must still heavily depend, in terms o f annual national income, on exports of 
basic commodities.” (Wallerstein 1979 , P. 116)
35 This has long been recognized for joint-stock companies. It must also be 
recognized for sovereign states. A state which collectively owns all the 
means of production is merely a collective capitalist firm as long as it 
remains - as all such states are, in fact, presently compelled to remain- a 
participant in the market of the capitalist world economy. ( Wallerstein 
1977b, P. 68) Chase Dunn (1982) a close associate of Wallerstein and an 
advocate o f the world-system approach argues that the socialist countries 
are "state capitalist." States have always been, according to him, important 
in capital accumulation, and they have recently become much more 
important. The Soviet Union has been able to develop an industrial base 
and military machine comparable to that of core countries. This 
industrialization "was organized and mobilized by an authoritarian state 
that consciously directed investment, trade and labor.” If however
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completely no country can achieve socialism. "The question is 
whether we shall arrive at a socialist world order by cumulating a 
series of revolutionary victories state by state until somehow a 
m ajority o f post-revolutionary states..tips us over some global 
balance. I simply do not believe this to be the case..." (Wallerstein 
1984, P. 144)
Therefore, unless the working class of the world, conscious of 
its revolutionary tasks, makes a global revolution, it is not possible 
for the working class of any single nation, or combination of some 
nations, to transform capitalism to socialism. (Wallerstein 1977)
In Wallerstein's scheme the revolutionary movements and the 
socialist countries have produced two contradictory effects. On one 
hand they have weakened the world bourgeoisie because they have 
constrained its freedom of action, 36 (Wallerstein 1977) and have
"socialism is equated with state mobilized" development, one can observe a 
similar pattern of development in the countries such as Japan and 
Germany, which are not referred to as socialist countries. (Ibid., PP. 34 and
87)
3 6 Mainly by limiting the mobility o f  capital and placing constraints on it.
(Chase Dunn 1982, P. 48)
Zeev Gorin (1985) suggests that Wallerstein’s position that the 
socialist countries contribute to the survivability o f the world 
capitalist system stem s from W allerstein's "Parsonian-Type 
Functionalist Analysis." Parts o f the system (subsystems) enhance 
the survivability of the total system. Changes consists in changes o f  
the subsystems and the system as a whole in direction o f a higher 
level o f survivability o f die total system." (Ibid. P. 336) Moreover 
Gorin argues Wallerstein's view  that the socialist countries 
undermine the capitalist countries is rooted in the theoretical 
framework developed by Wallerstein. In this framework the "system 
is conceived as a contradictory one, which by its 'normal' operation 
gives birth to and constantly reproduces anti-systematic forces."
(Ibid. P. 337) Furthermore, Gorin contends that although 
Wallerstein on different occasions emphasizes one o f the above 
positions, at other times dialectically combines these two. For 
example, when Wallerstein declares:
A struggle like that o f Vietnam, or Algeria, or Angola on the one 
hand, these colonial wars fundamentally weakened the internal
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"undermined the ideological justification in world capitalism, both by 
showing the political vulnerability of capitalist entrepreneurs and by 
showing that private ownership is irrelevant to the rapid expansion 
of industrial productivity." (Wallerstein 1974a, P. 414) On the other 
hand, the socialist countries, similar to the earlier forms of worker 
opposition (such as labor unions), come to existence "as weapons of 
resistance to the logic of capitalism and they force capitalism to 
expand and reorganize itself. But eventually they become functional 
parts of capitalist system rather than forces of its transformation."
(Chase Dunn 1982, P. 48) "(A)s their rise has resulted in coopting the
proletarian leaders into the political operation of the world system" 
they have strengthened the world bourgeoisie. (W allerstein 1977) 
And also they became a fundamental element in the survival of the
w orld-system  to the extent tha t they have prevented  the
polarization of the world by moving to the middle strata in the 
international hierarchy, and by doing so have raised the ability of
supports o f the regimes o f the U.S.A., one can ask if  the net result 
has not been to further integrate these countries, even their 
regimes, into the capitalist world economy. It did both o f course, 
(cited in Ibid., p.340)
I do agree with Gorin that in places Wallerstein only stresses one of
the above indicated positions. I, however, think that Wallerstein's
writing in general is more inclined toward the dialectical
combination o f these two positions
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the semi-peripheral areas to enjoy a larger portion of the world 
surplus. (Wallerstein 1974a, P. 414)37
Because Wallerstein defines socialism as a mode of production 
based on production for use, it cannot exist in any single country or 
combination of countries as long as the capitalist world-economy 
exists. The socialist mode of production "involves some kind of 
collective decision-making about social production to which we may 
give the shorthand label of ’planning.* As long as planning is at the 
level of individual states, it's ultimately planning for a firm and not 
for an 'economy' and cannot eradicate the law of value. The clear  
implication is that planning must be at a world level, the only kind of 
production for use tha t can elim inate unequal exchange."
37 Zcev Gorin (1985) suggests that Wallerstein’s position that the 
socialist countries contribute to the survivability of the world 
capitalist system stems from Wallerstein's "Parsonian-Type 
Functionalist Analysis." Parts of the system (subsystems) enhance 
the survivability o f the total system. Changes consists in changes of 
the subsystems and the system as a whole in direction o f a higher 
level o f survivability of the total system." (Ibid. P. 336) Moreover 
Gorin argues Wallerstein’s view that the socialist countries 
undermine the capitalist countries is rooted in the theoretical 
framework developed by Wallerstein. In this framework the "system 
is conceived as a contradictory one, which by its 'normal' operation 
gives birth to and constantly reproduces anti-systematic forces."
(Ibid. P. 337) Furthermore, Gorin contends that although 
Wallerstein on different occasions emphasizes one of the above 
positions, at other times dialectically combines these two. For 
example, when Wallerstein declares:
A struggle like that of Vietnam, or Algeria, or Angola on the one 
hand, these colonial wars fundamentally weakened the internal 
supports of the regimes o f the U.S.A., one can ask if  the net result 
has not been to further integrate these countries, even their 
regimes, into the capitalist world economy. It did both of course.
(cited in Ibid., p.340)
I do agree with Gorin that in places Wallerstein only stresses one of the 
above indicated positions. I, however, think that Wallerstein's writing in 
general is more inclined toward the dialectical combination of these two 
positions
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(W allerstein 1984, PP. 171-172) Such a system  has not been 
established yet; however, there are tendencies in the capitalist 
world-economy that move the whole system towards socialism. The 
outcome is not definite and depends on the result of interaction of 
these tendencies with the other factors, in operation, but the 
existence of these tendencies is undeniable.38
Wallerstein's assessment of prospects for socialism is therefore 
quite different from Frank's. Frank, who sees that the locally 
controlled capitalist development in the poor countries is no longer a 
possibility, seeks the only alternative in rupturing all ties with the 
world capitalist system and establishing a socialist country which is 
taken as synonymous with autarky. For Frank, therefore, the escape
38 There is an organizational imperative in which, the full development of 
capitalist relations o f production with its emphasis on "the increase 
surplus-value and the maximum efficiency (free flow) of factors of 
production" moves the system towards "a fully planned single productive 
organizational network." Also the appropriation of world surplus in the 
hands o f few results in the spread o f "antisystematic movements" and 
therefore the dispersion o f socialist ideas among the direct producers. The 
existence of the socialist movements in the individual countries which seek
to construct socialism creates "additional institutional pressures on the 
world-system to move in the direction o f socialism" despite the fact that
their location in the world interstate system constrains "the kinds of 
transformation they can effectuate within their boundaries o f  a given 
state." (Wallerstein 1984, PP. 24-25)
There are also counter-tendencies which impede the achievement of 
socialism. Among them is the "logic o f domination" by the ruling strata, 
world bourgeoisie, which leads this group to seek survival by adoption of 
new social roles and new ideologies. They are willing "to change 
everything in order to have everything remain the same," and perpetuate 
themselves in a new system. In the process o f seeking to secure their
position, the world bourgeoisie may adopt policies which result in nuclear 
war. This could bring the cessation o f the present system, but the 
destruction of most of the world's productive forces makes the establishment 
of a "socialist world order far less structurally feasible." (Ibid., P. 25)
According to Wallerstein, "(i)t is clear that the capitalist world-economy 
cannot survive, and that it is in the process o f being superseded as a
historical social system." What will be the end result is not clear and 
depends on "how conjuncture of forces at play will constrain the direction 
of change." (Ibid., P. 26)
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from the international hierarchy of division of labor which is only 
useful to the core countries is possible, though not easily achievable. 
For W allerstein, on the other hand, the international hierarchy of 
division of labor with unequally powerful states is not only assumed 
to be structurally necessary for the continued existence of the 
capitalist system but also to be contagious.39 So no break from the 
system is possible, and since the relinquishment of one country's 
structural position implies adopting a new role in the international 
division of labor, there is no evasion possible. Even if such evasion 
takes the form of autarky, the country continues to remain part of 
the capitalist world-economy. Because, the capitalist world-economy 
through different channels pressures it to do so. "Other states will 
not let any individual state be totally autonomous and will intrude 
directly and indirectly, politically and m ilitarily if necessary." 
(Wallerstein 1984, P. 84) The only alternative is the establishment 
of a socialist world system.
2*2.6.- .W allerstein and His C ritics;
39 The role o f states is particularly important. "The state power is used to 
extract labor-power (more directly in the periphery than in the core), but 
the competitive nature o f the interstate system prevents any single state 
from maintaining a statewide monopoly and subjects producers to the 
necessity o f increasing productivity in order to maintain or increase their 
shares o f the world surplus value. Thus, the interstate system reinforces 
the capital-wage labor relationship in the core, and coerced labor 
extraction in the periphery, and constitutes the basis o f  production 
relations for the capitalist system.” (Chase Dunn 1982)
And "the extraction of surplus value is based on two modes of 
appropriation: 1) the ability to use political power for the appropriation of
surplus value, 2) the ability to produce efficiency for the competitive world 
market." (Chase Dunn 1982)
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W allerstein tries to theoretically  explain the em ergence and 
development of capitalism since the Sixteenth Century, and in this 
process he hopes to demonstrate the hierarchical and exploitive 
nature of such development. He also proposes that the capitalist 
world-economy is universal and has penetrated every nook and 
comer of the world, including the socialist countries. The only way 
to eradicate this exploitive system is by a world-wide revolution and 
establishment of a socialist world economy.
Wallerstein, therefore, in accordance with Frank in trying to 
explain the development of capitalism and contemplating socialism 
as the only alternative to end the misery of the exploited classes, 
enters into the domain of Marxism. In critically evaluating 
W allerstein's scheme, then, it seems logical to concentrate on his 
Marxist critics.
Methodologically, Wallerstein’s starting point is a concept of 
totality. He claims that one either has to start "with the economy 
seen from the point of view of the producing units, which is where 
Adam Smith starts, or with the social economy as a totality, which is 
where Marx starts.” (W allerstein 1977) He in fact cites with 
approval Luckacs' comment that, "the decisive difference between 
Marxism and bourgeois thought (is) the point of view on totality." 
(cited in Gerstein 1977) And for Wallerstein a unit qualifies as 
totality if within the unit there exists one single division of labor in 
the sense that the "totality of essential needs of the overwhelming 
majority" of economic actors are satisfied by the production within 
that unit. It is in his context that he then introduces his concepts of 
the world empire and world systems.
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His methodology in contrast to his claim  is not a Marxist's 
methodology. Marx in the Grundrisse explains his concept of 
scientific method: While thought "appropriates" reality in all its
complexity one should construct out of this complexity the essential 
abstract concepts, and then reconstruct based on these relatively 
simple abstract concepts, the complex concepts which parallel the 
complex reality. Marx's Capital is structured in this way from a
simple abstract (i.e. commodity) to an increasingly complex abstract 
concept (i.e. capital). W allerstein, on the other hand, does the 
opposite: He starts with the complex concept of the "world-system"
and gradually reduces the degree of complexity of concepts which he
uses. Arnowitz (1981, P.508) argues also that the meaning of 
W allerstein’s "systems" is not consistent with the Marxist notion of 
"totality" in which "the elements of a system are understood within a 
matrix of mutual determinations." In W allerstein's scheme the 
system "is a structured totality consisting of relatively autonomous 
elements whose interaction constitutes the whole." 40
40 One aspect o f the point raised by Arnowitz can be viewed in Wallerstein's 
discussion of the emergence of capitalism. To comprehend how and why 
capitalism began is one o f Wallerstein's stated goals. His theory, however, 
does not put him in a good position to explain the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism in Europe. The most obvious difficulty is his lack of 
any theoretical conception o f the dynamics of feudalism. (Skocpol 1977, 
P1078) Wallerstein traces the origins of the capitalist world-economy to 
the expansion o f  trade in Western Europe, prompted by a series o f  
geographic, climatic, economic conditions whose conjunction gave rise to 
the international division o f  labor. This is however "construction o f a 
theoretical edifice using materials randomly drawn from what is at hand." 
According to Arnowitz, employing such categories as climate and cycles 
which are historically specifi- in explaining the genesis o f  capitalism, 
leaves an impression that there is no principle involved in Wallerstein’s 
analysis, since he implies that changes are not a function of internal 
contradiction "but o f sure contingency." (Arnowitz, P. 508)
Arnowitz (Ibid., P. 508) further argues that Wallerstein "in the first place 
in his analysis o f crisis o f  feudalism swallows whole the premises of
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Wallerstein's major interest is to construct a theory of capitalist 
development as a system of exchange relations which is shaped by 
its world-wide characteristic rather than by a mixtur of national 
features. Then, logically when he cojoins secular and cyclical crises,41 
the decline of feudalism could only lead to the world-economy. And 
it becomes reasonable for his theory to find the origin of capitalism 
in the expansion of the world trade and in the history of 
explorations. (Arnowitz 1981, P. 509)
Critics point out that Wallerstein is a reductionist; his model is 
based on a reduction of complete socio-economic structures. In his 
view, such structures are determined solely by world market 
opportunities and market exchange. He considers exchange as the 
mainspring of the organic whole, and to prove the legitimacy of his 
explanation he resorts to Marx's writings in order to "enlist him in 
his interpretation of importance of circulating capital in determining 
the organic whole." (Navarro 1982, P. 87) What he quotes, however, 
is not an accurate representation of Marx. In contrast to Wallerstein,
classical political economy that owes its origin to A Smith and Thomas 
Malthas - the law o f diminishing returns within a given technology - the 
more dubious notion o f cyclical theory..and finally the remarkable 
uncritically adopted idea that climatic conditions may be an independent 
variable in the transformation of social structure, unmeditated by the 
structure itself. In all of these ideas there is no dynamic of internal 
relations into which the variables may be placed. That is, Wallerstein has
no theory of social change as an outgrowth of the crisis o f the social
relations that structure a social system."
41 Cyclical crisis implies that the expansion reaches optimal points given the
level o f technology. Secular crisis implies diminishing return on land 
which limits the capacity o f surplus appropriation of the system. The 
emphasis on expansion as an imperative for feudalism makes Wallerstein's 
theory ahistorical. He generalized Marxists' argument that capitalism 
requires expansion because of the logic o f accumulation and applies it to 
any society, and argues the expansion is a property of all social systems or 
they must die. (Arnowitz 1981)
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Marx emphasizes the importance of production in determining a 
mode of production, though mentioning that within "the same mode 
of production exchange can also determine the type of production." 
(Navarro 1982, P. 88)42 In fact, Marx referred to capitalism as 
capitalist mode of production. This is not because he was a 
reductionist, but because he believed "the relations of production 
were the ones that determine how different moments (levels) of 
production, distribution, exchange, and consumption are articulated 
within the mode of production or organic whole.” (Navarro 1982, P.
88 ) 43
42 This is the complete quotation from Marx as (has been) translated 
by Vincente Navarro: (Navarro 1982, P. 87-88) "The conclusion we
reach is not that production, distribution, exchange and consumption 
are identical, but that they all are the elements of a totality, different 
components within a unity. From production, the whole process starts 
and is reproduced...There is no doubt that exchange and consumption 
cannot be determinant. The same applies to distribution and 
distribution o f  products...As a consequence, each production 
determines a definite consumption, distribution and exchange as well 
as a definite relation between those different moments. Also 
production, within its specific form, is determined by other moments. 
For example, when the market, i.e., the sphere o f exchange, grows, the 
volume of production also increases and appears a more profound 
division of production...There exists a reciprocal relation among the 
different elements. This is the case with every organic whole." 
(Grundrisse)
42 Wallerstein brings another quote from Marx to defend his position, but 
here also Marx indicates that exchange contributes to the expansion o f the 
already existing capitalist mode o f production. "I am no more 
'circulationist' than Marx was when he argued that 'competition' on the 
world market (is) the basis and vital element o f capitalist prodution."
(Marx Capital III. Ch.VI P. 110)." And when in the Sixteenth, and partially 
still in the Seventeenth, Century the sudden expansion o f commerce and 
emergence o f a new world-market overwhelmingly contributed to the fall 
of the old mode o f production. This was accomplished conversely in the 
basis of the already existing capitalist mode of production." (Marx Capital 
HI, Ch. XX, P. 333 Italics) (Wallerstein 1977)
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One consequence of Wallerstein's emphasis on market exchange 
is his limited attention to class struggle whose roots are in the 
relations of production and not in the relations of exchange; the 
external relations of the world market influence class struggle within 
each society but do not determine them. (Navarro 1982 and Skocpol 
1977) As Brenner (1977) puts it, Wallerstein disregards the fact that 
once a class structure as an outcome of class struggle is established in 
a society, it determines the direction of change and the courses of 
economic development or underdevelopment. Brenner in the same 
line argues that Wallerstein's model assumes that the dominant class 
is more or less free to adopt any method of labor control or form of 
production, which is best suited to its interest given the exigencies 
imposed by its position in the international division of labor. He 
reduces therefore the class struggle to the responses of the ruling 
class to the market and ignores the power of direct producers to set 
limits on such responses. Brenner's idea that "the solidarity of the 
local peasant communities may play a role in development as 
important as the pattern of international exchange" might appear 
devastating to the world system approach. (Evans 1979)44
W allerstein's definition of capitalist mode of production has 
also been criticized by Marxists. For Marxists the capitalist relations 
of production are the ones in which labor has been freed from
44 According to Brenner, the international division of labor that emerged in 
Europe should be explained only by interpreting the nature o f peasant 
communities' resistance to the ruling class strategies in different areas. 
Even when Wallerstein acknowledges the class struggles between serf and 
lords the importance of a discontented class o f capitalist entrepreneurs in 
the towns of feudal Europe, he still does not credit either of these with the 
vanquishment o f feudalism by capitalism. (Arnowitz 1981)
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obligation to land and is not the owner of the means of production. 
Wallerstein, on the other hand, focuses on capitalism as a "specific 
system of labor rationalization and unequal exchange." This 
categorization has led him to displace the question of exploitation, 
and substitute instead the inequality derived from  occupying 
different positions in the hierarchy of international division of labor. 
(Evans 1979) It is for this reason that he argues the core regions 
exploit peripheral regions through the mechanism of unequal 
exchange. (Petras & Trachte 1979)
Emphasis on circulation, and defining capitalism as a system of 
exchange relations has also led him to have a vague notion about 
sources of profit. On the one hand, profit is defined as "appropriation 
of a surplus which was based on more efficient and expanded 
productivity (first in agriculture and later in industry.)" (cited in 
Gerstein 1977, P. 11) Here profit is a surplus created in the system 
as a whole. On the other hand, profit is defined as the result of an 
unequal exchange, and essentially expropriation by one part of the 
world from another.45
Wallerstein's technical treatment of division of labor has also 
been criticized by Marxists. He explains the division of labor simply 
as so many different types of concrete activities. This explanation is 
exemplified by his attempt to show that the hierarchy of variation of 
tasks constitutes the international division of labor Marxists believe
45 "Because he conceives of capitalism from the point o f view of
circulation.he is unable to identify the roots of class struggle. This point is 
epitomized by his uncertainty over the origin and nature of profit, for the 
mode of appropriation of the surplus, based upon the relations of 
production, is the constitutive element o f the mode of production and of the 
structural definition of classes and the class struggle." (Ibid., P. 11)
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a purely technical definition of labor is inadequate since it is neutral 
and "excludes any specification of the social division of labor." The 
social division of labor forms the structure of society and the basis 
for the technical separations among different occupations which 
Wallerstein speaks of. His failure to make this distinction is another 
major factor for his substitution of class structure with "geographical 
distribution" of different types of labor. Since core regions are 
specialized in production of capital goods, they exploit the periphery 
which is specialized in production of less technical goods. 46 
(Amowitz 1981, & Gerstein 1977)
Because Wallerstein loses sight of the class struggles and the 
process of class formation which begets change, because of his belief 
that the relations of exchange determine the mode of production, and 
moreover, because he is also convinced that the capitalist relations of 
exchange are dominant ones in today's world, he concludes that 
capitalism is the only mode of production in the present era. Such 
credence leads him to consider socialist countries as capitalist ones.
46 Gerstein (1971) uses an example to show how Wallerstein's treatment of 
division o f labor has ignored the fact that each mode o f production defines 
its own division of labor. Gerstein says: "The concept of luxury production
as opposed to the production of essentials is very important in Wallerstein's 
scheme because it defines the regions that, while part o f the division of 
labor of a system, lies outside of it. However what is a luxury? The answer
cannot be given outside of a concept of mode of production in the first
place.
Amowitz also argues that such a line of reasoning has led Wallerstein to
conclude that the workers in the core are under a less severe coersive
system of labor control. They are in 'relative advantage' compared to the 
workers in the periphery who are working under a harsh system of labor 
control, a system of share cropping. In doing so Wallerstein’s scheme 
succeeds in blurring the distinction between workers and capitalists in the 
core, and leaves entirely aside the source of opposition that might arise in 
these regions. (Amowitz 1981)
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In addition, since the whole world is capitalist, he explains 
specific events within the world system in terms of the demand of 
the system as a whole. Actors are reacting, not for "their immediate 
concrete interests, but because the system dictates that they act." 
(Petras and Tachte 1979) Liberation movements thus are seen "as 
arising out of the structural contradictions of the capitalist world 
economy." (Wallerstein 1975, P. 26) Within his framework, then, he 
is not able to answer, why in a given conjuncture there are 
revolutionary movements in some parts of the world and there are 
none in other parts.47
The critics point out that: Even if one accepts Wallerstein's
contention that the world capitalist system incorporates different 
modes of labor control, the distinction between the motives and
forces behind their emergence in the ’world capitalist system1 is 
important. Portes for instance argues: "The blue print with which the 
Bolshevik party took power in Russia was quite different from that 
of the Japenese imperial bureaucracy,..It involved not a search for
hegemony within the existing world order, but its destruction." It is, 
therefore, quite difficult to believe that "the ultimate outcome of the 
Soviet experience is simply to promote Russia into 'core status'
within the capitalist world-economy." (Portes, P. 518) In response 
to Wallerstein's claim that the socialist countries, similar to other 
countries, are functioning parts of the world capitalist system, 
Szymanski argues that: "While it is true that the establishment of
47 The Russian Revolution in Wallerstein's eyes arose due to international war 
which led to the collapse of the Czarist regime which in turn caused a 
spontaneous explosion of the populace and finally seizure of power by a 
minority group, the Bolsheviks. (Navarro 1982)
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socialist productive relations in the U.S.S.R. and China was very much 
a product of the expansion of Western Europe capitalism into these 
countries," their establishments were however "reactions against 
capitalist relations of production." According to Szymanski, however, 
when one considers the revival of slavery or serfdom in the colonies 
as a result of the expansion of capitalism, one witnesses an entirely 
different situation: "...the revival of slavery and serfdom were 
integral and ongoing aspects of capitalist profit-making. The sugar 
and cotton produced in the Caribbean with slave labor was essential 
for the growing capitalist economies of Western Europe and North
America...Nothing like this has been the case for social relations in
the U.S.S.R. or China, which consequently cannot be considered to be 
a product of economic demand in the West." (Szymanski 1981, P. 
525)
It is obvious for the critics that all societies participate in the 
world capitalist system. Nevertheless, what they consider to be 
important and decisive in differentiating societies from one another
must be searched for "in their class relationship and struggles: the
external articulation (between the class structure/world market) of 
these internal changes influences and shapes, but in no decisive 
sense develops and initiates the basic changes that mark the scope of 
the transformation to new forms of capitalist domination or socialism 
and the direction of transition." 48 (Petras 1981, P. 152, cited in Gorin 
1985)
48 For a critical survey of Wallerstein's views on the socialist countries and 
world-system, see Zeev Gorin. (Portes 1981)
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Some critics argue socialism is not a mode of production, it is a 
social formation in transition from capitalism to communism. This 
transition may take centuries, as did that from feudalism  to 
capitalism. The direction of that transition depends primarily on the 
struggle within the given social formation rather than on the position 
of that formation in the world-system. Analysis of the socialist 
countries reveals varieties of "transitional problems and processes 
within and among peoples with diverse experiences, resources, and 
institutions as these societies attempt to chart the passage from 
capitalism, semi-peripheral, or various colonial" formations. Socialist 
transitions are occurring within the orbit of the capitalist world, and 
simultaneously are transforming and being transformed by it.
Appraising the significance of these internal and international 
changes, however, requires abandoning utopian expectations, since 
"the subsequent of cherished dreams in each case turned some of the 
m ost arden t proponents o f these revo lu tions in to  b itterly  
disillusioned critics as incapable of perceiving the genuine advances 
in each case as they had been of recognizing previous shortcomings." 
(Selen 1982)
PART TWO: DEPENDENCY AS E.C.L.A.’S CRITICISM  OF TRADE
THEORY
2.3. Sunkel:
The nucleus of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America's (henceforth E.C.L.A.) analysis was the critique of the 
conventional theory of international trade as expressed in the 
Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson model of international trade.
E.C.L.A's prescription for achieving accelerated and sustained 
economic growth was development of the industrial sector. Realizing 
that this process of industrialization would be inhibited by both a 
pattern of international division of labor and a series of internal 
obstacles, E.C.L.A. suggested a series of measures. These included 
state intervention in the economy as both a direct producer and as a 
formulator of economic policies. The formulation of economic policies 
includes attracting foreign investment into the industrial sector and 
emphasizing import substitution policies. (Palma 1978)
In the 1960s, however, it seemed that E.C.L.A.'s prescriptions 
did not produce the desired results. The process of import- 
substitution seemed to aggravate balance of paym ent problems, 
instead of alleviating them; foreign investm ent was in part 
responsible for that. In several countries income distribution was 
worsening and the rate of unemployment was increasing. This bleak 
picture subsequently led to some of E.C.L.A.'s members' pessimism 
about the possibility of capitalist development in Latin America. The 
disenchanted members o f E.C.L.A. at tempted to reformulate its 
thought and tried to discover why some of the expected
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consequences of industrialization were not happening in Latin 
America. Some of them produced different versions of stagnation 
theories. 49 Others, including Sunkel, however later abandoned the 
stagnation theories and produced "movement towards a more 
structural-historical analysis of Latin America.” (Palma 1978, P. 908) 
Sunkel criticized  both the m odernization and M arxist 
approaches in studying underdevelopment. He argues the former 
mistakenly considers countries as self-contained economic units 
which are on a par in their international relations. In the same 
manner this school conceives of underdevelopment as a moment in 
the evolution of society which has been economically, politically and 
culturally autonomous and isolated.
Sunkel also feels that Marxists are also wrong since they have 
restricted themselves to analyzing the international monopolies' 
penetration of underdeveloped countries for the purpose of 
appropriating their economic surplus, and as a result they have 
neglected the 'spread' and 'backwash1 effects of such penetrations. 
(Sunkel 1973)
Sunkel (1973), however, praises M yrdal (1957), Prebisch 
(1950), and Singer (1970), who originally initiated the study of 
'spread* and 'backwash' effects, and have suggested that in the 
interaction of industrial economies with primary products producing 
countries, the former tend to benefit more than the latter. According 
to him, their study introduces "a most important perspective since it
49 According to Palma, (1978) the most sophisticated perhaps being Furtado. 
(1966)
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focuses attention on the interaction between the external agents and 
the domestic economic, social, and political structures."
N evertheless, their study is partial and requires further 
generalization. It is partial because in analyzing the effects of 
interaction between developed and underdeveloped economies, it 
has concentrated exclusively on the primary product producing 
sector of the latter. As a result of this biased analysis they came to 
the conclusion that the underdeveloped countries must industrialize 
because the industrialization would result in "a cumulative process of 
self-reinforcing ’spread’ effects.” They prescribed that in order to 
achieve industrialization these countries should adopt the policy of 
import substitution. (Sunkel 1973, P. 5)
In reality, the policy of im port substitution, according to 
Sunkel, failed to achieve the aims of freeing the underdeveloped 
countries from heavy reliance on primary exports and foreign capital 
and technology. This policy, in the initial period, stimulated rather 
significant manufacturing industries and a national entrepreneurial 
class. But in the later period most of the industrial sector was taken 
over by foreign firms, with the result that much of the benefit 
associated with the industrialization has flowed abroad. This process 
of de-nationalization of the economy subsequently led to erosion of 
the national entrepreneural class. It also accentuated the process of 
uneven development: "On the one hand, a partial process of
modernization and expansion of capital intensive activities; on the 
other, a process of disruption, contraction and disorganization of 
traditional labor-intensive activities." (Sunkel 1972, P. 518)
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The recognition of the fact that industrialization has aggravated 
the problem  of economic dependence reveals the necessity of 
analyzing the problem of underdevelopment not in isolation but as a 
"part of the development of the international capitalist system, 
whose dynamic has a determining influence on local processes." One, 
then, in Sunkel’s account must look at foreign factors "not as external 
but as internal to the system, contributing significantly to shape the 
nature and functioning of the economy, society and policy." (Sunkel 
1973, P. 6) In other words, the capitalist system must be viewed as 
a whole, "as a global international system, within which national
econom ies-nation-states-constitute sub-systems."
Under this approach the development process is not simply 
considered "as a race which started somewhere before the Industrial 
Revolution and in which some countries reached advanced stages 
while others stagnated or moved slower." (Sunkel 1972, P. 519-520) 
It must be realized that capitalism from its outset has created an
international system, which has "brought the whole world economy
under the influence of a few countries." D evelopm ent and 
underdevelopment must be viewed as a "simultaneous process; tbe 
two faces of the historical evolution of the capitalist system." (Sunkel 
1973, P. 7)
During the colonial period, for example, the Europeans
interfered in Latin America and in order to extract the precious 
metals and obtain tropical products introduced slavery and other 
forms of forced labor. The establishment of overseas empires in this 
period played an important role in European economic development 
and created the basic conditions for underdevelopment in most
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territories conquered and colonized. The Industrial Revolution led to 
specialization of first Britain and later some other countries in 
production of manufactured goods, while the rest of the world 
became specialized in production of staples and raw materials. "This 
was a further step in the process of creation of conditions for 
development in the metropolitan area and for underdevelopment in 
the periphery." (Sunkel 1973, P. 9)
The age of imperialism ushered in a system of rivalry among 
the industrial powers and led to the eventual rise of the United 
States as the dominant power. During World War II and immediately 
thereafter, while Europe was ravaged by war and economic crises, 
"the U.S. economy experienced important changes in its internal 
structure. Government intervention expanded considerably within 
the United States, accelerating growth, reducing fluctuations and 
contributing to a fantastic development of science and technology;" 
all of which helped to create large business conglomerates. (Sunkel 
1972, P. 501) According to Sunkel, in the present era, "the capitalist 
system is in the process of being reorganized into a new international 
industria l system  w hose m ain institu tional agents are the 
multinational corporations, increasingly backed by the governments 
of the developed countries." (Sunkel 1972 P. 15) The multinational 
corporations tend to concentrate the planning and development of 
science and technology as well as entrepreneurial decision-making in 
the developed countries, and the underdeveloped countries are 
assigned to routine production or assembly of goods designed by the 
form er. The im port-substitu tion  policies of underdeveloped
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countries were used by the multinational corporations to penetrate 
into these countries and establish their subsidiaries.
According to Sunkel, the massive expansion of multinational 
corporations in the less developed countries has intensified the
dependent nature of economic development of these countries. He
argues further that such intensification has taken place through 
different channels. In the first place, there is a tendency on the part 
of subsidiaries of multinational corporations not to integrate with 
local suppliers or to share their technology. Secondly, subsidiaries 
within one country tend to integrate horizontally among themselves, 
and gain control over finance, credit and markets. More important is 
the fact that while at the beginning the foreign firms may make a 
con tribu tion  in cap ita l, sk illed  personnel, technology and 
management, overtime the cash outflow becomes larger than the 
inflow. These are only a few of the 'backwash* effects of the foreign 
investments in the less developed countries. (Sunkel 1972 and
Sunkel 1973)
To reverse the above mentioned trends, Sunkel suggests that in 
the first place one must take away the control of the state from the 
social groups which are closely associated with any benefit from the 
dependent structure of the less developed countries. After taking 
over the control of the state three major steps must be taken in 
order to correct "the main malformation inherited from the historical 
process of interaction with the international system." In the second 
place, there is a need for agrarian reform, since the present structure 
of the agricultural sector is "the fundamental root of inequality, 
marginalization and stagnation." In the third place, because the
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primary export sector is the most im portant source of capital 
accumulation, through control over this sector capital must be 
channeled towards expansion of heavy and consumer industries. 
Finally, the industrial sector must be reorganized, by reorienting 
production from conspicuous consumption to basic consumer goods 
necessary for satisfying the needs of the majority. (Sunkel 1972, P.
530)
In this process of structural reforms the foreign interests will 
be affected, either through nationalization of their interest or 
through renegotiation with them. The less developed countries have 
the right to control their most essential resources, and the policies of 
foreign firms do not necessarily coincide with the interest of these 
countries. Realization of this fact, according to Sunkel, has led to the 
end of the era of "creating favorable business conditions for direct 
foreign investment" and the opening up of a new era of hard 
bargaining, negotiations and "assertion of national interest of our 
countries in their international economic relations." (Sunkel 1972, P.
531)
Sunkel, like Frank and Wallerstein, sees underdevelopment and 
development as two sides of the same coin. He believes development 
is a global structural process of change; and underdeveloped 
countries have been deprived of autonomous capacity for change and 
growth, and are dependent for these on the industrial developed 
countries. (O’Brien 1975) While historically the dependency itself 
has remained unchanged, its mechanism has undergone changes. For 
example, according to Sunkel, in the past it was the interconnections 
of four essential elements- "the stagnation of traditional agriculture,
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the mono-export of primary product, the type of industrialization 
policies, and the functions of state"-which had created the implacable 
necessity to obtain foreign finance, and that became the key
m echanism  of dependency. (Sunkel 1973 and Sunkel 1969) 
However, in the modern era it is the penetration of the less
developed countries by the m ultinational corporation which is
counted as the essential feature of dependency. Sunkel's prescription, 
however, differs from Frank's and Wallerstein's and in contrast to 
them he does not seek demolition of the capitalist system. Rather he 
is in search of more nationalistic and reformist solutions. He admires 
the case of Peru in which the nationalist elements took over the
power of state and in opposition to the dependent nature of 
development of their country attempted to take necessary steps. 
(Sunkel 1972)
The aim, then, must be accomplishing "greater autonomy, in 
order to achieve development without 'dependencia.'" (Sunkel 1972 
P. 531) This does not imply autarky; rather the possibility of 
cooperation with foreign firms "is by no means excluded, even 
though there will certainly be little place for wholly-owned foreign 
subsidiaries or private foreign investm ent of traditional kind." 
(Sunkel 1973, P. 24)
Sunkel is not concerned with and has not attempted to analyze 
the relations between the socialist and capitalist industrialized 
countries. One may, however, anticipate that Sunkel in the light of 
his general methodology would probably consider those socialist 
countries which followed his prescriptions capable of achieving 
autonomous development. In fact he uses the example of 'socialist'
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Chile and its relations with the multinational corporations as a 
guiding light which must be followed by the less developed countries 
in their relations with these corporations. (Sunkel 1973 and Sunkel 
1972)
Sunkel's analysis, like others in the dependency tradition, has 
been criticized both on empirical and theoretical grounds. Bill 
Warren, (1973) for example, employs four criteria suggested by B. 
Sutcliff (1972) as the conditions of independent industrialization50 
and argues that empirical observation confirms the strong trends 
toward lessening dependence developm ent of less developed 
countries. In regards to dependence on the foreign technology, 
Warren argues the importation of these technologies represents a net 
gain for the Third World, and these technologies "are increasingly 
assimilated in the industrial process, and thereby contribute to the 
developm ent of indigenous technical cu lture and capacity." 
(Bernstein 1982, P. 226) Yet according to Warren, the very concept 
of "independent industrialization" is highly ambiguous and Sutcliffs 
criteria have not always been necessary or sufficient conditions of 
independent capitalist industrialization.
In Sunkel's analysis the results of what may be the very effects 
of cap ita list industrialization-such as m assive unem ploym ent, 
immiseratio-are assimilated to symptoms of the dependent nature of 
economies of the Third World countries. Similarly, his arguments
50 These four criteria are: 1) The development of a domestic market for the
products of national-industry. 2) A diversified industrial sector with 
numerous internal linkages including capital goods industry. 3) National 
control over the investment o f capital and the accumulation process. 4) An 
indigenous capacity for the development of technologies appropriate to a 
given country's industrial strategy.
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embody a "conceptual delusion” that there exists a "genuine" and 
"national" developm ent process which "delivers the goods of 
increased social welfare, more egalitarian income distribution, full 
employment, a process which benefits the majority. This definition 
virtually excludes the basic characteristic of capitalism which is 
"exploitation through the appropriation of surplus value, and creating 
the conditions of such exploitation." (Bernstein 1982, P. 227) Even in 
the developed countries where supposedly this 'genuine' process is at 
operation, one can observe inequalities, unemployment, poverty, as 
well as disparities among various geographic areas, between urban 
and rural areas, within cities themselves.
In summary, Sunkel's analysis only provides description and 
condemnation of the symptoms and effects of capitalist. development, 
rather than explaining them "in terms of intrinsically contradictory 
nature of the process itself." (Bernstein 1982, P. 229)
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Summary o f First Chapter:
The dependency school, represented here by Frank and Wallerstein, 
maintains that socialist and capitalist countries do not possess 
qualitatively different economic systems. In other words, Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union cannot be considered socialist countries. 
Frank and W allerstein each present different reasons for such a 
conclusion. Frank asserts that integration into the world economy 
defies a country's economic system, and since the socialist countries 
are integrated into the world international division of labor, they can 
not in any way be differentiated from the capitalist countries.
Wallerstein, on the other hand, believes in prevalence of only 
one mode of production throughout the world, and that is the 
capitalist mode of production. According to him, in capitalist mode of 
p roduction , se lf- in te re s ted  in d iv id u a ls  are connected  and 
interdependent through the exchange relations, or one single division 
of labor. Through this single division of labor, the totality of 
economic actors' needs are met by a combination of their own 
production and in some forms of exchange. Consequently, since all 
regions of the world, regardless of their internal forms of labor
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control* take part in this single division of labor, they are all
capitalist countries.51
According to the dependency school, the manner in which 
socialist countries insert themselves into the international division of 
labor is similar to that of intermediate capitalist countries: i.e. Brazil,
Mexico, etc. In other words, they exploit the countries at the lower
levels while simultaneously they are exploited by the advanced
capitalist countries. The pattern of trade of the interm ediate 
countries is an indicator of such hierarchical exploitive relationships. 
W hile these countries export m anufactured  goods to the
underdeveloped countries and import raw materials from them, the 
interm ediate countries export raw m aterials to the developed 
countries and import industrial products from them. It is the 
investigation of such a claim that will be the focus of my study in the 
fifth chapter of this dissertation.
51 Although at first glance Frank's and Wallerstein's schemes seem to be 
identical, in reality they are not. In Frank's version a breakout from the 
capitalist system is possible, while in Wallerstein's scheme it is not.
CHAPTER III
The Neo-Classical School
In the previous chapter, I tried to establish that the 
dependency school, represented by Frank, argues that Eastern 
European countries, by establishing economic relations w ith the 
West, have become a functioning part of the capitalist system. The 
world system approach, represented by W allerstein, maintains that 
since capitalism  is the only world-wide embracing mode of 
production, the nature of Eastern European countries1 economic 
system is not qualitatively different from those of other countries. It 
is the purpose of this chapter to investigate how the neo-classical 
economists address East-West economic relations. I will argue that 
as far as the basic assum ptions of orthodox economists are 
concerned, the differences in the socio-economic systems of capitalist 
and socialist countries are not important.
The orthodox economists have established their theory at a 
highly general and abstract level. Their starting point is abstract 
ind iv iduals endow ed w ith a certain set of psychological
characteristics which drive them towards maximization of their
satisfactions. It is also assumed that each of these atomized 
individuals has at his/her disposal a commodity and an exclusive and 
unlimited right to it. The individuals are completely free in deciding 
whether to sell their commodities or to retain them. An individual 
worker is thus free in choosing to sell his/her services to an
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entrepreneur or refrain from it, and may instead choose the "leisure" 
of not working. . All commodity exchanges are transacted only when 
the price ratios are equated with the ratio of "subjective preferences 
at the margin." Since the focus of theoretical analysis of orthodox 
econom ists is the process of exchange, there is nothing to 
differentiate and discriminate exchange of apples for oranges, from a 
worker’s sale of his/her labor power in the market. The attention is 
only on the equality of the marginal rate of substitution of apples for 
oranges and their price ratio in the case of the former transaction, 
and on the equality of the marginal rate of substitution of work for 
leisure with the wage rate in the case of the latter transaction.
The critics of neo-classical economics argue that emphasis on 
exchange and individuals (in contrast to production and institutions) 
has led the orthodox theorists to ignore the most peculiar aspect of 
the capitalist mode of production. Workers have been denied the 
ownership of the means of production and have been forced to sell 
their labor powers in the market. On occasion workers may be more 
or less free to sell their labor powers to whomever they choose, but 
they are not free to not sell them at all. If one loses sight of this 
aspect of capitalist relations of production, one is likely to reach some 
of the essential conclusions of orthodox economists' theorizing ideas 
of freedom, equality and optimality. According to these economists, 
economic agents are free to sell or not to sell their commodities and 
are free to leave or enter the markets; the individuals confront each 
other as equals having access to equal resources and information, 
exchanging equal commodities; and naturally only those exchanges
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take place that cause at least one of the agents to be better off and 
neither worse off. (Mohun 1979) & (Godelier 1972)
The neo-classical economists' assumption of rational, egotistical, 
and maximizing human beings have been established at a high level 
of abstraction that is institutional free. According to them, all human 
efforts can be reduced to the exchange of land, labor and capital in 
all societies, places, and times. Under any institutional framework, 
the atomized individuals are maximizing their exogenous preference 
structure (in the case of consumers) or a form of profit function (in 
the case of producers). Moreover, such concepts as wages, rent and 
interest are considered to be universal categories and are applicable 
to both the present day economies and the economies of the past 
with completely different institutional persuasions. (Hunt 1979) The 
categories of wage, rent and interest, then
are hedonistically 'natural' categories of 
such taxonomic force that their elemental 
lines of cleavage ran through the facts of 
any given economic situation...even where 
the situation does not permit these lines of 
cleavage to be seen by men...; so that, e.g., a 
gang of Aleutian Islanders slushing about in 
the wrack and surf with rakes and magical 
incantations for the capture of shell-fish are 
held, in point of taxonomic reality, to be 
engaged in a feat of hedonistic equilibration 
in rent, wages, and interest. And that is all 
there is to it. Indeed, for economic theory 
of this kind, that is all there is to any 
economic situation. (Veblan 1961, cited in 
Hunt 1979, P. 304)
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In the orthodox economists' view the capitalist economy differs 
from all the other societies only in the sense that in the former the 
universal human behavior, universal human activities and "the 
universal modes by which these activities were rewarded lead to the 
ideal situation of equilibrium and pareato-optimality.1
The following statements from Solow (Solow 1963), one of the 
major exponents of neo-classical econom ists, will clarify the 
institutional-free nature of analysis of this school.
Workers get paid for working; what do 
capitalist get paid for? For 'waiting' while 
ro u n d ab o u t p ro cesses  o f p ro d u c tio n  
percolate, or for 'abstaining' from some 
current consumption in favour of replacing 
or augmenting the stock of capital and 
m a in ta in in g  o r in c re a s in g  fu tu re  
consumption. Since so much of the 'waiting' 
gets done in expensive autom obiles and 
luxurious resorts, while the 'abstinence' 
excites little sympathy in an even slightly 
cynical observer, the w hole apparatus 
begins to  look like a transparent verbal 
trick...But even so, there is no excuse for 
economists to lose the concept in their 
resentment at the language. One of the 
elegant showpiece of econom ics is its 
an a ly s is  o f th e  re so u rc e -a llo c a tio n  
implications of a system of prices or shadow 
prices. We have learned to free this 
analysis of ethical overtones. All that is 
necessary in capital theory is to draw a 
conceptual distinction between the imputed 
return  to  cap ital and the incom e of 
capitalists. Here, as elsewhere in economics, 
but with rather more irony here, the best
Assuming free competition and ignoring such "disturbances" as monopoly.
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way of understanding the economics of 
capitalism may be to think about a socialist 
economy, (cited in Mohun 1979)
As far as the orthodox economists' theory is applicable to any 
society with diverse institutions, the same tools and instruments 
which are used to analyze a capitalist economy can be used to 
analyze other economic systems. Under the same logic, there is no 
need therefore to utilize different concepts and methods for 
analyzing East-W est economic relations. And as these economists 
hold that the international trade and investm ents are equally 
advantageous for all parties involved, it must not make any 
difference if one of the parties is a socialist country. It is the 
purpose of this chapter to investigate the methodology adopted by 
the orthodox economists in their study of the economic relations 
between advanced capitalist countries and socialist ones and to show 
the authenticity of the above statements, i.e. universal applicability 
of their theory. Furthermore, throughout this chapter, I will attempt 
to pinpoint the problems associated with the neo-classical school's 
methodology in investigating East-W est economic relations. To 
achieve such a goal an extensive survey of literature is necessary. 
Such a task at first may seem to be difficult, since the number of 
books and articles published by mainstream economists on the 
subject is extensive. A more detailed examination, however, reveals 
that there are two distinctive groups in this school which have dealt 
with the question of East-West relations. The first group in its 
analysis does not try to maintain any explicit theoretical perspectives 
and mainly relies on case studies. The second group comprises those
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orthodox w riters who take their theoretical approaches more 
seriously and try to apply the neo-classicist's concepts and methods 
in inquiring into their topic of study. Consequently, this chapter is 
divided into two major parts. In part one, I will review the 
methodologies adopted by 'non-theoretical' orthodox economists; in 
part two, I will focus on theoretical works of these economists.
PART ONE: NON-THEORETICAL ORTHODOX ECONOMISTS:
M ost orthodox economists who have sought to investigate 
East-West economic relations have produced works which steer clear 
of maintaining an explicit, coherent theoretical reasoning. Instead 
they have relied on case studies, informed speculation, taxonomical 
ex e rc ise ,2 or general description The lack of theoretical analysis on 
the part of these orthodox authors has been interpreted by M. Herold 
and N. Kozlov (1983) as their realization of the inadequacy of neo­
classical theoretical apparatus in dealing with the question of East 
and W est economic relations. "Lacking a concept o f mode of 
production, it is of course difficult to conceptualize relations between 
different forms of social organizations.” (Herold and Kozlov 1983, P. 
17) It is not the purpose of my study to find out whether these
2 I am using the categories employed by M. Herold and N. Kozlov (1983). I 
realize that such categorization is somehow arbitrary, as in many cases 
there is significant overlap between, for example, those authors who rely 
on case studies and those who have devoted considerable attention to 
taxonomy.
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orthodox authors abstain from theoretical investigation because of 
their "intuitive grasp of this difficulty" or their lack of belief in the 
universal applicability of the already produced neo-classical theory 
of international trade and investment or perhaps some other reasons. 
This study will try however to show that omission o f theoretical 
analysis has produced various consequences. On occasion, some of 
these authors, by relying extensively on the case studies, have drawn 
illegitimate generalizations based on limited information. On the 
other hand, the work of some authors can be illuminating and at 
times useful. As it is impossible to cite the works of all of the 
mainstream economists who have employed the "non-theoretical" 
approach in studying East-West economic relations, I will only bring 
some examples under each different category. 1 will try to illustrate 
only the works of those economists who are at least relatively well- 
known in their field of study.3
Part one of this chapter is subsequently divided into four major 
sections. 1- case studies; 2- general description; 3- informed 
speculation; 4- taxonomical exercises. I would like to state from the 
beginning that since my goal is to highlight the methodology adopted 
by the orthodox economists and show the consequences of their 
adopted methodology, I will not divide the following sections (3.1.- 
3.4.) based on the subject (i.e., trade, investment, etc.).
3 My emphasis will be on the recent studies. For a thorough survey of 
literature prior to 1974 see Holzman. (1974)
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3.1, CASE -STUDIES;
Most authors in the neo-classical tradition who have relied on case 
studies for analyzing the East-W est economic relations have 
emphasized only one aspect of such relations. Others have either 
concentrated on operation of one particular company (or industry) in 
Eastern Europe or have focused on the experiences of individuals. 
Among the best examples of the first group is McMillan (McMillan 
1981) who describes the "institu tional forms" and financial 
arrangements which characterize industrial cooperation agreements 
(henceforth I.C.A.) between East and West.
M cM illan considers I.C .A .s as "new m icroeconom ic 
relationships" which link Western firms to the Eastern state agencies 
in a broad range o f activities such as research, investment and 
marketing. He believes assimilation of Western technology is an 
important incentive for Eastern Europeans to conclude I.C.A.s. In 
particular, for more trade-dependent Eastern countries, the export- 
generating function of acquired technology is a major additional 
consideration.
The hard currency payments faced by Eastern countries is 
another consideration which has made them interested in the "self- 
financing" character of I.C.A.s. Under an I.C.A., in many cases 
purchases of Western plants and technology are partially offset by 
return from Westward flows of jointly produced outputs.
McMillan also pays considerable attention to taxonomy, and he 
seeks a definition of I.C.A.s, which he thinks is important for any
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rigorous and fundamental analysis o f East-West economic relations 
especially of quantitative nature. He then adopts the definition for 
an I.C .A . which "incorporates purchases o f technology and/or 
equipment (including complete plants) on a compensation basis, as 
well as more unambiguous forms of production cooperation - and 
extends to joint East-West companies, established for a wide variety 
of purposes." (McMillan 1981, P. 56) Based on this definition he then 
tries to establish the trend of I.C.A. development through the end of 
the 1970s. This task is admittedly a difficult and important one, 
mainly due to lack of any detailed and regular official, national 
statistics on the number or size of the I.C.A.s. Nevertheless he tries 
to assemble data mainly based on the secondary sources which are 
"susceptible to variations in coverage by the specialized press." 
(McMillan 1981, P. 60)
The tremendous growth of East-West trade in the first half of the 
1970s was matched with an equally explosive development of I.C.A.s. 
McMillan argues that in the second half of the mid 1970s, after the 
initial period of dynamic growth, one might have expected I.C.A.s to 
grow more slowly due to a combination of the following reasons. The 
more obvious opportunities for cooperation would have been 
exploited in the first phase. Moreover, the recession of 1974-75 
which created excess capacities in the West, therefore reduced the 
incentive of Western firms to add new productive capacity in the 
East. Furthermore, the Western companies became more interested 
in new important partners for industrial cooperation, the OPEC 
countries. Finally, renewed tensions between East and West could be
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seen as an impedement to further growth of I.C.A.s. McMillan's 
studies, however, show there was no evidence of an overall 
slowdown in the number of new I.C.A.s after 1976, despite the 
unfavorable economic and political climate. He also tries to present 
the breakdown of I.C.A.s by industry in 1975 and 1980, to mark the 
trend of their industrial structural changes.
In discussing the outlook for I.C.A.s in the 1980s, McMillan 
believes several important and potentially constraining factors must 
be considered. He argues I.C.A.s are inherently dependent upon 
favorable political conditions. For example, as a channel for the
transfer of Western technology they are vulnerable to embargoes of 
technology. In the absence of the propitious political climate he 
predicts there will be "concentration on smaller, short-term projects
in less politically sensitive sectors.” Moreover, due to increasing
W estern concern about the impact of com pensatory goods on 
W estern markets, the com pensation deals may be difficult to 
implement. However, the compensation deals are very important for 
Eastern countries, due to their chronic hard-currency deficits and 
mounting debts. He also mentions the differences in the socio­
economic system as a constraint on the growth of I.C.A.s. Here, in 
contrast to Frank and W allerstein who consider the economic 
relations with the W est as a determining factor in changing the 
economic structure of socialist countries, McMillan argues the I.C.A.
has proven not to be a substitute for 
economic reform; it is in fact a type of
reform of Eastern foreign trade mechanism.
To be sucessful, it must be accompanied by
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complementary changes in other aspects of
both external and domestic planning and 
m anagem ent. If  such accom odation is 
lacking, (I.C.A.) arrangements are like alien 
bodies grafted on to  a system  w hich 
ultimately rejects them.” (McMillan 1981, P.
64,)
In the absence of economic reform in those countries he concludes 
that "the quantitative growth of (I.C.A.) is unlikely to be matched by 
its qualitative development. (I.C.A.) would then remain stunted in its 
evolution, a euphemism for the simpler forms of subcontracting and
more complex forms of barter.” (McMillan 1981, P. 65)
Paul Marer and Joseph M iller (1972) also are interested in 
investigating the I.C.A. aspect of economic relations between East and 
West, in particular the U .S.’s participation in East-W est industrial 
cooperation agreements. They attribute Eastern countries' interests
in I.C.A. to their acute shortage of hard currency as well as the 
importance of narrowing the East-West technological gap. On the U.S. 
side their study, based on a survey of over one thousand U.S. 
corporations engaged in I.C.A.s, indicates the most important motive 
is the market penetration.
Among the interesting results o f their survey are: the majority 
of U.S. corporations involved in I.C.A.s were among the Fortune 500, 
almost all were multinational corporations, and nearly half have some 
type of involvement in more than one country. They also conclude 
that in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe projects in chemical 
and machinery industries dominate. Moreover, they argue that the 
Soviet Union exhibits a strong preference for turnkey agreements,
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whereas Eastern European countries are more interested in applied 
industrial technology and know-how. In general their study is not as 
comprehensive and thorough as McMillan's.
Barclay (1979) provides a comprehensive analysis of the role of 
com pensation agreements in Soviet trade with the W est. He 
attributes the impetus behind the rapid expansion of Soviet trade 
with the West in the 1970s to the Soviet Union's desire to acquire 
capital, technology and equipment in order to explore and exploit 
Siberia's natural resources and to expand the product in certain 
industrial sectors, such as chemical and petro chemicals. In their 
trade relations with the West the Soviets have emphasized the 
compensation agreements, which according to Barclay offer several 
advantages to them. One important advantage is the reduction of 
risk, because under the compensation agreements the Soviets are 
guaranteed long-term  export markets, which provide protection 
against Western recession that would otherwise reduce Soviet export 
earnings. Another advantage is the creation of export industry in the 
Soviet Union specialized in producing for export.
However, Barclay believes that in the second half of the 1970s 
as Soviet interest in the compensation deals had intensified, the 
number of new deals concluded had decreased considerably. He 
envisages both the Soviets' in ternal problem s and W estern 
disenchantment as the main reasons for such a decline. On the Soviet 
side he considers the following factors to be responsible for slow 
proliferation of compensation deals. First of all, the Soviet foreign 
trade bureaucracy  is ill-equ ipped  to handle com pensation
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agreements. Moreover, while successful conclusion of such deals
requires continuing Western presence, ownership, or control over 
production, the Soviet doctrine clearly does not perm it Western 
equity participation and/or management control. Furthermore, even 
if such difficulties can be surpassed, "the primitive level of Siberian 
infrastructure and the difficulties involved in taking on several large 
development projects simultaneously" make it difficult to negotiate 
and conclude a large number of compensation agreements. (Barclay 
1979, PP. 470-471)
On the Western side he argues that first of all the Western firms 
are reluctant to accept many Soviet products. In addition, many
agreements signed in the first half of 1970s reflected the Western 
firms' eagerness to insure access to raw materials; however, the 
recession of mid 1970s hit industries that produce the products that 
Soviets would like to export. Moreover, in most cases the Soviet Union 
requests harsh financial demands including long-run credits to 
finance the development of infrastructure as well as production 
facilities; deferred payments on installments until the end of plant 
construction. Such financial demands make the conclusion of 
com pensation deals for the W estern firm s less a ttractive . 
Furtherm ore, some firms are reluctant to enter into such deals
because they do not want "to sponsor additional com petition." 
(Barclay 1979, P. 472)
Barclay believes the prospect o f increasing the number of 
com pensation agreem ents to a large degree depends on the
resolutions of the above problems. In particular the Soviet Union
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must overcome "bureaucratic inertia, cut negotiation times (possibly 
by abandoning the past hard line on price, guarantees, credits, and 
other contract terms), and soften restrictions on the Western presence 
in the domestic economy." (Barclay 1979, P. 473) Barclay's argument 
is, therefore, different from those of Frank and Wallerstein, who see 
the economic relations with the West as a determining factor in 
shaping the economic structure of socialist countries. Barclay seems 
to say the opposite. He argues that it is only through changes in both 
internal factors and external factors tha t East-W est economic 
relations can be intensified.
Jozef Wilczynski (1977) is interested in analysing the licenzing 
aspect of West-East-West transfer technology. Starting with a brief 
history of technological embargo during the Cold W ar era, he argues 
that apart from the political considerations the support for embargo 
extended to the large corporations which were anxious to retain their 
world-wide leadership in the export of industrial products. They 
were concerned about rapid industrial development in the socialist 
countries and did not want to facilitate the emergence of dangerous 
competitors. However, according to him the result of embargo was "to 
push smaller socialist countries into the arms of U.S.S.R. as she had 
the largest range of technology as an alternative supplier."(Wilczynski 
1977, P. 122)
A good part of his paper is devoted to the historical survey of 
the total number of licenses sold by the Western countries to the East, 
as well as to exhibiting examples of some of the best known licenses 
provided by Western firms to the socialist countries. He enumerates
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the reasons for the change of attitude of Western firms in regards to 
the sales of licenses to the East. First, the direct exports of some 
goods in particular consumer products, to the socialist countries are 
often complicated and not favored by officials in these countries. The 
selling of licenses in these cases is a sensible alternative to direct 
exports. Second, the socialist countries are increasingly inclined to 
purchase licenses on the understanding that payment will be linked 
to the quantity of output sold, which may end up producing a quite 
substantial amount of money. Third, the sales of licenses in the 
majority of cases will lead to exports of other products. Finally, the 
Western firms are not too much concerned anymore about the loss of 
their technological lead, since in many cases they sell only dated 
technology. Furthermore, the inability of socialist countries to apply 
the acquired licenses in production is another reason for the Western 
firms' lack of concern for loss of their technological lead.
Wilczynski also mentions the socialist countries’ sales of licenses 
to the West. According to him, in recent years, by the increase in 
sophistication and magnitude of the invention made by the advanced 
socialist countries, their sales of licenses have also increased. Most of 
the buyers of socialist licenses are small or medium Western firms, 
and not multinational corporations. Such sales are important for the 
East, particularly in order "to dispel the conviction in the West that 
the the socialist countries are technologically backward," and also "to 
demonstrate that socialism is not only a superior social system but 
also has the capacity to catch up and surpass capitalism  
technologically." (Wilczynski 1977, P. 132 & 134)
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In discussing the prospects for future development o f license 
trade, he believes two sets of opposite forces will be operating, one 
w ith re s tric tiv e  effec ts, and the o ther w ith  expansionary 
consequences. Among the restrictive factors he counts the socialist 
countries' realization that such "'horizontal' transfer of technology - as 
contrasted with a 'vertical' flow from domestically-sustained effort - 
is likely to perpetuate the traditional East-West technological gap." 
(Wilczynski 1977, P. 135)
Among the expansionary factors he believes is the realization 
of the well-known fact that additions to advanced technology 
required tremendous costs in both expenses in R and D and 
investment in human capital. And he concludes that "these modem 
facts of technological life make the international division of labor 
imperative...It will be increasingly sensible for the .East as well as the 
West to specialize in certain lines of technology according to 
comparative advantage, and the resources so economized can be put 
to other worthy uses." (Wilczynskil977, P. 135) This conclusion is, 
however, in contradiction to his arguments in regards to one-sided 
benefits which Western firms obtain in their sales of licenses to the 
Eastern countries. Socialist countries are well aware of this point and 
according to Wilczynski himself, are taking some measures in order 
to ensure they are not handed over technology that is dated or of 
little economic consequences.
Hubert A. Janiszewski (1982) has concentrated his study on 
imports of technology by Poland. He considers it as an important 
task because the "conclusion drawn from its experience may be of
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in terest not only to other countries which are im porters of 
technology but also to suppliers." (Janiszewski 1982, P. 165) The 
paper is covered by axiomatic claims and statem ents with no 
attempts on behalf of the author to substantiate them. Such neglect 
can be partly attributed to the length of the paper, which is rather 
short given the importance of the topic.
He starts his study by examining different channels through 
which technology is imported to Poland, and continues by trying to 
analyze the impact of imported technology on the Polish economy. 
In doing so he shows that between 1971-1978 on the average, the 
outflows related to technological acquisitions accounted for by 
payment of fees, royalties, purchase of equipment, etc. were more 
than tw ice of the inflow s represented by export earnings. 
Janiszewski also mentions the widespread delays in implementing 
technology which almost exclusively are due "to the lack of resources 
for the continuation of the individual investments and imposed 
restriction on imports of spare parts, raw materials, etc." (Janiszewski 
1982, P. 169) This is an example of unsubstantiated statements 
which Janiszewski does not make any effort to validate.
Janiszewski concludes his paper by noting that Poland's 
attempts to modernize rapidly by means of imports of technology 
have, in general, been fruitful. However, its objective of massive 
export increases by the use of acquired technology has been 
unsuccessful. The reason, according to him, should be sought in both 
the internal and external conditions. Externally the world recession 
affected Polish exports as well as Polish investment capacities.
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Internally he believes the heavy emphasis on central planning 
"combined with national investment programs, led to poor planning 
of technology im ports leading into huge delays in pro ject 
implementation." (Janiszewski 1982, P. 170) Therefore, he concludes 
his paper with another axiomatic statem ent which he feels no 
obligation to back up.
John Holt (1977) takes up the study of eight U.S. agricultural 
and construction equipment companies' activities in Eastern Europe. 
He tries to show how U.S. companies profit by sharing their 
technology and know-how with Eastern European countries. He 
believes, in order to maintain or extend their markets in Eastern 
Europe, these companies have turned increasingly to industrial 
cooperation agreements. According to his study these companies 
consider the direct sale of their products more profitable than sale of 
technology and know-how. However, due to mounting competition in 
the ir field , the U.S. agricultural and construction equipm ent 
companies are yielding to Eastern Europeans' pressure to share their 
technology, to accept payments in product, and to provide a market 
for these countries' products. Other factors which in Holt's account 
will enhance the competitive positions of these companies include 
the uniqueness and scarcity of a company's products, its reputation 
for quality, its performance, and its good faith.
Holt's survey of eight U.S. agricultural and construction 
equipment companies indicates that not all of them are concerned 
about potential competition from the product of the transferred 
technology. The companies have frequently chosen to protect their
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markets and technology through contractural agreement limiting the 
territorial use and transferability of their technology. Some 
companies have also withheld their latest technology. However, the 
ability of companies to withhold is lim ited by their degree of 
dependence upon the Eastern country's production resulting from the 
acquired technology, as well as the companies' responsibility for 
marketing of the Eastern products outside these countries.
There are other authors who emphasize the legal aspects of 
foreign investment legislation in Eastern Europe. John G. Scriven
(1980), for example, studies the joint venture regulations in Poland, 
and in doing so tends to generalize based on limited information. He 
starts his discussion with the claim  that the unfavorable trade 
balances and acute shortage of hard currencies faced by the Eastern 
European countries have led to new directions and developments in 
the East-W est trade. Among the new developments, one is the 
growth of 'counter-trade' under which all purchases of Western 
products must be balanced by a sale of products from the purchasing 
country. The other new development is the "revival of interest in 
direct foreign investment by Western corporations in equity jo in t 
ventures." (Scriven 1980, P. 425) And then he turns to a detailed 
study of Poland's 1976 regulations on foreign investments as well as 
Polish investment law of 1979. Finally, he concludes that Poland, by 
allowing considerable freedom to Western partners in making their 
arrangements on management issues and by imposing no limitation 
on profit levels and royalty rates, has gone a long way in satisfying 
the likely  demands of the W estern firm s. Poland's foreign
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investments' regulations according to Scriven, avoid the extremist 
position of some of the developing nations in regards to flow of 
foreign investm ents in their country, and prove "the socialist 
countries recognize their need for technology from the W estern 
dem ocracies and wish to follow a non-dogmatic approach in 
negotiating such arrangements." (Scriven 1980, P. 437)
Scriven (1979) in another article takes up the issue of 
Yugoslavia's foreign investment law. Here, he also draws a detailed 
picture of the law and tries to attribute its legislation to the 1974 
political changes in Yugoslavia and resultant new constitution there. 
His analysis leads him to conclude "Yugoslavia's new foreign 
investment law is in line with the current UNCTAD 4 theories of 
p ro tec tion  o f 'T hird-W orld ' countries aga inst m ultina tional 
exploitation." (Scriven 1979, P. 107) However, if one tries - as 
Scriven does - to generalize the Eastern European countries' approach 
toward m ultinational corporations and direct foreign investment 
based on attitude of only one country one may reach opposite 
conclusions, as is obviously clear in regards to Scriven's studies. In 
the case of Poland he speaks about the non'dogmatic and lenient 
approach of Eastern European countries toward Western firms; in the 
case of Yugoslavia he complains about their hard-line attitudes.
The contradiction is not only limited to Scriven's conclusions; 
rather he also makes contradictory statements in the course of his 
study. At one point, for example, in discussing the provision which 
deals with regulating the minimum amount of capital contribution of
4 United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations.
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foreign partners, he states "this provision could put an end to token 
investments by foreign suppliers in joint ventures which are really 
disguised sales." (Scriven 1979, P. 100) At another point, talking 
about the same law he argues "the new law will be attractive only 
for these companies interested in disguised sales of equipment and 
technology." 5 (Scriven 1979, P. 106)
Summary,. Sgslign_2-J, ;
In this section I have attempted - to demonstrate only a few 
examples of those neo-classical school economists who have adopted 
the ’case study’ method of analysis. The following table summarizes 
the major points of their arguments and provides some information 
about the consequences of their adopted methodology.
3.2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION:
A significant amount of literature published on East-West economic 
relations by the mainstream economists has been devoted to general 
description and background information about such relations. Some 
have exclusively concentrated on studying historical developments 
and upswings and downswings which these relations have gone 
through. However, many have chosen this method to prove or
5 There are others such as William Diebold, Jr. (1979) who is interested in 
analyzing the Soviet Union participation in multilateral cooperation 
arrangements. He believes increase in Soviet foreign economic activities 
has not been matched by its interest in multilateral cooperation 
arrangements. He tries to shed some light on the reasons for such lack of 
interest and investigate the factors which might influence future Soviet 











He provides a brief history 
of evolution of East-West 
economic relations, and 
describes how the U.S. trade 
relations with Eastern 
Europe have been mistakenly 
viewed by American policy 
makers as an important tool 
in American diplomacy.
He believes the inability of 
Eastern Europe to generate 
foreign exchange is one of 
the main considerations 
behind the decline in the 
East-West trade.
He believes that Eastern 
European countries in their 
'macro-economics' are 
behaving like the rest of the 
world. In the 1970s, these 
countries raised investment 
without cuts in consumption, 
while their terms'of trade 
were polling. Hie result was 
huge hard currency deficit
Comments
He is more or less successful 
in demonstrating that there 
should never be a political 
consideration in regard to 
whether trade or not to trade.
He provides some data 
concerning East-West trade 
relations.
He produces contradictory 





Sankar L. De He concentrates his study
(1975) on die activities of Amer­
ican multinational corpora­
tion in the Soviet Union.
He dtes the reason behind 
the Soviet intrest in econ­





L. Evrawick He is interested in inves-
(1979) tigating the role of MNCs
in East-West economic 
relations.
He provides an overview 
of the volumes and dimen­
sions of U.S. multinationals 
in the Soviet Union.
He argues national sovereignty 
of the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European countries are 
strengthened rather than 
weakened by their relations 
with MNCs.
He claims that the Soviet Union 
favors relatively smaller and 
weaker corporations over the 
stronger ones.
He provides a comprehensive 
analysis of East-West economic 
relations.
He cites different reasons for 
the socialist countries' interests 
in dealing with MNCs; he claims 
that the highest percentage 
of East-West exchange is realized 
by MNCs.
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disprove a given hypothesis. A good example of such an approach is 
that of Stephen A. Garrett. (1982) Garrett tries to show how the U.S. 
trade relations with Eastern Europe have been mistakenly viewed by 
American policy makers as an important tool in American diplomacy. 
"During the earlier period, it was seen as a 'stick' with which the 
United States could pummel and weaken the Eastern European 
regimes; in more recent times it has been viewed as a 'carrot' that 
would facilitate a new American relationship with the countries of 
the region." (Garrett 1982, P. 490)
Garrett argues that immediately after 1948, the countries of 
Eastern Europe were viewed as hostile to the United States and 
deserving some response. Given this assumption, normal trade 
relations with these countries were considered not in the interest of 
the United States. He believes there were considerations underlying 
this judgement. Imports by the Eastern European countries would 
supposedly allow  them to shift capital resources to m ilitary 
development, would strengthen the technological base of their 
system, and m ost important of all "would save the communist 
regimes from the consequences of the inherent flaws in their political 
economic structure." (Garrett 1982, P. 490) An embargo on trade 
was suggested since it would obstruct their economic and military 
progress as w ell as "accentuate a process of internal political 
instability." Accompanying the embargo was a boycott of Eastern
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European exports with the belief that it would also impede the 
progress of these countries. 6
The change of U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe in the 1960s, 
and the doubt about the effectiveness of the use of combination of 
embargo and boycott, eventually led the U.S. government to use 
trade as a 'carrot1 rather than as a 'stick.' Arguments were advanced 
that increased trade would help to support the position of the 
relative moderates in the governments of Eastern Europe. In 
addition, increased trade with the United States would provide these 
countries another alternative to total economic reliance on the Soviet 
Union, therefore contributing to loosening the Eastern bloc structure 
with significant political advantages for the U.S. Finally, Western 
trade w ould encourage decentralization  o f Eastern European 
economies. As a whole, policy-makers felt there was an 'organic link' 
between internal economic reform in Eastern Europe and the latter's 
participation in the 'international division of labor.' (Garrett 1982, P. 
493)
Garrett then sets up the goal of measuring the degree of 
success of each of these policies and reaches the conclusion that the 
"level of American exchange with Eastern Europe could hardly have 
any decisive impact on the overall political equation.” (Garrett 1982, 
P. 499-500) The United States has never been a significant factor in
6 For more information on the history of the U.S. government's control on 
trade with the East see Bayard. Pelzmand & Perez Lopez. (1982) These 
authors also attempt to demonstrate under what conditions it may be 
feasible for the Western countries to inflict some economic costs to the 
Soviet Union and Eastern European nations through export control. For
some o f the recent development on the U.S. goverment trade policy toward 
the Soviet Union see Brougher. (1982)
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the general trade situation of Eastern Europe. The combination of 
several factors has created "tangible limits to development of trading 
relations between the United States and Eastern Europe. Among 
these limiting factors he considers the relative distance between the 
United States and Eastern Europe when compared with W estern 
European countries. Moreover, he believes the market in the United 
States for Eastern European products has been and will likely 
continue to be small and as a result these countries will "not be able 
to sustain the inevitable balance of payments that a large expansion 
of American exports...would entail." (Garrett 1982, P. 498)
Garrett's conclusion is that the use of trade as a 'stick' in the 
early phase of American policy toward Eastern Europe was politically 
unsuccessful and led to a large expansion of intra-East European 
trade. Adoption of this policy also resulted in the Soviet's increased 
"control over economic and ultimately military capabilities of Eastern 
Europe;" what the United States has always feared. (Garrett 1982, P. 
503) According to Garrett, the use of trade as "carrot" in the belief 
that expansion of trade with Eastern Europe will gradually mean 
taking the "economic prize away from the Soviet Union" is not 
justifiab le either. In the economic relations between Eastern 
European countries and the Soviet Union, the former "came to 
acquire as many if not more obligations to Eastern Europe in a 
material sense as rewards from it.” (Garrett 1982, P. 506) Therefore, 
Garrett concludes there should never be a political consideration in 
regard to whether to trade or not to trade. "This has always been the 
sort of judgement which essentially could and should be decided on
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trad itional grounds of com parative econom ic advantage and 
maximization of economic opportunity."(Garrett 1982, p.508)7
Jiri Dobrovolny (1983) uses data as East-West trade relations in 
order to demonstrate that the recent deterioration of the "economic 
and political environment pertaining to East-West trade is not only 
due to explicit sanctions by the West." (Dobrovolny 1983, P. 337) 
The essence of his argument is the growing Eastern European trade 
deficit in the 1970s has led these countries to take some measures in 
order to reduce the burden of debt. Their endeavors began to bear 
some fruit in 1980, but the deficit still continues to be large. The 
only escape out of the foreign exchange squeeze according to 
Dobrovolny "consists of sharply cutting back imports from the West 
and promoting imports in non-convertible currencies." He believes 
the quality and flexibility of East European countries’ exports do not 
come up to the requirements of Western markets, and therefore does 
not permit them to generate enough hard currencies. The inability of 
Eastern Europe to generate foreign exchange and the increasing 
reluctance of Western banks to grant them new credits must be 
considered when one tries to study the causes of the recent 
deterioration of East-West economic relations.
7 L.J. Brainard (1979) also believes the U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union 
has been unsuccessful. He argues for example that such policy since 1975 
has focused on the denial of most favored nation status, "of Eximbank 
credits and selected Soviet technology purchase. The Soviet Union has been 
able without much difficulty to deny U.S. any political benefit from the 
policy and lost sales by U.S. business have imposed economic costs. In turn, 
we have been unable to deny their access to credit and technology in other 
countries." (Ibid.,p. 109)
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Richard Portes (1981) also deals with the question of East- 
West economic relations, concentrating on their development in the 
1970s. According to him the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968 marked a change of direction in the Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance and its relations with the rest of the world. It not only set 
limits on how far decentralization of Eastern European economies and 
their approaches toward the West can go, but it also determined the 
process of further growth for these countries. Emphasis turned 
toward rationalization and integration of manufacturing production 
throughout the bloc. This integration did not exclude industrial 
cooperation with Western firms, and the purchase of technology was 
to become a key element in the process.
More or less at the same time the new Polish government 
which came to power after riots of 1970 was considering that the 
only way to deal with economic constraints which had led to the 
discontent was to invest heavily in modern technology for several 
years without reducing consumption. They decided upon massive 
purchases of Western plants and equipment on credit. Moreover, the 
commodity price increase of 1972-1974 put great pressure on the 
smaller Eastern European countries. These factors, coupled with the 
flowering of detente atmosphere, led to an acceleration of imports by 
Eastern Europe, which was mainly financed by Western credits. The 
accumulation of petrodollar deposits in W estern banks and the 
recession beginning in 1974 which caused both bankers and capital 
goods exporters to seek customers were important factors in a sharp 
increase in Eastern hard currency imports. Portes seems to suggest
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that the reason for the increase in Eastern European imports in the 
1970s should be sought in a combination of several factors, both 
internal to their system and external to it.
In contrast to "conventional wisdom," Portes believes Eastern 
Europe's hard currency deficits of the past several years were more a 
"manifestation of excessive pressure at the macro-economic level 
(excess real demand) than a policy response to the 'technological 
gap'." He argues "if there had been a decision to substitute Western 
for CMEA produced machinery, this could have been accomplished by 
cutbacks of other imports from the West," and then he tries to show 
that the composition of East-West trade did not show such a trend. 
(Portes 1981, P. 331) He emphasizes the evidence indicates that the 
Eastern European countries in their "macro- economies" are behaving 
like the rest of the world, in the sense that aggregate excess demand- 
results in an import surplus. In the 1970s, Portes believes the East 
European countries raised  investm ent w ithout "holding back 
consumption," while their terms of trade were falling. The result was 
huge hard-currency deficits.
According to Portes, the acceleration of hard currency deficits 
has not been the only consequence of importing Western technology; 
the other consequence is in a good number of cases that very little 
technology of value has actually been transferred to the East. The 
Eastern European countries have realized often their Western 
partners in the I.C.A. were merely "trying to recoup some of the 
development costs of a product or process which is already on its 
way out in the West, or possibly seeking access to Eastern markets
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with simple commodity exports which can cheaply be given a final 
stage of processing in the East," (Portes 1981, P. 342)
Portes sees two different alternatives through which the 
Eastern countries can deal with the problems o f trade-deficits and 
shortage of credit. They can choose either an import restriction or 
export promotion policy. Import restriction on food and consumer 
goods, according to him, will have political consequences; restrictions 
on materials may cause immediate bottleneck effects on production; 
restrictions on capital goods may cause long-run effects on East 
European technical progress,8 competiveness and growth. Portes also 
believes that a successful export promotion drive to penetrate 
Western markets is unlikely. For an export promotion policy to be 
triumphant "there would have to be institutional changes of a fairly 
radical nature;... decentralization in decision making in production" 
and "much greater scope" for I.C.A.s. He finds such institutional 
changes highly improbable, and in fact he argues increased "East- 
West trade in the 1970s has been in part a substitute for economic 
reforms." (Portes 1981, P. 332-333) Immediately, however, in the 
next paragraph, Portes seems to suggest another point of view. He 
argues that the logic of Eastern Europe's centralized economy dictates 
"the increased trade dependence on unstable Western economies will 
motivate somewhat greater centralization.” And he continues by 
suggesting that perhaps the only internally consistent" method of 
embarking on a successful export promotion policy would be to treat
8 One should notice that Portes suggested earlier that "little technology of 
value has actually been transferred to the East."
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this as high priority activity like military production." He is here 
implying the creation of enterprises which are separated from the 
rest of the economy and are specialized in production for export. As 
was m entioned prev iously , Portes also makes contradictory  
statements when he discusses the subject of transfer of technology to 
the East. On the one hand, he states that very little technology of 
value has actually been transferred to Eastern Europe. However, on 
the other hand, he argues that any import restrictions by Eastern 
Europe may have long-term effects on the technical progress of these 
countries.
Aside from making contradictory suggestions, Portes has also 
been criticized for not correctly distinguishing the main problem 
facing Eastern Europe in its efforts to mount a successful export 
promotion policy. Eidem (1981), for example, believes the main 
problem "is not to establish production units in the East that can 
produce to any specification (like spaceships). Instead, the main 
problem is to find the specification or product that can become 
successful in the market in the West." For example, to be successful 
in the W est, the Eastern European producers must have scattered 
repair shops in the West in order to be accessible to consumers. 
They also must become knowledgeable about such aspects as 
delivery conditions, com petitors' rebates, and brand loyalty and 
consumers' recognitions. "This means that the traditional attempts to 
launch products through agents in the West and try a new one each 
year is doomed to failure." (Eidem 1981, P. 359)
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Sankar L. De (1975) has also concentrated on studying the 
economic relations between East and West and in particular the 
activities of American multinational corporations in the Soviet Union. 
After giving a general overview of the volume and dimensions of the 
U.S. multinationals in the Soviet Union, he tries to explore the factors 
behind Soviet interest in increased East-W est trade. Apart from 
Soviet interest in obtaining Western technology and know how, he 
argues the most important factor which explains their interest in 
economic relations with the West is "an attempt at 'gap-filling'." By 
'gap-filling,' he means "an attempt to overcome shortages in supplies 
by import from abroad, and to pay for the augmented imports by 
exporting such relative surplus as may be on hand." (De 1975, P. 
1096) The duration of the gap may be seen as either short-term or 
long-term .
In the short-term gap-filling imports mainly consist of primary 
raw materials and intermediate goods as well as essential consumer 
goods. Imports connected with the long-term gap-filling consist of 
capital goods. A gap in supplies, according to De, may be planned, or 
it may arise in the course of plan fulfillment due to either planning 
errors or various setbacks in the execution of plans. It may also 
arise as a result of revision of plans and priorities.9
As the imports are mainly geared to the "gap-filling" purposes, 
De argues obtaining Western credits gains significant importance.
9 He uses examples o f the increased importation of consumer goods
immediately after Stalin's death and the sharp increase in the purchase of 
chemical industry equipment from the West after Khrushefs decision in 
1959 to 'chemicalize' the Soviet economy.
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The Western credits make it possible for the "gap-filling imports to 
take place in the short run before resources can be reallocated to 
yield the counterpart in the exports," and to the benefits from 
external finance for long-term projects." The same benefits can be 
flown to the Soviet Union through the product pay-back deals. For, 
by having the W estern partner take its repayment in the form of 
eventual products, the Soviets "create additional and economical 
export capacity to finance gap-filling imports in the future." (De 
1975, P. 1096)
De (1975) is also interested in investigating the possibility of 
the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries becoming 
gradually and slowly "the willing prey of the new imperial system" 
as a result of Western capital presence there. He argues that even 
the m ost ardent supporter of m ultinational corporations such as 
Grossman (1974) "grudgingly" admits that the national sovereignty 
of the Soviet Union, and Eastern European countries, is strengthened 
rather than w eakened by their relations with m ultinational 
corporations. Grossman notes that American collaboration with the 
Soviet Union has acted as an alternative to economic reforms and 
reduction in military expenditures.
De, following Gabriel (1972), argues that multinational 
corporations accept the jo int venture agreements from the positions 
not of strength but of weakness. These corporations "when faced 
with outright prohibition of full ownership of local enterprise, or 
when frightened by threats of property seizure of discriminatory 
regulations" typically respond by "acquiescing - or actively seeking -
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joint ventures with local partners." (Portes 1981, P. 1127-1128) The 
common features of a majority of joint venture agreements signed by 
the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries with Western 
multinational corporations are: (i) ownership remains in whole or in
controlling part in the host country's hand, (ii) "The duration of 
foreign company presence is limited." (iii) The terms of agreements 
are negotiable at specified intervals. Based on these characteristics, 
De concludes that "the U.S. - U.S.S.R. joint ventures, presage a new 
chapter in international economic relations marked by domination of 
a national government and subjugation of foreign monopoly capital." 
(De 1975, P. 1128)
There are two other important factors, according to De, which 
help the U.S.S.R. to assume the position of dominance in its 
relationship with m ultinational corporations. F irst, the vested 
interests, both political and economic, which thrive on multinational 
coporations' operations, are usually the champions of multinational 
corporations’ operations in their countries. In a politically less 
cohesive country of the Third World it is easier to find such 
sympathetic interests than in the Soviet Union. In fact, there are 
reasons to believe that in the case of East-West trade, this trend has 
been in the opposite direction. As Grossman (1974) argues "vested 
interests have grown in the U.S. which will seek to maintain the 
profitable Soviet trade and resist any change in the arrangements 
which may jeopardize their credits tied up in the U.S.S.R." (De 1975, 
P. 1128) Second, "the Soviet Union plays a game of checks and 
balances" in signing agreements with multinational corporations. The
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Soviets usually favor relatively smaller and weaker corporations 
over the bigger and stronger ones; and they usually do not place all 
of their contracts in the hands of one giant corporation. Furthermore, 
De (1975) argues the supreme advantage of the Soviet Union from 
the point of view of pure economic theory is its monopolistic position 
and its bargaining power with the multitude of competitve firms.
In  the final section of his paper, De is interested in 
investigating the relations between the Soviet Union and the Third 
World. He believes, based on current evidence, there is no sign 
which indicates the Soviet Union intends to be a partner in the 
imperial system. He cites the example of the Soviets' purchase of 
natural gas from Iran 10 as the only instance which shows "the rise of 
sophisticated multinational dealings across East-W est boundaries at 
the expense of Third World nations.” (De 1975, P. 1129) De is 
another example of orthodox economists whose conclusions are 
diametrically opposed to those reached by the dependency school. 
Frank and Wallerstein believe that the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe are considered prey of the world capitalist economy, while De 
believes the opposite. As was discussed above, De argues that in 
most cases it is the Soviet Union which acts as a predator by playing 
a game of checks and balances with MNCs and also by using its 
monopolistic position. Also, in contrast to the dependency school's
10 The Soviet Union negotiated the purchase of natural gas from Iran in 1966. 
The Soviets purchase price was 19 cents per thousand cubic feet, while its 
resale price was nearly twice as much - 37 cents. De (1975) argues this deal 
was also advantageous to the U.S., which without this arrangement would 
have had to pay 87 cents per thousand cubic feet to Algeria for such a 
purchase.
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proponents, De believes that the East-W est economic relations 
strengthen the national sovereignty of the Soviet Union.
L. Evrawicki (1979) is also among those authors who is 
interested in investigating the role of multinational corporations in 
East-W est economic relations. He starts his discussion with the 
argument that the highest percentage of East-W est exchange is 
realized by multinational corporations (henceforeth MNCs). 11 He 
attributes this phenomenon to the following: 1) The MNCs are able
to offer the socialist countries the most advanced technology and 
research and development. 2) The large output and diversified 
capacities of MNCs enable them to undertake large and sophisicated 
contracts. A medium size company or combination of some medium 
size companies is not able to meet the needs of such large markets as 
the Soviet Union and Poland. Moreover, the socialist countries prefer 
to deal with only a few partners as opposed to many. This tendency 
reflects their interest in greater efficiency and simplicity and "fits 
better the general framework of socialist planning and management." 
(Evrawicki 1979, P. 129) 3) As MNCs pursue global operations they 
are more flexible and have more experience in adapting themselves 
to different and changing environments. Therefore, it is easier for 
them to establish closer links with the socialist countries. 12 4) To a
11 One should notice that Evrawicki's claim that the highest percentage of 
East-West exchange is realized by MNCs, is in contrast to De's (1975) claim 
discussed earlier.
12 Evrawicki believes that MNCs are more flexible than other companies, but 
in socialist countries the MNCs flexibility and freedom of operations is more 
limited than they are in other countries. This limitation is mainly due to 
"state's control over all economic decisions.” As a result, any alteration in
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certain extent, in large corporations such as M NCs, planning and 
management techniques are similar to those which are applied by 
the socialist governments in their countries. "This phenomenon in 
turn facilita tes the negotiation and realization  of long-term  
contracts." (Evrawicki 1979, P. 129)
Evrawicki then tries to shed some light upon "eventual 
advantages" which socialist countries obtain from their different 
economic relations with the West. In this process he attempts to 
show the important role that MNCs play in socialist countries' 
acquisition of these benefits. He starts with imports, and argues 
Eastern importation from MNCs means the possibility of preventing 
and reducing their balance of payment deficit. Because the activities 
of MNCs are dispersed geographically, they can export from different 
subsidiaries representing distinct currency areas. Therefore, the 
payments for imports may be effectuated in the currency of a 
country which favors socialist countries' exports. Furthermore, the 
socialist countries dealing with a particular MNC can purchase their 
imports at lower prices at the least expensive market supplied by 
the corporation. Moreover, owing to the scope and variety of their 
activities, MNCs are more likely to be interested in various kinds of 
compensation deals. However, almost immediately he expresses the 
idea that MNCs try to avoid compensation trade commitments as in 
most cases the W estern customers are not attracted to these 
products. He believes the fact that the MNCs succeed in finding 
consumers for these products, while it is more difficult for socialist
the previously agreed upon activities have to be reviewed and accepted by 
the socialist authorities.
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countries themselves, may indicate both the quality of these articles 
and the superiority of the marketing network, skills and know-how 
of these corporations. (Evrawicki 1979, PP. 132-134)
Turning to the socialist countries' exports and their relation to 
MNCs, Evrawicki argues that socialist exports alone do not create 
close links with these corporations, even though these exports are 
often channeled by specialized agencies owned jointly by socialist 
and capitalist partners. These mixed capital companies enable the 
socialist countries to enter Western markets on equal terms with the 
local competitors. This form of activity according to Evrawicki, has 
not attracted MNCs mainly due to the following reasons: 1) MNCs are 
not interested in engaging in activities which will encourage more 
competitors. 2) The scale of this operation is still small and 
discourages potential volunteers among MNCs.
After dealing with socialist countries' exports and imports, 
Evrawicki discusses licensing agreements. The licenses not only 
permit introduction of "technical organizational experience" relating 
to the production of specific products while substituting for potential 
and actual imports, but can also be used as stimuli to expand Eastern 
countries' exports. In regards to the latter, Evrawicki argues that 
generally the marketing possibilities for the products manufactured 
in the East under licensing agreements in the West are not promising 
because of the heavy emphasis the Western competitors put on 
product differentiation, trademarks, publicity and sales promotion,
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which socialist countries have almost no experience in.13 Among the 
disadvantages of licensing agreements, he believes, is the fact that 
MNCs are aware that their exports of consumer goods will shrink as 
modem technology develops in the East, and aquisition of licenses 
only accelerates this process. As a result, these corporations tend to 
offer licenses to the East which are obsolete, incomplete or too costly; 
they may even try to keep socialist countries dependent on the 
continuous supplies of indispensable components.
Evrawicki, after presenting a thorough picture of costs and 
benefits of licensing agreements, directs his attention to I.C.A.s. In 
contrast to licensing agreements which are used to a certain degree 
as a substitute for direct imports, I.C.A.s according to him are an 
alternative for direct export of final products to the West. He then 
enumerates the advantages and disadvantages of I.C.A.s. Among the 
advantages, he believes, are the W estern partner’s interest in 
supplying the latest technology, as well as the possibility of socialist 
countries' entry into highly monopolized capitalist markets. Among 
the disadvantages of I.C.A.s he counts the following: 1) The Western
consumers generally purchase articles bearing the trademark of 
W estern m anufacturers, unaware of the identity  of socialist 
producers. In such cases the expansion of socialist exports is limited 
by the strategy of the Western partner. 2) The socialist countries 
become dependent upon the business cycles of the W estern 
economies. The risk is increased, he argues, by the fact that the
13 He believes only sharp price competition and/or the improvement of the 
original technology or o f the product itself might bring results. Even then 
the risk of being confronted with anti-dumping regulation is high.
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highly specialized components manufactured in the East fit only the 
final product of a particular firm.14
Evrawicki also spends some time studying joint ventures in 
Eastern Europe. He believes the MNCs are not too eager to establish 
jointly owned enterprises because jo in t ventures imply MNCs not 
only lose the exclusive control over the production, but oblige them 
to share the profit with the partner. He then takes up the study of 
joint ventures in different Eastern European countries.
Evrawicki's analysis is comprehensive and covers a variety of 
economic relations between West and East. He believes there are 
various motives behind East-W est relations. These motives are 
penetration of mutual markets, the reduction of manufacturing costs, 
and the transfer of technology. These targets "are due to the 
circum stances specified in the concrete aims and terms to be 
bargained for during negotiations." (Evrawicki 1979, P. 131) Thus, 
he argues the bargaining power of Eastern and Western partners 
plays a major role in achievements of either party’s goals, and needs 
considerable attention in any analysis of East and W est economic 
relations.
Sum m ary o f Section 3.2..: In this section, I have attempted 
to analyze only a few examples of those neo-classical school’s 
economists who have adopted the 'general description' method of 
analysis in the study of East-West economic relations. The following
14 To minimize the effects of Western business cycles on the local economy, 
Evrawicki suggests that socialist countries must seek the most stable, 
reliable, large and diversified partners.
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table shows a brief summary of their arguments. Although some of 
these economists have been successful in producing a relatively 
comprehensive historical background of East-West relations, a lack of 
any theoretical reasoning has led others, while concentrating on the 
same subject, to arrive at different conclusions. For instance, while De 
(1975) maintains that the Soviet Union prefers smaller corporations 
over the giant ones, Evrawicki (1979) exerts a great deal of effort to 
convince the readers that MNCs realize the highest percentage of 
East-West exchange. Richard Portes (1981) is another example, his 
reliance on the description of events, without following any theory, 
has led him to make contradictory statements.
3.3. INFORMED SPECULATION:
A nother form of analysis adopted by the 'non-theoretical' 
mainstream authors is the "on the one hand,...on the other hand" 
style of informed speculation. This form of analysis usually consists 
of choosing one position or other and developing arguments in order 
to show its plausibility. In this process the author sometimes ends 
up supporting opposite and/or contradictory conclusions at the same 
time. Raymond Vernon (1979) can be classified among those authors 
who have embraced this style of investigation. In his discussion of 
the future possibility of Soviet foreign direct investment, Vernon, 
who is mainly concerned with analysis of East-West trade, states: 
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the Soviets is unlikely. On the other hand, if their foreign trade 
expands, "the country will be pushed to set up servicing and 
assembling facilities in some of its overseas markets." (Vernon 1979, 
P. 1038) He, again, uses this style when he is inquiring whether the 
Soviet Union, in its economic relations with the West, is "in a position 
to exercise its power as sole supplier or sole purchaser...thus, 
capturing most or all of the gains from trade." His reply is: "As 
buyers, the Russians are not all that important to the West; and as 
sellers, they contribute only marginal quantities of any given product 
to the West. Accordingly, they are seen as price takers." On the 
other hand, the competition among Western firms along with the 
institutional structure in the Soviet Union induces strong temptation 
on behalf of Western firms to cut prices greatly. (Vernon 1979, PP. 
1040-1042)
Barkas and Gale's (1981) study of joint ventures in Yugoslavia 
is another example of the informed speculation type of analysis.
They start by stating the fact that importation of capital goods by
many less developed countries has exacerbated their balance of
payments problem. To reduce the pressure on their foreign 
exchange reserves, many LDCs are seeking MNCs involvement via 
equity investment or licensing agreements.
The authors believe that Yugoslavia traditionally has favored 
licensing over direct foreign investment, since it minimizes the risk 
of MNCs domination. Moreover, through licensing agreements, "the 
country is able to produce modern technology without tying up
investment funds." However, in recent years a growing proportion of
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the country’s balance of payment deficit can be attributed to 
licensing royalty payments. This factor along with other economic 
factors has forced Yugoslavia to shift toward encouraging direct 
foreign investment. "Direct foreign investment has the advantage of 
sim ultaneously providing Y ugoslavia with hard currency and 
increased production/technology capacity." (Barkas and Gale 1981, P. 
31) After counting the benefits which result from establishment of 
jo int ventures, they argue, on the other hand, in the cases where 
"joint venture is producing high-technology products that require 
components, ingredients or other materials" which are not produced 
inside Yugoslavia, the joint ventures produce additional revenue for 
MNCs. In other words, Yugoslavia's imports of intermediate goods 
will increase and put further pressure on the balance of payment 
deficit.
In their discussion of various motives behind MNCs interest in 
establishing joint venture in Yugoslavia, Barkas and Gale exhibit 
another instance of informed speculation. They argue that "in 
addition to providing access to raw materials, a Yugoslav joint 
venture may enable the MNC to produce needed product at lower 
cost." This lower cost w ill mainly be achieved because of 
Yugoslavia’s lower salaries and wages. Nevertheless, "this advantage 
may be offset by the lower productivity of the Yugoslav worker." 
Consequently, there exists a trade off between on the one hand lower 
wages, and on the other hand low productivity. (Barka and Gale 
1981, P. 34)
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In regards to benefit derived from access to raw materials, 
they argue in many cases sufficient amounts of raw materials and 
intermediate goods are available at reasonable prices in Yugoslavia. 
But on the other hand, it is estimated that "Yugoslav exports 
currently have a 35 percent import content. Therefore, there may be 
only limited opportunities for the joint venture to secure lower-cost 
raw material supplies." (Barka and Gale 1981, P. 34)
Likewise, Philip Hanson (1978) argues, on the one hand, that 
imports of Western technology act as a marginal stimulus to Soviet 
economic growth. Therefore, their im portance in the general 
performance of the Soviet economy is insignificant and negligible. In 
his words: "These imports are a comparatively small input to a large
economy" (Hanson 1978, P. 30) and "technology transfer represents 
only a very small share of Soviet equipment investment." (Hanson 
1978, P. 25) On the other hand, it seems he suggests such 
technological transfer exerts an important effect on the economic 
performance of the Soviet economy. "The bottom line for all of this 
is, of course, the size of economic benefits the U.S.S.R. has been 
deriving from its purchases of Western machinery and know how...it 
would not be surprising if these effects were shown to be relatively 
large." (Hanson 1978, P. 28) This statement is followed then by 
presenting different studies which have shown significant benefits 
gained by the Soviet Union as a result of its economic relations with 
the West.
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Summary of Section 3.3. : In this section, I have studied only
a few examples of those neo-classical authors who have adopted the 
'informed speculation' method of analysis. These examples, however, 
give a full support to my original claim that a large number of the 
orthodox economists who have chosen the non-theoretical method of 
investigation tend to produce contradictory statements. All the 
authors cited in this section, regardless of their subject of study, fall 
into the trap o f contradicting themselves. Vernon (1979), for 
instance, in investigating East-W est trade, states that the Soviet 
Union is a price traker. However, on the other hand, he seems to 
claim that the Soviet Union can enjoy a bargaining position due to the 
competition among the western firms. Another example is Philip 
Hanson (1982), who is interested in the study of the importation of 
western technology by the East. On the one hand, he argues that 
imports of western technology acts as a marginal stimulus to the 
Soviet economic growth. However, on the other hand, he suggests 
that technological transfers exert an im portant effect on the 
economic performance of the Soviet economy.
3.4. TAXONOMTCAL STUDIES:
Many "neo-classical” authors devote considerable attention to 
taxonomy. In fact, one can claim that the tendency toward taxonomy 
is a characteristic of the majority of the studies discussed previously. 
It is, therefore, fairly difficult to select only a few authors and 
classify their studies under 'taxonomical studies.' For example,
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Hayden and Nau's (1975) analysis of East-West technology transfer is 
infused with a combination of taxonomical fervor and excessive 
reliance on case studies. They divide the East-W est transfer of
technology into two broad categories, short-term and long-term, with 
each comprising different economic relationships. In their view, for 
instance, the long-term  transfer of technology incorporates: a- 
technical assistance, b-technical assistance plus trademark rights, c- 
technical assistance plus trademark rights plus resultant product 
purchase. They argue that the Soviet Union is more inclined to
experim ent with short-term  relationships w hile East European 
countries prefer the long-term variety mainly because they do not 
have the wealth of the Soviet Union to afford the payments for 
Western technology on a "one-shot" basis. They then present one 
case study under each variety of short and long term relationships. 
And from these case studies they conclude and generalize about U.S. 
corporate preferences in regards to different models of technology 
transfer. "If the firm wants a cheaper manufacturing source, or if it 
is using the cooperation vehicle as a market entry vehicle, a Model C 
arrangement is most likely... But if  the firm has a propriety
technology unavailable from other suppliers, it will more likely insist
on a Model A or B arrangement." (Hayden and Nau 1975, P. 79)
L ikew ise , Edw ard H ew ett’s (1975) approach tow ard 
investigating imports of Western technology by Eastern European 
countries can be categorized under 'taxonomical studies.' He starts 
with distinguishing technology from know how. Technology includes 
"specific knowledge about physical production, em bodied for
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example in machines, designs, formula, etc." Know-how is more 
general and com prises "organizational procedures concerning 
coordination in production, procurement, marketing, and research 
and development (R & D)." (Hewett 1975, P. 377) According to 
Hewett, in the 1960s Eastern European countries mainly sought to 
import Western technology through the direct purchase of licenses, 
machinery and equipment and complete plants. In recent years, he 
argues, in the small East European countries a new and more complex 
institutional arrangement has come into existence - the Industrial 
Cooperation Agreements (I.C .A.s). Hewett Tecognized different 
specific forms of I.C.A.s. One is "simple purchases of complete plants 
or licenses in exchange for later payment with resulting products." 
The second is subcontracting "in which the western partner provides 
technology and possibly some inputs for producing a certain 
component and the Eastern European partner repays in a fixed 
amount of components." The third is "coproduction or comarketing, 
where the partners specialize in parts of a single production process, 
assemble the final product in one or both countries, then divide up 
marketing areas." And finally, Western companies participated with 
East European in establishing joint ventures either in a third market
or in Eastern Europe. (Hewett 1975, P. 378)
Hewett argues that although Eastern European countries have
considered I.C.A.s as the most efficient form of importing Western 
technology, in fact the I.C.A.s by "following the dictates of static 
com parative advantage...serve to perpetuate some of the major
weaknesses of the Eastern enterprise, rather than eliminating them."
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(Hewett 1975, P. 380) He uses the case of Hungary to prove his 
point. He argues almost all of the I.C.A.s in force in Hungary are
small subcontracting or coproduction arrangem ents. The East
European partner usually produces the least capital intensive 
components employing substantial amounts of imported Western 
m aterials, and possibly some imported W estern capital. The 
production mainly takes place by using the Eastern partner's excess 
capacity, then almost all the products go back to the Western partner 
to be used as inputs or to be marketed. Therefore, the end result is 
the Hungarian enterprise is involved only in production, and the
Western enterprise is involved in research and development and 
m arketing.
This process tends to reinforce the weakness of Hungarian 
enterprises in marketing and research and development. Hewett 
even goes so far as to say that many I.C.A.s are nothing but 
traditional trade under the name of cooperation. This process is 
quite profitable for the Western partners, since they shift the less 
profitable, more labor intensive processes to an area where 
semiskilled and skilled labor is relatively inexpensive. Moreover, 
there are other attractive features of these economies which make
Western corporations interested in I.C.A.s: A reliable labor force
which has been denied the right to strike and the possibility of 
avoiding tariff and non-tariff barriers.
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Summary of Part One:
In Part One of this chapter, I have attempted to review the 
work of those orthodox economists who have adopted the 'non- 
theoretical' method of investigation of East-West economic relations. 
This part was divided into four major sections. Throughout these 
sections, my goal has been to investigate the consequences of 
adopting such a method of analysis. My examination reveals that, 
regardless of the subject of study, the omission of theoretical analysis 
has produced various consequences. Some of these authors have 
been successful in producing useful and illuminating studies, but a 
large number of orthodox economists have either drawn illegitimate 
generalizations based on lim ited inform ation, or have made 
contradictory statements. Moreover, we have seen cases where two 
authors have chosen an identical subject of study, but lack of any 
theoretical reasoning has led them to arrive at very different 
conclusions.15
PART TWO: THEORETICAL STUDIES
The orthodox authors who have taken their theoretical approaches 
seriously have em phasized either the trade or the investment 
aspects of East-West economic relations. In this process the majority 
of them have assumed the same principles which govern the conduct 
of consumers and producers in the Western countries to be also at 
work and applicable in investigating the behavior of consumers and
15 See, for instance, examples of De (1975) & Evrawicki (1979)
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producers in the Eastern countries. As a result they have employed 
the same techniques and methods used in analyzing the foreign 
trades and investments under conditions of perfect competition, in 
studying the foreign trades and investments of socialist countries. 16 
I will start the following sections with a discussion of some of the 
most im portant theoretical undertakings of mainstream economists 
in regards to East-West trade relations and try to demonstrate that 
trade in general is conceived of as beneficial to all engaged parties. 
It is, therefore, assumed to be advantageous to both East and West.
3.6. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES;
Holzman (1968) and Brown (1968) are usually cited by the 
mainstream economists as among the first economists who have 
attempted to apply the neo-classical tools of international trade 
theory in analyzing the foreign trade of socialist countries. Holzman 
and Brown generally view centrally planned economies to be 
relatively "insensitive to external m arket developments," except 
when planners manipulate exports in order to maintain a fixed 
volume of im ports.17 Their arguments, however, have been
*6 Holzman (1974) seems to suggest the same idea: "this literature deals
so abstractly with trade problems that it applies generally to all 
economies, whether free market or centrally planned, and therefore 
does not elicite research from economists dealing with the latter, Or 
it builds models that are based on price and market mechanisms, 
largely irrelevant to C.PJE.'s except insofar as they may occasionally 
serve as normative models or as the basis for empirical studies to test 
the rationality of C.P.E. trade practices." (Ibid., P. 1)
17 See Thomas Wolf (1982).
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criticized for lacking a rigorous theoretical fram ew ork.18 For 
instance, Holzman's writings (1974), (1976) have been described as 
an incisive description of socialist foreign trade theory and practice 
aimed at the general reader." (Rosefield 1977, P. 99) According to 
his critics, even when he attempts to be more theoretical, such as 
Holzman (1974), he in fact produces nothing but a repetition of his 
previous works with no comprehensive methodology. As Rosefield 
(Rosefield 1977) argues, Holzman in (Holtzman 1974) "did not seize 
the opportunity...to provide a general and rigorous theoretical 
framework for evaluating the comparative merit of centrally planned 
foreign trading systems." (Rosefield 1977, P. 100)
Batra (1976) endeavors to overcome this deficiency and to 
rigorously apply conventional international trade theory to an 
analysis of trade between market economies and centrally planned 
economies. He analyzes two different cases. In the first case, his 
analysis is conducted under the assumption that the centrally 
planned economies of a small country possesses no monopoly power 
in trade; in the second case, however, the country is assumed to be 
large and has monopoly power in trade. In both cases, it is assumed 
that the planners are faced with a "social utility function" which he 
assumes to be the same "as planner's own utility function for the 
society."
When the country has no monopoly power in trade, the external 
terms of trade are given and fixed for the country. Under these 
conditions, the planners, in order to maximize the 'social utility
18 See Batra (1976), Wolf (1982) and Rosefield (1977).
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function,' choose a level of consumption and production at which the 
marginal rates of substitution and transformation are equal to the 
given world terms of trade. Batra's solution in this case is similar to 
the one which would prevail under the free trade in a market 
economy and would satisfy the "pareto-optimality" conditions. The 
following diagram represents his solution.
%
 X i -
figure (1)
In this figure II' is the transformation curve and the terms of trade 
is represented by the line PC. Given the 'social indifference curve' of 
U i , the planners will choose production at P and consumption at C. 
PT is the amount of Yi exported and CT is the amount of Y2 
imported. In a market economy also producers would produce at P 
and consumers would consume at C.
The complete similarities between the market economies and 
centrally planned economies end when Batra adds the assumption
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that the centrally planned country has monopoly power and the 
terms of trade are determined by the volume of trade. In other 
words, in order for the country to sell more it has to charge a lower 
relative price. Batra's solution, in this case, is that the country must 
operate like a profit maximizing monopolist/monopsonist which in 
effect pursues an optimum tariff policy.
Batra's solution can be presented by the use of the following 
figure.
figure (2)
The offer curve of a market economy is given by OF. Facing this 
offer curve, the planner in the centrally planned economy optimizes
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by selecting the consumption point A, where the 'social indifference 
curve' U i is tangent to OF. At this point the amount of Yi exported is 
equal to OB and the amount of Y2 imported equals AB. The terms of 
trade are given by the slope of OA.
Batra then goes on to show that such an optimal solution is 
parallel to that requiring an optimum tariff in a market economy. He 
considers the case of trade between two market economies, with 
offer curves of OF and OH. Under free trade the economy with offer 
curve of OH will maximize its welfare at point C on the social utility 
curve of U. This economy, in Batra's view, can increase its welfare 
and move on to the social utility curve of U i, by imposing an 
optimum tariff on its imports, so that its offer curve shifts to OHi. It 
is in this sense that a centrally planned economy and a monopolist 
under decentralized conditions operate similarly.
One conclusion can be reached from this line of arguments 
which is that the Eastern countries in their trade relations with the 
W est enjoy a strong bargaining advantage because the planners can 
simply choose point A, while a market economy "has to follow the 
route of tariff to capture the advantage of monopoly power and 
dissuade its trading partner from benefiting from its own optimum 
tariff." (Batra 1976, P. 370) Meanwhile, the market economy does 
not know what the centrally planned economy's offer curve looks 
like, because like the monopolist's supply curve, it is not well 
defined. Consequently, the market economy pursuing an optimum 
tariff policy in trade with a centrally planned economy cannot be 
certain that with a given increase in its tariff its terms of trade will
158
improve. Based on this analysis, Batra proceeds to recommend that 
the market economy should adopt "some kind of non-tariff barriers 
like production and consumption taxes or subsidies or more 
significantly the institution of a state trading corporation to deal with 
the centrally planned economy." (Batra 1976, P. 374)19
Batra applies his analysis to the trade relations between 
socialist countries. In such cases Batra argues the terms of trade are 
settled by the planners through bilateral bargaining and the party 
with greater power will be able to get the favorable terms. This can, 
in part, according to Batra, explain "Russia's economic exploitation in 
the part of some of Eastern European nations." (Batra 1976, P. 374) 
Batra's basic assumption that the socialist countries follow the 
same pareto optimal marginal rules is so astonishing that it has even 
aroused the criticism and ridicule from some members of the neo­
classical school, not so much because the pareto optimal marginal 
rules are presumably the necessary conditions for the optimum in 
the perfectly competitive market economy but because Batra "simply 
ignores the vast literature on the 'irrationality' of domestic price 
structure" in the centrally planned economies. (W olf 1978, P. 988) 
Furtherm ore, he has been criticized for suggesting that the 
hypothetical centrally planned economies of his model resemble 
those o f the real world, and consequently presenting misleading 
conclusions and making irrelevant policy recommendations. W olf
(1978), for instance, argues that when Batra stresses that the 
centrally planned economies with the external market power do not
19 Presumably any kind of barriers which will not affect the terms of trade.
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have well defined offer curves, Batra makes "an interesting 
theoretical point but one of doubtful policy relevance." By 
implication he is suggesting the market economy’s offer curve is well 
defined theoretically and "it is actually 'known' to the policy makers" 
in the centrally planned economies. W olf argues that in the real 
world to the extent that a country pursues optimum tariff policies, 
they are im plem ented through trial-and-error and not through 
knowing for sure the shape of the offer curve of its counterpart.
Moreover, W olf believes that Batra's assertion in regards to 
trade among centrally  planned econom ies, and the resultant 
exploitation of Eastern European countries by the Soviet Union is 
mistaken. Indeed, W olf argues that "it is generally accepted today 
that for various political and institutional reasons Soviet terms of 
trade with its CMEA partners deteriorated throughout much of the 
post war period." Thus, Batra's model also does not explain the 
development in terms of trade among socialist countries. (Wolf 1982, 
P. 990)
Elsewhere, W olf (1982) somewhere else presents a model of 
foreign trade for the centrally planned economies. In contrast to 
Batra's model which assumes price-sensitive planners, W olfs model 
assumes planners who are price-insensitive in the short-run. This, 
W olf believes, is a realistic assumption, since once the plan is 
adopted the "planners are unlikely to upset (it) on the production 
side in response to what may be short-lived world-market terms-of- 
trade changes. Likewise, it is doubtful the allocations of goods for 
domestic consumption will be made on the basis of short-run
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fluctuations in world-market prices per se." 20 (Wolf 1982, P. 39) 
W olfs model of a price-insensitive centrally planned economy is 
therefore based on two assumptions. The first one is the adopted 
annual production plan is rigid and unresponsive to world market 
prices. As a result, "while from a purely technical standpoint the 
(centrally  planned econom y) m ight be considered to have 
continuously differentiable production possibilities frontier," (as 
shown with dotted line in the following figure), it is assumed that 
planners limit the economy to a fixed production point. So, if the 
planners have to decide on the production mix between two goods 
one importable M and one exportable X, they choose a point like P as 
the fixed production point. (Wolf 1982, P. 38) Wolf also assumes that 
the "domestic consumption of these goods...is determined by the 
p lanners’ preferences ra ther than the preferences of actual 
consumers." And the planners are assumed to allocate these goods (X 
and M) in predetermined proportions. In other words, they "have a 
fixed coefficient preference function.” (Wolf 1982, P. 39) He traces 
the consumption possibilities of such economy by the income- 
consumption path of OH (as is presented in the following figure). 
Assuming the planners are rational they therefore "attempt to 
maximize their own welfare by attaining the highest possible point 
on OH."
20 To support his point Wolf brings some support from Soviet literature. 
For instance, he argues Shagalov (1973) "attests to the lack of  
integration,.bet ween consumption plans and domestic opportunity 
costs on the one hand, and foreign-trade prices on the other.” (Wolf 
1982, P. 39)
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Starting with these two basic assumptions, Wolf proceeds to 
show in contrast to Batra's conclusion, the offer curve of such an 
economy can be determined, and is well defined, regardless of 
whether or not it is a large country. To show this he places the origin 
of the rest of the world's (ROW) offer curve (OCR) at production point 
P (as is shown in the following figure). Given his assumption the 
planners will produce at point P and consume at point C. As a result 
they plan to export PR of the exportable good for CR of importable 




To derive the socialist country's offer curve, Wolf assumes the 
ROW offer curve to pivot on a fixed point P. As OCR intersects 
consumption path OH to the right of C, the socialist country must give 
up larger quantities of its exportable for sm aller amounts of 
importable. As OCR intersects the consumption path to the left of C, 
the country must give up smaller quantities of its exportable for 
larger quantities of importable. Looking at the right-hand panel of 
the above figure, the price-insensitive socialist country's offer curve 
will fall between OT and VT. At a point like Y (in the right-hand 
panel of above figure) the planners' marginal propensity to consume 
the importable good approaches 1.00, giving offer curve VT. At a 
point like E, as the marginal propensity to consume the importable 
approaches zero, the offer curve approaches horizontal line OT.
Given all of his assumptions, W olf argues that the "optimal" 
foreign trade for a price-insensitive socialist country can be achieved 
by attaining the "highest feasible point" on its offer curve. And the 
feasibility is determined by the shape of the rest of the world's offer 
curve. Observe the following figure; if  the ROW's offer curve is 
elastic (OCR), a socialist country with offer curve OCS can maximize 
its welfare according to Wolf by trading at point F. At this point the 
planners are indifferent as to whether or not they have monopoly 
power, and consequently their trade offer remains the same. 21
21 Wolf also considers another case in which the ROW's offer curve is inelastic 
at its intersection with OCS. Under this condition the socialist country can 
impose what he calls "implicit revenue maximizing tariff which is 
different from optimum tariff, because based on the tariff theory Wolf 
argues the "tariff imposing country always operates in the elastic portion 




The important point in W olfs account is that in contrast to the 
m arket econom y or Batra's p rice-sensitive cen trally  planned 
economies which if they are large, "may decide to impose optimum 
tariff," a price insensitive planned economy facing an elastic ROW's 
offer curve has a well defined offer curve, regardless of its size. As a 
result it appears to be vulnerable, and the ROW "could safely predict 
the impact on the terms of trade of unilaterally restricting trade, and
elastic offer curve) that has allocated almost all o f W olfs attention, I have 
only described this case.
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it need not fear retaliation" by centrally planned economy. (Wolf 
1982, P. 42)
The policy implication is that in the event that a centrally 
planned economy has market power on the Western market, the 
planners "may not have the motivation to use their power so as to 
earn monopoly profits at the expense of Western firms," not because 
they are irrational, W olf argues but because "they may have 
different trading criteria." Consequently, "it would be incorrect to 
argue that the Soviet Union obtains a disproportionately high share 
of the gains of trade simply by virtue of its state of monopoly over 
foreign trade." (Wolf 1982, P. 51) 22
W olf starts his discussion by criticizing Batra's model primarily 
for Batra's lack of consideration for differences in institutions 
implanted in a market and planned economy. However, he ends up 
by falling into the same trap, essentially, because he addresses his 
criticism not to the roots of Batra's problems but to the problems 
which appear at the sarface. Like Batra he follows the neo- 
classicals' marginal rules and extends them to the conditions of a 
planned economy. He assumes planners, the same as any other 
human beings, choose rationally among alternatives confronting 
them. In other words, he perceives a set of indifference curves for 
planners, which he takes to be identical with those of society in
22 Wolf in another article argues the same point that "despite the Soviet
monopoly of foreign trade, we found little theoretical or empirical support 
for the claim that the U.S.S.R. is systematically capturing monopoly profits 
at the expense of the U.S. firms and U.S. consumers. In many respects, the 
Soviet Union is not significantly different, in its trade with the West, from 
many other countries with very small shares of world trade." (Wolf 1979, P. 
337)
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general. It is then the combination of limitations imposed by the 
country's technology and its natural endowments along with the 
planners' indifference curves and their maximizing behavior which 
determines the country's pattern of trade. These conditions are not 
significantly different from those which, according to the neo­
classical tradition, prevail in the market economies. Therefore, even 
though W olf tries to take into account the existence of different 
institutional frameworks in the socialist countries, his methodology 
forces him to apply the same omnipresent rules to both capitalist and 
socialist economies.
Another group of economists who have taken the basic
assumption of the neo-classical tradition to be applicable to both a
capitalist country and a socialist country are Canto and Laffer (1982).
In their model, the behavioral assumption governing the conduct of 
economic actors are posulated to be uniform between Eastern and 
W estern econom ies: "the people respond to incentives" and
"everything's being equal, individuals allocate resources according to 
after tax yields." Furthermore, the "consumers maximize their well­
being and producers maximize profits." (Canto and Laffer 1982, P. 
60) Canto and Laffer then produce a theory in which the pattern of 
investments in both East and West is determined by changes in 
prices through their effects on wages and the rate of return on 
capital. The purpose of their analysis is, however, to study "the
economic effects of a commodity trade embargo under alternative 
assumptions regarding technological differences across countries as 
well as different degrees of factor mobility." (Canto and Laffer 1982,
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P. 60) In the following, I will analyze two of the scenarios presented 
by them and which are closely connected to the economic relations 
between East and West.
The first scenario describes a world with factor mobility within 
the national boundaries, but not across countries. They assume the 
existence of two factors of production, which produce three 
commodities. Furthermore, they postulate a total of three countries, 
one the U.S., which has an efficient technology in production of all 
three commodities. The second, the East, has an inferior technology 
in production of one commodity (C). And the rest of the world has an 
inferior technology in production of commodity B. They moreover 
assume that the three countries always engage in "free trade in at 
least two commodities," since this guarantees the factor price 
equalization across countries. (Canto and Laffer 1982, P. 62) Under 
these conditions, if the U.S. embargoes the exportation of commodity 
C, the U.S. production of C can now be used to produce the other 
commodities. Meanwhile, the rest of the world, which is as efficient 
as the U.S. in production of C, will increase the production of C and 
consequently reduce the production of commodity A. Thus it will 
export more of C and import more of A. The East, on the other hand, 
will be unaffected and will simply import commodity C from the rest 
of the world instead of from the U.S. "Because factors are mobile 
within countries, and at least one other country has technology 
equivalent to that of the U.S., world prices and world consumption 
will not be altered by the U.S. embargo." (Canto and Laffer 1982, P. 
62)
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In another scenario they assume the export restrictions are 
totally effective and labor is mobile across industries while capital is 
immobile. In this case "a U.S. embargo on the export of commodity C 
w ill remove foreign demand for the em bargoed com m odity,” 
Consequently, there will be a decline in the domestic price of C as 
well as a decline in the rate of return on capital employed in 
production of commodity C both in the U.S. and the rest of the world. 
At the same time, in the East the price of C as well as wages paid and 
rate of return on capital used in its production will rise.
Their conclusion is interesting: "The U.S. industry’s incentive 
would be to invest less in the embargoed sector, while for the 
country East the opposite would be true." Therefore, they predict the 
identical reactions in response to similar situations in both East and 
West. "As investment occurs in the activities with the highest 
returns, the rate of return to capital in each sector will again be 
equalized. Trade in the remaining two commodities assures factor 
price equalization." (Canto and Laffer 1982, P. 63)23
Summary of Theoretical Investigation  of E ast-W est Trade:
It has not been my purpose to offer a full critique of each 
model presented here; rather an attempt has been made to put 
forward some of the methodological problems of each model. And 
Canto and Laffer's model probably more aptly than any other models 
presented here reveals one of the major inadequacies in the neo-
A group of neo-classical economists have emphasized the organizational 
aspect of the socialist countries foreign trade. Appendix (I) shows an 
example of such a discussion.
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classical methodology: The lack of consideration for differences in
institutions and the ways the economy operates under different 
socio-economic conditions. Declaring that in the East a rise in the 
'rate o f return on capital' in any branch of industry w ill 
automatically and necessarily bring an increase in investment in that 
particular branch, if  nothing else proves the ignorance and lack of 
knowledge of the authors about how the decisions regarding 
investment priorities are made in the centrally planned economy.
A brief review of the theoretical investigation of East-West 
trade in this section reveals the following points: First, the orthodox
economists tend to ignore the differences in the socio-economic 
systems of different countries. Consequently, they extend the neo- 
classical's marginal rule to the conditions of a planned economy. 
They perceive consumers, in a planned economy, as maximizing their 
utility, and firms as maximizing their profit. A more sophisticated 
orthodox economist, such as Wolf (1982), takes planners' indifference 
curves to be identical to those of society in general. He then argues 
that the combination of these indifference curves with planners' 
maximization behavior, as well as the lim itation imposed by the 
country 's natural endowments, determ ine a planned country's 
pattern of trade.
Secondly, since the same rules can be applied to both a market 
and a planned economy, then one is correct to conclude that the 
socialist countries conduct their trade according to the principles of 
comparative advantage. Consequently, in socialist countries, one 
should witness a rise in import-domestic supply of those products for
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w hich DCs maintain a 'com parative cost advantage1 in their 
production. I will investigate this point in the fifth chapter of this 
d issertation .
Thirdly, trade can be advantageous to both socialist and 
capitalist countries. Such a conclusion is in complete opposition to 
the dependency school's argum ent. The dependency school 
m aintains th a t the socialist countries' partic ipation  in the 
international division of labor has led to the exploitation of these 
countries by DCs, as discussed in the second chapter of this 
d issertation .
^ T H E O R I E S  OF INTERNATIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENTS 
AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES:
It is difficult to find a common thread running through all of the neo­
classical school's studies which have attempted to theoretically 
investigate the international investments in Eastern Europe. This 
lack of common denominator can in part be attributed to the 
existence o f a variety of theories presented by the neo-classical 
economists for explaining the international investments in general. 
This problem becomes even more apparent when one focuses only on 
these economists' theoretical explanations of international direct 
investments and production. John H. Dunning (1973), for instance, 
enumerates in a survey article at least five different approaches
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presented by the neo-classical school in response to 'why 
international direct investment and production?'
In recent years, however, a dominant theoretical approach 
seems to be emerging in the international direct investment 
literature; and it is the study of the application of this theory to 
Eastern Europe which will be the focus of most of this section. Based 
on this theory, the multinational corporations are considered to be 
the result of internalization of real costs within imperfect markets. 
The analytic basis of the argument is derived from Coasian theory of 
firm. (Coase 1973) The argument, reduced to the simplest terms, is 
that when transaction costs associated with the market exchange are 
high, the firms tend to internalize the transaction. Coase recognized 
two modes of implementing an economic transaction; through firms 
or through markets. "In certain cases the market entails transaction 
costs significantly in excess of those that would be incurred if the 
firm  in te rn a lized  the transactions."  C onsequently , M NCs' 
establishment of subsidiaries in other countries can be viewed as 
internalizing markets across the national boundaries and is due to 
efficiency considerations. (Coughlin 1983, P. 28)
Development of new technology, according to Williamson 
(1975), generates strong incentives for in ternalization . A 
combination of factors makes the sale of new technology by means of 
market transactions difficult. For exam ple, the seller of the 
technology holds significant advantages over the outside buyers due 
to access to information about details of the technology. There exists, 
therefore, a tendency on the part of the seller to not represent the
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accurate value of the technology. Consequently, it is difficult for the 
interested parties to reach an agreement. Furthermore, the seller of 
technology may also find out that the price which the outsiders are 
willing to pay "yields a lower return to the firm's R & D expenditure 
than does its own exploitation of the technology." (Brada 1981, P. 
210) The combination of these factors encourages the firm to 
establish foreign production rather than sell their technology, and 
thus internalize the costs of allocating the technology. (Coughlin 
1983, P. 130)
In what will follow I will start with a discussion of those 
studies which have employed the above theory in investigation of 
East-West industrial cooperation agreements. Referring to them as 
the model of cost internalizing, I will then discuss those studies 
which have attempted to explain I.C.A.s with the use of mathematical 
models.
3.7.1. Cost Internalizing Models:
Josef C. Brada (1981) is interested in a theoretical appraisal of the 
transfer of technology to Eastern Europe by means of I.C.A.s. Brada’s 
main hypothesis is that the pattern of transfer of technology through 
I.C.A .s can be explained by the "economic parameters" which 
determine the way that firms organize their international operations 
and "exploitation of technology" as well as the type of technology 
that the firms use.
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Brada distinguishes two types of technology which firms use in 
support of their market position: product technology and process 
technology. This distinction is important in elaborating his theory. 
"Product technology" is concerned with developing new products 
which are unique and have few or no close substitutes. The firm's 
advantages derive solely from the ownership rights over technology 
which yield the firm monopoly profit. The process technology, on the 
other hand, deals with production and marketing of a given product. 
In this case, the firm’s advantages over its competitors are due to its 
ability to produce the same product at a lower cost or to produce a 
similar but better product at the same cost incurred by its rivals. 
Brada believes that in some industries the competition is exclusively 
based on process technology, and in others competition is on the 
basis of product technology. He further believes that the type of 
technology competition which is predominant in a given industry will 
be reflected in the manner that the firms in that industry organize 
their international operation. Firms that compete based on the 
product technology tend to be centralized, vertically integrated, and 
unwilling to transfer technology. On the other hand, firms that 
compete based on the process technology tend to be decentralized, 
horizontally integrated, and willing to transfer technology and as a 
result good candidates for I.C.A.s.
Brada uses the 'cost internalizing model' discussed earlier and 
argues that firms which compete mainly through the innovation of 
unique products should experience "the need to internalize the 
technology transfers more intensely” than firms which compete on
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the basis of process technology. 24 Brada believes the majority of 
"information costs" associated with development of new and unique 
products are absent in the case of firms involved in improvement in 
process technology. Innovation in process technology usually takes 
place on the factory floor and does not require expensive research 
laboratories; moreover, "the innovation is often carried out by 
engineers and technicians who may have routine production or 
design functions in addition to their R & D responsibilities." (Brada 
1981, P. 211) Consequently, innovation in process technology is much 
cheaper than the development of a unique product. It is also easier 
to determine the price of innovation in a particular process, partly 
because by definition it must have at least one substitute for the 
previous technology for producing the product. These factors plus a 
couple more reduce the "inform ation costs" of transferring
24 Brada believes there are several reasons for such a tendency. First, the 
firms whose innovative activities are focused on development of new
products spend heavily on R & D and employ highly trained specialists and 
modem and specialized facilities. Second, development of new and unique 
products by nature is risky; a new product may or may not appear as a 
result of a certain amount o f R & D expenditure, and even if it does it may 
not gain acceptance in the market. It is, therefore, difficult for a firm to 
allocate R & D costs precisely to a successful new product. The managers 
consequently allocate arbitrarily the total amount o f a firm's R & D 
expenditure on its successful new products.
T here are other factors w hich  in crease  the uncertainty  
surrounding the transfer of technology. The uniqueness o f a new product 
makes it difficult to set a price for it, mainly because there is no close 
substitute for the new product. Thus there is no market price that the
inter-and intra-company transfers could be based on. Furthermore, the 
uniqueness o f  a new product complicates the process o f determining the 
economic benefits which it may bring to the owner, particularly because
"the monopoly profits derived from a product's uniqueness are subject to 
erosion from generally unpredictable successes o f the firm’s rivals."
(Ibid., P. 212) It is the combination of these factors which creates the need 
for internalizing the transfer of technology.
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technology and as a result reduce these firms' tendency toward 
internalization and make them good candidates for I.C.A.s.25
Brada's theory indicates an important factor in a firm 's 
behavior. "The willingness of firms to undertake any action, including
I.C.(A.), is to a large extent objectively determined by its competitive 
position and the technology and material means of production at its 
disposal." (Brada 1981, P. 227)
The policy implication of Brada's theory is obvious: Eastern 
Europe should seek I.C.A.s with those Western firms which compete 
based on prices and services, and avoid those firms which operate in
25 Brada, after postulating the main points of his arguments, takes up the 
case studies o f two different industries, which he believes are the polar 
cases -the pharmaceutical industry and the construction-equipment 
industry. While the former according to Brada relies heavily on 
promotion o f new drugs, the latter relies on improvement in process 
technology to promote competition among firms. Consequently the 
pharmaceutical industry as his theory predicts, must be reluctant to 
transfer technology. Indeed, Brada argues ”(t)he lack o f inter-firm 
transfer of technology and inputs evident in the pharmaceutical industry 
is reflected in the attitude of pharmaceutical Firms toward I.C.A. in East 
Europe." (Ibid., P. 215) He then cites the conclusion arrived by Holt (1977) 
in studying a number o f pharmaceutical firms in Eastern Europe, as 
supportive o f his argument. Holt characterizes these Firms' behavior as 
one o f "limited cooperation."
In contrast to the pharmaceutical industry, within the construction 
equipment industry there are several factors which facilitate I.C.A.s. "The 
greater certainty about the price of components and the value of 
technology greatly aid negotiations and the development of trust between 
the two partners." Second, because the construction equipment industry 
clearly uses intensive intra- and inter-firm transaction of technology it 
can transfer technology across national boundaries more cheaply than 
drug industry. According to Brada, International Harvester "has 
developed important skill in transferring its standards, design needs and 
technology" to suppliers in Western markets. Thus "it is likely to find 
similar transfers to" the Eastern European companies "much cheaper and 
easier to carry out than would a firm which had no experience in inter- 
firm technology transfer." (Ibid., P. 217) Brada mentions International 
Harvester and BUMAR's cooperation as an excellent example o f a 
successful I.C.A. conducted by a firm operating in an industry where 
competition takes the form of development in process technology.
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industries where competition is based on innovation in new products. 
However, he acknowledges that such policy may not be in accordance 
with the development plans in Eastern European countries. These 
countries may perceive the participation in industries where the new 
product development is highest as important "in order to maintain a 
dynamic industrial structure. However, they should be aware that 
participation in such industries is not likely to be aided by I.C.(A.) 
but will require, instead, indigeneous efforts." (Brada 1981, P. 219)
Coughlin (1983) is interested in an economic analysis of joint 
ventures in Yugoslavia. He believes that the Yugoslavs have been 
disappointed by the Western corporations’ response to the joint 
ventures legislation. It is his purpose to shed some light on possible 
reasons for the Western firms' lack of interest in participating in 
Yugoslav joint ventures. He starts with a more or less complete 
description of Yugoslavia’s current joint ventures legislation.26
Coughlin then proceeds by reviewing all the studies which have 
attempted to explain the reasons behind the limited success of 
Yugoslavia in attracting foreign investments. Huff (1972) and Gupta 
(1978), for example, believe the "foreign exchange restrictions have 
hindered the repatriation of profits and, consequently, have deterred
26 Some o f the important aspects of this legislation are as follows: Joint
ventures are allowed in all sectors except in insurance, social services, 
domestic and foreign trade. Foreign ownership is restricted to 49% of 
investment and most joint ventures are expected to be export oriented. The 
joint ventures contracts must specify a ceiling on annual profit transfer. 
"Firms have three alternatives concerning the disposition of profit 
exceeding the maximum." They can consider these profits as repatriation 
of capital; they can reinvest these profits in the joint ventures until the 
49% limit is reached, or they can invest the funds in another joint venture 
in Yugoslavia. (Ibid., P. 14-15)
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foreign investment." (Coughlin 1983, P. 31) Others argue the 
inflexibility of jo in t ventures legislation in response to potential 
areas of conflicts discourages foreign investment. According to 
Coughlin, however, the analysis of the impact of the minority- 
ownership restrictions on foreign investment has generally been 
neglected by the majority of the studies; and it is the purpose of his 
study to analyze the effects of such restrictions.
Coughlin believes some of the deficiences of the previous 
studies can be overcome by taking into the account the theory of 
firm behavior. Since the Western MNCs are the prime actors in the 
joint ventures, "an underlying theory of MN's is essential for 
understanding joint venture investment." (Coughlin 1983, P. 26) He 
chooses the "cost internalizing" theory discussed previously as the 
corner-stone of his arguments; furthermore Coughlin accepts Magee's 
(1977) theory that "development that is not easily imitated is a 
primary goal of the MNCs. The difficulties associated with imitation 
increase the probability that the firm can capture a satisfactory 
return on its research and development. Given the incentives for 
secrecy, the MNC will tend to exploit any new technology via wholly 
owned direct investment." (Coughlin 1983, P. 27, emphasis added)
Coughlin argues that the preceeding theories can provide a 
num ber of im portant insights about foreign investm ent in 
Yugoslavia. "The most important revolve around the implications of 
restricting foreign ownership to a minority position." (Coughlin 1983, 
P. 27) According to him the ownership restrictions affect not only 
the magnitude but also the distribution of foreign investments. To
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support these arguments Coughlin uses the information about the 
amount of the U.S. foreign investments in Yugoslavia and other 
developing countries. The am ount of such investm ent is 
com paratively small in Yugoslavia relative to that in other 
developing countries, and he concludes: "(T)he reduced flow of
foreign  investm ent, rela tive to  situations w here ownership 
restrictions are less prominent, follows directly from the theory." 
(Coughlin 1983, P. 28)
Coughlin also provides information about the ownership and 
distribution of the U.S. global foreign investment between 1967- 
1975. His study shows, for example, that 91% of the printing 
industry's foreign investment was in the wholly owned subsidiaries. 
His data indicate that "(i)f ownership restriction exists, the printing, 
drugs and cosmetics, wood and furniture, and beverages sectors 
provide poor prospects" for foreign investments, because over 75% of 
foreign investment in each of these industries goes to wholly owned 
subsidiaries. (Coughlin 1983, P. 28) Consequently, one would expect 
to find no or limited participation of these industries in Yugoslavia’s 
joint ventures. Coughlin submits supporting data: as of the end of 
December 1978, these industries accounted for only 9 out of 150 
joint ventures in Yugoslavia.
Moreover, Coughlin is interested in studying the transfer of 
technology to Yugoslavia. Following Brada (1981), he argues that 
first, the transfer of technology should be biased toward process 
technology instead of product technology due to Yugoslav restricting 
foreign ownership to a minority position. Second, the product
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technology transferred to Yugoslavia should be relatively old.27 To 
support these points he brings evidence from the case studies of the 
Gillette Company and the Dow Chemical Company's transfer of 
technology. The Gillette Company, according to him, is involved in a 
industry where com petition is based on developm ent of new 
products. Coughlin argues in 1973 Gillette transferred a technology to 
Yugoslavia which was being utilized in the 1960s in the West. Dow 
Chemical's involvement in Yugoslavia provides similar evidence. Dow 
has signed two joint venture agreements, and in both cases it 
transferred technologies which were relatively old.
Gupta (1978), in contrast to Coughlin, dismisses the importance 
of the majority of wholly-owned subsidiaries for MNCs, because he 
believes these corporations are able to adapt to different situations. 
Moreover, if the majority ownership was an important consideration 
for MNCs, one expects that they would attempt to increase their 
ownership to the legal maximum. Yet, despite the Yugoslav 
authorities' encouragement, these corporations have not attempted to 
do so.
P. Artisan and P. Buckley (1984) also argue Gupta's point. "The 
absence of urgency among firms to increase their share of joint 
venture's capital to the legal maximum of 49.9 percent" is an 
indication "that there is little concern (among these firms) about 
minority participation.’’ They support their argument with a survey 
of 42 Western European and North American firms which have joint
27 In another paper Coughlin endeavors to present the same arguments. 
See (Coughlin 1983)
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venture investments in Yugoslavia. Eighty percent of the firms in 
their sample do not consider the minority participation rule in 
Yugoslavia as "an impediment to their potential investment." Only a 
minority of firm s-10 percent-consider restrictions as an initial 
deterrent to their investment activities in Yugoslavia. And even for 
them the "equal representation on the joint management board had 
subsequently allayed their fears of under-representation. (Artisan 
and Buckley 1984, P. 168)
Peter F. Cory (1982) establishes his theory based on the "Cost 
Internalization" model. Although he argues that attempts to 
"validate and substantiate" this model and to specify the 
circumstances under which it may apply have been numerous, it is 
the "eclectic theory of international production" which offers a 
comprehensive framework for such a task.28 The eclectic 
theory's "principal hypothesis is that a firm will engage in foreign 
direct investment if three conditions are satisfied:
1. It possesses net ownership advantages vis a vis
firms of other nationalities in serving parti­
cular markets. These ownership advantages 
largely take the form of the possession of in- 
tangiible assets, which are at least for a per­
iod of time exclusive or specific to the firm 
prossessing them.
2. Assuming condition (1) is satisfied, it must be
more beneficial to the enterprise possessing
these advantages to use them itself rather than
to sell or lease them to foreign firms, for it is
28 The 'eclectic theory' is fully discussed by Dunning. (1980) & (1979)
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to internalize its advantages through an exten­
sion of its own activities rather than ex­
ternalize them through licensing and similar 
contracts with independent firms.
3. Assuming conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, 
it must be profitable for the enterprise to 
utilize these advantages in conjunction with at 
least some fact or inputs (including natural 
resources) outside its home country; otherwise 
foreign markets would be served entirely by ex­
ports and domestic markets by domestic produc­
tion. (Dunning 1979, P. 275)
Cory's principal purpose is to explain the industrial cooperation 
agreements and joint ventures within the framework of the above 
mentioned theories.
He starts his analysis by raising the same issues and concerns 
expressed by Coughlin. He argues the MNCs' strategic option is 
establishing wholly-or majority-owned subsidiaries. In Eastern 
European countries, however, foreign ow nership is severely 
restricted, thereby elim inating MNCs preferred option. Such 
elim ination affects "the quantity and/or quality of resources 
transmitted, and the manner of their utilization." Yet, he asks, given 
the existence of a set of "intermediate contractural relations," which 
I.C.A.s and joint ventures signify, how great will this effect be? And 
to what extent will these "intermediate contractural relations" 
provide some benefits of full internalization ("with respect to the 
maintenance of decision-making authority and control and the
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lowering of transaction costs")? Such agreements as licensing fail to 
ensure these benefits. (Cory 1982, P. 131)
Cory believes that these "intermediate contractural relations" 
may under some circumstances evolve into de facto internalization 
mainly because over time mutually dependent, intimate relations, 
understanding and trust can emerge between Eastern European 
enterprises and MNCs. Cory argues that of course important decisions 
in regards to utilization of resources and allocation of rewards are 
subject to negotiation and bargaining and are part of long run 
contractural agreements. But over time, as the intimate relations are 
established among the parties, "the transaction costs associated with 
negotiating and enforcing such agreements, and adapting them to the 
changing circumstances, may decline substantially." Furthermore, 
within the climate of mutual trust, understanding and familiarity, 
MNCs may attain control "through the 'exercise of influence,' rather 
than exclusively via the 'exercise of authority’ through specified 
contractual terms." (Cory 1982, P. 131) Consequently, the benefits of 
full internalizing in regards to both maintenance of control and 
lowering of transaction costs w ill be achieved. Cory’s arguments are 
in contrast to Coughlin's finding that the restrictions imposed on 
wholly-or majority-owned ownership are the main deterrent to 
foreign investment in Yugoslavia.
Cory's second step is to empirically validate his arguments by 
using the information concerning MNCs' activities in Yugoslavia. He 
intends to discover to what extent the I.C.A.s and joint ventures 
between this country and MNCs can "be classified as significant
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'interm ediate mechanism' for resource allocation, as de facto 
internalization?" (Cory 1982, P. 137)
He presents some aggregate data on the levels and patterns of 
various technology transfers between Yugoslavia and W estern 
corporations. He next consider the development of inter-firm 
contractual relations within a few industries.29 His focus on these 
industries is partly due to the fact that the sub-contracting and co­
production within I.C.A.s and joint ventures are more common in 
these industries.
Cory's empirical investigations reveal that a very large number 
of agreements have been concluded between Yugoslavie and MNCs in 
the last few decades. They also indicate a rapid expansion of foreign 
subsidiary production vis-a-vis licensing production. Moreover, they 
denote that the establishment of the intimate relations between two 
parties in most cases have started from simple import-export or 
licensing agreements. Furtherm ore, they disclose a significant 
integration of Yugoslav enterprises into Western industries. In most 
instances these relations appear to be motivated by a desire to 
maintain or to expand the Yugoslav local markets. The export 
activities resulting from those arrangements are frequently due to 
increasing the local pressures on companies to produce for export. 
Nevertheless, there are important examples which represent some 
notable "subcontracting or sourcing role" for some Yugoslav firms. 
The production of small tractors by Pobeda, production of Fiat autos
29 He chooses the following industries: The engineering, motor vehicles,
parts and accessories; tractors; household appliances; office and 
telecommunication equipment; bearings; and razor blades.
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and vans by Zastava are examples of arrangements which have made 
it possible for a Western firm to "phase out its own production of 
items that have become superseded in its production programme." 
(Cory 1982, P. 166)
On the basis of his empirical research, Cory concludes that 
because the number of instances where the MNCs got involved in 
joint ventures in order to "exploit sophisticated, advanced, valuable 
proprietary technology" is significantly  large, it appears that 
eventually all but a small minority of MNCs will accept the 
ownership restrictions imposed by Yugoslavia.30 This acceptance 
according to him, does not signify the "sacrifice of effective control; 
rather, it implies that (joint ventures) arrangements can incorporate 
the essential elements of internalized relationships between the 
parties." (Cory 1982, P. 167)
John Holt (1976) provides another interesting analysis of 
I.C.A.s. 31 His stated goal is to offer a theoretical framework for "a 
more systematic study, explanation, and prediction of East-W est 
industrial cooperation." (Holt 1976, P. 71) However, what he 
produces in fact are a description of possible areas of conflicts in
30 Provided that "the stakes, in terms of local market size, are high enough." 
(Ibid., P. 167)
31 Holt is not following the cost internalizing model, and, therefore, 
presenting his mode in this section may seem inappropriate. I have 
however presented his paper in this section for two reasons: First, because 
I believe he is a prominent scholar in East-West economic relations and it is 
important to be familiar with his work, and in particular with the analysis 
provided in this particular paper especially because here it is his stated 
goal to provide a theory of the East-West I.C.A.s; second, the second section 
of this part is devoted to presenting the mathematical models of theories of 
direct investment in Eastern Europe, and because Holt's investigation is 
certainly not a mathematical one.
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conducting an I.C.A. and some recommendations for their resolutions, 
as well as a description of the factors which influence each party's 
decision in regards to participation in the I.C.A.s.
An I.C.A. requires connecting a market oriented enterprise with 
a centrally planned enterprise. According to Holt, linking a "profit- 
oriented Western company with" an Eastern enterprise which 
operates based on the requirements of central plans "requires 
adjustments and entails costs, reducing the net benefits of industrial 
cooperation." (Holt 1976, P. 72) In the same manner that for a 
Western firm flexibility in responding to changes in market prices is 
compulsory, for an Eastern firm adherence to the central plan is 
compulsory; and "(F)lexibility in meeting an unpredictable market 
constitutes a cost to Eastern enterprise compare with the advantage 
of a long run production for achieving centrally planned production 
goals." (Holt 1976, P. 73) In Holt's view, it is to overcome this 
problem  th a t the Eastern governm ents in some cases have 
decentralized foreign trade negotiations and have exempted those 
enterprises engaged in I.C.A.s "from five-year plan allocations and 
requirements in varying degrees." (Holt 1976, P 73)
I.C.A.s also require linking enterprises under two different 
systems of ownership. For the Western firms a maximum return on 
investment traditionally requires ownership and managerial control. 
The I.C.A.s, therefore must not only preserve the Eastern countries' 
principle of social ownership, but at the same time they must 
provide some sense of security for the Western partners. To 
overcome this problem, the Eastern countries in most cases provide
185
guarantees and higher returns to the Western partners. According to 
Holt, in fact, "the Eastern countries are accepting in varying degrees 
the hypothesis that" in I.C.A.s "the prospects of mutual benefit will 
increase with Western company sharing not only the supply of 
capital and technology but also in management, income and 
disposable rights over assets." (Holt 1976, P. 75) Their actions are in 
accordance with the belief which postulates that transfer of 
technology will be most efficient if it is accompanied with Western 
firms’ participation in capital and management. Holt's thrust of 
argument is, therefore, ”(t)he greater the bargaining power of the 
Western firm, the higher its prospects of participation in the rights of 
ownership; the more extensive these rights, the greater the prospect 
for mutual economic advantage from industrial cooperation.” (Holt 
1976, P. 76)
A part of Holt's study is devoted to describing factors which 
influence Western companies' and Eastern countries' decisions in 
regards to participating in I.C.A.s. The nature of transferred 
technology, for instance, will determine the possibilibity of some 
types of I.C.A.s. "(T)he ease with which the industrial process can be 
broken down for an economical division of labor and managed in 
separate locations or by separate m anagem ents....effects the 
feasibility of specialization, co-production, and subcontracting." 
(Holt 1976, P. 79) Holt believes the technology life cycle also plays a 
role in Western companies' degree of interest in I.C.A.s. Western 
companies prefer to transfer those technologies which are at the 
stage of introduction in the Eastern markets. At this stage, however,
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the technology is usually widely available to the Eastern countries 
from other sources; therefore, the bargaining power of these 
countries will increase.
The size of the firm is also important. Holt cites a study which 
shows the larger the Western firm, the more likely it is to engage in
I.C.A.s. Another study observes that the middle-size firms more 
engaged in licensing agreements, and the largest firms more 
engaged in scientific-technical cooperations.
After enumerating some other factors which he believes affect 
the Western firms' decisions to embrace I.C.A.s, Holt reaches an 
important conclusion: It is eventually the degree of each party’s
bargaining power which determines the allocation of costs and 
benefits resulting from I.C.A.s. Their bargaining power, in turn, 
depends on "their resources, priorities, and available alternatives." 
(Holt 1976, P. 84)
Summary;.
The authors who have employed the "cost internalizing" model 
are interested in determining what factors influence a Western firm's 
decision to undertake an ICA with an Eastern European country. 
Although in some cases they arrive at contradictory conclusions (see, 
for example, Gupta and Coughlin), in most cases they are able to 
provide useful information about conducts of MNCs in Eastern 
Europe.





Artisan and Buckley (1984) 
Peter Cory (1982)
Summary
He distinguishes two types of technology:
1- Product technology
2- Process technology
Firms who compete based on product technology 
experience the need to "internalize" the cost of 
transfer technology. Consequently, these firms are 
reluctant to transfer technology. In contrast, firms 
involved in process technology can transfer 
technology across national boundaries.
The ownership restrictions in eastern Europe 
prevent MNCs from seeking investment ventures 
there. Using Brada's (1981) argument, Coughlin 
argues that firms involved in "process technology" 
are more likely to transfer technology to Eastern E
He down plays the importance of the majority of 
wholly-owned subsidiaries for MNCs because he 
believes these corporations are able to adapt to 
different situations.
They dismiss the importance of wholly-owned sub­
sidiaries in the MNCs1 decision as to whether or not 
they should invest in Eastern Europe.
The MNCs' strategic option is establishing wholly- 
or majority owned subsidiaries. However, ICAs 
provide some benefits of full internalization, mainly 
because over time mutually dependent, intimate 
relations are established between the parties, "the 
transaction costs associated with negotiating and 
enforcing such agreements may decline substantially." 
Furthermore, eventually MNCs may attain control 
"through the 'exercise of influence,' rather than 
exclusively via the 'exercise of authority." Con­
sequently, the benefits of full internalizing in regards 
to both maintenance of control and lowering of trans­
action costs will be achieved.
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3.*L2._ The Mathematical Model:
There are some neo-classical economists who have chosen to discuss 
the subject by the use of elaborate mathematical models. For 
instance, Brada's purpose (1977) is to demonstrate that despite the 
similiarity in legal and organizational structures of joint ventures in 
Rumania, Hungary and Yugoslavia, the joint ventures in these 
countries "differ in terms o f criteria for resource allocations, 
economic motivation of the participants, and the nature of economic 
benefits about which the partner must negotiate." (Brada 1977, P. 
168)
Brada presents in the case of each of the three countries a more 
or less comprehensive description of joint ventures regulations. Also 
in each case he derives an objective function from the standpoint of 
each partner involved in the jo in t venture. Brada's purpose is to 
show that although both W estern and Eastern partners are after 
maximizing their objective functions, as their objective functions 
differ the allocations resources will be suboptimal, and are strongly 
influenced by the structure of property rights as well as the extent 
that prices are determined by the market in the socialist country.32
Brada's model clearly dem onstrates the validity  of the 
argument presented earlier in this chapter, namely that the neo­
classical theory is established at such a high level of abstraction 
which is institution free. Brada assumes the firms in both capitalist
32 For a mathematical explanation o f his model see appendix II.
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and socialist countries are "maximizers." The capitalist firms 
maximize their profit, and as a result they are efficient and allocate 
inputs efficiently. The socialist firms, on the other hand, maximize 
either income per worker or their profit plus the income which they 
derive from the sales of inputs. Such a generalization provides 
models which are incapable of explaining the reality. For instance, 
the majority of studies which have dealt with the question of East- 
W est I.C.A.s have counted almost every reason but maximizing 
profits as the motivation for East European involvement in a joint 
v e n tu re .33 Even some researchers such as Artisan and Buckley
(1984) question and raise doubts about the generation of profit, at 
alone the maximization of profits, as the prime motive of the 
Western firms' participation in the joint ventures in Eastern Europe. 
Using a sample of 42 West European and North American firms, they 
found that 33 firms cited growth as their main objective for 
investment in Yugoslavia; and only 4 firms obtained higher profits in 
Yugoslavia than in home based operation. The majority of firms, 
they argue, "did not wish to forego the medium - and long-term 
benefits of an enlarged market solely for the purpose of shorter- 
term superior profits.”(Brada 1977, P.165)
Jan Svejnar and Smith (1982) criticize Brada's analysis within 
the neo-classical framework, using the variable bargaining power 
model, in order to show that the behavior of joint ventures in Eastern
See, for example almost all the studies presented previously under section 
3.7.1. of this chapter
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Europe is quite similar.34 Their conclusions indicate that in the case 
of Rumania, partners jointly allocate resources so that the "marginal 
value of each input equals the corresponding per unit cost of input." 
(Svejnar and Smith 1982, P. 159) As a result their actions lead to 
"socially efficient allocation of resources." Consequently, they 
conclude "the jo in t venture operating in a 'Rom anian type' 
institutional system can thus be expected to be pareto-efficient from 
the private point of view of the two partners as well as from the 
social vantage point." (Svejnar and Smith 1982, P. 159)
They also apply their model to Hungary using the same profit 
function presented by Brada and taking into account the new 
changes in the Hungarian joint ventures regulations and conclude 
that the allocational and distributional conditions in the "revised 
Hungarian model" are identical with those in the "Romanian-type- 
model."
Furthermore, they use their model and substitute for the profit 
functions presented by Brada (1977) for the Western and Eastern 
partners involved in a jo in t venture in Y ugoslavia. They 
consequently conclude that the ’’resources are allocated so that the 
marginal value products of all non labor inputs are equated to the 
per unit acquisition costs of these inputs. In this respect the 
Yugoslav joint ventures behave like their Romanian or Hungarian 
counterparts." (Svejnar and Smith 1982, P. 164) Like Brada, they 
find out that in contrast to Rumanian and Hungarian joint ventures,
34 For a mathematical explanation of their model, please see appendix II.
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the Yugoslav joint ventures equate the marginal value product of 
labor input to the income per worker. As a result, they argue, "the 
actual allocation by a given joint venture is pareto-inefficient from 
the social point of view." (Svejnar and Smith 1982, P. 165)
C onclusion: What was presented above was only a ’limited’
discussion of orthodox economists' arguments. Nevertheless, even 
such a limited overview clearly supports the underlying theme of 
this chapter: The neo-classical economists' belief in the universal
applicability of their theory eventually leads them to treat every 
country in exactly the same manner regardless of the differences in 
their socio-economic system. The "laws" of profit and utility 
maximization govern the behavior of firms and consumers in each
society. If this is so, then there must be no separate laws which 
regulate Western trade with and investments in Eastern European 
countries and distinguish them from those of any capitalist country. 
Every country's pattern of trade is mainly determined by its factor 
endowment, and the changes in such patterns can mainly be 
explained by the "growth," in other words the changes in its factor 
e n d o w m e n t . 35 Moreover, the Eastern European enterprises’
investment decisions are induced by the same kind of incentives
35 This statement can be verified by Rosefielde's (228) attempts to apply the 
Hecksher-Ohlen model to the Soviet economy. He shows that in terms of factor
content the post war development of Soviet foreign trade has been by and
large consistent with the shift in factor proportions in the Soviet economy 
over the same period. Investments in Eastern Europe are not in any way 
qualitatively different from those in any other country organized by a free 
market economic system.
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which motivate the Western firms. Finally, the Western companies' 
d irect investm ents in Eastern Europe are not in any way 




As was discussed in Chapter two, the dependency school 
maintains that the economic relations between the East and West 
have entailed the socialist countries' conversion into a functioning 
part of the capitalist system. The world system approach, on the 
other hand, asserts that the mere existence of the world capitalist 
system implies the im possibility of the presence of any other 
economic system. The neo-classical approach in contrast to the 
above approaches seems to ignore the differences in the socio­
economic systems of capitalist and socialist countries, and/or to 
believe such differences are irrelevant and play an insignificant role 
(as far as the basic assumptions of economic theory are concerned) in 
the investigation of economic relations of the East and the West. Still 
another position is expressed m ainly by the East European 
economists who acknowledge the existence of two different economic 
systems in the world, but suggest that some form of economic 
coexistence between them is possible. They believe not only that 
East-West economic relations help to solve a number of common 
problem s, but that progressive movements in the direction of 
mutually advantageous trade and cooperation between the two 
systems will foster forces of peace, democracy and socialism in the
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world. It is the purpose of the fourth chapter of my dissertation to 
focus on the discussion of this final approach.
This group's views in part reflect the changes in the role of 
foreign trade in the Eastern European economies. Foreign trade itself 
in these societies is, however, only significant as part of a larger 
process, the process of construction of socialism. In order to get a 
better understanding of Eastern European economists’ views, I will 
therefore start with a brief discussion of the evolution of this 
process, tracing it from the outset to the October Revolution, to the 
reform of the 1960s which marked the beginning of an increased 
interrelationship with the West.
EART OWE ‘.GENERAL BACKGROUND
This chapter will be divided into two major parts. In the first 
part the historical rational for autarky will be discussed. In the 
process I will attempt to highlight the following points:
1. The role of foreign trade in Eastern Europe, particularly the 
Soviet Union was determined by changes in the material conditions 
of these countries. It was the interaction of both internal and 
external factors which led to adoption of one policy and the rejection 
of others. For instance, I will try to show that adoption of autarky, in 
contrast to popular belief, was not due to one man's choice.
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Moreover, in contrast to Frank's argument, it was not mainly forced 
upon them by the world market capitalist economy.
2. One of the most important characteristics of the Soviet
model of development was the fact that there was no attempt to
direct trade according to the principle of comparative advantage.
3. The accepted principle was, and to a large extent still is, to 
import only when there was a shortfall in domestic production, and 
to export only the surplus goods which were enough to finance
imports. Furthermore, these countries continue to rely minimumly
upon trade with capitalist countries and on Western technology.
In the second part of this chapter, I will discuss the recently 
emerged doctrine of openness in Eastern Europe. In the process I 
will attempt to show:
1, How the recently em erged philosophy explains its 
dissatisfaction with the autarkic model of development, and the 
alternative it seeks.
2. How the new doctrine views the role of Eastern Europe in 
the international division of labor.
Pre-Revolutionary Russia was a backward semi-feudal country. 
The majority of the population consisted of peasants who had been 
recently freed from the obligations of serfdom. In the late 1800s, as 
a result of government policies some industrial progress was taking 
place; consequently the industry gTew at an average annual rate of 
5.8 percent over the period 1885-1913, and the industrial working 
class grew to the estimated number of 2.5 million in 1913. In spite 
of industrial progress, Russia was, however, behind industrial 
countries: its industrial large-scale output was only 6.9 percent of
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American gross industrial output (Nuti 1979, P. 236), and in terms of 
industrial output per-capita Russia ranked with the poor Western 
European countries. (Gregory & Stuart 1981, P. 18)
In regard to foreign trade Russia was an exporter of raw and 
agricultural products and an importer of manufactured goods. More 
than fifty percent of Russia's total exports was of cereals and other 
food stuffs. The imports of manufactured goods were so important 
for Russia that it continued to import from Germany even during the 
F irst World War, explicitly exempting imports of such products as 
chemicals, metals and machinery from the general prohibition of 
trade with enemy countries. (Dobb 1978, P. 37)
Russia was also an importer of capital from the West. It 
imported on the average an annual amount of 200 million roubles in 
the two decades prior to the First World War. The total foreign 
capital invested in Russian industry before the Revolution is 
estimated at more than 2 billion gold roubles, and a further 5 billion 
in state and municipal and state-guaranteed loans. (Dobb 1978, P. 
38) Foreign capital accounted for 40 percent of industrial 
investment, and 15-20 percent of total investment at the end of the 
Tsarist era. (Gregory & Stuart 1981, P. 32)
The Weakness of Russia's industries and agriculture and its 
"dependence” on the foreign sector were not the sole difficulties 
faced by the Revolutionary government which took power in 1917. 
The country was devastated by the war, and the start of civil war 
and the capitalist powers, aggression intensified the extent of havoc. 
The Soviet leadership's first step was to strengthen and stabilize its 
political position and to rebuild the economy to its pre-war levels.
197
Once this step had been accomplished, the government had to strive 
with the dual tasks o f "economic development" and socialist 
construction." (Doane, Jr. 1983, and Ellman 1968) To complete these 
tasks the Soviet leadership not only had no model to emulate, but 
also had limited options to pursue. The Soviet leadership's ideology 
prevented the Soviets from accumulating capital through colonial 
exploitation, foreign investments, or military conquests. Moreover, 
the repudiation of Tsarist foreign debts diminished, if  not completely 
destroyed the chance of the new government's obtaining any new 
loans. Most importantly, the anticipated revolution in the industrial 
capitalist nations of Western Europe did not take place. It was 
expected that if the revolution had come true it would have provided 
an important source of economic and technological assistance to the 
Soviet economy.
4iL Prelude to Autarky as Model for the Foreign Trade:
On April 22, 1918, less than six months after accession to 
power, the Soviet government declared the nationalization of all 
foreign trade. This was the first time that in peace time, a modern 
state had sought to expand its control over foreign trade to such a 
great extent. Whereas previously governments had limited their 
intervention in foreign trade to imposing tariffs and enforcing 
prohibitions, now the Soviet government was assuming the task of 
conducting all imports and exports by itself. The fundamental reason 
for the Soviet government's nationalization of foreign trade was the 
fear that unrestricted and uncontrolled foreign capital might prevent 
them from "constructing" a socialist economy. (Quigley 1974, P. 34)
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The m onopoly of foreign trade must not be taken as 
synonymous with aversion to foreign trade. In fact, Lenin seized 
every opportunity to argue for the importance of foreign trade in 
rebuilding the war tom economy, as well as for the development of 
the productive forces and consequently achieving econom ic 
independence:
our economic crisis is so deep that we cannot, on our own, 
rehab ilita te  our ruined econom y w ithout m achinery and 
technical aid from abroad. (Lenin 1977a, P. 182)
It was the extent of the crisis that made him willing to offer granting
very important concessions to the West.
The calam ities and havoc of the Seven-year War and the 
overstrain due to the virtually superhuman exertion on the part 
of working class . . . have now so aggravated that they demand 
urgent measures on the part of the Soviet power. (Lenin 1977a, 
P. 268)
Among such measures are:
We could grant concessions to the biggest imperialist trusts on 
a wider basis: say a quarter of Baku, . . and a quarter of our
best forest reserves . . .  in return for this we shall be getting 
badly needed machinery . . . (Lenin 1977a, P. 183)
We are proposing maximum concessions, and we believe it to 
be in our interests to sign a trade pact and purchase with all 
possible dispatch some of the essentials for the restoration of 
the railw ays (i.e ., locom otives), for the rehabilitation of 
industry, and for electrification. (Lenin 1977b, P. 473)
I know no reason why a socialist commonwealth like ours 
cannot do business indefinitely with capitalist countries. We do 
not mind taking their locomotives and farming machinery, so 
why should they mind taking our socialist wheat, flax and 
plantinum? We have reiterated and reiterated our desire for 
peace, our need for peace and our desires to give foreign
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capital the most generous concessions and guarantees. (Lenin 
1977c, P. 177)
Lenin also considered the importance of foreign trade for economic 
developm ent which is the precondition for achieving economic 
independence:
Through trade with Italy, America . . . you must exert every 
effort to develop the productive forces. (Lenin 1977a, 317)
Our aim now is to obtain trade agreement with Britain so as to 
start regular trade and be able to buy as soon as possible the 
machinery necessary for our extensive plan to rehabilitate the 
national economy. The sooner we do this the greater will be 
the basis ensuring our economic independence of the capitalist 
countries. (Lenin 1977b, P. 472)
4.1.1. The Concession Policy:
The concession policy, therefore, became the first attempt by 
the Soviet government to attract foreign capital and technology. 
There were different types of cooperation with foreign enterprises 
under the concession policy. In one form of cooperation, the Soviet 
government leased the enterprise to the foreign interest, and shared 
the profit. The enterprise was run by the concessionaire. Every 
aspect of the enterprises' activities—production, employment, trade— 
was regulated by contracts. The enterprise was committed by 
contracts to restore the idle equipment and provide the enterprise 
with the most advanced technology. The amount to be invested, the 
production specifications and the project’s deadline were all 
stipulated by the contract. In this form of cooperation the priority 
was given to the former owners o f the enterprises. The most
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significant of the concessions given to the former owner was the one 
to the British Lena Goldfields that had run thirteen plants on a vast 
territory, and when liquidated, its wealth was estimated at $89 
million. It employed almost 12,000 people, yielded 30% of the Soviet 
gold output, and had an even greater share in Soviet silver in 1925- 
26. (Koves 1976, P. 160)
Another form of cooperation was the establishment of mixed 
companies, in which the Soviet government held 50 percent of the 
shares, and directly participated in running the company. The mixed 
companies were primarily created in the fields of foreign trade, 
timber production and transportation.
Yet the significance of such cooperations in the development of 
factors of production was only limited. In 1928, for example, when 
the number of these cooperative ventures reached their peak, only 
110 existed. In the same year these enterprises employed 20 
thousand people and produced only 6 percent of the total industrial 
output. (Koves 1976, P. 162) There are several reasons cited for the 
lack of Western firm s' interest in participation in concession 
agreements with the Soviet government; among them are: the
uncertainty about the internal conditions of the Soviet Union, the 
Western propaganda against the concessions and later, in the 30s, the 
unfavorable effects of the Great Depression. Internally the 
concessions policy also faced strong opposition, partly because from 
the political and ideological point of view it was not yet decided 
whether such forms of cooperation with the industrialized West were 
acceptable. Moreover, the intensity of dispute was enhanced by the
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specific form of concessions, in particular the aspect of concession 
policy calling for the cooperation with the pre-revolutionary owners.
Notwithstanding, in 1928 a comprehensive concession program 
was elaborated, predicting the probability of 80 million roubles of 
foreign investment annually. The program hoped to attract foreign 
capital into the branches o f the industry in which the Soviet 
government could not afford to invest; and it hoped to involve 
foreign capital in "reconstruction, replacement and modernization" of 
state enterprises.1 This program was not implemented, and during 
the first five-year plan period the concessions virtually ceased to 
exist; by then, offering the concessions became more and more 
undesirable both politically and economically. Under the condition of 
a planned economy in which the intention is to "concentrate all 
detectable resources on the creation of new plants, and to control the 
investm ents and the whole production by m eans of direct 
instructions, concessions appeared to be intolerable foreign bodies." 
(Koves 1976, P. 163)
4.1.2. C ontroversy  Over S tate M onopoly of Foreign T rade: 
Despite the state monopoly of foreign trade, in practice during 
the period of war communism (1918-1921) a considerable amount of 
foreign trade was conducted through non-governmental channels. 
(Nuti 1979) And indeed by the beginning of the New Economic
1 Some foreign firms were involved in technical assistance contracts. Under 
this arrangement a foreign firm made no permanent investment, but 
provided technical expertise for a fixed fee. For more information on the 
activities o f the foreign firms in the Soviet Union at that period, please see 
(McKay 1974).
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Policy (NEP 1921-1928) many leading party and government figures 
questioned the necessity of retaining the monopoly of foreign trade 
itself. The principle contention of those who attacked the 
government monopoly of trade was that the state agency responsible 
for conducting the foreign trade (i.e. the People's Commissariat of 
Foreign Trade) was incapable of successfully performings its tasks. 
Bukharin, for example, argued:
neither Lenin nor Krasin says a word about the incalculable 
losses that are borne by the economy of the country as a 
consequence of the inefficiency of the People's Comissariat of 
Foreign Trade, due to the principles on which it is organized; 
they do not say a word about the losses incurred because we 
ourselves are unable (and will not be able for a long time for 
quite understandable reasons) to mobilize the peasant's stock 
of goods and use them for international trade. (Quoted in Lenin 
1976, P. 455)
Bukharin's opposition to the monopoly of foreign trade, therefore, 
stemmed from his belief in the monopoly system's inability to 
effectively encourage the peasants to produce and sell for exports. 
Considering the unavailability and high cost of consumer items in 
Russia itself, "only the lure of cheaper foreign consumer goods 
offered by private traders could stimulate the peasant to improve his 
production and to market goods in large quantity." (Quigley 1974, 
P.P. 29-30)
Lenin, while advocating the monopoly of foreign trade, was the 
first to admit its inefficiency. But such deficiency for him was of 
secondary importance.
The question of the inefficiency of the people's Commissariat of 
Foreign Trade is only a minor one. For this inefficiency is only
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part and parcel of the inefficiency o f all our People’s 
Commissariats, and is due to their general social structure; to 
remedy this we shall require many years of persistent effort to 
improve education and to raise the general standard. (Lenin 
1976, P. 455-56)
The fundamental reason for maintaining monopoly of foreign trade 
in Lenin's mind remained the same as when he in 1918 decreed such 
monopoly: to protect the country from the imperialism of Western
powers. (Quigley 1974, P. 30)
In the epoch of im perialism  when there are monstrous 
contrasts between pauper countries and imm ensely rich 
countries . . . the only system of protection worthy of
consideration is the monopoly of foreign trade. (Lenin 1976, P. 
457)
Lenin at the same tim e believed that the problem of 
inefficiency of the Foreign Trade Commissariat could and would be 
resolved. One of the remedies he suggested was:
learning from foreign traders participating in the mixed 
companies. The system of mixed companies is the only system 
that can really im prove the poor staff of the People's 
Commissariat of Foreign Trade, since under this system foreign 
and Russian merchants work alongside each other." (cited in 
Quigley 1974, P. 31)
The opposition to the foreign trade monopoly continued 
through the remainder of the decade. Although such opposition was 
not successful in abolishing the monopoly, it did force important 
concessions. As a result of these concessions, a number of agencies 
outside the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade were allowed to 
engage in direct foreign trade.2 These included private Russian
Quigley (1974) attributes the establishment of mixed companies in the field 
of foreign trade to the insistence of anti-Foreign Trade Monopoly forces.
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citizens and com panies, cooperatives, foreign citizens, mixed 
companies and state-owned agencies.
It was stipulated that a Russian private citizen who owned or 
leased an enterprise could under exceptional cases apply for a license 
to import items necessary for his enterprise's production, or export 
goods that the government was particularly anxious to sell abroad. 
(Quigley 1974, P. 34) Another channel through which private
Russian citizens were perm itted to become involved (although 
indirectly) in foreign trade was by allowing them to deal with 
concession firms inside Russia. (Quiqley 1974, P. 35) Another major 
achievement of the opposition was forcing the government to grant 
admittance to a large number of state agencies to get involved in 
foreign trade activities.
4.1.3. Volume and Structure of Foreign Trade 1917-1928:
Soviet foreign trade almost ceased in 1918 and 1919 and was 
still very small in 1920-21. The economic recovery commenced in 
1921, at the beginning of the NEP period, and was accompanied by 
the growth of foreign trade. Foreign trade grew sharply during the 
NEP; it however never reached its 1913 level. By 1927, exports (in 
1913 prices) had risen to only 34.7% and imports to 38.9% of their 
1913 level. (Holzman 1963, P. 286)
Throughout the period imports increased more rapidly than 
exports, and the country was faced with large balance of payments 
d e f ic i ts .3 Holzman (1963) argues that the Soviets would have
3 Except for the years 1923, 24 and 26 which showed small surpluses. 
(Holzman 1963, p. 86)
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imported even more to speed the country's reconstruction, but their 
efforts were hampered by their inability to increase exports more 
rapidly than imports and/or to obtain long-term credits. Their 
deficits were financed by exports of gold and other precious metals 
and by short-term credits obtained on difficult terms. (Holzman 
1963, P. 287)
The inability of government to increase the exports was mainly 
due to the structure of landholding in the Soviet Union during the 
NEP period. In this period the small peasant farms replaced the
large state, nobility, and church estates of the pre-revolutionary era. 
These estates were previously the main producers of the grain 
surpluses for exports. Furthermore, the Soviet government was 
unable to induce peasants to produce and more importantly to 
market grain at the pre-war level, mainly because manufactured 
goods were scarce, and also because the peasants could easily 
substitu te  hom em ade m anufactures, when the governm ent's 
manufactured products were not offered at sufficiently low prices.
Although grain remained the number one export, it never reached its
pre-war level, and the chronic shortage of grain and other 
agricultural products repeatedly disrupted the government's plan to 
increase export. (Furtado 1966, Dohan 1976, and Quigley 1974) The 
Foreign Trade Commissariat's problems were aggravated by the fact 
that the domestic prices of such important export items as timber, 
flax and grain often exceeded world prices. The government,
nevertheless, continued to export, selling abroad at a loss, because 
the primary goal was to import items needed for reconstruction and 
not to make a profit. (Quigley 1974, P. 46)
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However, the chronic balance of payment problems eventually 
forced the Soviet government to cut back on imports. The biggest 
cutbacks happened on the consumer goods items, and the imports of 
many industrial outputs also were curtailed. Yet the imports of
industrial output crucial to the reconstruction and development of 
the economy increased and surpassed the pre-war levels. (Holzman 
1963, P. 287)
The decade of the thirties brought important changes in the 
Soviet economic model of development as well as its foreign trade 
policy and institutions.
 Autarky as the Model of Foreign Trade:
A hallmark of Soviet economic development over the years has 
been the emphasis on self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency became 
prominent during the 1930s, when foreign trade became negligible,
and it continued into the 1950s. As Holzman (1979) argues, the
desire for self-sufficiency exists in all nations to some extent, partly 
because of the reasons of military security, partly due to economic
consideration—i.e. to achieve self-sufficiency in those commodities
produced at a comparative disadvantage.4 It seems, however, the
4 Holzman (1979, p. 263) argues such desire is stronger in the centralized 
economies and is intensified by the following reasons: first, because of
complicated inout-output interrelationships among intermediate products, 
central planners try to avoid dependence on foreign suppliers and insulate 
the economy from the vagaries of the world market. Second, the irrational 
price system of these economies often makes it difficult for planners to 
decide what to trade.
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adoption of autarky as the model of foreign trade by the Soviet 
government was motivated by more complicated factors.
4.2.1. The First-Five Year Plan (1928-33):
In 1928 the Soviet planners drafted the first five-year plan 
(1928-33). One of the basic goals of the plan was the expansion of 
the foreign trade; exports were projected to increase 21% every year, 
imports were also to be expanded rapidly, especially machinery 
imports called for by import substitution policy. Imports became a 
vehicle for industrialization of the country and achievement of 
economic independence. In the words of a Soviet scholar
Imports into the USSR are planned so as to aid in quickly 
freeing the nation from the need to import. . . [and] in the 
execution of the plan for socialist industrialization [it is 
necessary to] import the most finished equipment and newest 
machines . . . for the organization of our own production of 
these very m achines, to secure our technical-econom ic 
independence from capitalist nations (cited in Holzman 1963, 
P. 302)
Moreover, the plan projected an annual trade surplus in order to 
replenish depleted reserves. The planners furthermore attempted to 
change the structure of exports and to rely particularly on the 
exports o f industria l’ raw materials such as timber, oil and 
manganese in the first three years of the plan. Such a move was felt 
to be necessary because grain, the traditional export item, had 
proved to be unreliable during the NEP. The government, however, 
planned to increase grain exports in the fifth year of the plan, on the 
expectation of increased output and marketing of a modest number
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of collectivized farms that were to be established. (Doham 1976, P. 
611-612)
Throughout the plan there was no indication that the foreign 
trade would be cut back or discontinued after the completion of the 
p la n .5 In fact it was a combination of several external and internal 
factors which led to an extensive cutback in the foreign trade by the 
end of the plan period. This contention that foreign trade was cut 
back because of economic forces is in contrast to the popular belief 
that Stalin deliberately pushed for the adoption of autarky. It is true 
that, in the XlVth Party Congress in 1925, Stalin said that the Soviet 
Union "today can't help" but to import machinery; such a necessity, 
he added, should not be interpreted as "a principle, theory, or 
development perspective.” According to Stalin, imports were at that 
time essential in assisting the Soviet Union to move rapidly from the 
stage of development in which it "must import equipment and 
machines instead of manufacturing them" on its own. (cited in Koves 
1976, P. 171) His formulation, which can be well interpreted as 
advocacy of the policy of import-substitution industrialization in the 
hope of achieving economic independence, ten years later became a 
theoretical base for the adoption of autarky.
There is no doubt that the realization  of "economic 
independence" was the goal of the planners in drafting the first five- 
year plan. However, the planners never m eant economic 
independence to imply a complete isolation from the outside world:
5 Except in a few cases, the increase in the domestic output permitted such a 
cutback or cessation, such as cotton, zinc, paper and yam. (Dohan 1976, p. 
612)
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In the field of international relations we must not start from 
the empty slogan to develop these relations in the widest range 
(a consistent application of this slogan issued by the opposition 
would mean the end of foreign trade monopoly, as well as 
economic and military capitulation before the international 
bourgeoisie), nor from the slogan to cut the economic relations 
with the Capitalist world (which, if implemented, would mean a 
strong retardation of the rate of our economic development in 
general). In this field we must start from having the widest 
ranging relations provided that these relations (foreign trade, 
foreign credits, extending concessions, drawing in foreign 
engineers and technicians, etc.) increase the economic power of 
the Soviet Union, make it increasingly independent of the 
cap ita list world, expand the socialist bases for further 
developing the Soviet industries; widest ranging relations may 
exist only within these frameworks, (quoted in Koves 1976, P. 
171)
Foreign firms, in fact, continued to be active and play a role in 
construction and operation of new capacity associated with the five- 
year plan. For example, Freyn Engineering Company of Chicago, 
according to McKay (1974), directed all aspects of construction of the 
Kuznetzk steel plant, and Arthur G. McKee and Company of Cleveland 
directed the Magnitogorsk steel plant. The autarky, then, as will be 
shown was not pursued as a result of one person's wishes; it was 
rather a pragmatic response to the balance of payments crisis. The 
alternative would have been, as Dohan (1976) suggests, the reduction 
of "investment and output programs to a level appropriate to import 
capacity until the export position improved." (Dohan 1976, P. 633) 
This policy, if it had been adopted, would have postponed the 
achievement of the highly desirable goal of "realization of economic 
independence" to the unforeseeable future.
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The period of the first five-year plan was a troubled time for 
Soviet foreign trade. The Great Depression in the West had an 
adverse effect on the Soviet international terms of trade mainly 
because the world price of Soviet exports fell more than the price of 
Soviet imports. According to Holzman (1963), the index of the prices 
of Soviet exports fell from 100 in 1929 to 48.7 in 1932, while the 
prices of its imports declined from 100 in 1929 to 68 in 1932. 
Despite such adverse developments, the Soviet volume of trade 
increased tremendously in the same period. According to Holzman 
(1963), the volume of exports increased 46 percent, and the volume 
of imports 61.5 percent, from 1929 to 1931. As a result, trade 
deficits were incurred in every year from 1928 to 1932, except in 
1929 when there was a small surplus. These deficits were financed 
in part by shipments of gold and other previous metals but primarily 
by high-cost short-term  credits and some long-term  credits. 
(Holzman 1963, P. 290)
In response to the unpredicted large trade deficits, the original 
plans for 1930 and 1931 were abandoned, imports for light industry 
and consumer goods were cut sharply, and the government initiated 
another campaign to economize on imports: to attempt to meet most
essential machinery needs domestically. This campaign turned out to 
be ineffective, and the imports continued to grow faster than exports 
and led to even further depletion of foreign exchange reserves and 
accumulation of even more short-term foreign credits.
The Great Depression had another adverse effect on Soviet 
Foreign trade. The Depression-hit capitalist countries, in order to 
protect home industries, sought to reduce imports through imposition
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of high tariffs and other trade barriers. The Soviet government, 
desperate for foreign exchange, nevertheless, continued to expand 
the exports, regardless of exports' prices. Consequently a vigorous 
campaign was waged in many Western countries against the Soviet 
"dumping policy" which induced the imposition of discriminatory 
tariffs, quotas and other restrictions against Soviet products. (Dohan 
1976 and Quigley 1974) Although the outcry against Soviet 
"dumping policy" diminished by the summer of 1931, the general 
efforts of the capitalist countries to protect themselves from the 
widening Depression suffocated the policy of free trade and replaced 
it with "protective trade." As a result, the policies which a couple of 
months before had been merely discriminatory measures against 
Soviet products became Western countries’ general trade policies, 
and by the end of 1931, Soviet products like any other nation's 
became thoroughly "enmeshed in general trade barriers that not only 
depressed export volume and prices, but also began to force the USSR 
toward bilateralism, which was to characterize its trade in the post 
World War H years." (Dohan 1976, P. 622)
Another adverse development for Soviet foreign trade in late 
1931 and 1932 was the decreased availability of credit. The 
Western creditors began to refuse to grant new credits to the Soviet 
governm ent and requested at least the partial liquidation of 
outstanding debt. Borrowing in the international market played an 
important role in financing Soviet imports from 1928 up to 1931.
6 Dohan (1976) believes the Soviet economists of the time were correct in 
arguing that the capitalist countries were moving toward autarky.
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The Great Depression made access to foreign credits easier for the 
Soviet Union, and in 1931 about 25 percent of imports was financed 
by net increase in borrowing.7 In addition, as a large portion of 
exports increasingly became committed to retiring the existing short­
term  credits, the "imports had become very vulnerable to any 
decline in credit supply.” Such vulnerability, according to Dohan, 
(1976) was a significant factor in reduction of imports after 1931, 
especially after Germany and other Western creditors discouraged 
new credits to the Soviet Union.8 (Dohan 1976, P.P. 624-626)
These major adverse international developments were not the 
only obstacles to the maintenance of Soviet foreign trade at the 
desired levels; there were also some domestic factors which spurred 
the cut back in foreign trade after 1931. One of the most important 
internal contributing factors was collectivization. Collectivization, 
some believed, depressed the output of agricultural outputs for 
exports, and unpredictably increased the imports for the agricultural 
sector. On the exports side Quigley, (1974, P. 61) for example, 
believes that peasants who w ere "forced into collective farms 
p ro tested  by slaughtering  livestock  and p o u ltry , thereby
The Soviet debt in October of 1931 was about 811 million roubels. Dohan 
(Ibid.) adds to the figure the amount of credits secured by the Soviet exports 
warehoused abroad and its future liabilities for machinery on order, and 
reaches the total real and contingent liabilities for the Soviet Union as 
about 1400 million roubles. He concludes with long-term credits and good 
prospects for refinancing. This would not have been a problem, but such 
was not the position of the Soviet Union.
Another effect of the Soviets' increasing dependence on credits was that 
they ended up purchasing only from a limited number of foreign 
suppliers, especially Germans, who were willing to supply credit. These 
suppliers were able to take advantage of their positions and charge higher 
prices on Soviet orders.
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complicating considerably the procurement of eggs and butter, two
important export commodities." Considering that the exports of
animal products were 16% of total exports in 1927/28 and they were 
expected at least to double by 1932/33, the slaughter must have had 
a devastating effect on the export earnings. (Dohan 1976, P. 619) 
The slaughter of horses and oxen had another adverse effect as far as 
exports are concerned, because they led in part to a sudden
mechanization of agriculture. The mechanization, in turn, implied 
diverting the petroleum products from the export market to the 
agricultural sector in order to meet its increasing needs for fuel. On 
the im ports side, the sudden loss of draft power meant an
unanticipated increase in imports of tractors and other heavy 
equipment. Added to these problems were the massive crop failures 
of 1931, 1932 and 1933 which worsened the export crisis of the
agricultural outputs.
In addition, the overambitious plans are also cited as another 
factor which intensified the balance of payments crisis, mainly 
because planners turned to imports in order to cover the inevitable 
shortages due to the underfulfillment of the plans.
To ease the foreign trade crisis, by late 1931 the Soviet 
government undertook an extensive campaign in order to find ways 
to reduce or to tally  elim inate imports of raw m aterials and
machineries. As a result the Soviets began a reduction of imports, 
production of domestic versions of the imported machineries, and
redesigning products to eliminate the imports. The first step toward 
establishment of the "autarkic" model of development was taken. 
The character of the measures adopted can be illustrated by a
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directive addressed to the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry 
in early 1932:
To stop and to prohibit henceforth the import of the following 
kinds of equipment for which orders to the value of 21 million 
gold rubles were to be placed in the course of the next 
fortnight within the country: transformers, all types of trucks
and railw ay engines, m otor veh icles, cranes, internal 
combustion engines, generators and spares for any equipment 
already imported. (Cited in Koves 1976, P. 172)
The government did not intend the adoption of such policies at the
time of their initiation to be a complete isolation from the outside
world; they hoped such policies would assure the economic growth
and defense of the country. In the words of a Soviet scholar at that
tim e:
Economic independence means that the m ost im portant 
branches of the national economy are assured domestic raw 
materials and installations in a degree which makes them 
independent from individual nations of the capitalist world . . . 
But industrialization is, of course, not designed to reduce 
imports in general, and imports of machinery and installation 
in particular. The extent of the imports of USSR . . . will be 
determined by what and under what conditions one will sell to 
us. (cited in Dohan 1976, P.P. 633-634)
The "anti-import" policies were therefore praised because they
helped to achieve economic independence.
The initiation of autarky as the model of foreign trade spurred
the reinforcement of the government monopoly of foreign trade. All
p rivate citizens, mixed companies and non-com m issariate state
organizations once again were banned from conducting direct foreign
trade. (Quigley 1974, P. 62) And the adoption of centralized
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economic planning put an end to the debate over the desirability of 
government monopoly of foreign trade.
4.2.2. The Reinforcement of the Autarky:
By the end of the first five-year plan, there were many factors 
at work which prevented increases in Soviet foreign trade. As far as 
the capitalist countries were concerned, their attitudes toward the 
Soviet Union and trade in general remained the same. Domestically, 
however, the huge imports of machineries and large investment in 
the basic plant and equipment of the first-five year plan period 
made the Soviet Union more independent of the other countries. 
According to Holzman "without question, the Soviet Union could in 
1933 come much closer than ever before to satisfy its requirements 
in  a re a s  c o n s id e re d  im p o rta n t by the  p la n n e rs ."  
(Holzman 1963, P. 304) Therefore, the Soviet Union’s ability to 
produce most o f its strategic requirem ents internally was an 
important factor in their unwillingness to expand their foreign trade, 
especially under the conditions when terms of trade were still very 
disadvantageous to the Soviet Union. "Having satisfied their most 
urgent needs for m achinery and equipm ent, it seems most 
reasonable for the Soviet Union to have decided that the costs, in 
terms of export, of many less urgently needed imports had become 
too high." (Holzman 1963, P. 305) M oreover, the Soviet 
government's desire to end food rationing and improve domestic 
food consum ption increased the pressure to cut exports of 
agricultural products.
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There were other factors at work which made the contraction 
of foreign trade desirable. For example, putting less emphasis on 
foreign trade was advantageous from the perspective of central 
planning. Because foreign trade is less amenable to prediction and 
control, its reduction minimized the possibility of the disturbance of 
the national economic plan. (Doane, Jr. 1983) Furthermore, the 
campaign for the reduction of imports, which had been adopted as a 
pragmatic response to the balance of payments crisis, now became a 
virtue.
Consequently the role of foreign trade was reduced to marginal 
importance. The country imported only when there was a shortfall 
in domestic production, and exported only the surplus of goods which 
were enough to finance the imports. In the words of a Soviet scholar 
at that time:
The basic task of Soviet exports . . .  to earn foreign exchange to 
finance expenditures on imports and to accumulate the foreign 
exchange reserves of the country . . .  the USSR exports its goods 
only in order to pay for a comparatively small quantity of 
imported goods which are necessary for the speedy execution 
of the national economic plans. Therefore, the dynamics of the 
quantity of exports is defined by the plan which is constructed 
in connection with the planned volume of imports, (cited in 
Holzman 1963, P. 362)
In practice, however, at times the import requirements proved 
to be higher than expected, and the exportable commodities had to 
be created either by reducing domestic consumption (Koves, P. 114) 
or by planning for export production. (Holzman 1976, P. 33) The 
most salient feature of the Soviet model remained the fact that there 
was no attempt to specialize and direct the foreign trade based on
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the principle of comparative advantage. And the volumes of exports 
and imports continued to decline. By one index they only reached 
their 1913 levels in the I950s.9
4.2.3. World War II and its Aftermath:
Among the important foreign economic developments during 
the war years was the lend-lease shipments from the United States 
to the Soviet Union in the amount of $10.8 billion. These shipments, 
according to Koves (Koves 1977), were not restricted to military 
equipment but also served to aid the continuous operation of Soviet 
industries, in particular heavy industry, as well as to help the 
"reconstruction of destroyed factories." However, the reemergence of 
the economic relations with the West did not last long and the Cold 
War brought a universal Western system of prohibitions and 
restrictions of trade with the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, in the post 1945 era the economic and political 
isolation of the Soviet Union came to an end by the addition of the 
Eastern European countries to the ranks of socialist countries. The 
Soviet Union started to import what it needed from these countries. 
The East European countries, along with the Soviet Union followed 
the same economic concepts which had dominated Soviet foreign 
trade policy since 1931: that is they would rely only marginally on
9 Based on this index (1913=100) the volume of exports started to decline in 
1933 and continued to decline until 194S and since then has been steadily 
growing. The volume of imports, on the other hand, fluctuated widely 
between 1933 and 1945; it reached its highest level in 1948 and its lowest in 
1943, and it has grown since the end of World War II. (see Gregory & Stuart 
1981, p. 267)
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trade with capitalist countries, on Western technology, and would 
take into account the effects of economic ties with the West in the 
solution of the economic problems of growth only to a minor extent. 
(Koves 1977) M oreover, these countries had attem pted to 
industrialize as rapidly as possible as had the Soviet Union, in the 
hope that each would achieve self-sufficiency. In Holzman's words, 
these countries consequently sacrificed "mutually profitable trade 
based on comparative advantages” in the "pursuit of a higher degree 
of self-sufficiency." (Holzman 1963, P. 308) In addition, the Eastern 
European countries, like the Soviet Union, considered exports as 
"necessary evil" in order to cover the shortfall in domestic production 
(Doane Jr. 1983), or/and pursue the policy of import substitution. 
(Brown & Marer 1973) Such a policy extended, according to Holzman 
(1963), to even the trade relations among these countries 
th e m se lv e s .10 In any event, the emergence of Eastern Europe as 
socialistic countries led Stalin in 1931 to expound the theory of 
emergence of two opposed, parallel world markets.
It should be observed that the U.S.A., and Great Britain and 
France, themselves contributed—without themselves desiring it 
. . .  to the formation and consolidation of the new, Parallel 
World Market. They imposed an economic blockade on the 
U.S.S.R., China and the European people’s democracies . . . 
thinking thereby to strangle them. The effect, however, was
In terms of foreign trade the economic relations among these countries 
are of major importance. However, the manner that the trade among these 
countries takes place in is a manner qualitatively different from that 
between the socialist and the capitalist countries, or among the capitalist 
countries themselves, and it is a subject which is beyond the discussion of 
this dissertation. Among the recent studies which deal extensively with 
such trade relation is that of M. Herald. (1985)
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not to strangle, but to strengthen the new world market. 
(Stalin 1971, P. 566)
In Stalin's view the most significant aspect of the "socialist world 
market" was that it would result in "a fast pace of industrial 
development in these countries. It may be
confidently said that, with this pace of industrial development, 
it will soon come to pass that these countries will not only be in 
no need of im ports from capitalist countries, but will 
themselves feel the necessity of finding an outside market for 
their surplus products. (Stalin 1971, P. 566)
Furthermore, the existence of the "socialist world market," according 
to Stalin, would imply the loss of opportunity for the Western 
countries, to sell in this market.
. . . that [capitalist countries'] opportunities for sale in the 
world market will deteriorate, and that their industries will be 
operating more and more below capacity. . . . This is felt by the 
capitalist themselves, for it would be difficult for them not to 
feel the loss of such markets as U.S.S.R. and China. (Stalin 1971, 
P. 566)
In contrast to Stalin's belief, Soviet trade with the industrialized 
Western countries as a portion of total Soviet foreign trade started to 
increase in the 1960s and it reached roughly 40% in 1978. (Gregory 
& Stuart 1981, P. 272) Indeed, during the 1960s, East-West trade 
increased more rapidly than the intra-socialist trade, albeit from a 
smaller percentage base. While the socialist countries continued to 
trade with each other and the level of their trade remained low, the 
first sign of a new development had emerged: the participation of
the socialist countries in the international division of labor, (Holzman 
1974, P.P. 127-129, Doane Jr., p. 9) and by 1978 the volume of East- 
West trade exceeded $60b. (NYiri 1982, P. 21)
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One corollary of the increased East-West trade was a change in 
the perception of the role of foreign trade in socialist countries. 
W hile the autarkic model of development viewed imports to be 
significant as long as they cover the shortfall in the domestic 
production, the recently emergent philosophy stresses participation 
in the international division of labor and promotes the "outward 
looking" model of development, which seeks to increase the imports 
of Western technology in order to enhance the level of productivity 
and efficiency of production. Some even argue the economic 
development must be geared into specialization in production of new 
products for export to the W estern countries (export oriented 
developm ent).
I will devote the rest of the chapter to establishing how the 
recently emerged philosophy in Eastern Europe views the following 
m a tte rs :11
1. The genesis of the "outward looking" model of 
development, and its implication for the construction of socialism.
2. The role of Eastern Europe in the international division of
labor.
I will demonstrate that this approach holds that the autarky 
was a condition mainly forced on socialist countries by an
11 I realize that my survey will be limited in extent, because I will 
concentrate only on those studies which are available in English.
However, I believe there is an adequate amount of study available to enable 
one to get an accurate picture of the entire literature. Acta Oeconomica and 
Problems o f Economics are among the best sources, one published by 
Hungary, the other by USSR. International Affairs (Moscow) and Current 
Digest of Soviet Press can be used for such purposes. In any event, the rest 
of this chapter will be entirely based on the Eastern European sources.
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environment hostile to the Soviet Union and later to the rest of 
Eastern Europe, a view similar to that of dependency schools. This 
view contends that the autarkic model o f developm ent was 
successful in amassing the domestic resources, rebuilding the war
torn economies and achieving the desired industrial transformation. 
It proved, however, to have some limitations in particular for the
smaller Eastern European countries. These limitations, along with the 
shortage of labor and raw materials and rising capital output ratios, 
suggested the need for a transition from extensive growth (i.e. via 
increases in scale) to intensive growth (i.e. via modernization and 
increases in productivity) based on imports. On the other hand, the 
Western governments finally realized the failure of the Cold War and 
the economic blockade of Eastern Europe. Such realization led to the 
creation of the political context of detente, which facilitated the 
implementation of the "outward" looking model of development.
With regard to the place of the Eastern European countries in 
the international division o f labor, it is argued that these countries 
occupy an intermediate position. Their economic relations with the
advanced cap ita list countries resem ble those of center and
periphery. (Nyiri 1982, and Eckstein 1980) This resemblance, 
however, does not mean that advanced capitalist countries exploit 
Eastern European countries: it rather implies establishment of a
mutually advantageous relationship. In regard to their economic 
dealing with the LDCs, it is argued that although at the surface the 
Eastern European countries may resemble DCs in their relations with 
the LDCs, in fact Eastern European economic relations with LDCs "will
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serve the socio-economic progress of people liberated from the 
colonial yoke.” (Smith 1979, P. 310)
PART TW O: THE NEW APPROACH TOWARDS FOREIGN
TRADE
The principle premise of the Eastern European economists' 
v i e w s 12 in regard to the role of foreign trade is that it is 
indispensable for the economic development of any given country, 
mainly because:
Nowadays individual countries—and even whole groups of 
countries—can no longer grapple successfully with world-wide 
problems such as those connected with raw materials and 
power supplies. Alone and unaided, they are not in a position 
to elim inate the more dangerous and widespread diseases, 
ensure supplies of foodstuffs . . . and exploit resources of the 
seas. . . . For this reason, economic links and a division of labor 
at the international level are assuming increasing importance 
for individual countries, irrespective of their stage of economic 
development. (Shiryaev and Sokolov 1979, P 289)
By the Eastern European economists, I also mean those Soviet economists 
who adhere to the new paradigm. Therefore, "Eastern Europe" henceforth 
includes the Soviet Union.
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There are other factors at work which make development of
even the w ealthiest countries w ithout foreign trade virtually 
impossible: "the assortment of goods produced is so diversified while
the range of social needs is so wide, that a single economy cannot 
produce by itse lf all the goods indispensable for the normal 
functioning of society." (Rosati 1979, P. 53) Some of these
economists even go further and in accordance with the theory of 
comparative advantage argue: the "production for the world market
taken in the widest sense may result in considerable advantages for 
any country, independently of its size. Buying abroad goods which 
cannot at all or only too expensively be produced domestically will 
earn the biggest profits for a national economy if it is accompanied 
by the export of goods that can be produced with sign ifican t 
advantages in that national economy." (Koves 1979, P. 325 emphasis 
added)
In addition, the countries are different in terms of their
productive resources "including [their] natural resources, climate 
conditions, and classical factors such as labor and capital," which
intensify the need to participate in the international division of labor. 
(Koves 1979, P. 53) Moreover, such participation will resolve the 
"economic problems of raising the efficiency of production," (Goldian 
1984, P. 3) and "promotes the acceleration of technical progress." 
(Klochek 1979, P. 10) The importance of such participation is further 
enhanced, when one considers it from a political point of view: the
"development of economic cooperation between East and West is not 
merely an economic interest for the partner-countries, but also an 
important factor of peaceful coexistence." (Kador 1977, P. 153) The
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policy of peaceful co-existence or "the course towards the easing of 
international tensions," is believed to be "inseparably linked with the 
expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation . . . among countries 
with different social systems." (Bogomolov 1979, P. 305) According 
to these economists, the importance of East-W est cooperation was 
predicted and stressed by Lenin also. For example, Lenin declared 
that "[t]here is a power that is greater than the desire, will, and 
resolve of any of the hostile governments or classes. This power is 
common worldwide economic relations that compel them to enter 
into [economic relations] with us." (quoted in Bogomolov & Dostal 
1974, P. 56) He also stated that the "[e]conomic need will itself point 
the way . . .  the development of regular trade relations between the 
Soviet Republic and the rest of the capitalist world must inevitably 
continue.'' (quoted in Goldian 1984, P. 11)
 Autarky and its Achievements:
In the light of the Eastern European economists' attribution of 
such important roles to the economic relations between East and 
W est, one may wonder how do they explain the adoption of 
"autarky" in the Soviet Union and later on in the rest of the Eastern 
European countries. The most frequently cited reason for the Soviet 
Union's adoption of the policy of ’autarky' is the Western powers' 
trade blockade and economic embargo.13
13 D. Rosati (1979) believes along with the capitalist countries' pressures, 
other factors were also responsible for the decreases in the Soviet Union's 
foreign trade. Such decreases in the years 1930-39, according to Rosati, 
were "the result of the acceptance o f a set o f views concerning the 
independence of the Soviet economy from the world capitalist market." 
(Ibid., p. 52-53)
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For many years the predominant view held in the socialist 
countries on the role of foreign trade in socialism was that the 
sole purpose of foreign trade was to satisfy needs which cannot 
be supplied by domestic production; and exports should 
develop only as far as is necessary to cover import necessities. 
This view was the product of a period when, between the two 
W orld W ars, the capitalist countries tried to_ isolate the 
economy of the Soviet Union totally bv imposing an .economic 
blockade. . . . (Szita 1974, P. 282, emphasis added)
the imperialist powers, according to Klockek (1979), at first militarily
intervened against the Soviet Union and refused to establish any
economic contact with the young Soviet Republic, and later on
through their economic blockade tried to impede the growth of the
Soviet Union's foreign trade. Nevertheless he argues that the Soviet
Union "has a lw a y s  resolutely opposed the concept of autarkic
development and proceeds from the need for the broad, mutually
advantageous cooperation of countries in the realm of economic,
trade, science and technology." (Klockekl979, P. 18 emphasis added)
According to Koves, (1981) another explanation seems to stem
from the Western capitalist countries' economic conditions at that
time. The world economy of the thirties, Koves believes, was
characterized by "disintegration, slow technological and economic
development,” and the existence of the capitalist system itself was in
jeopardy. Therefore, the price to be paid by the Soviet Union for not
trading was not really so high.
It is, then, generally conceived that the policies of the Western
powers forced the Soviet Union to embrace autarky. "It had been the
political tension that made the Soviet Union and other countries to
withdraw into themselves and that had not allowed them to progress
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toward a widening cooperation." (cited in Koves 1978, P. 115) Such 
a conception is more or less similar to that of the dependency school 
which maintains that autarky was mainly forced upon the Soviet 
Union by the world capitalist economy.
Multiple reasons are, however, cited in order to explain the 
conditions which stimulated the adoption of autarky as the model for 
the economic development in the rest of Eastern Europe after 
WorldWar II. "The heritage of the past, war damages, tensions of the 
Cold War, [and] an almost complete isolation from the world market" 
are generally perceived as the main reasons for such adoption.14 
(Mandel & Muller 1974, p. 37)
In B. Radar's view (1977), for example, the Eastern European 
countries shaped their development strategy along the path of 
internal and regional autarky "partly in consequence of the 
extrapolation of experiences obtained in the restricted  world 
economic relations between the wars and partly in response to the 
political embargo." (Kadar 1977, P. 155)
The Hast European economists maintain the policy of autarky did not entail 
completely abandoning foreign economic relations; it rather meant to curb 
Western economic relations and to create an almost complete isolation of 
the economy from the influence of the world market. (Tardos 1981, p. 222) 
M. Mandel and J. Muller (1974) in fact argue that the development o f  the 
socialist countries after World War II took place in a framework where 
"dynamism of foreign trade was so significant that formally this should 
exclude the qualification of the economic policy as autarky." They believe, 
however, employing the terminology of autarky is still justified because 
the foreign trade was carried on under the conditions of regional co­
operation in order to satisfy the "quantitative needs of the rapid 
industrialization accomplished parallelly and at the same time in the 
individual countries." In addition to the socialist regional co-operation, 
development policies were based on import substitution. Mandel and 
Muller believe that in "consequence of these two factors the main 
tendencies o f development policy can be qualified as autarkic despite a 
significant growth in foreign trade.” (Ibid., p. 36)
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J. Bognar (1979) counts both internal and external conditions as 
stimuli for adoption of autarky. He argues in the late 1940s the 
'external' world was very antagonistic and hostile to the socialist 
countries. Politically, the Cold War was raging with full force and the 
danger of transforming the Cold W ar to an actual war between East 
and West was mounting. Economically, the United States declared an 
embargo which was followed by its allies. Eastern European 
participation in the international division of labor was further 
restricted by the fact that the colonial system was still strong, the 
new national states were only just beginning to come into existence, 
and economically they were approachable only through the Western 
metropolises. Under these conditions, "the preference of 'internal' 
trade was not only a policy but the only possibility, and import 
substitution (substitution of W estern im ports) was not only a 
conception but the only possible solution." (Bognar 1979, P. 3)
In regards to internal conditions, Bognar refers to the economic 
underdevelopment of the Eastern European countries, in particular 
the smaller ones, and the existence of an ample labor surplus as the 
conditions which made the adoption of extensive econom ic 
development in order to bring about an industrial structure not only 
logical but necessary.
Rosati (1979) and N. Shmelev (1979) also consider the Cold 
W ar and the Western imposition of the economic blockade as the 
important factors for the Eastern European reliance on the use of 
domestic productive forces for the purpose of economic development. 
Yet Rosati (1979) believes the doctrinal considerations promoting an 
excessive adaptation of the Soviet experience of the thirties were
also a significant factor. B. Rasdar (1977, P. 155) more or less raises 
the same issue: After the second World War the Western countries
wanted to restrain imports from the socialist countries and prevent 
their econom ic developm ent by applying an em bargo for 
considerations connected with foreign policy and strategy. "The 
exports of socialist countries were limited by the so-called customs 
escalation policy of W estern countries, by duties on individual 
products increasing  paralle l w ith the grade of processing, 
discriminative restrictions with reference to market disturbance and 
various administrative obstacles." The effect of Western powers’ 
restrictions resulting from political hostility was strengthened by the 
different ideas in regard to development strategy and foreign 
economies in Western and Socialist countries. In the view of East 
European economists, it was under the above mentioned conditions 
that the autarky becam e the "creed o f econom ic policy ." 
Consequently the socialist countries came to the conclusion and the 
belief that they had to isolate themselves from the effects of the 
world economy, since only unfavorable and dangerous consequences 
could come from such a hostile environment. They devised the 
theory that maintained after the Second World War, a socialist world 
market independent of the capitalist world market had come into 
existence, and that the rapid economic development o f socialist 
countries needed no more than an intensive division of labor among 
themselves. The strategy chosen in this context for economic 
developm ent considered the highest possible degree of self- 
sufficiency of the individual countries and of the entire community. 
(Koves 1981, P. 113)
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According to this conception, trade with the outside world— 
mainly DCs—had only marginal importance. From the DCs the 
socialist countries would have to import only commodities of which 
they are partially and/or temporarily short. Thus with a low import 
level, the East European economists hoped that there would be no 
obstacles to achieving a balance of trade. It would be sufficient to 
export to the capitalist countries what was left over after satisfaction 
of domestic needs. (Koves 1981, P. 113)
This naturally worked out less smoothly in reality. Import 
requirements often proved to be higher than expected, and the 
exportable commodities had to be created not from some excesses 
but by trimming domestic consumption. (Koves 1981, P.P. 113-114)
The essence of the conception was nevertheless fully asserted: 
self-sufficiency became the gist of economic policy and the 
opportunity to  establish a division of labor with (DCs) was
disregarded in determ ining the goals and trends of economic
development. (Koves 1981, P.P. 113-114) There was, then, no
attempt to specialize according to the requirements and possibilities 
of a world market which was exposed to cyclical fluctuation and full
of hostile political interests. (Kadar 1977, P. 155) The engine of
growth, then, relied on sources of fuel like the increase in
employment, and volume of investments or what later came to be
known as the "extensive economic development." (Koves 1979, P. 
324) The development became characterized by a very strong
quantitative approach, and the development policy emphasized new 
projects, for employment and regional development. (Berend 1975, 
P. 167) The main economic task of the time became the creation of
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full em ployment, through industrialization, raising the minimum 
subsistence level as rapidly as possible, and creating a strong 
national defense capacity. (Nyiri 1982, P. 19) Industrialization was 
carried on based on the policy of import substitution, and economic 
planning became the rule.
According to the Eastern European economists, at that time the 
adoption of all these policies was logical, and their implementation 
was conceivable. For example, using the case of Hungary, G. Y. 
Kovacs (1976) argued that during the first phase of socialist 
industrialization, characterized by an extensive development, the fast 
rate of economic growth was by no means limited by either 
realization or production considerations. The demand on the home 
market, he argues, surpassed the supply and consequently there was 
no problem in regard to selling goods domestically. In addition, the 
markets in other socialist countries provided unlimited realization 
possibilities even for the products which did not completely satisfy 
the "internal technical parameters." On the production side also 
there existed plenty of factors which promoted extensive economic 
growth. First of all, there were ample labor reserves, mainly 
released at the first stage of socialist industrialization from the 
agricultural sector and households. Second, the growing raw material 
and energy needs of the country were satisfied by imports from 
other socialist countries and in particular from the Soviet Union, in 
exchange for industrial products resulting from extensive industrial 
development. Furthermore, Kovacs believes, "since the fixed assets 
and technological requirements of quantitative growth were not in 
the first place determined by criteria of realization on a competitive
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market," capacity expansion was possible in many instances with not 
the most up-to-date fixed assets and technologies coming from home 
production or from other socialist countries. (Koves 1976, P. 52)15
Furthermore, Eastern European economists maintain that the 
adoption of autarky and all other supporting policies was either 
justified or inevitable at that time. The adoption of central planning, 
for instance, was justified because, as S. Pasztor (1980, P. 90) argues, 
the autarkic endeavours can be only enforced in a framework of 
direct plan instructions. It was further justified, as Berend (1968, 
P.P.. 76) explains, because it was the only feasible solution to the 
problem  of traditional backwardness of the Eastern European 
countries. These countries, he asserts, had never passed through an 
industrial revolution in the Western sense, and with the exception of 
C zechoslovakia, p reserved  the ir agrarian  and sem i-agrarian  
character. The predominantly agricultural character of this part of 
the European continent made capital accumulation impossible and 
kept the level of investment low. Consequently the economic growth 
of these countries was no more than moderate in the inter-war 
period, and "these countries were completely unable to change their 
economic structure or solve the dramatic social contradiction in their 
societies." Against this historical background Berend believes central 
planning seemed to be "a possible weapon against backwardness and
^  A. Koves (1981) argues more or less the same points when he states: "it
could still be reasonably expected that the Soviet Union and the other 
socialist countries possessed all the internal conditions, beginning with 
apparently boundless opportunities to increase the volume o f investment 
and employment, for dynamic economic growth." (Ibid., p. 115)
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poverty, and presented a drastic method to forte a 'take o ff  period, 
to use Rostow's expression."16
Import-substitution, given the context of the Cold War, was 
intended to reduce imports at both national and regional levels. 
(Csaba 1983, and Mandel & M uller 1974) Its adoption was 
inevitable not merely because the Soviet Union's industrialization 
was based on import-substitution policies, but because it had deep 
historical roots in Eastern Europe. According to L. Csaba (1983), in 
the in terw ar period  in Central and South-East Europe all 
industrialization invariably was based on the import-substituting 
concept. This policy had a foundation in the 'economic nationalism' 
of the successor-states to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. These 
states, in the name of self-reliance, in a political climate of animosity, 
did what was in their power "to dismantle the integrated large 
economic entities of the former empire." Consequently, each state 
embarked on the policy of import substitution for the purpose of 
creating all of the branches of industry domestically in order to 
protect itself from the "undesirable consequences of dependence on 
the neighbouring states." Given such a background, Csaba believes 
that with the emergence of the Cold War and Western embargo 
policy, reemergence of the import substitution policy was inevitable.
16 It is important to know that this point is not shared by all the Eastern 
European economists. I. T. Berend, (21S) for instance, maintains that the 
adoption of central planning was wrong from the time of its inception:
"the method of compulsory plan directives, in spite o f  significant results, 
had some very decisive disadvantages from the first dav of its adoption. 
There can be no doubt that this method was harmful, nor can the damage 
caused by mistaken aims be clearly separated from the damage caused by 
mistakes in planning." (Ibid., p. 83 emphasis added)
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The Eastern European economists (with qualification) admit 
that the adoption of autarky and all concomitant policies induced 
decisive changes in the structure of Eastern European economies. For 
instance, the agrarian character of these societies changed 
d r a s t i c a l ly ,17 the share of industry in the net national product 
increased tremendously, and the structure of the industry altered. 
Countries that once produced consumer goods, mainly food, began to 
produce capital goods. In addition, all these countries experienced a 
phenomenal economic growth; according to official figures, the gross 
national product during the 1950s more than doubled in the majority 
of Eastern European countries. (Berend 1968, P.P. 80-82)
4 4  Autarky and_Its Consequences:
Yet, the Eastern European economists maintain that not all 
these economic achievements must be attributed to the adoption of 
the autarky. L. Csaba (1983), for example, argues that the 
impressive growth rates achieved by the socialist communities in the 
period of the 1950s and 1960s were influenced by several factors: 
"Besides the undeniable mobilizing effects o f the victorious new 
system, the socialist ideology, the introduction of the system of 
macroeconomic planning," there were other factors at work; for 
example agrarian over-employment, female labor and chronic white 
and b lue-collar workers' unemployment provided an excellent
This pan of Europe, Berend (1968) argues, with the exception of 
Czechoslovakia, preserved its agrarian character even after World War II. 
After World War II about 75% of the population in the Balkan countries and 
50% - 60% in Poland and Hungary derived their income from agriculture.
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untapped pool of labor which was to be used as a source of extensive 
economic growth. A major share, Csaba believes, must be attributed 
to the possibilities inherent in a low starting level, as well as to the 
requirements of the reconstruction period.
M. M. Tardos (1981) raises another issue. He argues that a 
great part of the industrial development in small countries of Eastern 
Europe in the 1950s was fostered by the technical knowledge 
accumulated earlier prior to World W ar U and as a resu lt of 
extensive contact w ith the W estern powers. Among the first 
factories nationalized in these countries, Tardos maintains, were 
those operating with foreign capital and technologies, at a time when 
economic relations with advanced capitalist countries flourished. 
Most of these factories later proved to be among the most dynamic of 
any given industry .18 This technical knowledge provided a
satisfactory base fo r rapid industrial developm ent in Hungary 
animated by a growing domestic investment demand and by demand 
from  other Eastern European countries. For example, after 
nationalization, the MAVAG and Ganz plants were more or less easily 
retooled for the production o f engines and freight cars meeting 
Soviet demand. Shipbuilding had developed prior to World W ar II 
and had produced river-sea and deep-sea vessels; in the 1950s it 
received orders from the Soviet Union for the production o f ships
18 In Hungary, for instance, a decisive pan in the expansion of the capital 
goods industry was played by the production of rolling stock, which had a 
long history. The MAVAG and the Ganz Wagon and Machine Works had 
produced engines and freight cars in large quantities during the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy.
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suitable for coastal trade, in quantities perm itting large-scale
production unprecedented in this branch.
Tardos' belief that the industrial development in the small 
countries of Eastern Europe was primarily promoted, not by the
learning of new advanced technical expertise, but rather by
knowledge accumulated before and during the second World War— 
leads him to the conclusion that the scope and extent of industrial 
developm ent in these countries was greatly lim ited by this 
traditional expertise.
Tardos' conclusion directs us to a point which is more or less 
shared by almost all the Eastern European Economists [that is]: 
despite the achievements of autarky and its concomitant policies, 
they produced several negative consequences in all sectors of the 
economies as well as in the foreign trade sector; indeed, these 
policies were imbedded with contradictions. As J. Bognar (1979)
argues, "the fact that some development alternative (decision) is 
inevitable and justifiable" at one time "does not save us from the 
consequences" and their negative effects. (Bognar 1979, P. 4)
The heavy em phasis on industria lization , fo r instance, 
generated profound unbalances in the structure of the economy. 
First of all, the pace of industrialization was "irrational." (Berend 
1968, P. 83)19 In Hungary, for example, there was a bias against
19 Berend (199) asserts that the first five-year plan envisaged a 210 percent 
growth in industry. During the same period he maintains that almost half 
of all investment was concentrated on industry, with the emphasis on the 
primacy of heavy industry, and only 13 percent went into the agricultural 
sector. Berend (1975) argues this conception o f industrialization, initiated 
in the middle of the 20th century, was based on an idea reflecting the 
requisites of the turn of the century in regard to the structure of the 
industry and the necessity of heavy industry.
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the agricultural sector, along with other policy measures involving 
compulsory delivery of agricultural products at low prices, excessive 
taxation and unrealistic pace of collectivization led to the stagnation 
of this sector. (Berend 1975 and Berend 1968) Such stagnation, in 
turn, resulted in an acute shortage of agricultural goods which hurt 
and weakened the traditional export base of the country and created 
"a permanent crisis in supplying the population with its needs." 
(Berend 1968, P. 83) It is believed, therefore, that the decline in the 
agricultural goods available for export caused great difficulties as the 
need for imports grew tremendously as a result of intensive 
investment. Some Eastern European economists believed that the 
system of central planning also produced damaging consequences. 
Among the most important of such damaging consequences was 
"inefficient investment." "The lack of incentive to produce for 
market," these economists argue, created a complete "disinterest in 
the cost of investment and consequently [led] to the overextension of 
investment in new plants and underinvestment in technology and 
replacement." (Berend 1968, P. 84) Waste and low efficiency 
characterized the production as well. For the enterprises were 
interested only in fulfilling the plan, and they were not concerned 
about cost of production.20 Furthermore, the planning system
20 Berend (1968) argues that in fact, according to the terms o f the plan, the 
value of production could be achieved by using greater quantities of raw 
materials, or more expensive ones. The fact that the most important plan 
directive was fulfillment of the total planned value of production was 
harmful in still another way. The enterprise did not produce all the 
articles called for, but only those which could be manufactured in the 
easiest way. Superfluous quantities of the most material-intensive articles 
were produced.
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hindered technological development. Because the enterprises were 
not interested in modernizing, "the position of enterprise in the 
internal market was monopolistic, and not even in foreign trade was 
it exposed to the risks of competition. The artificial price system and 
the elimination of any kind of incentive for marketing formed a ring 
of protection around the economy against not only the unfavorable 
effects of the world market, such as major fluctuations, but against 
any pressure for rationalization.” (Berend 1968, P.P. 84-85)
The "ring of protection” led also to the technical isolation of the 
Eastern European countries from the advanced capitalist countries.
Such isolation had extremely harmful effects for the sm aller 
countries of Eastern Europe as far as their technological advancement 
is concerned. Their main provider of technology became the Soviet 
Union and other more advanced countries of Eastern Europe, whose 
growth pattern o f manufacturing and engineering industries were 
not in line with the world market requirements. (Tardos 1981)
The Eastern European economists furthermore claim that the 
low efficiency o f investm ent and production is the m ajor 
characteristic of any policy of autarky. "Needless to say, such waste 
and in effic ien cy  is inheren t in the au tarch ic  view of 
industrialization." (Berend 1968, P. 83) Or, the "endeavours to
produce in one country (or even a group of countries) all necessary 
products that can be produced there, or whose production can be 
organized through great efforts sooner or later, unavoidably lead to 
low efficiency." (Koves 1979, P. 325) This low efficiency stems from
the fact that in almost all cases the size of the country makes it
impossible "to utilize economies of scale, and the too wide range of
238
goods produced lead to inefficiency in individual fields, in addition to 
the neglect of the advantages from international specialization 
according to comparative advantages." (Saba 1983, P. 62) It is 
therefore argued that under the condition of autarky, on the one 
hand, the production takes place on a small scale because it has to 
meet only the needs of the domestic market, which in turn is limited 
in its purchasing power; on the other hand, production is based on 
the domestic production apparatus whose technical standards cannot 
be high in all areas. In addition, autarky cannot stimulate the use of 
modern and advanced production techniques because of the small 
scale of production, and also because the need to develop production 
in all areas causes a dispersion of the resources for research. As a 
result the internal possibilities for raising the level of quality of 
production is almost non-existent. Furthermore, the low quality of 
goods prevents the effective competitiveness on the world market 
and makes exporting difficult and consequently limits the imports. 
The insignificant size of imports does not allow a full satisfaction of 
consumer needs, and as a result, the provision of goods and services 
to society is considerably impaired. This became a further incentive 
for im port-substitution. (Rosati 1979) Im port-substitution itself, 
however, led to the further dispersion of productive resources, and 
in fact as it has been shown historically it increases the import needs, 
and demands a steady rise in exports in order to cover the 
permanent growing import needs. (Rosati 1979 and Mandel & 
Muller 1974)
It is, therefore, autarky per se which leads to the low efficiency 
and crisis in foreign trade, notwithstanding that it is implemented in
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the framework of centralized planning and is accompanied with a 
strong emphasis on heavy industry. The problem, however, is that in 
Eastern Europe all these policies were adopted at the same time with 
the consequence of, as far as foreign trade is concerned, "weakening 
of the traditional expoTt base, insufficient competitiveness of the 
exported finished goods, difficulties in pooling the necessary export 
resources under the conditions of over-strained dom estic supply 
conditions, a not rational enough import structure, . . . "  (Bogmolov 
1979, P. 306) to name only a few of the problems enumerated by the 
Eastern European economists. It is the culmination of these problems 
which the Eastern European economists claim incited them to 
advocate another form of economic development, the "outward- 
looking" model of development.
The Eastern European economists' view on autarky and its 
consequences is diametrically opposed to that of the dependency 
school. As was discussed in the second chapter, Frank maintains that 
the adoption of 'isolation policy' is one of the major reasons that the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can now participate in the 
international division of labor on a basis which is 'remotely equal' to 
that of developed capitalist countries. (Frank, 1981) Wallerstein 
also argues that autarky enabled the Soviet Union to convert itself 
from a weak semi-peripheral status to "a very strong member of the 
sem i-periphery and would begin to seek full core status." 
(Wallerstein 1974a, P. 41)
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 ,,Q lltw ar^^ook ing ,, Model o f Development:
The Eastern European economists maintain that by the late 
1960s, it became clear that "the price of autarky is too high and not 
worth ’paying’.” (Pasztor, P. 90) These economists believe that by 
the late 1960s, changes in the following objective factors led to the 
creation of condition in which abandoning autarky became a 
necessity:
—Labor shortage
—D ifficulty of intra-technology transfer among the Eastern 
European
countries
—Acceleration of the scientific and technological development
—Shortage of raw material and energy
—Difficulty of exporting 'low quality' goods among the Eastern 
European countries.
The policy of autarky can only be consistently maintained if all 
the factors of production are available domestically, and it was 
precisely this element which was changing. By the late 1960s and 
early 1970s the sources of extensive development, a characteristic of 
the policy of autarky, were exhausted. (Koves 1979, P. 324) 
Extensive development met with difficulties from the side of 
production factors: first of all the labor shortage almost rendered it
impossible to continue the policy of extensive economic growth. 
(Kovacs 1976, P. 54 and Nyiri 1982, P. 19) Indeed, "full employment 
has changed to overemployment." There were no longer any labor 
surpluses to a point that indeed in "the dynamic sectors and in 
services 'anticipatory investments' have to be implemented in the
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interest of releasing the necessary labor." (Bognar 1976, P. 229) In 
addition, in the production of any given product in Eastern Europe, 
an unjustifiably high amount of labor was consumed, which under 
the condition of exhaustion of labor reserves, further necessitated 
the call for fast technological progress and substitution of modem 
technology for manual labor and inefficient production techniques. 
(Bognar 1979, P. 5 and P. 10)
Moreover, the conditions of intra-technology transfer among 
the East European countries became less favorable (Kadar 1983, P. 
308), if not impossible. (Csaba 1983, P. 55) This was mainly true in
regard  to the m odernized technology, fo r transfer became
particularly difficult basically because of a
"levelling up of technical standards, the large extent of parallel 
fe a tu re s  in  in d u s tr ia l- te c h n o lo g ic a l s tru c tu re s , the
underdeveloped state of inter-enterprise relations and of
technical transfer capacities indispensable for an efficient 
cooperation in technology-intensive activities, the financial 
limits to the trade in technology, and the difficulties of having 
the technical m odernization and qualitative developm ent 
recognized in prices, it  is not justified  to expect that 
cooperation in the technology-intensive fields can be promoted 
considerably." (Kadar 1983, P. 308)
These factors, along with the "low efficiency" of production inherent
in the policy of autarky, demanded the raising of productivity by
finding additional sources of supply of modern technology, and
creation of export capacities in comformity with the import demand
of the new markets.
According to the Eastern European economists, the need to
acquire modern technology from W estern advanced countries is
further enhanced in the period of "acceleration of the scientific and
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technical development." They argue that theoretically any efficient 
production has always dem anded extensive world econom ic 
relations. However, they maintain that when the scientific and 
technical development was less dynamic, it was justified to assume 
that keeping pace with technical progress particularly if  limited to 
only a few branches—is possible through individual im port 
transaction. Such actions, they argue, did not require constant and 
regular economic relations with the West; nor did they require 
maintaining direct and permanent production relations with Western 
companies. Economic relations could be restricted for domestic or 
foreign political and economic considerations for a short or long 
period of time w ithout fear o f any perm anent dam age to 
technological progress. That was indeed the situation in the 1930s 
when the Soviet import substitution policy of the first five-year plan 
period was followed by a decline in trade relations. Practically the 
same conditions occurred in the period of the Cold War, when the 
international political situation and W estern embargo led to an 
almost total halt in the trade relations between Eastern Europe and 
the West. (Koves 1978, P. 116)
The situation became different by the late 1960s and early 
1970s. The acceleration of technological and scientific development 
entailed a permanent renewal of economic structure and product 
patterns, and made the above mentioned approach obsolete. Since 
the most modem equipment purchased today becomes out of date 
tomorrow, only the establishm ent of long term and permanent 
economic relations with the W est could guarantee technological 
progress. A dynamic increase in imports of machinery became
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necessary because it was not possible any more to import just a 
"prototype" which would then be adapted to home conditions and 
manufactured accordingly. Such an act requires time and is a 
complicated task which may lead to uneconomic manufacturing and 
to the "conservation of backwardness" (Koves 1978, P. 116) 
Therefore, the acceleration of scientific and technical development, 
coinciding with the limited possibility of intra-technology transfer 
among the Eastern European countries, became another factor in 
indicating a need for establishment of economic ties with the 
advanced capitalist countries.
Accelerated Western Technological and economic development 
made them [the socialist countries] realize that they could 
maintain the dynamism of growth and could keep pace with 
the scientific and technological revolution only if  they 
encourage the development of trade with nonsocialist countries 
also. (Koves 1981, P. 116)
The need for meeting the requirements of the technical and 
scientific revolution made it necessary to ensure the inflow of 
technological processes, technical experiences and know how 
which can be taken over from the Western countries . . .  by 
normalizing and developing the economic relations with the 
capitalist countries. (Kozma 1974, P. 344)
There were other indications that the sources of extensive
economic growth were being depleted in the socialist countries. The
Eastern European countries, in meeting their dem and for raw
materials and energy, were facing more and more constraints, partly
because of physical lim its to supply within the region, and partly
because the world-wide increase in prices of these factors made
tempting their exports to the non-socialist regions for the purpose of
earning hard currency. (Kadar 1983, P. 308) Given the fact that in
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these countries the energy and raw material inputs of almost every 
product are high, the need for an improvement in efficiency became 
even more urgent. (Kadar 1983, P. 307) The reduction in energy 
and raw material consumption, through the employment of more 
efficient production techniques, is not just due to economizing in the 
costs of production, but because "no body on the world market," not 
even the socialist countries, are willing to purchase "equipments 
'devouring' energy, fuel, or raw materials." (Bognar 1979, P. 10)
Furthermore, the sale of products not matching the world 
market standards became increasingly difficult on the markets of 
socialist countries and within the country itself, which used to 
provide unlimited marketing possibilities. (Kovacs 1976, P. 54) The 
Soviet Union, hitherto a secure market for the increasing industrial 
output of the Eastern European countries, sought from its partners 
major innovative improvements in various fields. (Tardos 1981, P. 
255) The same pressure was being applied by the consumers in
these countries, who were demanding better quality and more 
diversified products. (Koves 1978, P. 120) For the first time Eastern 
European countries might have encountered realization problems. 
(Kovacs 1976, P.P. 54-5) Consequently, as a result of internal social 
pressures, raising the population's standard of living and providing 
them with more and better consumers' goods became a "major policy 
task." (Koves 1981, P. 19) The policy which itself required intensive 
participation in the international division of labor, in Leonid 
Brezhnev's words: "the scientific-technical revolution progress . . .
vastly increases people's needs and demand, and necessitates a
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growing degree of international division of labor." (cited in Koves 
1978, P. 115)
A. Koves (1975, P. 312) argues that by 1971 it became quite 
clear that increasing the intra CMEA21 trade and o f co-operation to 
higher levels requires more outward looking to the world market. It 
became common knowledge that for the socialist countries, intra 
CMEA trade, and trade with the developed capitalist countries could 
be treated not as alternatives but as two complementary processes 
which reinforce each other. The growth in trade of machinery as 
well as consumer goods and foodstuffs between CMEA countries 
could be significantly enhanced by imports of machinery and 
materials from the West.
In the late 1960s the culmination of all these difficulties was 
manifested in the slow down in the growth of national income in the 
Eastern European countries. (Csaba 1983, P. 54) In order to combat 
these difficulties and to increase the rate of growth, the Eastern 
European economists advocated "intensive economic development."
The main task of the present stage in the CMEA countries' 
development is not as much to accelerate the quantitative 
growth of the production apparatus and the scientific and 
tech n ica l p o ten tia l as to im prove th e ir  q u a lita tiv e  
characteristics, the balance in their development, and their 
much more efficient use. (Bogmolov 1979b, P. 8)
Founded in 1949, the CMEA (formerly known as the COMECON) now has the 
following active members: Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German
Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Vietnam and 
the Soviet Union.
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Such a developm ent policy is only achievable through 
international cooperation and participation in the internal division of 
labor
In the past, when economic growth was mostly based on 
sources like the increase in employment and in the volume of 
investments, the requirements [of] machinery imports . . . from 
the West—emerged less sharply. However, when possibilities 
o f extensive developm ent are exhausted and econom ic 
developm ent depends more and more on the successful 
improvement of quality, efficiency and productivity, it will 
becom e m ore and more im portan t that techno log ical 
development and the raising of efficiency should be promoted 
also through the import of up-to-date technology, . . . (Koves 
1979, P. 324) See also (Dobazi and Inotai 1981).
Therefore, according to the Eastern European economists, the
requirement for increasing the standard of living of the population
and more importantly the requirem ent for the acceleration of
growth—under the conditions where the sources for the further
extensive growth had been exhausted—made the "greater and more
many sided participation in the international division of labor"
imperative. Only through such participation are the "technological
development, increase in efficiency, the modernization of economic
(and com m odity) structure"—the basic foundation of intensive
growth”—achievable. (Koves 1975, pp. 311-312)
In the stage of intensive development when the limits to the 
volume of investm ent and to increasing employment are 
closely discernable in every European CMEA country, the role 
of technological process, of higher productivity, of moderizing 
the economic structure and, along with these, of Western 
imports for the purpose of modernization, increase among the 
sources of growth. It is less and less possible to rely on the 
sources available at home or in the CMEA region for increasing 
efficiency, in investment policies, in the supply of materials
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and parts to the ever-growing volume and ever more modern 
and diversified production, in supplying the population with 
industrial consumer goods. . . In other words, increased 
participation in the international division of labor, o p en in g  
towards the world-economv. was put on each CMEA country's 
agenda bv the requirements of domestic social and economic 
developm ent. (Koves 1981, P. 117)
Such an argument is obviously different from that of the 
dependency school. One can recall Frank's belief that economic 
relations with the West can only bring harm to the Eastern European 
countries. According to Frank, the ill-effects of economic relations 
with the West are tremendous. They range from importing inflation 
to importing capitalism itself.22 According to Eastern European 
economists at the same period, some changes were happening in the 
W estern powers' attitudes toward the Eastern European countries. 
Western powers gradually came to the conclusion that the "Cold War 
strategy was undermining the very basis of normal relations 
between peoples and countries and was impeding the development 
of their internal economy.” (Bogdanov and Dustal 1975, P. 58) The 
end of the post war boom revealed the damages resulting from the 
economic blockade of the Eastern European countries. However, the 
change in the Western powers' stand toward the development of 
economic relations with the socialist countries was mainly influenced 
by "the general change in forces in the world arena in favor of the 
forces of peace and socialism," which in turn is based on the 
advantages of the socialist economic system;” and the ability of 
Eastern European countries to achieve great successes in their
22 See the first chapter of this dissertation.
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economic progress in a historically short period of time. (Bogdanov 
and Dustal 1975, P. 59) Consequently, remarkable progress toward 
normalization of political relations between East and West became 
possible at that tim e. A nother factor responsible for such
normalization was the fact that the socialist countries became able to 
maintain and increase their defense capacities. A balance of military 
force was achieved between East and West, a balance which is a pre­
condition of peace. (Bognar 1979, P. 5) Such a development "served 
to fulfill the primary conditions of changing the role of foreign 
sector" in Eastern Europe. (Samulewicz 1984 P. 257) Because "the 
long lasting process of detente is indispensable in providing an
atmosphere for long term and interdepenent links." (Zagorski 1981, 
P. 124) The policy of detente is also desirable for the development 
countries because the most important aim of these countries is a "fast 
and smooth development at home, and the establishment of such
international econom ic conditions" which "will prom ote this 
development," (Bognar 1979, P. 5)
Besides the changes in the internal and external conditions, 
there were m ore general considerations which also com pel
international cooperation:
The gigantic scale of m odern production requires the 
mobilization of material, financial, and human resources that 
are more and more beyond the potential of individual national 
economies, even the most powerful.
At the same time, it is specifically the latest equipment and 
technology that determine the level of the social productivity 
of labor and the corresponding ability to withstand competition 
on the world market. In this regard integrative processes are 
developing in countries with the same socioeconomic system,
249
on the one hand, and on the other extensive participation in the 
universal division of labor is becoming an objective necessity 
for all countries. In other words, the rates of economic 
development of each of the two competing systems are greatly 
influenced by the degree of their interaction. (Bogdanov and 
Dostal 1975, P.P. 56-57)
Furthermore, the necessity of resolving problems caused by the 
scientific and technological problem s demands the cooperation 
between the industrially developed countries and socialist countries. 
Such problems include the development of hitherto unutilized energy 
sources and the resources of the ocean, the protection of the 
environment, etc. (Bogdanov and Dostal 1975, P. 57)
4.6. Eastern Europe and the International D iv ision , ofLLabor:
4.6.1. The Econom ic R elation  w ith  the A dvanced C ap ita lis t 
C o u n tr ie s :
In the late 1960s, it was mainly the smaller CMEA countries, 
more dependent on foreign trade, which increased their trade with 
the W est rapidly. Their imports grew strongly, and under conditions 
of prosperity in the West markets for sales of their export items also 
expanded markedly. Moreover, terms of trade for CMEA countries 
exporting foodstuffs and finished products developed favorably. 
With relatively stable (slowly growing) prices and fixed rates of 
exchange, Western sales could be planned as safely as sales to other 
Eastern European countries. (Koves 1981, P. 116)
Later, in the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union also joined the ranks 
of other Eastern European countries and since then "has been
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exploiting the inherent advantage of the division of labor more fully 
than ever before in order to resolve the problems of raising the 
efficiency of its production." (Goldina 1984, P. 3) By that time the 
countries of Eastern Europe were covering up to 40% of their total 
imports of food, 25% of their raw materials, machinery, and transport 
equipment, and over 40% of their imports of chemical products from 
developed capitalist countries. (Ivashkin and Panchenko 1980, P. 
58) A t the same period, in individual years, the Soviet Union's 
exports covered, for example, 70% of Finland's requirements for oil 
and petroleum products and 60% of its requirement for timber; 
almost 70% of Sweden's requirement for oil and petroleum products 
and 70% of its requirement for chromium ore; 25% of Great Britain's 
need for nickel; 44% of Austria's need for pig iron; 40% of France's 
requirement for chromium ore and 35% of its need for fuel oil; 60% 
of Greece's requirement for pig iron, 38% of its requirement for sawn 
wood. (Ivashkin and Panchenko 1980, P. 60)
Such an increase in the role of the DCs in the foreign trade of 
Eastern European countries, according the A. Koves (1975), proves 
that the "international division of labor is increasingly interpreted . . . 
as a long-term lasting factor of economic growth, and no longer as 
something marginal and complimentary, used to overcome particular, 
though important, bottlenecks, or tensions that might occur here and 
there, . . (Koves 1975, P. 312)
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4 .6 .I .I . Different Types of Economic Relations with the PCs 
and Their Advantages for East and West:
The economic relations between East and West have not been 
lim ited  to only the conventional trade agreements; they have 
increasingly included a broad spectrum of economic ties. In addition 
to trade, new forms and methods of economic cooperation "that go 
far beyond the framework of commodity and trade relations" have
become more and more widespread. And their economic effects 
have been manifested "not in the sphere of commodity exchange, not 
in circulation, but in particular . . .  on material production."
According to Eastern European economists, these new forms and 
methods or Industrial Cooperation Agreements (henceforth ICAs) 
help not only to increase the socialist countries' national income, but 
to influence their scientific and technical progress; they include such 
activities as industrial cooperation on a compensatory basis, creation 
of joint enterprises, agreements on reciprocal participation in various 
projects in third countries, etc. (Ivashkin and Pachenko 1980,P. 62) 
ICAs represent "the highest degree of internationalization" allowed in 
Eastern Europe. (Cieslik 1983, P. 69)
In the words of two Soviet economists;
The 1970s are characterized by the strengthening of economic 
relations between socialist and capitalist countries. While in 
the past socialist countries used only their available export
resources, at the present time they are expanding on a planned
basis the production of commodities especially intended to 
satisfy the needs o f the markets of Western countries. New 
forms of collaboration are placing economic relations between 
socialist and capitalist countries on a stable, long-term footing. 
The jo int construction of enterprises, the conclusion of large- 
scale compensatory deals, specialization and integration of
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production, the adoption of a coordinated technical policy in the 
production of certain technical items, and the amalgamation of 
research efforts in the elaboration of individual urgent 
problem s—all these factors open the way to m utually 
advantageous collaboration based on the enjoyment of the 
advantages offered by the international division of labor. 
(Bogdanov and Dostal 1975, P. 60)
The Eastern European economists unanimously believe that 
ICAs provide excellent opportunities for the transfer of technology to 
the Eastern European countries. Such an element is of considerable 
im portance, because these countries are in need of imported 
technology at this stage of their development, when development is 
based on intensive growth, and because of shortcomings inherited 
from the previous strategy.23
Aside from the import of technology,24 these econom ists 
believe that there are other advantages associated with industrial 
cooperation agreements. The ICAs guarantee higher volumes of 
trade, raise the productivity of labor and decrease the production 
costs per unit of product; in addition, they bring about the 
modernization of production and higher standards of final products.
23 As the extensive growth factors (employment, investment) are depleted, 
the socialist economy begins to encounter barriers, which can be 
overcome only by activating inherent human creative forces and boosting 
management efficiency, for example, by more extensive use of the 
achievements o f science and technology and by closer ties with the 
international division o f labor. This leads to the conclusion that entering 
the intensive growth phase—creates in the socialist economy objective 
preconditions for increasing the demand for imported technology and for 
increasing the role o f foreign technology in the solution to problems of 
national development." (Rapacki 1982, p. 62)
24 It is argued that the transfer of technology in the context of ICAs is not 
transfer o f  "a product but an indispensable 'factor' intended to initiate 
further effects, such as product quality, economies of scale, and the 
creation o f new markets growing out of active and effective cooperation." 
(Kozinski 1981, p. 142)
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Moreover, the ICAs by increasing the productivity and efficiency of 
production, solve the problems of insufficient labor and raw 
materials in the Eastern European countries. (J. Nykryn 1979, P.P. 
246-7) ICAs according to J. Kozinski, (1981, P.P. 142-143) are the 
most important vehicle in the introduction of up to date technology 
in these countries. Furthermore, ICAs can improve the balance-of- 
payments of the Eastern European countries directly by providing 
Western help to produce the kinds of goods that are stable for hard 
currency and to market these products in the "hard currency 
areas.”25
The establishment of joint enterprises in the Eastern European 
countries with the participation of Western firms is another specific 
aspect of economic cooperation between East and West. The legal 
frameworks and economic terms of these organizations differ from 
country to country. What makes these organizations so significant is 
that the Western firms and in particular the MNCs are directly 
involved in the process of production in the Eastern european 
countries.26
25 E. Zagorski (1981, p. 127) believes that ICAs are more effective when they 
give each partner a chance to start new lines o f production that may have 
been too expensive for each without cooperation or when they are used in 
lowering the costs o f production through application of modem highly 
efficient technologies and economies o f  scale. Lower production costs can 
strengthen the competitve position of each partner in local as well as in 
foreign markets.
26 A Gordos (1978) believes MNCs are usually chosen by the socialist countries, 
because they "can satisfy expectations of" these countries "towards the 
import o f  technology." He argues that the MNCs subordinate their entire 
activity to their market strategy which includes extensive control of 
markets and may exclude profit maximization as their primary goal. It 
follows that market expansion is the primary goal of the MNCs who get 
involved in establishment of joint ventures (henceforth J.V.s) in the
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The Eastern European economists believe J.V.s bring not only 
foreign capital but also technology, the two most im portant 
requirements of intensive growth, into the socialist countries. The 
flow of capital through J.V.s is considered to be very important by Z. 
Krasznai and M. Laki (1982, P. 150). They argue the increased 
participation of foreign capital mitigates the scarcity of capital in the 
receiving countries. Furthermore, the foreign banks are more willing 
to lend money to countries where foreign investment is allowed. The 
establishment of J.V.s, therefore, indirectly also helps to increase the 
stock of capital of these countries. They attribute additional 
advantages to the establishment of J.V.s. They argue the J.V.s, 
besides furthering the adaptions of modem technology in the Eastern 
European countries, will help these countries to im prove their 
international balance of payments mainly because the J.V.s enable 
domestic manufacturing of several products which were previously 
imported. This moderates, on the one hand, the lack of equilibrium 
in the balance of trade on the import side and, on the other hand,
socialist countries. (Ibid., p. 408) On the side of the socialist countries, the 
participation o f MNCs in the establishment o f J.V.s leads to the exchange of 
"intellectual products" and the transfer o f technology. This line of 
argument is similar to Evrawicki's (1979) presented in the second chapter, 
who argues that socialist countries favor MNCs over other Western firms.
It seems that the Eastern European economists suggest that the MNCs in 
general are more suited for any kind o f ICAs, because these corporations 
are "well provided with capital and modem technology” and are in a 
position to satisfy most of the requirements of the ICAs. (Zagorski 1981, p. 
128) and (Zurawicki 1975, p. 109) Also, these economists believe that the 
MNCs do not give the Erst priority to gaining a majority-share in the joint 
enterprises. This argument is in contrast to that of some of the Neo­
classical economists' discussed in Chapter (2). In fact, E. Zagorski believes 
the "greatest obstacle to equity joint ventures" stems from the 
inconvertibility o f the Eastern European countries' currently and 
"subsequently, from exchange rate difficulties." And "property 
ownership" is not a decisive factor for doing business through J.V.s (Ibid., 
p. 123)
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furthers the realization of efficient import substitution, that mitigates 
the pressure even for uneconomical exports." (Laki 1982, P.P. 150- 
151) J.V.s also help to strengthen the general organizational and
technological discipline of Eastern European enterprises.
In general, therefore, Eastern European economists highly
value and praise any aspect of the socialist countries’ economics
relation with the advanced countries. In regard to foreign trade, 
they argue that it is im portant because it makes significant
contributions in carrying out the main task of raising the living 
standard of Eastern European people through importing food or 
equipment used in production of consumer goods. (Klochek 1979, P. 
1 1 )
Imports from the advanced capitalist countries are appreciable 
factors in the modernizing of leading branches of industries and in 
the implementation of large investment projects, to mention only a 
few. The exports to DCs, apart from ensuring the bulk of foreign 
exchange earnings to pay for the necessary imports, contribute to the 
rise of technological levels of production and to improvement in the 
quality of products of "not only enterprise working directly for 
exports but also within a wide scope of related branches." (Shmelev 
1979, P.P. 315-316)
It is argued that taking advantage of economic integration with 
the DCs is even more crucial for the smaller Eastern European 
countries, because these countries at the present stage of their 
economic development are constrained more than other Eastern 
European countries by their limited domestic resources and by their 
domestic accumulation. It is no wonder that these countries are
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strongly in favor o f acquiring and implementing a percentage of their 
total investment with the aid of external sources, and increasing the 
share of foreign technology and machinery in their total investments. 
(Simai 1977, P. 2) It is further argued that the smaller Eastern 
European countries in the process of their development have 
produced unnecessarily and inefficiently a broad range o f products, 
and if  instead o f importing the most modern technology from the 
DCs, they decide to continue their production domestically and 
’’widen the any way too broad range of domestic products," they will 
face the unfavorable condition of "diminishing efficiency," and their 
modernization of production pattern w ill be impeded. (Koves 1979, 
p. 332)
The Eastern European economists, w hile insisting on the 
benefits of the socialist countries' participation in the international 
division of labor, also mention that such participation is "mutually 
beneficial" and the DCs also benefit from their economic relations 
with the socialist countries; (Bogmolov 1979, P. 305) and "the 
economic cooperation between countries of two opposite social 
system yields a mutual economic effect." (Bogmolov 1983, P. 24) 
Such benefits can be attained at both Macro and enterprise (Micro).
It is argued that due to the Eastern European countries' "stable, 
crisis free and smooth developing markets," the Western countries 
are able through the establishment o f trade relations with them to 
promote the "technological functioning of leading branches of 
industrial production" in the West. In addition, the imports of 
Eastern European countries from the DCs provide new sources of 
income for the Western enterprises and more importantly guarantee
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a long period of employment for the workers of these countries. 
Such economic relations can significantly attenuate the impact of 
economic crisis on the DCs.27 (Ivashkin and Panchenko 1980, P. 61)
The W estern companies can benefit from their economic 
relations with the Eastern European countries through different 
channels. Besides such factors as cheap labor and tariff reductions 
which they can find in most of the capitalist developing countries, 
these companies face smaller political and commercial risks when 
they deal with the Eastern European countries. (Gordos 1978, P. 408) 
After all, the foreign trade organizations of these countries are not 
faced with the threat of bankruptcy and/or being swallowed up by 
more powerful competitors. The reliability of business relations with 
these organizations is guaranteed by the socialist countries. (Voinov 
1975, P. 5) In addition, the reliability of the socialist countries to a 
certain degree may diminish the market problem that the Western 
companies encounter and create the possibility of expanding "the 
scale of production and increase its effectiveness in the face of 
merciless competitive struggle in the capitalist economy." (Voinov 
1975, P. 4)
The ICAs also provide an excellent source o f considerable 
commerical gain for the Western companies. The compensation 
agreements, for instance, guarantee a long range supply of the 
necessary raw materials, and other industrial products and result in
27 According to V. Ivashkin and V. Panchenko (1980, p. 61) the volume o f East- 
West trade in 1980 provided employment for at least two million persons at 
enterprises belonging to firms and companies in the DCs.
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long-range orders for machinery equipment and industrial products. 
(Ivashkin and Panchenko 1980, P. 71) The delivery of the products 
within the context of compensation deals may be followed by 
delivery of products outside of these deals and further enhance the 
benefit obtained by the Western companies who seek markets for 
their products28 (Nykryn 1979, P. 247)
Once again we w itness the sharp contrast between the 
argument of the dependency school and that of the Eastern European 
economists. While the dependency school maintains that as a result 
of socialist countries' economic relations with the West, only the West 
will benefit, Eastern European economists insist that such economic 
relations will produce mutual benefit.
4 .6 .1 .2 . T he A dverse C onsequences of Q pen ing-un  to th e  
W orld  M arke t
The Eastern European economists maintain that the rapid
expansion of economic relations between East European countries
and the DCs in the first half of the 1970s confirms the fact that the 
"two socially different world systems are developing not in isolation 
from one another but in a clear interaction with one another . . ." 
(Bogdonov and Dustal 1975, P. 61) If such argument is true, then 
one may expect that these economists would admit that their
countries cannot escape the consequences o f adverse economic
28 The Eastern European economists' insistence on the benefits the West 
derived from East-West economic cooperation is in a way an attempt to 
combat the "reactionary circles" in the West who advertise the one-sided 
advantage o f cooperations for Eastern Europe. (Bogdonov and Dustal 1975, 
p. 64)
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conditions in DCs. Indeed, they believe that to some degree such 
adverse conditions have affected Eastern Europe and refer to the 
period of the mid 1970s when the "objective conditions for the 
cooperation of countries with different social system began to 
change," and the new trends in the world economy proved to have 
"far-reaching consequences and eventually affected the interests of 
the Eastern European countries."29 (Shmelev 1979, P. 316 and 
Bogomolov 1979c, P. 305)
The most drastic manifestation of these changes was the 
emergence of recession in the West and a general decline in economic 
growth of the developed countries. Such recession was accompanied 
by high inflation; this meant not only increases in the cost of energy 
and raw materials, but a steep rise in the interest rates.30 Besides
29 It is inconvenient that the appearance o f requirement rooted in the 
intensive period of Hungarian economic development coincided with the 
stagnation of world economy, with the troubles of its monetary and 
institutional system and the sudden changes in price relations. (197, p. 57)
One of the significant aspects of these developments was an increase in the 
interest rate. In the first half of the 1970s international liquidity was high, 
and consequently credit was relatively cheap and easily available. 
Domestically, the period o f intensive growth requires increasing use of 
efficient, modem technology. Yet possibilities of financing modernization 
of production apparatus from internal savings were limited in Eastern 
Europe due to the commitment of raising the population's standard of 
living. (Samulewicz 1984, p. 258) Therefore, in that period, both internal 
and external factors were conducive to obtaining credit. Hence, one of the 
cornerstones of the compensation deals became reliance on Western credit. 
However, the increase in the interest rates in the second half o f the 1970s 
was among the factors which led to the slow down o f economic cooperation 
of East and West and to the deteriorating balance of payments o f some of the 
Eastern European countries. Some Eastern European economists believe 
that the application of high rates of interest on the credit issued to the 
socialist countries is unjustified, because such rates are dictated by the 
internal problems o f the capitalist countries. The businesses conducting 
relations with the socialist countries are advised to seek Western 
governments' subsidies for development o f credit relations with the
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the inflation, the instability of the international monetary system 
was further enhanced by the introduction of floating exchange rates. 
All these developments had im portant effects on the Eastern 
European countries' policy of intensive growth through introduction 
of modem technology, improvement of efficiency, and quality mainly 
through integration into the world market. (Bogomolov 1979, P.P. 
205-6; Shmelev 1979, P.P. 316-317; Koves 1981, P.P. 118-119)
In addition, the advanced capitalist countries, in order to 
protect their recession-hit industries, resorted to the policy of 
protectionism. "The policy of trade liberalization" turned into "one of 
'neomercantilism;' 'new protectionism' . . . "  (Golding, P. 12) The 
protectionism made it extremely difficult for any country to increase 
its participation in the international division of labor. (Kossut 1981, 
P. 113) Moreover, the DCs increasingly employed discriminatory 
measures against Eastern European products. "[T]he capitalist states, 
expressly violating the Helsinki accords, practice and even enhance 
tariff and non-tariff discrimination against the CMEA countries' 
exports." (Bogomolov 1983, P. 29)31 As a result, the Eastern 
European countries were faced with serious obstacles in increasing 
their exports. The opposition of the "reactionary" elements in the 
West to any trade agreements between East and West led to the
socialist countries because socialist countries can agree only with a 
reasonable level of interest. (Bogdonov and Dostal 1975, p. 69)
The Eastern European economists like to add that these restrictions do not 
reflect solely the strained market situation. They rather reflect the 
protectionist tendencies o f Western countries in general. (Mujzel 1979, p. 
419)
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imposition of special non-tariff restrictions on the socialist countries' 
imports in various DCs. (Bogdanov 1983, P. 30) (Bogdanov and 
Dostal 1975, P. 62) Such restrictions, of course, adversely affected 
the balance of payments of the East European countries.
Inflation in the West also contributed to foreign trade tensions 
and indebtedness of the socialist countries. Due to inflation, their 
imports grew at a higher rate than expected, and the growth of their 
exports was not able to keep pace. (Koves 1981, P. 119)
Consequently, the rapid growth of trade with the West took place 
with the dynamic of imports considerably exceeding that of exports 
causing the accum ulation of significant trade deficits by the
countries. (Koves 1979, P. 327)
The changes in relative international prices did not affect all 
the socialist countries identically. The Soviet Union, due to its huge 
purchasing power and the strategic importance of its exports, proved 
to be less vulnerable to the changes in Western economic conditions,
and the policies adopted in reaction to them. The smaller countries
of Eastern Europe, in contrast, proved to be more susceptible to the 
Western economic policy measures. (Kador 1982, P. 324) The 
Eastern European economists are, however, quick to argue that such 
susceptibility to the Western economic conditions and their policy 
measures must be sought in the internal conditions of the Eastern 
European countries. Therefore, many of the problems encountered 
by these countries as a result of their economic relations with the 
West stem from their internal economic structures and not from the 
external conditions. The Western economic situations, their political 
pressures, etc. certainly affect the socialist countries, but by no
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means can determine or direct the economic conditions of these 
co u n trie s .32 To improve their international position and to reduce 
and eventually wipe out the adverse consequences of the economic 
relations with the West, the East European countries must implement 
econom ic reform s and in tensify  the ir partic ipation  in the 
international division of labor.
4.6.1.3. The Internal "Structural” Problems o f Eastern
Europe:
The Eastern European economists do not deny that as a result 
of East-W est economic relations the Eastern European countries 
become vulnerable to external conditions, but such a vulnerability, 
according to them, is not as are important as the benefits derived 
from these relations. B. Kadar, (1982) for example, argues that
The increased dependence on the world market . . . has created 
an objective material base for foreign trade relations to serve 
power policy interests to a much greater extent than before, 
since, in countries sensitive to foreign trade, an unexpected 
closure of either markets or sources of supply may force the 
affected trading partners to engage in costly substitution 
programs. (Kadar 1982, P. 335)
Consequently, he believes the foreign trade has turned into a 
strategic instrum ent for influencing international power relations. 
He cites, for example, the Carter administration's imposition of the 
grain embargo on the Soviet Union in 1980 and the Reagan
This is another argument which is in complete opposition to that of the 
dependency school.
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administration's restriction of exports of technology to the Soviet 
Union in late 1981.33 Kadar, however, maintains that
The presence of the power policy intentions and the use of 
political pressure, is undeniable in East-West relation. But the 
experience . . . call attention to the fact that government 
decisions do not automatically imply implementation." (Kadar 
1982, P. 336)
He argues that trends in actual trade often outweigh political 
considerations of the traders; for instance, despite such restrictions, 
exports to the Soviet Union increased faster than the total exports of 
the OECD.34 The Western companies, interested in exploiting the 
increased purchasing power in the Soviet Union which resulted from 
the rise in the price of crude oil, were not willing to give up the 
Soviet market. Kadar admits the smaller countries of Eastern Europe 
are more sensitive to the political pressures and the domestic policies 
of the Western countries.35
Many other experts of East-W est economic relations, Kadar 
argues, call attention to the strong cyclical fluctuation and to the
33 Following American pressures in January 1982, the NATO Commission, 
coordinating exports o f strategic goods to the Socialist countries, ordered a 
stricter control of exports. The resolution was a compromise; Western 
Europe and Japan resisted U.S. pressure, and only imposed restrictions on 
the export o f most modem technology.
34 Kadar asserts that it is true that in the mid 1970s the growth rate of Soviet 
imports of engineering products gradually diminished. But such a decrease 
"is not necessarily a consequence of export restrictions, but reflects to a 
considerable extent the structural changes in the Soviet import pattern, 
the above average dynamics of the imports o f foodstuff and other 
agricultural products." (Ibid., p. 336)
35 Z. Krasznai • M. Laki 1982 (p. 153) also argue that although the Western 
endeavor to limit exports to socialist countries is never taken from the 
agenda in the West, the more diversified the sources o f technology imports 
are, the more Western firms are involved in this relationship, the less 
sensitive this field will be to politics.
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sensitivity of such relations to the Western business cycles. Kadar 
believes that the growth rates of East-West trade, however, show 
such fluctuations which exceed those of either world trade or the 
trade of OECD countries. The fluctuations in East-W est trade, 
therefore, cannot be explained simply by the phenomena of market 
anarchy, since they are much stronger than the swings of the 
business cycles of the market economy. (Kadar 1982, P. 338) Nor 
can they be explained by the foreign trade policy discrimination of 
Western Europe, because the import policy dispreferences of these 
countries against the four industrialized South East Asian countries 
are stronger than those against Eastern European countries. In spite 
of such dispreferences, the exports of these four countries to Western 
Europe expanded at a faster rate than the exports of Eastern 
European countries to the West.36
Kadar, along with other Eastern European economists following 
the doctrine of openness, believes that most o f the problems 
associated with East-West trade relations must be sought inside of 
the socialist countries and in their "structural features," not in the 
external conditions.37 At this point one can easily observe that the 
dependency school, discussed in the second chapter, tends to ignore
36 J. Szita (1974) also argues that the argument that the impediment to the 
development of East-West trade is discrimination imposed by the Western 
countries is misleading. It is misleading because it diverts attention from 
other problems whose solution requires efforts from socialist countries.
37 Emphasizing the external problems will, according to J. Szita (1974), "often 
divert attention towards questions which are not in line with the most 
important problems of the development o f East-West trade, and then they 
are likely to distract attention and efforts into the wrong direction." (Ibid., 
p. 283)
2 65
these internal factors. However, the Eastern European economists 
argue that studying these internal 'structural factors' is of vital 
importance for understanding East-West economic relations.
The Eastern European economists believe that the development 
of economic relations with the West requires reacting to the sudden 
changes in the world economy. However, it is argued that the 
structure of East European economies, the weak points of their 
production structure, including unsatisfactory quality  level of 
production, and the lack of flexibility and poor initiative of their 
industrial and trade organizations do not allow them to meet the 
requirement of reacting to the fluctuations of the world economy. 
(Kovals 1976, P. 57; Veress 1974, P. 336; Mujzel 1979, P. 420) The 
majority of these problems is attributed to the policy of autarky 
which was the dominant policy for decades in these countries, and 
the system of central planning and m anagem ent's
38 W. Samulewicz (1984, p. 260), for instance, argues that the Eastern European 
countries' "inability to produce enough goods of sufficient quality" can be 
traced back to the system of central planning. The central economic 
authorities, he maintains, translate the national goals, (at macro level) into 
the plant targets (micro goals) for particular enterprises. The managers 
of enterprises are then stimulated to fulfill these goals. According to him, 
however, there is a great danger that managers neglect those aspects o f the 
operation o f enterprises which do not find formal or full expression in 
their plain targets. These neglected aspects are, in most instances, 
activities like development of new products, which produce results only in 
longer time periods, or those which have effects—like quality 
improvement—that are not quantifiable.
According to W. Samulewicz, the Eastern European countries' inability to 
market saleable goods in the West stems also from the domination o f central 
planning in these countries. Marketing goods on Western markets 
requires the ability to adapt to changing conditions, but the Eastern 
European enterprises operate according to plan, and the margin envisaged 
by planners for flexible adjustment to changing market needs is very 
narrow. Consequently, many opportunities for exports are not utilized, and 
exports grow slowly. (Ibid., pp. 260-261)
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M. Tardos (1981) attributes the problems associated with the 
participation of Eastern European countries in the international 
division of labor to the lack of flexibility of institutional and 
management systems in these countries. He argues "one of the 
principle and still unsolved economic management problems is the 
rather slow reaction of the whole system to new requirements and 
cutbacks in demand. For example, no ways have yet been found to 
meet the demand for a new product by establishing a new company." 
He further asserts that "if there is no effective demand for a 
company’s product, the system will not suspend production and wind 
up the company. Instead production will be maintained by state 
subsidies until some government decision is taken." (Tardos 1981, P. 
231)
Along with the inefficiency of Eastern Europeans' production 
(Koves 1979, P. 328), and the lack of adaptation to conditions of the 
international division of labor, another internal situation is cited as 
the reason behind the problematic cooperation between East and 
West: that is the existence of the seller's market in Eastern Europe.39
(Samulewicz 1984, P. 259)
39 According to Samulewicz (1984), the existence of the seller's market means 
that the demand/supply ratio permanently is higher than unity for almost 
all products. Z. Krasznai-M. Laki (1982, p. 156) discussing the Hungarian 
situation, argue that the Hungarian market is characterized by lasting 
disequilibrium and excess demand. Due to the shortage situation existing 
for more than three decades, enterprises are defenseless as buyers while 
they are in a relatively comfortable situation as sellers. Hungarian 
enterprises can obtain new labor, investment capacity, or credit only with 
difficulties and they have serious problems even in purchasing parts, units 
and auxiliary materials required for current production.
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On the seller's market sellers neglect buyers' requirements 
concerning qualities, assortm ent, etc. Because of the lasting 
superiority of sellers characteristic of the Eastern Europe market, the 
buyers have developed particular, defensive methods to increase 
their security. In the interest of easing their defenseless position 
they often arrange for occasional or lasting self supply, are willing to 
accumulate material stocks and in their emergency situation they 
themselves initiate concealed or open price increases. Under these 
conditions it is believed that
. . .  if  a new product or technology deviating from those well 
known in the enterprise is introduced, then the aforementioned 
fo rm s of e lim ina ting  defenselessness are  even less 
efficient.((Krasznai and Laki 1982, P. 158)
Relating the existence of the sellers' markets in Eastern Europe 
to these countries' participation in the international division of labor, 
Z. Krasznai and M. Laki (1982) argue that certainly the possibility of 
purchasing from abroad im proves the position of purchasing 
enterprises against domestic suppliers. Subcontracting agreements 
make it possible for the Eastern European enterprises to become 
independent of domestic conditions of material supply.
In the case of Western cooperation deals and J.V., however, the 
situation is by no means unambiguous, especially if the deal is aimed 
at the manufacturing of some products or group of products new for 
Eastern European enterprises. Here—mainly if several domestic 
parts, units, auxiliary materials are used for the new product—the 
aforementioned methods of eliminating defenselessness is inefficient. 
(Krasznai and Laki 1982, P. 158) As a result, the more an enterprise
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is forced to resort to domestic sources of purchasing and sales on the 
world market, the more problems and inconvenience the cooperation 
with Western firms will cause. The Eastern European countries' 
enterprises accustomed to circumstances of the domestic markets are 
rarely capable of reliable quality, deliveries in time, etc.
Z. Krasznai and M. Laki (1982) therefore conclude that due to 
the lasting excess-demand on the domestic market, there is a strong 
pressure for imports and involvement in those types of cooperation 
deals which lead to increases in imports; at the same time the 
intention to export to Western markets is weak. Furthermore, for 
the reasons mentioned before, they argue the Eastern European 
enterprises are only willing to participate in those cooperation 
agreements that use world market input and produce output for the 
Eastern Europe markets. These conditions consequently lead to 
chronic balance of payments problems, and do not permit the 
socialist countries to take advantage of participation in the 
international division of labor.
Besides the inability of the socialist countries to produce 
sufficient goods for export, to produce goods of higher quality, and 
[their inability] to market saleable goods in the West, some of the 
Eastern European governments' policies are also blamed for these 
countries' problems in dealing with the West. A. Koves (1981), for 
instance, argues that after Eastern Europe opened up to the world 
market, although smaller Eastern European countries encouraged the 
export to the West products of such inefficient sectors as agriculture, 
food industries, and light industries. The sectors which enjoyed 
priorities in development policy, and whose development was mainly
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promoted by imports from the West, manufactured products not 
primarily for export to the West, but for domestic use.
Other unfavorable conditions were at work which made the 
participation of Eastern European countries in the international 
division of labor in the second half of the 1970s more problematic. 
The insufficient development of fuel, raw and primary material 
producing branches along with repeatedly unfavorable harvests 
increased demands for imports from outside Eastern Europe, and 
made the raising of commodity funds for exports almost more 
difficult. Under these circumstances, the individual countries made 
increased efforts to shift some of their products traditionally sold 
within Eastern Europe to be sold for convertible currency. Such acts, 
therefore, produced a chain effect which led to a general increase of 
im ports from the W est throughout all the Eastern European 
countries. (Koves 1979, P. 328)40
The pattern of trade of Eastern European countries is also cited 
as an important contributer to the problem of trade deficits and 
other difficulties faced by these countries as a result of their 
engagement in the international division of labor. For example, 
regarding pattern of trade of smaller Eastern European countries, 
Kozma (1982) argues that these countries generally appear as sellers 
in those industries in the West in which competition is sharp and the
40 Other internal factors are also blamed for the failure of Eastern European 
countries to take advantage of participation in the internal division of 
labor. B. Kadar (1983, p. 306), for instance, argues that insufficient 
development o f infrastructure has a retarding effect on the foreign 
economic relations o f these countries. He believes infrastructural 
development (transport, distribution, storage, sales, flow information) 
reduces the cost o f  foreign economic relations.
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dominating form of production is the small and medium-size plant, 
whose protection is, to a certain extent, in the political interest of the 
W estern governments. Therefore, one im portant cause of the 
problem s faced by the Eastern European countries in their 
international economic relations must be sought in what types of 
products these countries export and what type of products they
import, (Koves 1978, P. 109) which takes us to the discussion of the 
Eastern European economists' arguments in regard to the place of 
Eastern Europe in the hierarchy of the international division of labor.
4.6.I.4. _ The Position of Eastern Europe in the Hierarchy of 
the International Division of Labor and Cost of Openness:
The E astern  European econom ists argue tha t despite  
tremendous development of the forces of production of Eastern
European countries, they are placed in the middle of the hierarchy of 
the international division of labor. The structural characteristics of
East-W est foreign trade reflect those of foreign trade relations
between the developed capitalist countries and the "medium 
developed" countries. (Kadar 1977, P. 154) The developed capitalist 
countries, "mainly for the historical reasons," are at an advantage 
over the socialist countries. The DCs sell goods and products to 
Eastern Europe which they usually export to the LDCs and in turn 
purchase goods and products from Eastern Europe which they 
usually import from LDCs. (Chase Dunn 1982, P. 21) Eastern Europe 
exports, consisting mostly of raw materials, sources of energy, and 
foodstuffs, pay for imports of industrial goods. Eastern Europe
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exports mainly consumer goods, and imports mainly capital goods. 
(Kadar 1977, P. 158)
Such a pattern of trade put Eastern European countries in a 
disadvantageous position, mainly because most o f the exports of 
these countries rely  on the natural endowment (foodstuffs, raw 
materials, as products of timber, paper and sources of energy, etc.) 
which consist of products "that are more capital intensive than the 
average. Yet, the Eastern European countries are relatively short of 
capital, and by exporting the capital intensive products they 
aggravate their problem. (Kadar 1977)41
Moreover, the fact that there are few up-to-date machines and 
other industrial products of outstanding quality in the structure of 
Eastern European exports makes these countries especially sensitive 
to restrictions. (Koves 1979, P. 336) Among the manufactured 
products exported to the Common Market, for example, is clothing, 
which is produced by small and medium sized industries in the West 
ind consequently prone to high tariff rates and other restrictions.
At any rate the Eastern European economists believed that the 
zone in which the Eastern European countries are situated in the 
international division of labor is one of the 'danger zones' in the
41 The Eastern Europoean economists argue, it is true, that a similar situation 
can be observed in the case o f  underdeveloped or medium-developed 
capitalist countries that export capital-intensive products of the extractive 
industries, as well as other raw materials, but in these countries the 
extractive industries are usually the result o f  foreign capital investment. 
In the case of Eastern European industries there is not such foreign 
investment; therefore the export structure engaged additional domestic 
resources o f  investment and influences the "efficiency o f  investments" at 
the national level. (Ibid., p. 159)
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world economy, mainly because of the following considerations: a—
the industrializing developing countries can break into this zone in a 
relatively short time and become Eastern Europe's competitors; b— 
the majority of Eastern Europe's products exported to the West are 
vulnerable to the DCs' defensive measures in order to protect their 
"non-leading" industries and agricultural sector. (Simai 1977, P.P. 9- 
10) It follows, then, that "breaking-out" of this zone and moving 
towards an advanced industrial level is of vital interest for the 
Eastern European countries.
The Eastern European economists, however, like to emphasize 
two important points: first, the position of Eastern Europe in the
hierarchy of the international division of labor does not reflect the 
level of development of productive forces of this region and is 
largely of historical nature, resulting from traditional regional 
specialization in production and in exports of fuels, raw materials, 
other production materials, and agricultural and food products. 
(Tabaczynski 1981, P. 98) To support this point, they assert that for 
instance, in the case of Hungary, its exports to the socialist countries, 
amounting to two-thirds of its foreign trade, correspond to the 
exports of the most industrial developed countries, w hile the 
structure of its non-socialist exports is close to the trading structure 
of the developing countries. (Mandel and M yller 1974, P. 38) 
Clearly Hungary is capable of producing high-quality goods but is 
unable to market them in DCs. Part of this problem, apart from 
discrim inatory procedures of W estern countries, is due to the 
difficulties of establishing new, wide trade relations on the markets 
of the DCs. In these countries years of development of international
273
trade fostered the formation of wide and stable trade and capital 
relations* of which for a long time the socialist countries had been 
left out. The sophisticated system of business relations is based on a 
close and com plicated system of relations embracing a whole 
network of traders* financial institutions* production companies, 
governments agencies, etc. For the outsider and the newcomers it is 
very difficult to break into this complicated network, therefore the 
quality of their products and technology by itself is not sufficient for 
their success. (Szita 1974* P.P. 281-82) In the case of Eastern 
European countries, although the level of production and variety of 
goods and services which are produced by them are far superior to 
those of the developing countries and indeed in cases surpass those 
of DCs, they are not successful in penetrating into the Western 
markets. Notwithstanding, Eastern European economists do not deny 
that the quality of most o f their goods may be below the DCs' 
standards.
The second point that Eastern Economists like to stress is that 
their participation in the international division of labor is a necessity 
and an undeniable fact, but it does not imply that their economic 
development is shaped and directed by the requirements of the 
world market. For exam ple, according to Kovas (1976), the 
Hungarian economy is an open economy, which means that it is 
linked through many threads (by imports and exports) to the world 
economy. Such openness is no doubt necessary.
Because "of the actual and potential scarcity of production 
resources the utilization of neither the operating nor the newly 
entering capacities, nor the employment of labor can be
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realized by relying exclusively on the growth of the home 
market. In other words, the importing of raw materials, and 
means of production necessary for extended reproduction in 
the Hungarian economy and of consumer goods as well 
becomes possible only by exporting a considerable part of the 
output." (Koves 1976, P. 51)
Kovacs, however, m aintains that "openness" means something
different in the case of Hungary than when applied to small and
medium-sized Western countries. In their case openness means a
much more direct assertion of foreign m arket effects on home
processes. In Hungary the wide sphere of plan-controlled and
influenced economic processes, the socialist character of price and
income policies, and the government control of investment decisions
allow —openness notw ithstanding—a less d irec t, restric ted  and
delayed infiltration of foreign influences. (Koves 1976, P.P. 51-52)
Yet he admits that the open character of the Hungarian economy
makes this country to some extent vulnerable to the changes in the
world economy and has manifested itself in deterioration of its terms
of trade under the effects of world market changes in 1974 and
1975.
G. Stepanov (1981) states that the history of the Soviet state is 
full of examples of "futile attempts to 'punish* or 'isolate* it." For 
example, during the first years of the Soviet Republic the imperialist 
states wanted to strangle it by means of blockade. But even in those 
extremely difficult conditions the Soviet state managed to hold out. 
Another imperialist attempt to prevent the Soviet Union's economic 
development in the 1940s and early 1950s also ended in failure. At 
that time restrictive export lists included almost all products that the 
Soviet Union needed for the rehabilitation and development of its
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economy. Yet, the Soviet Union was able to organize its own 
production including the most import branches of industries. Today, 
with the existence of the socialist community and their close 
collaboration, opportunities for imperialist states to influence the 
economic developm ent of the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries are largely limited. (Stepanov 1981, P. 46)42
G. Kohlmey (1975) also strongly denies that the socialist 
countries as a consequence of their participation in the international 
division of labor are compelled to 'import' the capitalist countries' 
inflation and crisis.
"Some disadvantages do arise for us (owing to difficult 
marketing conditions due to recession, growing protectionism 
and increasing competition), but there emerge also certain 
advantages (e.g. more favorable procurement conditions, better 
cred it term s). At other tim es the advantages and 
disadvantages differed, and the disadvantages were often 
great. Crisis and inflation do influence the socialist economies, 
but their influence is not significant and not deforming at all." 
(Kohlmey 1975, p. 305)42
42 One can also add the increase and rivalry among Western firms to export 
pipeline to the Soviet Union.
43 Given the position of Eastern European countries in the international 
division of labor, and the problems encountered by these countries as a 
result of such position, the Eastern European economists seek the solution 
not in the curtailment but "in the expansion and rationalization of 
economic relations" with the non-socialist countries. (144, p. 317) They 
believe that the most important element o f long-term strategy of the CMEA 
countries must be following the "export-oriented model of development." 
For a discussion of this approach please see appendix (II).
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2.6.2.East European Countries and the LPCs:
The dependency school maintains that since the socialist 
countries occupy an intermediate position in the hierarchy of the 
international division of labor, their economic relations with LDCs 
resemble those of DCs with LDCs. I believe the explanation for East- 
South economic relations given by the Eastern European economists 
are important and worth further investigation.
One of the first points generally raised by the Eastern European 
economists is that they do not consider their countries responsible 
for the problems of LDCs. For example, O. Bogomolov (Bogomolov 
1979b, P. 15) maintains that it is the developed capitalist countries 
which are responsible "for the colonial past and present condition of 
developing countries" not the socialist countries. Bognar (1979) also 
argues the same points, "[f]or the past—for colonialization and its 
consequences—socialist countries are in no way responsible," but he 
maintains that "yet for the future they are, since they have immense 
direct and indirect influence on its formation." (Bognar 1979, P. 15) 
According to him, the socialist countries should initiate and promote 
establishment of such circumstances "which allow that countries with 
different social system and state of development can help each other 
in solving economic problems. . . . Only in this way will it become 
possible that the various economics—and especially the economics of 
developing countries. . . . "  (Bognar 1979, P. 16) Such economic 
development in the Third World can be accelerated by the socialist
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countries* establishment of trade, extensive cooperations, and aid.44 
(Bognar 1979, P. 15)
One form of economic cooperation with LDCs is providing 
technical assistance and "economic aid credits" to them. According to 
Bogomolov, the technical assistance of the socialist countries to the 
LDCs is concentrated mainly in the state sector, especially, in the key 
industries whose development is important for ensuring the "political 
independence” of these countries and which contribute to the 
consolidation of their national economies." (Bogomolov 1979d, P. 30) 
It was only after socialist countries started to build engineering and 
other heavy industries that the DCs became compelled to enlarge and 
extend their scale of aid to the developing countries. Therefore, the 
Eastern European rendering of technical assistance to LDCs has been 
doubly advantageous to the developing countries, on the one hand 
providing these countries with the heavy industrial sector, on the 
other hand forcing DCs to extend their economic assistance from the 
extractive industries to other sectors.
According to the Eastern European economists, there exists a 
distinct difference between the types of "economic aid credits" 
granted by CMEA countries to LDCs and those granted by DCs. 
Socialist countries* credits as a rule are long term (10-15 years) and
Y. Shiryayev (1979) in fact argues that the establishment o f these 
economic relations must be aimed at elevating the position o f LDCs in the 
hierarchy of the international division of labor. "One important indicator 
of the CMEA countries' growing role in the system of international 
economic relations is their vigorous efforts to solve one of the most 
imperative problems of our day, i.e. to change radically the place and role 
of the former colonial and semi-colonial countries in the world division of 
labour." (Ibid., p. 5)
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are granted at a 2.5 percent interest rate. "The long-term nature of 
credits allow  the recipient country enough time to build the 
industrial project, to master production and start repaying the 
credits with the receipt from its output." (Bogomolov 1979d, P. 31) 
Admittedly they assert that the total sum of credits extended by the 
socialist countries' assistance to the LDC is "less than that provided in 
the form of so-called 'aid' by the industrialized capitalist countries." 
They continue that one should remember that "by diverting a part of 
its free capital to developing countries as 'aid,' the West derives even 
greater benefits by extracting interest, profits and other receipts 
from the developing countries."45
According to Bogomolov (1979a), the socialist countries, desire 
to render all-round assistance to the developing countries is mainly 
motivated from their interest to support LDCs in their "struggle for 
national sovereignty and independent development." In maintaining 
these relations the socialist countries "are not motivated by any 
unilateral advantages: they are pressing for neither concessions, nor
political domination, nor military bases. On the contrary, they are 
m otivated by a sincere striving for justice, equality, mutual 
advantage and people's solidarity." (Bogomolov 1979a, P. 24) In
In 1977, for example, the LDCs (non-petroleum exporting developing 
countries) paid $25b against loans and credits and the interest on them 
amounted to 21% of their export earnings. In the same year the entire 'aid' 
received by these countries from the West amounted to $14.86. (Ibid., p. 31) 
(See also Kulev 1983, p. 26) It is argued that the socialist countries could 
increase their volume of aid to LDCs and increase their contribution to 
their development "if the progress is achieved in disarmament." The 
socialist countries could channel to the LDCs a fixed share o f the resources 
which would be released through the reduction of the military budget. 
(Bogomolov 1979b, p. 16)
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addition, he argues that the socialist countries' economic assistance to 
LDCs indicates "a fundamental difference in the division of labor and 
economic cooperation between these two groups of countries, on the 
one hand, and the capitalist division of labor” on the other hand. 
(Bogomolov 1979a, p. 24)46
The economic-relations between the socialist countries and the 
LDCs are not lim ited to technical assistance, and 'economic aid 
credits.' They entail a variety of economic relations including trade 
and ICAs.
"The Soviet Union devotes great attention to the development 
of relations with the developing countries. . . . and purses a 
p o lic y  of co m p re h en s iv e -- in c lu d in g  trad e --eco n o m ic  
cooperation with them. In all phases of this cooperation the 
Soviet Union adheres to the democratic principles of total 
equality and mutual advantage and the inadmissibility of any 
manner of encroachment on sovereignty." (Klochek 1979, P.P. 
15-16)
The Eastern European economists believe these types of 
economic relations not only help LDCs to "achieve genuine 
independence but are also an important factor of countering the 
imperialists' attempts to obstruct the positive processes taking place 
in them in the political, economic and social spheres." (Kulev 1983, P. 
22)
46 On other points, however, Bogmolov suggests that the socialist countries' 
economic assistance and aid should be directed at rationalizing "the 
division o f labor between the socialist countries and LDCs." Such rational 
division o f labor will "secure new sources o f  stable imports o f raw 
materials, fuel, and some goods by CMEA countries, while simultaneously 
creating a stable prospect for exports to the developing countries of the 
goods they need." (Bogomolov 1979b, p. 16-17) This type of division of 
labor is not significantly different from that which exists between DCs and 
LDCs.
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The socialist countries, some argue, follow certain principles 
and criteria in their economic relations with LDCs; these principles 
are outlined by T. Szentes: (1976, P. 146):
-exclusion of exploitation from internal economic relations; 
-equality o f partners, avoidance of one-sided economic 
dependence, and exclusion of interference with the partner's 
affairs;
-support to countries fighting for their economic independence 
against imperialist economic powers;
-full respect for national sovereignty over the natural and 
labour resources of the partner countries and support to 
governments intending to realize it;
-combining the observation o, the principles of mutual 
interests and advantages . . .
-cooperation with and assistance to the state and collective 
sectors, wherever it is possible in the partner countries; . . . "
The Eastern European economists also stress the economic
advantages which the socialist countries obtain from their economic
relations with LDCs. The question is, however, raised about what
types of products CMEA countries should import from and export to
LDCs which would be mutually advantageous [to both parties]. O.
Bogomolov (1979c), for instance, suggests that in the interest of
raising the efficiency of investment and in "a fuller satisfaction of
demand for energy in the CMEA countries" it is reasonable that these
countries increase the imports of energy and other raw materials
from LDCs. (Bogomolov 1979c, P. 310) He furthermore argues that
under the conditions of pressing "scarcity of natural resources" it is
important for Eastern Europe to ensure access to mineral resources
on a long-term basis. (Bogomolov 1979c, P. 311) To ensure such
access, the Eastern European countries can pool their resources
together and help developing countries to increase their extraction
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and processing of certain raw materials. (Bogomolov 1979c, P. 
310)47
L. Csaba (1983) argues more or less the same points, but he is 
more cautious and maintains that Eastern European countries could 
increase their industrial exports to LDCs at the present time, but this 
action may overstrain "their already very strained balance of 
payments," especially if  one considers that the Eastern European 
countries are in need of imports of the most advanced technology 
from the W est in order to continue their policy of 'intensive 
development.' Consequently, East European countries, in order to 
afford these imports should channel their exports toward the West, 
(Csaba 1983, P. 69) and not LDCs.
There are economists like M. Simai (1977) who believe that 
given the growing differentiation in the Third World, and uneven 
economic development, it is wrong to prescribe a single and common 
pattern of trade with these countries. The developing countries, 
these days, can produce and export a variety of different industrial 
products. These products include: traditional and new labor-
intensive industrial finished products (such as clothing; textiles);
47 Consequently, Bogmolov suggests that LDCs in their relations with the
socialist countries should confine themselves to their traditional role in the 
international division of labor, i.e. the exporters of raw materials. The only 
impediment he foresees in the continuation of such economic relations is 
the inability o f socialist countries to provide enough investments in the 
expansion o f their export-oriented production in order to pay for the 
rising volume of imported fuels and raw materials. (Ibid., p. 310) However, 
he believes Eastern Europe, by redistributing the existing investment 
funds from the extractive industries to the manufacturing industries and 
consequently by specialization in the manufacturing sector, can raise 
efficiency and produce enough goods of high quality to be exported to the 
LDCs. (Ibid., p. 311)
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machines, electrical engineering and electronics products; basic 
chem icals, chem ical products, synthetic fibers, fertilizers, etc. 
Therefore, the Eastern European countries can purchase increasing 
amounts of semi-finished and finished products from these countries, 
and do not have to limit themselves to purchases of raw material and 
fuel. (Bimai 1977, P.P 16-17) I. Kulev (1983) similarly believes that 
the socialist countries do and will continue to provide a stable 
market for the developing countries' traditional export goods as well 
as output of their new enterprises. (Kulev 1983, P. 25) In fact, he 
asserts that a large portion of LDCs industrial output exported to the 
Soviet Union is produced by industries established by the help of this 
country. According to him, the conclusion of "compensatory 
agreements” under which deliveries of equipment and other services 
by the Soviet side are paid for by deliveries of the output of new 
enterprises is a growing practice in the economic cooperation 
between the Soviet Union and LDCs.
O. Bogomolov (1979a) emphasizes the importance of ICAs in 
the East-South economic cooperation. He believes ICAs help the 
developing countries "to speed up the introduction of new industries 
and attain the necessary production efficiency and quality output. It 
also helps them to increase their exports of manufactured and 
sophisticated goods to the extensive and stable markets of CMEA 
countries." (Bogomolov 1979a, P. 31) At the present time, therefore, 
because of the existence of a variety of economic relations between 
the Soviet Union and LDCs, the Soviet Union supplies these countries 
with increasing numbers of various kinds of machinery, equipment 
and materials. In turn the USSR has increased its purchases of not
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only raw materials and traditional exports of foodstuffs but also of 
the finished products of their young industry.48 (Klocheck 1979, P. 
16)
It seems there exists an apparent difference between the 
Soviet economists who recommend the export of a variety of 
industrial goods from LDCs, and those of smaller Eastern European 
countries whose countries lack a sufficient supply of raw materials 
and consequently recommend exports of traditional products of LDCs. 
One way of solving the apparent contradiction between these two 
approaches is suggested by T. Szentes. (1976)49 Szentes suggests 
that one can easily visualize a long-term agreement which would 
start from exploration and exploitation of raw materials to be sold
48 ICAs between the socialist countries and LDCs through the years have taken 
different forms. In the earlier time, the CMEA countries introduced mass 
deliveries and installation o f complete plants. Under this form of  
cooperation the contractor undertook the delivery of all the equipment 
required for the project under construction. Later another form was 
developed, the 'turn-key* projects. Apart from delivering the complete 
plant, the socialist countries pledged to carry out building jobs, and hand 
over a complete ready-to-operate industrial enterprise. Recently, a more 
complex form of technical assistance has been developed. Under the type 
of agreement, the socialist countries undertake "to master the project's 
capacity and train local manpower, as well as to ensure the profitable 
operation of the enterprize in the intiial stages." (Bogomolov 1979a, p. 29) 
Another form of cooperation is the establishment of joint companies. The 
host country holds the controlling interest and actively participates in its 
mangement. All of these types of economic cooperation are believed to 
help "to strengthen the state sector o f these countries' economies and 
become an effective instrument for expanding the economic ties between 
the two groups of states." (Ibid., p. 34)
49 According to him, there exists an apparent contradiction even between 
"the deliberate policy of Hungary . . .  o f assisting the developing countries 
in the building up of their own processing facilities and the dynamic key 
industries, applying modem technology, and based upon local natural 
resources, on the one hand, and her import demands for traditional raw 
materials, on the other." (Szentas 1976)
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partly to the cooperating country; it would then be followed by local 
processing of the raw materials, and the growing share of the related 
manufactured products in the export to the partner; and finally it 
would proceed to the development of some advanced industrial 
centers based upon the local natural resources and entering into 
intra-industrial exchange and cooperation with those in the assisting 
country. The drop, in a relative sense, of the raw material purchases 
of the latter from the developing country, which follows from the 
increasing volume of processing on the spot, can be purposefully, and 
for mutual benefits, compensated by an appropriate increase in the 
m anufactured imports for the related final consumption, without 
harmful consequences for the Eastern European country. The greater 
mutual benefits will arise in those fields in which sharing of the raw 
material supply can be connected with the sharing of the final stages 
of the production. (Szentes 1976, P. 152)50
At any rate, the Eastern European economists believe that since 
the nature of socialist countries' economic relations with LDCs is 
different from that of DCs, the developing countries will obtain 
considerable benefits from their economic relations with the socialist 
countries. It is therefore irrelevant whether LDCs export raw 
materials or machinery to Eastern Europe. "Unlike the imperialist 
powers which have preserved and often even increase customs and 
other barriers blocking the export output of the newly-free countries
50 Szentes' proposal is almost similar to that of Csaba (187) discussed earlier. 
Csaba suggests a conscious and deliberate policy to divest from declining 
industries, and instead import the related products from the developing 
countries, and concentrate and specialize on those manufacturing products 
in the production o f which Eastern Europe enjoys comparative advantage.
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and especially the finished products of their industries, there are no 
tariff barriers in the USSR, . . . the clearing system of accounts based 
on cancelling out the mutual accounts of the sides is of considerable 
importance for a number of countries. Many young states are 
experiencing difficulties with freely convertible currency, and the 
clearing system rids these states of such difficulties." (Kulev 1983, P. 
25)
Another important aspect of economic relations between the 
East and developing countries is its long-term nature. The long-term 
agreement "creates a stable basis for commodity exchange and allows 
the developing states to count on stable exports not only of 
traditional goods, but also of newly m anufactured products." 
(Bogomolov 1979a, P. 28) They furthermore "enable the Soviet side 
to recoup its outlay on the building of projects." (Kulev 1983, P. 25) 
Another significant element which makes Eastern European 
countries' relations with LDCs distinguishable from those of DCs and 
LDCs is that the majority of East-South economic cooperation takes 
place within the framework of the state sector.
"Because of the weakness of the national economy most Afro- 
Asian and Latin American countries lack the capital and the 
necessary experience to manage a modern economy. The 
record has shown that in these conditions the state sector, if 
used sensibly, can become an effective means of mobilizing 
in ternal resources, accum ulating the necesary skills of 
developing and managing the economy. . . . "  (Kulev 1983, P.25)
In addition it is argued that "the state sector makes it possible to
solve top-priority social problems, such as the introduction of regular
working hours, free primary education, raising minimum wages,
introducing a system of social insurance, free medical services, etc."
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(Kulev 1983, P. 23) Therefore, strengthening the state sector not 
only raises the level of economic development of developing 
countries, but it also raises the standard of living of people of these 
countries. The Eastern European countries do not reject, however, 
development of business cooperation with the private sector of LDCs 
under the condition that it "facilitates the consolidation of the newly- 
free countries' national economy." (Kulev 1983, P. 23)
Furtherm ore, the Eastern European countries promote these 
types of economic relations which are contained in the economic 
plans of various developing countries. "In this way commodities, 
services and technological systems to be supplied can directly 
prom ote econom ic developm ent in the developing countries." 
(Bognar 1976, P. 240) The programmed, planned character of such 
economic relations "can offer the required safety in supply, in 
revenues and for the employment situation on both sides.” (Szentes 
1976, P. 152) Consequently, the socialist countries have been able to 
develop and apply "totally new patterns of international relations, 
differing fundamentally from those obtaining" in LDCs under 
capitalism . These economic relations "make it possible for all 
oppressed peoples to rid  themselves of the im perialist yoke." 
(Shiryayev 1979, P. 5) In fact the economic relations between the 
socialist countries and the developing countries should not be viewed 
only based on "purely economic indicators like the volume of credits, 
foreign trade, . . . etc," because these economic relations produce two 
very important benefits for LDCs. First, they serve to strengthen the 
economies of these countries and their economic independence, and 
they consolidate the position of the state sector to build modem
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industrial and agricultural sectors. Second, the developing countries 
become involved in an advantageous, "steady and balanced division 
of labor with the CMEA countries" which along with all sorts of 
benefits, eliminates the DCs' monopoly as sole exporters of industrial 
goods to them and importers of their products and consequently 
enhances the economic independence of the LDCs. (Shiryayev 1979, 
P. 6) Such economic independence in turn will help the restructuring 
of the world-wide economic relations and place these relations on 
more equitable and democratic foundations. (Bogomolov 1979a, P. 
23)
Unfortunately, the economic relations between the LDCs and 
Eastern European countries have not reached the desired level, 
partly because of lack of historical contact between these two groups 
of countries. Historically, the majority of Eastern European countries, 
unlike the former colonial powers in Europe, did not establish any 
contact with the LDCs; as a result they did not acquire "accumulated 
knowledge and field  experiences in the developing countries." 
(Szentes 1976, P.145) Consequently, many developing countries are 
inclined to continue their traditional ties w ith the W estern 
co m p an ie s .51 The Eastern European countries, therefore, need to 
endeavor harder and concentrate their efforts on acceleration of 
their economic relations with LDCs. The importance of such economic 
relations become even further enhanced, if  one considers that the 
developing countries and Eastern Europe have similar interests as far
51 Apart from the influences and pressures of MNCs.
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as "actively countering the forces of colonialism and neo-colonialism 
and the imperialist exploitation of nations are concerned." Their 
interests also coincide "on issues relating to restructuring world-wide 
economic relations and placing them on new democratic and just 
foundations." (Bogomolov 1979a, P. 23) It has been shown, once 
again, that the conclusion reached by the Eastern European 
economists are considerably different from those of the dependency 
school. Even if  the Eastern European economists agree with the 
dependency school's argument that Eastern Europe's pattern of trade 
with LDCs is similar to that of DCs with LDCs, they disagree with the 
dependency school's idea that Eastern Europe expolits the LDCs. 
Eastern European economists maintain that the nature of Eastern 
Europe's economic relations with the LDCs is fundamentally different 
from that of the DCs with LDCs. Therefore, regardless of their pattern 
of trade, the LDCs will gain from their economic relations with the 
socialist countries.
4^7. Sum m ary and The C ontending Views:
The proponents of openness in Eastern Europe believe that 
although adoption of autarky and its concomitant policies was 
justified at one time, by the late 1960s it became clear that "the price 
of autarky is too high and not worth paying." (Pasztor 1980, P. 90) 
They argue that, by the late 1960s, the sources of extensive 
development, a characteristic of autarky policy, were exhausted; 
consequently, a shift from an extensive growth to an intensive
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growth became imperative. An intensive growth in turn requires 
participation in the international division of labor.
Eastern European economists argue that as a result of its 
participation in the world market, Eastern Europe is placed in the 
middle of the hierarcy of the international division of labor. The 
structural characteristics of East-West foreign trade reflects those of 
foreign trade relations between the DCs and the "medium developed" 
countries. They argue, however, that as a result of such a position, 
Eastern Europe is neither exploited by nor dependent upon the DCs, 
mainly because foreign capital cannot directly infiltrate these 
countries, and in most cases the ill-effects of such infiltration can be 
m itigated by the governm ent policies. The Eastern Europe 
economists' conclusion is, therefore, different from  that of the 
dependency school.
In regard to Eastern Europe's economic relations with the LDCs, 
these economists argue that such relations are entirely favorable to 
the LDCs. They maintain that since the nature of Eastern Europe's 
economic relations with the LDCs is fundamentally different from 
that of the DCs with the LDCs, the LDCs will benefit from their 
relations with the socialist countries.
The proponents of doctrine of openness, w ith their heavy 
emphasis on the imports of Western technology, have been criticized 
in Eastern Europe on several grounds. E. Kozma (1982), for instance, 
argues that in spite of all the "deficiencies and exaggerations" 
associated with the policy of "autarky," this economic policy "had two 
starting points" which are correct even today, namely, that the 
development of the Eastern European economies "should rely on
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developing the intellectual capacity and technical skills of the 
population and that the highly important specialization should be 
implemented within the socialist community." (Kozma 1982, P. 33) 
These two important principles seem to be abandoned by the export- 
oriented model's proponents; and "their abandonment would amount 
historically to abandoning the efforts at true development in Eastern 
Europe." (Kozma 1982, P. 33)
The critics argue that the policy of openness renders it possible 
for the capitalist countries to build in the Eastern European 
community "a base of raw-material supply, food supply and of cheap, 
moderately qualified 'subsidiary' labor, which would one-sidedly 
depend on Western capital and technology." (Kozma 1982, P. 31) 
Moreover, it is unrealistic to believe that Eastern Europe can increase 
in a large magnitude its exports of manufactured articles to the West, 
particularly in the short run.
"Massive exports of manufactured articles to the West will not 
be competitive for a long time to come, and this is because the 
products are not so new  that the 'extra profit' to be included in 
their price could bear the relatively high social costs of labour. 
On the other hand, the manufactured commodities that could 
be otherwise sold in the West, are not introduced to the
Western markets. The costs of marketing which emerge in
convertible currencies are . . . much higher than what could be 
borne by the particular socialist countries." (Kozma 1982, P. 
32)
As a result, the Eastern European countries have no choice but to
resort to export of raw materials to the West in order to import
Western technology, which would make Eastern Europe dependent 
on the West, and as a result it would do immeasurable harm to the 
cause of socialism. The socialist countries should develop "their
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economic relations with the West to the extent which does not 
threaten their technological and economic independence and does not 
make them strategically vulnerable.” (Bogomolov 1983, P. 26)
Another point raised by the Eastern European critics is that 
the promotion of business cooperation with the West and the import 
of technology from them tends to weaken the ability of Eastern 
Europe to manufacture sophisticated products internally. They argue 
that as a consequence of the import of Western technology and 
know-how the development of domestic research and development 
has been neglected . Such a negligence produces severe 
consequences; it for instance guarantees the Western countries' 
superiority in introduction of new technology, and propels Eastern 
Europe to seek even further the imports of Western technology until 
they become completely dependent on it. They then suggest that 
Eastern European countries, instead of emphasizing the imports of 
Western technologies, should direct their efforts in supporting and 
encouraging dom estic research  and developm ent and exert 
themselves in introduction and diffusion of home-grown technology, 
(see Hanson 1983, P. 32)
Apart from all the adverse consequences of imports of Western 
technology mentioned above, it is believed that there is no guarantee 
that the Western firms will sell most up-to-date technology to the 
socialist countries; getting such technology is one of the major goals 
of the "export-oriented" model of development. (Koves 1981, P. 53) 
In fact, Bogomolov (1983, P. 33) maintains that in most of the ICAs, 
Western firms attempt to obtain unilateral advantages and supply 
the socialist countries with those "production lines or technologies
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which seriously pollute the environment, require an insufficiently 
skilled labour and are difficult to be mechanized." In addition, he 
asserts that the "capitalist firms often sell licenses for obsolete 
technology while possessing a better one which is to oust the 
former." Moreover, he believes that the ICAs entail a substantial 
additional import of components and materials from the West and 
somewhat "tethered the CMEA countries to Western standards and 
technology . . ." (Bogomolov 1983, P. 33) O. Bogomolov (1979b) also 
points out the extension of imports of Western technology. Under no 
condition can these be considered as an alternative for the socialist 
countries' scientific and technical progress. They can merely 
supplement it. (Bogomolov 1979b, P. 13)
Some critics argue that the doctrine of openness makes the 
economic development of East Europe susceptible to W estern 
economic fluctuations, which will produce adverse consequences for 
the socialist countries. These adverse effects will be further 
enhanced during the period of Western recession when the politically 
motivated discrimination against socialist countries is aggravated by 
the strengthening of protectionism. (Koves 1981, P.P. 52-53) The 
socialist countries' economic, social and scientific and technological 
progress must re s t prim arily on the developm ent of internal 
resources and increasingly on expanded possibilities of cooperation," 
for it is only then that they will be able to protect themselves from 
the influences from without. (Bogomolov 1983, P.P. 29-30) Any 
policy which ignores the importance of economic and political 
independence of the socialist countries not only does not contribute
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to the solution of problems facing Eastern Europe, but in fact 
heightens these problems.
The critics maintain that the doctrine of openness model's 
contention that the Eastern European countries are unable to develop 
their economies without the import of foreign capital, technology, 
and know how is groundless. (Goldina 1984, P. 13 and Stepanov 
1981, P. 47) Eastern Europe and in particular the Soviet Union has 
tremendous economic and scientific-technological potential, and the 
external economic ties with the capitalist countries are only 
"supplement to rather than the determinant of progress for the USSR 
and the other members of the socialist community." (Goldian 1984, 
P. 13) The Soviet Union's total imports from the capitalist countries 
represented only 1.6% of the Soviet Union's gross social product in 
1981. (Goldian 1984, P. 13) The share of industrial equipment 
imported from capitalist countries does not exceed 5-6 percent of the 
Soviet Union's total capital investment in machinery. (Stepanov
1981, P. 48) In terms o f development of technology, the CMGA 
countries account for at least 80 percent of total research on the 
European continent. (Stepanov 1981, P. 48)
Nevertheless, even the critics do not advocate a total isolation 
from the world market. The socialist countries should take
advantage of possibilities inherent in the international division of 
labor. However, at the same time they have to search for a rational
means to link their economies to the world market, a means which
intensifies the economic growth of socialist countries, does not 
endanger their economic and political independence, and does not
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make them vulnerable and/or dependent on the economic conditions 
of the capitalist countries.
The doctrine of openness, some believe, strives in essence to 
change the socialist economies and suggest a compromise. Such an 
approach is criticized as ignoring "instead of understanding the 
reality: the socialist planned economy is an established system
whose continuous development is not determined by the aspects of 
the trade with Western economies but by its inherent necessities and 
requirements." (Szita 1974, P. 283) The solution should be sought 
not in concessions to be made in the fields of the systems of 
management and trade but in those practical measures which could 
positively foster the development of the trade. The experience of the 
past years has shown that only such a pragmatic approach brought 
success; only this could bring about a situation in which East-West 
trade is developing and, according to all indications, its further 
expansion can be anticipated. (Szita 1974, P. 284)
CHAPTER V
EM PIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
The table below summarizes the major issues raised in the 
previous chapters. It is • the purpose of this chapter to investigate 
empirically the validity of the dependency, neo-classical and Eastern 
European schools' arguments in regards to East-W est economic 
relations. This investigation does not attempt to be a thorough test; 
rather it will only give an indication of empirical relevance of the 
theoretical analyses of these three schools. Much of the emphasis 
throughout the chapter will be on the dependency school, since this 
is the only school among the three that has vigorously attempted to 
theorize the economic relations between East and W est.1 In any 
event, in order to empirically substantiate or repudiate these schools' 
arguments I will take the following steps: F irs t: I will systematically
collect necessary data in regards to the patterns of trade of Eastern 
European countries with both DCs and LDCs for selected years. 
Second: As the dependency school (as well as some Eastern European
economists) has categorized Eastern Europe along with Brazil and 
Mexico and a few other countries as "intermediate" countries, I will 
collect appropriate data in regards to patterns of trade of these 
"intermediate" capitalist countries with DCs and LDCs.
There have been various attempts in testing the dependency "theories." 
See for example Chase-Dunn, C. (1975); Kaufman, R., et al. (1975) and 
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Socialist countries in their 
economic relations with the West, 
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of joint ventures with Western 
firms, are "profit maximizers."
In general, their analyses are void 
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potential conflicts of interest 
between Eastern Europe and the 
Western firms.
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T h ird : The comparison of these sets of data together can give
an indication of the authenticity of the dependency and Hast
European schools’ arguments. If the patterns of trade of capitalist 
intermediate and Eastern European countries with LDCs are similar to 
these of DCs with LDCs, then these schools are correct in one aspect of 
their arguments. If  the patterns of trade of the capitalist 
"intermediate" and Eastern European countries with DCs are similar 
to those of LDCs with DCs, then these schools are correct in another 
aspect of their arguments.
F o u rth : The dependency school posits that Eastern European
countries' economic relations with the W est place them in an 
intermediate position in the international division of labor. As a 
result of such a position, the development of the former is in essence 
determined by trends in the latter. These trends, in turn, are molded 
by the developm ent of the capitalist system in the advanced
capitalist countries. I believe one way of empirically verifying such 
an argument is by establishing how dependent Eastern European
countries are on the imports and exports from and to DCs. By 
calculating the ratio of net imports and net exports of different 
categories of products to actual domestic production of these 
products, one can more or less measure such dependency. I will look 
at these ratios for the USSR, because it is the country most discussed 
in the dependency literature.2
See, for example, Frank and Wallerstein's discussion about the Soviet 
Union.
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F ifth : The calculation of such ratios can be a means to partially
verify the neo-classical school’s belief that the Eastern European 
countries conduct their trade with the DCs based on the principle of 
"comparative costs." If these countries are taking advantage of the 
gains from trade, stemming from the differences in comparative 
costs, then one should witness a rise in import-domestic supply 
ratios of those products for which DCs maintain a "comparative cost 
advantage" in their production. In other words they should rely 
increasingly on imports to satisfy a growing share of domestic 
demand. (Dohan 1979, P.345).3 At the same time, one should 
observe an increase in the export-domestic ratios of those products 
in which they have "comparative cost" advantages in their 
production.
S ix th : Finally, I will look at the international investments in
Eastern Europe and try to establish any pattern of similarity or 
d iss im ila r ity  betw een such investm ents and in te rn a tio n a l 
investments in the "intermediate" countries.
5.1. East-W est Economic Relations:
As was mentioned previously, in the late 1960s and early 
1970s the com bination of both external and internal factors 
compelled East European countries to participate in the international 
division of labor. In the East, rates of growth of national product, 
industrial production and capital and labor productivity had begun to
Since DCs mainly export industrial goods, I assume they have a 
comparative advantage in production of those goods.
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fall from the significant levels which they achieved in the previous 
decades. The East European economists and policymakers perceived 
these problems as a consequence of movement of these countries 
from the extensive to the intensive phase of economic development. 
According to Bomstein (1979, P.292), "this diagnosis led initially to 
the prescription that 'reform' of the domestic economic system could 
improve economic performance from available resources—through . . 
. 'decentralization.'” The decentralization was, however, rejected in 
the most of these countries, with the exception of Hungary, where an 
"economic decentralization" policy was implemented to a significant 
ex ten t.4 Consequently, the East European countries, in order to solve 
their problem s, paid greater attention to the establishm ent of 
extensive economic relations with the Western countries.
In the West, by the mid 1950s a gradual thaw in the 'Cold War' 
situation had started. In the 1960s such a change coupled with the 
conditions of prosperity in the Western economies stimulated lively 
competition among the Western firms in regard to penetrating into 
the Eastern markets. As a result Eastern Europe imports from the 
W est climbed from $6 billion in 1970 to over $26 billion, and their 
exports to the West increased from $6 billion in 1970 to over $17 
billion in 1975. 5 (See Table (1) all tables can be found at the end of 
this chapter). From 1970 to 1975, the Soviet Union's imports from
4 In Bomstein's account, 'economic decentralization' envisions ''a greater 
role for domestic and foreign market forces in determining the 
composition o f  output, the allocation o f resources, and even the distribution 
of income." (Ibid., p. 293)
5 Including the Soviet Union.
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the West rose from $2.4 billion to $11.8 billion, and its exports to the 
West from $2.4 to $8 billion.
The development of East-West trade was, however, interrupted 
by inflation and recession in the West. Although in 1980 imports to 
Eastern Europe (including the Soviet Union) from the West climbed to 
$47 billion and exports to the West rose to $46.8 billion, much of 
such increase must be attributed to price increases. For example, as 
Table (2) indicates between 1976 and 1980, the volume of East 
European countries' exports to OECD was increasing but at a declining 
rate every year, except for 1978 and 1979 which remained constant; 
during the same period, East Europoean countries' volume of imports 
from OECD showed a fluctuating trend. From 1975 to 1976 the 
volume of imports increased by 13%; in 1977 it however decreased 
by 9%; in 1978 it showed a 9% increase and in 1979 it declined again. 
As the same table indicates, at the same time interval the prices of 
East European countries' imports and exports were increasing almost 
every year at an increasing rate, and in alm ost every year the 
increase in prices surpassed the increase in volumes of both imports 
and exports.
Nearly from the beginning, among the m anifestations of 
increase in trade relations between East and West were trade deficits 
and balance of payment problems of East European countries. The 
"export-oriented" model o f developm ent was based on the 
assum ption that the increased productivity  realized from the 
im portation of foreign technology would enable exports to be 
increased in order to finance the cost of Western technology.
302
(Hanson 1982, P.P. 130-131) Although it was only Poland that fully 
embraced this model (Bomstein 1979), the rest of the East European 
countries were under the impression that im ports of W estern 
technology would generate enough exports earnings to maintain the 
balance of payments. Even though Soviet planners in the early 
1970s did not project large terms-of-trade gains, they "may have 
intended that these imports should be self-financing." (Hanson 1982, 
P. 140) Nevertheless, the adverse conditions in the West, along with 
the difficulties faced by East European countries in increasing their 
exports at the same rate as imports, led to trade deficits and balance 
of payment problems.6
Much of the trade deficit was financed through credits, and the 
debt levels of CMEA nations grew rapidly, resulting in high debt- 
service ratios. (Doane, Jr. 1983, P. 12) Not unexpectedly, the foreign 
trade deficits of East European countries had a depressing effect 
upon trade with the capitalist economies. These countries had to 
forgo planned 'import investment,' for they had experienced some 
bottlenecks due to reduced imports and had to reduce the 
availability of some consumer goods. (Hanson 1982, P. 130)
Trade is, however, only one dimension of East-West economic 
re la tions; another dim ension involves Industrial Cooperation 
Agreements (ICAs). One important feature of the foreign economic 
relations of East European countries in the 1970s included not only
The Western and Eastern European economists cite different reasons for 
Eastern European countries' inabilities to increase exports. (See previous 
chapter)
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their deeper involvement in the international division of labor, but 
also their orientation tow ard long-term , large-scale economic 
relations with the developed capitalist countries. (Ivashkin and 
Panchenko 1980) The ICAs included a wide range of activities such 
as licensing, compensation agreements (Eastern imports of capital 
goods repaid by output from the finished plant), countertrade 
agreements (in return for a sale, the Western exporter agrees to 
purchase East European goods), coproduction, and joint ventures.
This chapter is divided into two major parts. The first part will 
analyze the trade relations between East European countries and DCs, 
and in the process I will take the five out of six steps mentioned 
earlier. In the second part I will study the ICAs between DCs and 
East Europe and take the final step.
5.2. Trade Relations: Geographic Distribution of East-West
T rad e:
In 1970, four European countries (Austria, Switzerland, Finland 
and Sweden) had a 20% share in the Eastern European countries' 
imports from the OECD; however, as East-W est trade started to 
expand, the share of these countries as percentages of East Europe's 
imports and exports from the West declined.7 The Federal Republic 
of Germany, on the other hand, has traditionally been the dominant
B. Kadar (1982) believes that these four countries could not cope with the 
economic requirements of the imports demand of the CMEA countries, for 
example with the buy back arrangements.
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exporter to Eastern Europe and the extent of its dominance has been 
even further enhanced by the increase in the East-West trade. As 
Table (3) discloses, in 1980 about 31% of Bulgaria's, 37% of 
Czechoslovakia's, 38% of Hungary's, 23% of Poland's and 31% of 
Romania's imports from the West came from the Federal Republic of 
Germany. The East European countries' interests in the Federal 
Republic of Germany's products stem from not only the close 
historical and cultural ties but also from East Europe's high regards 
for West German engineering products. The fact that in the 1970s 
the Federal Republic of Germany surpassed the United States as the 
world's largest exporter of manufactured products should also be 
recognized as an important factor in the expansion of this country's 
export market-share in the East Europe. (Wolf 1977, P. 1052) 
France, United States and Italy are other important exporters for East 
Europe (See Table (3».
The major importer of East European products is also the 
Federal Republic of Germany. As Table (4) indicates, in 1980, 23.5% 
of Bulgaria's, 34.4% of Czechoslovakia's, 37.2% of Hungary’s, 26% of 
Poland’s and 27.7% of Romania's exports to the West went to West 
Germany. The second major im porter is Italy, which in 1980 
attracted 33.4% of Bulgaria's, 8.6% of Czechoslovakia's, 9.3% of GDR's, 
14% of Hungary's, 10.8% of Poland's and 18.9% of Romania's exports 
to the West (See Table (4)). The United States, which is among the 
dominant exporters to Eastern Europe, does not purchase much of 
their products. In 1980, for example, only 3.6% of Bulgaria's, 1.4% of 
Czechoslovakia, 2.2% of GDR's, 9% of Hungary's, 1.9% of Poland's and
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2.4% of Romania's exports to the West went to the U.S.A. (See Table
(4))
The Federal Republic of Germany also is the major
industrialized Western trading partner of the Soviet Union. As Table
(5) shows, in terms of total trade turnover, Japan and Finland follow 
the Federal Republic of Germany as second and third trade partners 
of the Soviet Union. The shares of these countries, however, are
much higher as a percentage of the Soviet Union's imports and
exports to the West. (See Table (6))
On the Eastern side, the Soviet Union, due to its vast market 
and its significant purchasing power, has attracted most of the
Western countries' trade flow. As Table (7) denotes, in 1970, about 
40% and in 1980, 50% of OECD's exports to East Europe went to the 
Soviet Union. Poland was only a distant second which received in 
1970, 12.4% and in 1980, 14.7% of OECD's exports to East Europe. In 
summary, the major Western trading partner of the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe is West Germany.
5.3. Eastern Europe’s Trade R elations w ith Developed
C a p ita lis t C o u n tries
5.3.1. Data and Method:
In order to explore whether the East European countries in 
their trade relations with the non-socialist world play the same role 
as the "intermediate capitalist” countries do, I have taken the 
following steps:
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1. I have categorized commodities into two broad groups: 
primary goods and manufactured goods. The primary goods include 
the UN’s categories of SITC (0) and (1) food, beverages and tobaccos, 
SITC (2) and (4) crude materials, SITC (3) mineral fuels and related 
materials. The manufactured goods include the UN categories of SITC
(5) chemicals, SITC (7) machinery and transport equipment, and SITC
(6) and (8) other manufactured goods.
2. I have taken the U.N. (1982) category of the Latin America 
Free Trade Association to be synonymous with the "intermediate 
capitalist" countries. The Latin America Free Trade Association 
includes Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. (Steiber 1979, P. 36) Such 
generalization, at first instance, may not seem to be justified. If, 
howeve,r one pays attention to the fact that in 1970 almost 73% of 
imports and 69% of exports, in 1975, 81% of imports and 78% of 
exports, and in 1980, 79% of imports and 82% of exports of the Latin 
American Free Trade Association belonged to only four countries 
(Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Venezuaea)8 then such generalization 
will gain some ground. (See Table (8))9
8 These four countries have elsewhere been considered as "intermediate 
capitalist countries." Frank, for instance, refers explicitly to Brazil and 
Mexico as semi-peripheral countries. According to Kaufman, et al. (1975), 
Venezuela's extraordinary oil wealth represents "a degree of bargaining 
power and an advantage in the international system not normally implied 
by concept of dependency." Consequently, I believe there will be no 
objection in considering it a "semi-peripheral" capitalist country. The 
same authors rind Argentina ranking among the 'least dependent' 
countries in Latin America, which I believe gives a certain creditabilily to 
treating it as a "semi-peripheral" capitalist country.
9 I realize that to consider only these four countries as "intermediate 
capitalist" countries is somehow limited in scope. Such consideration,
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3. In order to discover whether the East European countries, 
along with the Latin American "intermediate capitalist countries", 
exhibit the same pattern of trade that the less developed countries 
maintain in their trade with the DCs, I have taken the following 
steps:
i. For three different periods (1970, 1975, and 1980), and for 
three d iffe ren t groups of countries (LDCs, Latin Am erica 
'intermediate capitalist countries', and the East European countries), I 
have calculated the percentages of primary goods and manufactured 
goods in their total exports to DCs.
ii. For three different periods (1970, 1975, and 1980), and for
the same three groups of countries, I have calculated the percentages 
of primary goods and manufactured goods in their total imports from 
DCs.
iii. In both steps (i) and (ii) I have made the calculations for 
five major groups of DCs, including Western Europe, U.S.A., Japan, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
4. In order to find out whether the East European countries, 
along with the Latin America 'intermediate capitalist' countries, 
exhibit the same pattern of trade that DCs maintain in their trade 
relations with LDCs, I have taken the following steps:
i. For three different periods (1970, 1975, and 1980), I have
calculated the percentages of primary goods and manufactured goods
however, allows me to rely on one consistent source of data (U.N. 1982, 229) 
which has the advantage o f preventing any confusion resulting from 
conversion of different currencies into one major currency such as U.S. 
dollars.
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in the total exports of LDCs to Eastern Europe and the Latin America 
'intermediate capitalist' countries.
ii. For three different periods (1970, 1975, and 1980), I have 
calculated the percentages of primary goods and manufactured goods 
in the total imports of LDCs from East Europe and the Latin America 
'intermediate capitalist' countries.
iii. I believe my findings will support to some degree the 
dependency school's argument. However, there will be some 
exceptions to "the dependency school's 'rules."' I will argue that 
these exceptions are sufficient to enable one to reject the existence of 
any general and comprehensive rules which govern the pattern of 
East-W est trade.
5.3.2. The Eastern European C ountries’ Position in Jthe
In te rn a tio n a l D ivision o f L abor:
It is the purpose of this section to empirically study the 
dependency schoo l’s argum ent tha t 'in te rm ed ia te  cap ita lis t ' 
countries, LDCs and the socialist countries exhibit an identical pattern 
of trade with DCs. They ostensibly import finished products from 
and export primary goods to DCs; consequently, part of their 'surplus’ 
is expropriated by developed capitalist countries which makes them 
underdeveloped and dependent to DCs. This is a situation which is 
not reversible and almost impossible to change.10 East European 
economists, although maintaining more or less the same arguments
Due to the persistently unfavorable terms of trade for LDCs' products.
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in regard to pattern of trade of socialist countries with DCs, do not, 
however, believe such a condition is a permanent state of affairs. 
They argue that by importing finished goods from DCs, the socialist 
countries will be able to change their position and to move to a 
higher rung in the international division of labor.
5.3.2.I. Imports from DCs
If Eastern Europe and the Latin Am erica ’interm ediate 
capitalist' countries maintain the same pattern of trade that LDCs do 
in their trade with DCs, then, according to both the dependency and 
the East European schools, these countries must be the main 
importers of manufactured goods. In this section I will try to 
investigate this subject.11
The calculations for 1970 (Table (9 »  show that the major 
portion of LDCs', Latin America 'intermediate capitalist' countries' 
[hence forth Latin America] and Eastern Europe's imports from DCs 
consisted of manufactured goods. Seventy-eight percent of LDCs' 
imports, 84.9% of Latin America's imports, and 75% of Eastern 
E urope 's im ports from  developed cap ita lis t countries were 
manufactured goods. Eighty-four percent of the Soviet Union's 
imports from DCs comprised of manufactured goods. However, 
looking at the imports of these groups o f countries from different
11 I would like to remind the readers that although the dependency school 
and the Eastern European economists reach the same conclusions, their 
methodology is different. While the Eastern European economists 
emphasize the qualitative differences between their trade relations with 
DCs and those of LDCs with DCs, the dependency school ignores such 
differences.
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parts of DCs changes the picture somewhat. For instance, while the 
main share of LDCs' and Latin America's imports from all sub-groups 
of DCs, except those from Australia and New Zealand, was composed 
of manufactured goods, the East European countries' main share of 
imports from only two out of five sub-groups of DCs consisted of 
manufactured goods. In the case of the Soviet Union, its main share 
of imports from two out of three sub-groups of DCs was made of 
manufactured goods.
The calculations for 1975 more or less reveal the same pattern 
[See Table (10).] Eighty-one percent of LDCs' imports, 84% of Latin 
America’s and 81% of Eastern Europe's imports from DCs consisted of 
manufactured goods. The picture changes again when one focuses 
upon the imports of these countries from different sub-groups of DCs. 
While the main share of LDCs' imports from all sub-groups of DCs, 
except that from Australia and New Zealand, was manufactured 
goods, East Europe's and the Soviet Union's imports from only two 
out of five sub-groups of DCs were mainly of manufactured goods. 
They essentially import manufactured goods from Europe and Japan. 
In the case of Latin America; the imports from all sub-groups of DCs 
were primarily composed of manufactured goods, a performance 
which in the dependency school's context should be considered worse 
than that of LDCs.
In 1980, one observes the same pattern. The major portion of 
LDCs', Latin America's, Eastern Europe's and Soviet Union's imports 
from DCs was composed of manufactured goods. Eighty percent of 
LDCs’, 82% of Latin America's, 71% of Eastern Europe's and 72% of
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Soviet Union's imports from developed capitalist countries were 
made of manufactured goods. (See Table (11)) Although in 1980 the 
shares of manufactured goods' imports in Eastern Europe's and Soviet 
Union's total imports from DCs declined, compared with 1975, they 
still represent significant portions o f their imports. In 1980, again, 
while the major shares of LDCs' and Latin America's imports from all 
sub-groups of DCs, with the exception of Australia and New Zealand, 
were manufactured goods, for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
imports from two out of five sub-groups of DCs, Japan and West 
Europe, were in principle manufactured goods.12
5.3.2.2. Exports to DCs:
Another issue raised by the dependency school, and in another 
context confirmed by the Eastern European economists, is that the 
Eastern European countries' exports to DCs consist mainly of primary 
goods, a pattern  that according to the dependency school is 
maintained by LDCs and 'intermediate capitalist' countries. It is the 
purpose of this section to investigate this point empirically.
The calculations for 1970 (Table (12)) disclose that although 
74% of LDCs* and 78% of Latin America's exports to DCs were 
composed of primary goods, only 45% of the East European countries' 
exports to DCs were primary goods. The situation remains the same 
when different sub-groups of DCs are considered. Without exception, 
LDCs' and Latin America's exports to all of these sub-groups, were
Steven R. Steiber's (1979) calculation for 1973 more or less reveals the 
same results.
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essentially primary goods; Eastern Europe's exports, on the other 
hand, to all of the DCs' sub-groups consisted mainly of manufactured 
goods.
In 1975, the picture changed somewhat (See Table (13)). It is 
true that while LDCs and Latin America continued to export mainly 
primary goods to DCs, Eastern Europe continued to concentrate on 
exports of manufactured goods. (Fifty-four percent of Eastern 
Europe's export to DCs were manufactured products.) In 1975 the 
Soviet Union's pattern of exports, however, was similar to LDCs and 
Latin America's (Seventy-seven percent of its exports to DCs were 
primary goods).
When one breaks down DCs into different groups, the situation 
changes slightly for the Eastern European countries. While they were 
in essence exporters of manufactured goods to three out of five of 
these sub-groups, they mainly exported primary goods to the U.S.A. 
and Japan (55% of their exports to the U.S.A., and 63% of their 
exports to Japan were primary goods). By such a breakdown, the 
situation changes for the Soviet Union. Its share of exports of 
primary goods outweighted its share of exports of manufactured 
goods in only two cases: Japan and West Europe. While LDCs
exported mainly primary goods to all sub-groups of DCs, Latin 
America exported mainly primary goods to four out of five of these 
sub-groups.
The calculations for 1980 indicate that LDCs and Latin America 
were essentially exporters of primary goods to DCs: 82% of LDCs'
exports and 81% of Latin America's exports to DCs consisted of
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primary goods. They maintained the same pattern of exports to all 
sub-groups of DCs, with the exception of Latin America's exports to 
Australia and New Zealand. Eastern Europe, however, exported 
primarily manufactured goods to DCs and to all of DCs' sub-groups. 
Fifty-six percent of Eastern European countries' exports to DCs, 55% 
of their exports to West Europe, 89% of their exports to Canada, 6 7 % 
of their exports to U.S.A., and 61% of their exports to Japan were 
manufactured goods. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, at the 
first glance, exhibits an export pattern similar to those of LDCs: 83%
of its exports to DCs were primary goods. It exported, however, 
mainly manufactured goods to Canada, U.S.A. and Australia and New 
Zealand, three out of five sub-groups of DCs. (See Table (14) *3
Summary:
Clearly, as the calculations in this section reveal, in some cases 
dependency school adherents are justified in their argument that 
East-European countries' and the Soviet Union's patterns of trade
The conclusion o f this section seems to be in part consistent with Donges' 
empirical study, (cited in Portes 1981, p. 345) Donges categorizes exports 
into: 1. Ricardo goods (some primary products), for which production 
functions differ between countries because o f differencs in their resource 
endowments; 2. Heckscher-Ohlin goods, for which production functions 
are identical but capital-labor ratios differ among various countries. 3. 
Product cycle goods: new commodities produced with new techniques
"which are not equally available to all countries." Donges* findings suggest 
that Eastern Europe seems to have comparative advantages in some labor 
and some capital-intensive products but is shifting more and more to the 
production o f the latter such as non-ferrous metal processings, pulp and 
paper. The "industrially advanced LDCs" appear to have comparative 
advantages in Ricardo goods and some labor intensive Heckscher-Ohlin 
goods as well as some mature product cycle goods (electronic assembly, for 
exam ple).
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with DCs display similarity with those of LDCs and DCs (an argument 
which is confirmed by the East European economists). More 
importantly, however, these calculations exhibit that there exists not 
a certain set of rules, which are eternal, unchangeable and 
inescapable, which govern the pattern of trade of LDCs, 'intermediate 
capitalist* countries, and Eastern European countries with DCs. One 
may be able to conclude from the data presented in this section that 
Latin American 'intermediate capitalist' countries and to some extent 
the Soviet Union manifest a pattern of trade similar to LDCs; but
undoubtedly the East European countries, especially when the
category of DCs is broken down into major sub-groups, break the
"rule" and damage the dependency school's arguments.
The data presented here casts some doubt on the "theory" of 
dependency of East European countries on DCs, a theory which partly 
states that DCs dump finished goods into their economies and import 
primary goods from them and thereby expropriate part of their 
surplus. This is an interesting conclusion and contrasts with the 
general belief that in the early 1970s the East European countries 
were following the model of "export-led" growth and deliberately 
had concentrated on the imports of machinery from the W est.14
Such a conclusion, however, confirms the contention that, although in 
that period most East European countries assigned to the East-West 
economic relations and in particular import of Western technology an 
important, though modest role, it was mainly Poland that went so far 
as to actually adopt the model of "export-led" growth as an economic
See (appendix 3) for explanation.
3 1 5
strategy. (Bomstein 1979, P. 293, and Hanson 1982, P.P. 130-131)
Poland’s hard currency debt of $13 billion in 1977 out of total $31.7
billion hard currency debt of all East European countries confirms
this contention. (Bornstein 1979, P. 297)
5.3.2.3. Eastern European Countries' Trade with their M aior 
EaLUiera
As was mentioned before, the Western European countries, in 
particular the Federal Republic of Germany, are the major Western 
trading partners of Eastern Europe. It seems, therefore, necessary to 
separately investigate the patterns of trade of E ast European 
countries with the Western Europe. Such necessity in part stems 
from the concern that it is justified to ask: it is true that East
Europe's trade relations with Australia, for example, do not resemble 
those of LDCs and DCs, but East Europe's trade w ith Australia 
accounts for only one percent of its trade with the West? How about 
its trade with its major partners?
About 40% of East-W est trade takes place between East 
E u ro p e 13 and twelve West European countries of Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, FRG, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K. (Wolf 1977, P. 1042) It is my 
intention in this section to show the commodity composition of 
individual East European countries' exports to and imports from the
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.
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above mentioned Western European countries. For the purpose of 
my study I have chosen three periods, 1975, 1977, and 1980.
In all three periods, Tables (15-17), the proportion of 
manufactured products (SITC 5-8) in the total im ports of East 
European countries from the W est was high. In 1975 (See Table 
(15)) the highest proportion of imports belonged to Bulgaria (93.1%) 
and the lowest to the GDR (83.6%). In 1980, (table 17) although the 
proportion of manufactured products in the imports of East Europe 
was uniformly high (ranging from  72.2 to 87.3), the proportion 
declined compared with 1975. In Romania, for instance, while the 
share of manufactured goods in total imports from West in 1975 was 
86.1%, it dropped to 72.8% in 1980. For GDR, the same proportion 
declined from 83.6% in 1975 to 74.6% in 1980.
In all three periods and for all East European countries, 
machinery imports (STIC 7) accounted for the highest proportion of 
manufactured products imports from the West. On the other hand, 
miscellaneous manufactured products (which include most consumer 
goods) (SITC 8) accounted for the lowest proportion of manufactured 
products im ported. In 1975, fo r instance, the m iscellaneous 
manufactured products made up 4% of East European countries’ 
imports from the West, at the same time the machinery imports 
made up 38% of these countries' imports. In 1980, while the share of 
m iscellaneous manufactured products increased to 7% of East 
European imports, from the West, the share of machinery imports 
remained almost the same (39%). At this point it is worth noting that
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the share o f 'h igh-technology ' im ports,16 in total imports of 
manufactured goods from the W est,17 fell from 15% in 1970 to 12.7% 
in 1980. (See Martens 1984, P. 40). For the Soviet Union the same 
ratio fell from 18.2% in 1970 to 15.4% in 1980. (Martens 1984, P. 
70). According to Richard Portes (1981, P. 33), one reason that such 
deals get publicity in the West is that such attention seems to 
"confirm our prejudices that the centrally planned systems cannot 
cope without Western help.18
The structure of East European countries' exports to West 
Europe has undergone a striking transform ation since 1965. 
Agricultural exports (SITC 0-1), for instance, dropped from 35% of 
total exports to 19% in 1975 (W olf 1977, P. 1047) and to 12% in 
1980. At this time interval, however, the share of manufactured 
goods increased from 36% to 51% in 1975 (Wolf 1977,.P 1047) and to 
55% of East Europe's total exports to the West Europe in 1980 (See 
Tables (19) and (21)).
As Tables (19-21) indicate, the majority of East European 
countries' exports to the West consist of manufactured goods. In 
1975, however, Bulgaria's and Poland's share o f exports of 
manufactured products were less than 50% of their total exports to 
the West (44.9% and 38% respectively). In 1977, only Poland's 
proportion of manufactured exports to the West was less than 50% of
16 For a list o f what items are considered high technology see Table (18).
17 West, here, refers to all industrialized West.
18 Cooper (1986) also makes a similar point. He states that in recent years, 
"certain Western perceptions of the Soviet Union have gained broad 
currency (due to) sustaining deeply held beliefs in the superiority of free 
enterprise and liberal democracy." (Ibid., p. 317)
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its total exports to the West (48.5%). In 1980, while Bulgaria's share 
fell to 48.2%, Poland increased its exports of manufactured goods and 
they reached 51.8% of its total exports to the West. At the same 
time, however, the proportion of Romania’s exports of manufactured 
goods dropped to 46% of its total exports. Despite such fluctuations, 
because the exports of manufactured products account for a high 
proportion of East European total exports to West Europe, one can 
consider these countries in general as exporters of manufactured 
goods and not as exporters of primary goods. There exists, however, 
a distinct difference between the type of manufactured goods that 
they im port and export. While they are m ajor importers of 
machinery from W est Europe (SITC 7), they export predominantly 
m iscellaneous manufactured products (SITC 8) and manufactured 
goods classified by materials (SITC 6).19
5.3.3. Dependency on the West and Export Specialization:
As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, in order to 
empirically investigate the validity of the dependency, neo-classical 
and Eastern European schools' arguments, six steps must be taken. 
In the previous section I dealt with steps 1-3; in this section I will 
deal with the remaining steps.
SITC 6 includes such items as basic manufactures, rubber, paper, textiles, 
yam, fabric, non-metal minerals, iron, non-ferrous metals, metal 
manufactures, etc. SITC 8 includes such items as furniture, clothing, 
precision instruments, photo equipment, plumbing, heating, lighting, 
footwear.
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The dependency school posits the pattern of trade of a country 
with the D(^s is an indicator of the level o f developm ent 
(underdevelopment) of its productive forces. If one accepts this 
postulate then she/he has to admit that the Soviet Union is among 
the least developed, if  not the least developed, countries of the 
Eastern Europe. As Table (22) shows, the Soviet Union primarily 
im ports machinery and manufactured goods, and exports raw 
materials and mineral fuels. In 1980, for example, while 71% of its 
total exports to the W est was composed of mineral fuels, exports of 
manufactured products were counted as only 12% of its total 
e x p o r ts .20 On the import side, the Soviet Union’s imports of 
manufactured products were about 72% of its total imports from the 
West, and primary products, mainly food and beverages, made about 
25% of its total imports. These numbers suggest that the Soviet 
Union's pattern of trade with the West is similar to that of LDCs: it
exports primary goods and imports manufactured goods. According 
to the dependency school as a result of such position in the 
international division of labor, the 'development' of the Soviet Union 
is determined by the trends in the developed capitalist countries.21
20 As Table (21) shows, in 1980 in the case of Romania, one of the least 
industrialized countries o f East Europe, the share o f primary goods exports 
in the total exports of this country to West was about 52%; the same ratio for 
the Soviet Union is about 81%.
21 One can easily remember Frank’s argument, which states the "socialist 
countries are becoming increasingly dependent on the West and on the 
economic and political stability in the West." (Frank 1977, p. 124) Or his 
argument that "the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will 
be importing not only western factories . . . but the capitalist relations 
embedded in them. . . .  In short . . . will be and are already importing 
capitalism.” (Ibid., p. 127)
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One can verify this argument by establishing how dependent the 
Soviet Union economy is on the imports from and exports to DCs. One 
way of measuring this 'dependency* is by calculating the ratios of net 
imports and net exports of different categories of products to the 
actual domestic production of these products.22 The measurement 
of these ratios might also prove helpful in verifying the neo-classical 
economists' claim that the Soviet Union's foreign trade, like that of 
any other country, is conducted based on the principle of 
'comparative costs.'23 If the Soviet Union is taking advantage of the 
gains from trade, stemming from the differences in comparative 
costs, then one should witness a rise in import-domestic supply 
ratios of those products that the Soviet Union does not maintain 
comparative costs 'advantages' in their production. In other words it 
should rely increasingly on imports to satisfy a growing share of 
dom estic demand for those products rather than use domestic 
resources. (Dohan 1979, P. 345)
At the same time, one should observe an increase in the 
export-dom estic production ra tio s of those products in the 
production of which the Soviet Union maintains comparative costs 
"advantages;" in other words, a growing share of domestic production 
should be devoted to their export.
22 Such ratios have been calculated by Michael R. Dohan in two superb 
studies (Dohan 1979 and Dohan 1976). The main part of this section will 
rely on his studies.
23 The "comparative costs" in turn arise from "economies o f scale, differences 
in natural resource endowment, differences in factor proportions, 
locational advantage, and noncompeting imports (coffee, citrus, et cetra)." 
(Dohan 1979, p. 345)
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It is important from the outset to establish to what extent the 
Soviet Union is involved in the international division of labor. An
analysis of the trade data (Table (23)) underscores the increasing
importance of DCs’ trade to the Soviet Union. In 1965, while DCs 
accounted for 18% of Soviet Union exports, their share increased to 
32% in 1980. The major trading partner of the Soviet Union is 
Eastern Europe. In 1980, the Soviet Union conducted 42% of its 
exports and 43% of its imports with Eastern Europe. Despite the 
growing share of DCs in Soviet Union foreign trade, such trade 
accounts in general for a small portion of Soviet economic activity. 
In 1980, for instance, Soviet exports to the West made up 1.8 percent 
of Soviet GNP, and its imports from the West accounted for only 1.7% 
of its GNP.24 (Cooper 1982, P. 461) Indeed, as the following table 
suggests, the Soviet Union is less dependent on trade with the West
than Western countries are with each other.



















NMP = Net Material Product
24 In 1980, total Soviet exports accounted for 5.5% of its GNP and its total 
imports made up 5% of GNP. (Cooper 1982, p. 461)
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5.3.3.1. E xport Specialization:
The major share of Soviet exports to the West comprises 
mineral fuels and raw materials. It is, therefore, important to find 
out what portion of domestic production is devoted to the exports of 
mineral fuels. As Table (24) shows, the net export-output ratio for 
coal was 4% in 1960; it increased to 9% in 1970 and declined again to 
6.6% in 1976. The same ratio for crude oil was 20% in 1960; it grew 
to 28% in 1970 and remained about the same in 1976. One can 
conclude, then, that the dramatic increase in importance of oil in the 
Soviet Union's export structure can be largely attributed to the rise 
in prices. In the case of natural gas, the Soviet Union’s exports were 
only about 4% of domestic production in 1960 and reached 4.4% in 
197 6 .25 Obviously, these numbers suggest that the intensification of 
the Soviet Union's pariticipation in the internal division of labor in 
the 1970s has not been accompanied by a significant attempt on its 
part to specialize in production and export of any particular item.
Ferrous metals also show a trend similar to that of 'energy 
products.' Net exports of iron ore, for instance, were equal to 20% of 
domestic output in the 1960s; it only increased to 22% of domestic 
output in 1976. The export-output ratio for chromite ore, on the 
other hand, showed a decline between 1960 and 1976. In the case of
This ratio increased later on due to many gas for pipe deals negotiated 
between Soviet Union and Western countries in particular West Germany, 
France, Italy and Austria.
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manganese, in 1960 18% of output was exported and in 1976 about 
20% of domestic output was devoted to export. (See Table (24))
Similarly, in the case of non-ferrous metals, one does not 
observe a major increase in export-domestic production ratios as a 
result of expansion of Soviet Union trade relations with the West. 
For example, this ratio for copper between 1965 and 1975 increased 
by only 3% (See Table (25)); in the case of lead the ratio in fact 
showed a declining trend: while exports of lead in 1960 stood at
about 12% of production, it was only about 9% of production in 1975. 
The export-domestic production ratio for zinc remained constant in 
the period of study. It was only aluminum that showed a growing 
export-domestic production ratio.
In sum, the above information reveals that, in general, net 
export-domestic output ratios for many energy products and raw 
materials, despite increases in their exports, increased only slightly 
as a result of Soviet participation in the international division of 
labor, and in fact in some cases, such as chromite ore and lead, these 
ratios declined.26
S.3.3.2. Soviet D ependency on Im ports
Once a major exporter of agricultural products, the Soviet Union 
has become an importer of these products in recent years. Such a 
transform ation has been attributed to "lagging productivity in 
agriculture, several crop failures, and a commitment by Soviet
For more information about commodity portfolio o f Soviet exports to DCs 
see (Kravalis 1979).
leadership to improve the diet of its citizens." (Dohan 1979, P. 355) 
As the following table exhibits, between 1950 and 1980, the Soviet 
Union, for instance, significantly increased its imports of coffee, tea, 
sugar, rice and eggs. The Soviet Union, however, imports most of its 
agricultural products from Eastern Europe, Cuba and developing 
countries primarily in bilateral exchange for Soviet exports, and 
thereby does not risk 'dependency1 on the developed capitalist 
countries' economies. An exception to this trend: the Soviet Union,
for instance, is a major importer of grain from the West. Every year 
it spends large sums of hard currency on grain imports.—largely to 
feed livestock to provide more meat and animal products in the 
population's d iet.27 These imports would seem to increase Soviet 
vulnerability to the Western powers' trade policies, such as the U.S. 
grain embargo of 1980. The Soviet Union, however, as Marshall 
Goldman (1976) mentions, has proved able and willing to hold down 
it grain purchases whenever it feels it is important to maintain its 
independence, or when it has no choice. In 1972, for example, the 
Soviet Union imported 27 million tons of grain with a harvest of 168 
million tons; in 1975 it imported about the same amount with a 
harvest of only 140 million tons, a serious shortfall from an expected 
yield of 215 million tons.28 As a result of such cutbacks, the pig
Between 1950 and 1977 Soviet per capita consumption of meat and fat 
increased by 2.19 times; consumption of milk and milk products by 1.87 
times; consumption of eggs by 3.73 times. (Golrich 1979 and Szymanski 
1982)
Due to a combination of serious hard currency shortages and U.S. exports 
embargo.
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herd in 1975 fell from 72 million head to 58 million. "Thus, despite 
its promises of more meat in the diet, the Soviet Union seems 
prepared to impose at least limited hardship on its population when 
it wants or is forced to.” (Goldman 1976, P. 86)
The increase in Soviet grain imports did not mean a reduction 
in domestic production. As Table (27) denotes, between 1956-61 
and 1975-79, the Soviet Union increased its grain production by a 
factor of 1.63 times.
The same table also shows that while in the period of 1975- 
1979, 111 million tons of grain was used to feed animals, only 46 
million tons was used as human food; in 1956-1961 human food
Table (27)
Soviet Grain Production and Utilization 
in Millions of Metric Tons
Piodactioa Utilizatmn
Annual Averages Feed Food
1956 - 1961 122 37 43
1975 - 1979 199 111 46
Source: extracted from Goldrich (1979) cited in Szymanski (1982).
obtained the larger share of grain production. Such a change, as was 
mentioned earlier, reflects the Soviet Union's desire to increase meat, 
eggs and other animal products in the Soviet Union population diets 
by increasing the animal stocks of the country. (Szymanski 1982) It 
is therefore doubtful that Soviet Union imports of grain from DCs
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make it dependent on the West. The existence of quite a number of 
major grain producers and exporters in the W est, along with their 
tendency to overproduce grain, almost ensures a permanent source 
of grain supply for the Soviet Union, even in the case of total cut off 
of Western grain the Soviet Union would only be faced with a 
temporary hardship, because such cutoff would imply an initial 
slaughter of livestock. After that the Soviet Union would have to 
stabilize the availability of grain by storing more grain in the years 
with good harvest in order to use them in the years with bad 
harvest. Such action, no doubt, would reduce the chance of the 
Soviet governm ent to increase the meat consum ption of its 
population quickly, but it would not render it impossible.
The Soviet Union is also a major importer of machinery from 
the West. Its postwar import structure has been characterized by a 
large share of machinery imports, 30-37 percent of total imports. 
(See Table (28)) The Soviet Union, at the same time, is an exporter of 
machinery. For instance, in 1970, gross machinery imports supplied 
about 15% of investment in equipment and inventory, but allowing 
for machinery exports, net imports were accounted as only about 5% 
of total machinery available for domestic use.29 (Dohan 1979, P. 
356) In some branches of industry, the Soviet Union imports a large 
proportion of domestic supply. In 1970, for example, products with 
relatively high import-gross domestic supply included metal-forming
In 1976, the net import-investment in equipment and machinery was 
about 13% much greater than 1970. Evidence suggests, however, this ratio 
has been falling since then.
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(23%), paper and pulp industries (52%), the chemical industry (41%), 
food processing industry (27%) buses (10%) trolleys (39%), combines 
(16%), grain cleaners (13%), mowers (18%). (Dohan 1976, p. 122) 
According to Dohan, however, compared with 1913 or the NEP, the 
degree of import dependence remains relatively low. (Dohan 1976, 
P. 122.) Furthermore, a major portion of these imports comes from 
the countries of Eastern Europe, primarily from Czechoslovakia, East 
Germany and Poland. According to Dohan, Soviet imports of 
machinery can be divided into two distinct categories: "equipment
for factories and mass produced items." Equipment for factories such 
as chemical, automotive, machine building, etc. come from DCs and to 
a lesser extent from GDR and Czechoslovakia (See Table (29)). Mass 
produced items, on the other hand, come from Eastern Europe and 
include such items as vehicles and parts, e lectric  motors, 
transformers, lifting and transporting equipment, etc. (Dohan 1979, 
P. 357)
Imports of machinery from DCs in general represent a small 
share of Soviet equipment investment. As Table (30) indicates, this 
proportion has increased since the early 1960s, "but the rise has 
been neither strong nor continuous." (Hanson 1978, P. 25) The 
highest growth happened in the m id-1975, when the machinery 
imports from the W est accounted for 5.6% of domestic machinery 
investm ent.
The fluctuations in the value of machinery imports from the 
W est have been considerable. Between 1974 and 1975, for instance, 
the amount o f machinery imported doubled from $2,094 million to
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$4,184 million. Between 1975 and 1976, however, machinery
imports increased by about $75 million. Such fluctuations, according
to Hanson, appear to be "the result of the exigencies of the Soviet 
hard-currency balance of payments." (Hanson 1978, P. 25) One may 
add to this element the Soviet Union’s ability and willingness to cut 
such imports when other priorities arise. For instance, in 1977 when 
the Soviet Union's hard currency indebtedness reached a point which 
was deemed to be undesirable by the Soviet government, it sharply 
reduced its new orders for Western machinery.30 (Hanson 1978, P. 
25) In general the Soviet Union's imports of machinery in recent 
years, as a percentage of total imports, are lower than their share of 
total imports at its  peak of industrialization in 1932 (which was 
about 55.7%). (Azov 1982)
Imports from the West in some cases, however, are responsible 
for a large portion of domestic production. The chemical industry is 
a prime example; the Soviet Union over the past quarter of a century 
has devoted about a quarter of all the Western machinery imports to 
the chemical industry (Goldman 1976, P. 138). In the 1970s alone 
imported chemical equipment accounted for about one-third of all 
Western machinery purchased by the Soviet Union. Consequently, in 
the late 1970s, about half of the Soviet ammonia output was from 
Western plants. (Parpartzoeter 1982, P. 484) Imports from DCs also
30 According to Hanson it is not correct to believe that the Western
governments and bankers imposed a limit on the Soviet Union borrowing. 
To the contrary, "western governments continued to extend official credit 
support for exports to Soviet Union and medium-term Eurocurrency loans 
continued to be obtainable by the USSR on good, though marginally
hardened, terms." (Hanson 1978, p. 25)
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have played an important role in supporting the energy sectors; 
virtually all the large diam eter pipe needed for gas pipeline 
construc tion  has come from  W est G erm any and Japan. 
(Parpartzoeter 1982, P. 485) Less well known cases are the role that 
the W estern machinery im ports play in some consumer goods 
producing industries. For example, in textile machinery, imports 
contributed 40% of the domestic supply in 1976; in shoemaking 
equipment industry, the machinery imports accounted for 64% of 
domestic production in 1976; in the paper making equipment 
industry, imported machinery provided about 61% of domestic 
production. (Dohan 1979, P. 358) In some other industries, such as 
the machine tool industry, although the imports of machinery from 
the W est is relatively high, their contribution to the domestic 
production is not significant; their contribution is estimated to be 
from 1% to 10% of domestic consumption in 1975. (See Hanson and 
Hill 1979, P.P. 586-88)31
In general the Soviet Union uses Western machinery in order 
to modernize its industries. The sectors which receive most of the 
Western machinery include first, the 'high priority' sectors, such as 
the chemical industry. The emphasis on this industry started with 
the 'chemicalization* drive begun in 1958, with the idea that the 
Western technology should be injected into previously neglected 
branches in the Soviet economy, in particular the chemical industry. 
(Hanson 1978, P. 76) The imports of Western technology in these
See Hanson and Hill 1979 for the reasons behind such a wide difference in 
such contribution.
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cases enable planners to implement new priorities more rapidly.
(Dohan 1979, P. 366)32 Second, sectors such as shoes, clothing, 
paper and furn itu re equipm ent industries in which design,
assortment, and finishing are essential aspects of the final products. 
(Dohan 1976, P. 127) One reason for reliance on Western machinery 
in these sectors is that they "received less support in research and 
development over the past years compared with energy branches or 
metallurgy. (Koves 1978, p. 358) Growing imports, however, do not 
seem to have led to a drastic reduction in domestic output 
production. (Koves 1978, P.367) As Table (31) indicates, in all four 
cases domestic output grew between 1960 - 1975, notwithstanding
in the cases, of equipment for the chemical industry and shoemaking 
equipment such growth was not smooth.
Sum m ary:
In this section I have attem pted to address two major
argum ents:
1. Some neo-classical econom ists’ argum ent that the 
determinant of Soviet Union import and export structure, similar to a 
market economy, is comparative costs which in turn depends on 
comparative factor endowment.33 (Dohan 1976, P. 126)
32 Cooper (1986) argues the same point. According to him, the Soviet industry 
has a "multilevel pyramidlike structure." At the upper levels of this 
pyramid are those sectors which are capable o f production o f high-quality 
goods. However, the "quality of goods diminishes as one descends to lower 
level o f pyramid." (Ibid., p. 318) In recent years, Cooper believes that the 
Soviet Union has acquired Western technology in order to raise such 
industries as oil, chemical, automotive and gas, to the higher level of the 
economic pyramid.
33 See for example Rosefield (1973).
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2. The dependency school argument that due to the Soviet 
Union's position in the international division of labor, this country 
has becom e "dependent" on the DCs and consequently its 
"development" is largely determined by the development in the 
industrialized W estern countries. "The socialist countries are 
becoming increasingly dependent on the West and on the economic 
and political stability in the West." (Frank 1977, P. 124).
The neo-classical economists' argument is not inconsistent with 
the changes in the Soviet Union foreign trade structure: a shift away
from agricultural, light industry to more capital intensive heavy and 
extractive industries. Dohan (1976, P. 126) argues that the change in 
factor proportions may not be responsible for such a shift. The 
Soviet Union’s "development" of export capacity, import needs, and 
comparative costs can be explained in part by reference to its natural 
resource endowment but also by a set of "qualitative" institutional 
and historical factors peculiar to Soviet economy. Such qualitative 
factors as historical priority of sector, comparative technological 
levels, the complexity of the products in terms of assortment, . . .  the 
probability of plan fulfillm ent. . . . "  These factors, however, are 
difficult to quantify, but such difficulties should not prevent one 
from "outlining tentatively their impact on Soviet trade." For 
instance, the Soviet Union transform ation from an exporter of 
agricultural products to an importer of agricultural products has its 
origin in the Soviet Union's "domestic policy priorities and 
institutions of the prewar five-year plans" with their emphasis on 
heavy industry at the expense of light industry and the agricultural
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sector. (Dohan 1976, P. 104) Moreover, as argued in this section the 
intensification of Soviet Union participation in the international 
division of labor has not been responsible for the Soviet Union's 
specialization in any particular branch of industry. The Soviet Union 
largely exports products of priority branches of heavy industry, in 
particu lar those which rely heavily  on natural resources. 
Consequently, one cannot observe a significant increase in the 
export-domestic output ratios of the exported products as a result of 
the Soviet Union in tensification of its participation in the 
international division of labor.
On the import side, the data presented in this section reveal
that while imports from the West play an increasingly large role in 
the Soviet economy, they have not significantly increased the 
dependence of this economy on the West. (Dohan 1979, P. 366) In 
other words, neither have import-domestic supply ratios increased 
significantly in recent years, nor has the growth of imports led to a 
decline in domestic production. The Soviet Union has gained from 
imports of Western technology by enabling its planners to implement 
new priorities more rapidly, and to improve product quality and 
productivity of some historically neglected branches. As Cooper 
argues, the "economic strength and military might of the Soviet
Union are based overwhelm ingly on dom estic resources and 
capabilities: Western technology is important, but by no means
crucial." (Cooper 1986, P. 342) Imports are also used to cover 
shortfalls in domestic production. Soviet imports of grain have 
enabled this country to quickly improve the living standards of its
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population beyond its present economic capability; such imports also 
reflect the institutional and historical factors peculiar to the Soviet 
Union, i.e. its neglect of the agricultural sector, and its inability to 
produce all types o f commodities for which the assortment, design 
and "finishing" are important elements for the end product.
5 .4 . E a s te rn  E u ro p e ’s T ra d e  R e la tio n s w ith  th e  Less
PeYfilftped Countries:
This section is devoted to em pirical investigation of the 
dependency school's contention that the socialist countries as well as 
'intermediate capitalist' countries in their trade relations with LDCs 
follow the same pattern of trade as DCs do in their trade with LDCs. 
In other words, they import essentially primary goods from these 
countries and export manufactured goods to LDCs. The methods of 
analysis is identical to that described in Section A of this chapter.
Both Tables (32) and (33) support the dependency school 
argument in regard to the pattern of trade of East European countries 
and the Soviet Union with LDCs. In all three periods of study more 
than 80% of these countries imports from LDCs were composed of 
primary goods; and in all those periods more than 75% of East 
European exports to LDCs consisted of manufactured goods. In the 
case of Latin America intermediate capitalist countries, however, the 
data suggest a different kind of pattern of trade. The major portion 
of these countries' exports and imports to and from LDCs is made of 
primary goods, a pattern which undeniably rejects the dependency
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school prediction in regard to the trade relations between LDCs and 
semi-peripheral capitalist countries.
Although East Europe's and DCs patterns of trade with LDCs are 
similar, the breakdown of their imports from and exports to LDCs 
into different commodity groups displays some dissimilarity. As 
Table (34) shows, DCs* imports from LDCs are mainly concentrated 
around one category of SITC (3).34 In 1975, for example, 68% of DCs 
imports from LDCs and in 1980 about 71% of their imports were 
made up of fuel. On the other hand, the Soviet Union's imports from 
LDCs in large part are composed of food. In 1975, 56% of its imports 
and in 1980, 61% of its imports from LDCs were made up of food. 
East Europe's imports from LDCs in 1975 were largely concentrated 
around fuel and crude materials. In 1980, however, a major portion 
of Eastern European imports from LDCs were composed of fuel.
Table (35) represents the commodity breakdown of Eastern 
Europe's, the Soviet Union's, and DCs' exports to LDCs. Machinery and 
transport equipment (SITC 7) occupy the prominent position in the 
export structures of all three. While a large portion of DCs' and 
Eastern European exports to LDCs are also made up of SITC (6 and 8) 
and other manufactured goods, for the Soviet Union it is the exports 
of fuel that play an important part in its export structure to LDCs.
While there exists some obvious similarity in patterns of trade 
of East European countries with LDCs and DCs with LDCs, there also 
exist significant differences in these groups of countries' trade
SITC 3 includes such items as coal, coke, petroleum and gas.
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relations with LDCs which must be noted. Although since 1955 the
share of LDCs' trade in the total trade of East Europe has increased
considerably, it still remains at a relatively low level, and the part
LDCs play in the East European countries trade is less significant than
their position in the trade of DCs. For example, in 1978, LDCs
supplied 25% of DCs' imports and took 23.8% of their exports.
(Paszynski 1981, P. 34) In the same period, however, LDCs received
only about 14.7% of East European exports and provided 10% of their
imports. (Dobozi and Inotai 1981, P. P. 51) As Table (36) shows,
these ratios are not identical for different countries of Eastern
Europe; Romania occupies, for instance, the prominent place in the
East European trade with LDCs,35 and GDR receives the smallest
share of LDCs trade with the CMEA.
Table (36)
Percentage Share of Developing Countries 








Source: from (Paszynski 1981, P. 37).
Not including the Soviet Union.
336
Probably the differing importance of LDCs* trade with individual 
Eastern European countries depends to some extent on the various 
degrees of these countries' openness to international trade; the 
smaller ones tend to be more open to international trade.36
There are several factors that explain the relatively small share of 
LDCs in the total trade of East European countries. Eastern Europe 
initiated its trade relations with a majority of LDCs only after 
decolonialization. The most important factor is, however, connected 
with the function that foreign trade performs in Eastern European 
e c o n o m ie s .37 Historically, foreign trade has acquired a residual 
nature in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These nations 
imported in order to cover domestic shortfalls and exported enough 
to pay for imports. Consequently, they did not feel an urgent need to 
expand their foreign trade with the LDCs. Coker (1984) argues the 
same point when he discusses Soviet Union foreign trade policy:
"Soviet Union’s trade with the outside world, and the third 
world in particular, is a marginal element in its own economic 
planning. Most of the goods imported from LDCs are rather 
peripheral to the Soviet economy and therefore of no great 
importance to the overall planning process. Imports from the 
Middle East are generally exported immediately. Imports of 
grain from Latin America are "balancing items," for use when 
the plan goes awry. There is really no significant volume of
Such an explanation is, of course, only a partial one, because in the case of 
Romania the relatively large share of LDCs' trade in its total imports and 
exports is mainly due to its deliberate policy o f extending trade relations 
with and preferential treatment to LDCs. (Paszynski 1981, p. 38)
This explanation is also valid in regard to the small share o f DCs' trade in 
the total trade of Eastern Europe.
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imports that is integrated into the planning system. Trade 
policy could be characterized as a "barter of residuals."
Another feature of trade between Eastern Europe and LDCs is
the fact that Eastern Europe runs persistence trade surpluses with
LDCs.38 Dobozi and Inotai( 1981, P. 50) and R. Portes (1981, P. 327)
argues that such surpluses are little help in "redressing their large
deficit with the West." Much of their surpluses with LDCs is in
inconvertible currencies or is covered by economic aid which will
only be redeemable in the long run. For example, in the mid 1970s,
almost one-half of the Soviet Union's imports from the LDCs were in
the repayment for development aid credits; and its involvement in
bauxite production in Guinea and in the extraction of phosphates in
Morocco will not be recovered for another twenty years. In fact, the
provision of credit to Morocco in 1978 was so extensive that it
brought the Soviet Union’s foreign aid figures in parity with those of
the U.S. for the first time. (Coker 1984, P. 13)
There is, therefore, no ground for the dependency school's
argument that Eastern Europe, by running surpluses with LDCs,
exploits these countries in order to cover its own deficit with West.
(Dobrovolny 1983, P. 98) Indeed, the existence of a trade surplus
should not be taken as synonymous with the existence of a hard
currency surplus. Szymanski (1982) argues that between 1975 and
1978, the Soviet Union exported, on the average, about 4.5 billion
rubles annually to LDCs, at the same period importing an annual
average of 2.9 billion rubles from them. According to him, a large
This feature is also a common characteristic o f DCs' trade with LDCs.
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portion of Soviet Union exports were financed through "exchange 
agreements,” or the barter without any hard currency purchases by 
LDCs. At the same time, the Soviet Union purchased a high 
proportion of its imports with hard currency. In the 1975-1978 
period, the Soviet Union earned $1.4 billion a year in hard currency 
because of its transactions with LDCs; at the same time period on the 
average it spent $2 billion annually in hard currency in order to 
purchase goods from them. In other words, the Soviet Union ran a 
hard currency deficit with LDCs averaging about $600 million a year, 
(see also Bozek 1979)
In fact, some economists believe running trade deficits is more 
advantageous to the socialist countries than running trade surpluses. 
Their argum ents run as follow: the socialist countries face
productive capacities which are not capable of producing enough 
goods to satisfy the demand. Domestic supply, therefore, lags behind, 
expanding dom estic demand: such countries are described by
Kalecki as "supply-constrained” economies, (cited in Paszynski 1981, 
P. 38) Under these conditions, the functions of foreign trade differ 
from those in DCs. In the latter, exports supplement insufficient 
domestic demand and therefore play the prominent role. In socialist 
countries, the situation is opposite: it is the imports that perform the
most important function and supplement the insufficient domestic 
supply. Exports, on the other hand, are deemed undesirable because 
they compete with domestic demand; therefore, the most important 
function of exports is "to cover indispensable import requirements." 
(Paszynski 1981, P. 39) The same arguments are applicable to
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export surplus over imports. In DCs "a positive trade balance ac ts- 
like investment—as a stimulus to growth of demand, through the 
multiplier effect, and to fuller capacity utilisation." In socialist 
countries it is the trade deficit that can assist the country to ease up 
its "supply-constrained" situation. (Paszynski 1981, P. 39)
Kalecki and Sachs express the same ideas about the economic
aid:
Turning now to the definition of aid from the point of 
view of the donor country, we should make a clear 
distinction between two positions: a) the donor country
has no free productive capacities (as e.g. usually happens 
in socialist countries); b) the donor country does not fully 
use its productive capacities, because of lack of effective 
dem and (a frequent situation in developed capitalist 
countries).
In the former case giving foreign aid, embodied in export 
surplus, means a sacrifice because the aggregate internal 
expenditure (i.e. national incom e less exports plus 
imports) will be less than the income generated, which 
cannot be stepped up above the maximum level 
warranted by the productive capacities. Would there 
have been no export surplus, the aggregate internal 
expenditure would be equal to the income generated at a 
maximum level.
In the latter case the picture changes entirely: the export
surplus, similarly to investment, has a "multiplier” effect, 
so that the aggregate dom estic expenditure after 
deduction of the export surplus from the income thus 
generated is higher than the income which would be 
generated without the export surlus. We may say 
therefore, that by giving economic aid to other countries 
a developed country with free productive capacities 
assists its own economy in obtaining a higher level of 
economic activity, (cited in Paszynski 1981, P 39-40)
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It is therefore not universally true that running a trade surplus is
advantageous for any given economy and under any condition.39 
There is no doubt that the Eastern European countries and the Soviet 
Union benefit from their trade relations with the LDCs. There is, 
however, some doubt about the dependency school's argument that 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are the beneficiaries of such 
re la tio n s.40 The long-term nature of their trade contracts with LDCs, 
for instance, is certainly useful for planning purposes in Eastern 
Europe; but such long term contracts are also important for LDCs 
because they create a reliable and permanent market for these 
countries' products and consequently assist the stable functioning of 
their economy. Another feature of these trade relations, i.e. the 
clearing system of accounts based on cancelling out the mutual
account of each side, is of considerable importance for both parties.
Such a system not only perfectly matches with the foreign trade 
system of Eastern European countries, but at the same time it
enables LDCs as well as Eastern Europe to conduct their trade without
39 The "supply constrained" feature of Eastern European economies is 
another important reason behind their trade aversions. It is, therefore, 
not surprising that Eastern Europe's trade with LDCs is comparatively low. 
"If we compare the CMEA share in world exports to its share o f world 
product, we find it is in the proportion o f 1:2. Taken together, its share in 
world exports is twice as low as its share in world production." (Coker 1984,
p. 10-11)
40 It appears that most East-South economic relations tend to reinforce the 
existing place o f the underdeveloped countries in the international 
division of labor. The economic and political advantages that East-South 
economic relations confer on the underdeveloped countries are not 
significantly different from "advantages" o f imperialist economic relations 
between the capitalist underdeveloped and the capitalist developed 
countries of the West." (Frank 1977, p. 118)
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facing difficulties of providing sufficient 'valuable' hard currency in 
order to import the needed products. Running trade surpluses with 
LDCs, as was discussed earlier, is considered by some economists to 
be more harmful than helpful to Eastern Europe. Many of these 
surpluses stem from Eastern European countries' extending economic 
assistance to LDCs. It is, of course, not true that Eastern European 
countries are the complete losers in such deals. They are "inclined to 
accept deferred payment conditions for that part of their exports 
which consist of goods that are usually traded internationally on 
credit terms." An export surplus in these cases is used to finance 
imports, but at a later stage. (Paszynski 1981, P. 40)
In view of the controversy, it is not easy to make a definite
judgm ent on the dependency school's argument that "East-South 
economic relations are not significantly different from economic 
relations between DCs and LDCs. However, it seems to me there 
exists enough evidence to raise serious questions about the validity 
of the dependency school's argument.
5.5«_ Industrial- Cooperation Agreements and Eastern Europe:
The dependency school posits that besides East-W est trade, 
another aspect of East-West economic relations which has led to the 
integration of East European countries into the world capitalist 
system is defacto investment of MNCs in these countries. Such 
investments allegedly amount to nothing less than the utilization of
cheap East European labor for the export of goods manufactured in
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these countries back to the West. The dependency school believes
that the MNCs' activities in Eastern Europe are parallel to the
"transfer of certain kinds of industrial production from the
West to certain parts of the underdeveloped countries: the
transfer of labor intensive industries, such as textiles, clothing,
and footwear, or manufacturing process such as the fabrication
of electronic components, from economies where the cost of 
labor has become too high to keep them profitable to areas 
with cheap labor; the transfer of some heavy industry, part of 
automotive and related equipment manufacturing, and of steel 
production, to more advanced parts of South and East . . . what 
better strategy than to shift some of the production in these 
industries to Brazil, the Soviet Union and Poland where labor is 
not only cheap but more diciplined?" (Frank 1977, P. 112)
In this part of my dissertation, I will try to verify empirically
to what extent the dependency school’s argument is valid, and find
out whether MNCs' investments in Brazil and Mexico are similar to
those in Eastern European countries. Since the direct investments by
MNCs in Eastern Europe are minimal, and in fact nonexistent in some
of the Eastern European countries such as the Soviet Union, from the
beginning one has to accept a broader definition for MNCs'
investments in Eastern Europe, a definition which covers all types of
economic activities conducted by these corporations in Eastern
Europe. Consequently, in this part I will take ICAs between Eastern
Europe and the West to be synonymous with MNCs* investments in
Eastern Europe. A specific feature of investment, according to this
definition, is that while “equity may be title to a specified share of
output or profits, rather than physical assets which generate them,"
the debt or return on investments may frequently be repayable in
kind. (Portes 1978, P. 163) Such definition makes a distinction
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between MNCs' activities in East Europe and those in the capitalist 
countries. In the capitalist countries MNCs' investments entail actual 
ownership of physical assets, and return on investments are almost 
never, in kind. Such a definition seems to be accepted by McMillan 
when he argues that ICAs are
"the framework for a form of real capital investment, since 
through production and marketing sharing provisions, quality 
contro l arrangem ents and other agreed procedures, the 
Western firm is able to play a continuing, if  indirect, role in the 
use of productive assets within the Eastern economies" . ..
In sum he believes ICAs
"can be viewed as means by which, in principle a Western firm 
can exercise some of the- property rights which normally 
accompany equity investment. In the absence of formal title to 
assets in the East, the W estern partner may nevertheless 
exercise some control over the uses allocation of income from, 
and disposal of transferred assets during the life of the 
agreem ent."
In this sense he argues, ICAs "can perform some of the functions of 
more direct forms of capital investment and can substitute for the 
latter in the face of East-W est legal and systematic constraints." 
(McMillan 1977, P. 1192)
The ICAs differ from international trade in two important 
aspects: time and interdependence. Ordinary trade is characterized
by a series of "once-and-for-all transactions;" a cooperation 
agreement, in contrast, is represented by a contract "extending over 
a number of years." (Hanson 1978, P.P. 127-128) Although ICAs 
take different forms, almost all of these forms entail at least one of 
the following activities: sales of know how, transfer of technology,
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training of labor and management, engineering consultancy, etc. It is 
therefore not difficult to see why these activities tend to have a 
duration and a character of continuing interdependence between 
contractual partners; (Hanson 1978, P. 128) a characteristic which is 
absent from an ordinary trade transaction of selling or purchasing of 
a given product.
L L L  D ifferent Form s of ICAs:
ICAs bring Eastern European countries and W estern firms 
together in a broad range of activities. Table (37) presents the 
different forms of ICAs from least to most integrated. In practice, 
however, "quantitative research has been hampered by the absence 
of a standard definition" for different forms of ICAs. (McMillan 
1977, P. 1181) Furthermore, accurate classification requires a fairly 
detailed knowledge of a given contract and such information is not 
generally easily or systematically available. The East European 
authorities are reluctan t to publish detailed inform ation, and 
W estern governm ents do not require reg istra tion  o f ICAs. 
Consequently, individual researchers are lim ited to collecting 
information based on scattered data as reported in domestic and 
foreign business publications, an endeavor which is extremely time 
consuming. The major problem, however, is that there is no 
guarantee about the accuracy of data or their classifications.41 (Cory
Because one has to rely on the secondary sources.
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1982, P. 141 and McMillan 1977, P. 1181) As a result, it is often 
very difficult, sometimes even impossible, to decide whether a 
particular deal falls within a given definition of ICAs. It is based on 
the realization of such difficulties that, in the empirical section of this 
part, I will mainly rely on the United Nations survey and McMillan's 
studies which are generally accepted and are referred to as accurate 
sources of information about the numbers, different forms and 
characteristics of East-West ICAs. Consequently, I do not feel it 
necessary to conduct a separate investigation on my own, in 
particu lar because M cM illan 's and the U .N .’s stud ies are 
comprehensive and cover ICAs at different periods of time and 
therefore allow one to draw legitim ate conclusions about their 
characteristics.
Regardless of difficulties in classification of East-West ICAs, 
there are some well known examples of different forms of ICAs 
which can be useful in explaining Table (37). Among the examples of 
turnkey projects is the $20 billion Occidental Petroleum contract with 
the Soviet Union, part of which calls for Occidental to provide 
manufacturing facilities, pipelines and shipping in exchange for 1.5 
million tons of ammonia per year. (Herold and Kazlov 1983, P. 65)
Licensing agreements can also operate without payments of 
royalties in hard currency to Western firms. For instance, there is an 
agreement between a Polish state enterprise and the Swedish firm 
Ericsson in which the former is licensed to produce heavy devices for 
railway signal boxes in return for payment of half of the license fees 
in the form of delivery of these devices to the Swedish company.
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(Schnitzer 1980, P. 48) Subcontracting is another form of ICA which 
can be used by East European countries to earn hard currency. 
Hungarian subcontracting, for instance, is used in cutting and
finishing clothes for Western markets. In 1975, Hungary earned an 
estim ated revenue of $175 m illion from  its  subcontracting
agreements with Western firms. (Schnitzer 1980, P. 51) Among the
examples of production cooperation agreements is the one which 
involves the French subsidiary of Regie-Renault in Poland. Based on 
this agreement, the French company built a factory in Warsaw to 
manufacture Jelez-Berliet buses, which are sold in Eastern and
Western markets as well as Africa. Machine tools and equipment for 
the buses are made in Poland with the help of French specialists. 
(Schnitzer 1980, P. 45)
Examples of joint ventures in Eastern Europe include: the one
between Volvo, the Swedish car manufacturer, and the Hungarian 
enterprise for production of two standard models for sale in both 
Eastern and Western markets; another one is between the U.S. firm 
Coming and the Hungarian foreign trade organization for production 
of blood gas analyzers. In this venture Coming is responsible for 
providing technology and certain components as well as distribution 
and sales of blood gas analyzers in Western Europe. (Schnitzer 1980, 
P.P. 97-98)
There are other types of ICAs which are not mentioned in 
Table (37), such as Pepsi-Cola Corporation's agreement with the 
Soviet Union which illustrates a cooperation between joint- 
production and joint-marketing. In 1976 Pepsi Cola provided a
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bottling plant to the Soviet Union with capacity of 50 million bottles 
of Pepsi. Pepsi-Cola Company furnishes the Soviet Union with cola 
concentrate, under a barter agreement in which Pepsi sells Soviet 
vodka and wine in the U.S.A. The more vodka and wine Pepsi can 
sell in the U.S., the more cola concentrate the Soviet Union gets in 
return. (Schnitzer 1980, p. 48)
The initial contact between Western companies and East 
European countries usually takes the form o f licensing and/or 
provision of turnkey projects. They then are followed by more 
integrated forms of cooperation (such as co-production or jo int 
ventures in third countries and probably later establishment of joint 
ventures in East Europe). (Herold and Kazlov 1983, P. 29) The 
reasons that licensing usually evolves into co-production deals are 
not difficult to comprehend. The royalties are often too expensive in 
hard currency, and there exist numerous complains about lack of 
sufficient servicing and/or advice. 42 (Herold and Kozlov 1983, P. 29) 
The evolution from one form to another, however, is not 
automatic and depends on "the development of partners capability 
and the growth of mutual knowledge and confidence." (McMillan 
1977, P. 1195) Furthermore, a careful study of East-W est ICAs 
reveals the importance of historical ties in establishment of more 
integrated forms of ICAs. The Control Data establishment of joint 
venture in Romania took place only after this corporation was selling 
its products in Romania for a couple of years. Fujitsu Fanuc of Japan
42 For more difficulties in measurement of ICAs see (McMillan 1977, p. 1183).
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had had an ICA since 1974 for numerical process control equipment 
in Bulgaria before establishing the first joint venture there. And the 
manufacturing of "the Vutronik system for controlling industrial 
processes" by Honeywell in Poland was made possible only after long 
years of Honeywell transactions with Poland. (McMillan 1977, P. 
3132)
The U.N. breakdown of ICAs into different forms, using a 
broader definition of ICAs, as of the end of 1978 reveals that the 
majority (about 45.2%) of these agreements were concentrated on co­
production and specialization. U.N.'s study, however, exaggerates the 
role of specialization and co-production in Eastern Europe. For 
exam ple, 20.4% of co-production and specialization are only 
concerned with research and development. Therefore, only 24.8% of 
ICAs can be really categorized as co-production and specialization; 
and out of them 21% are related to co-production in which each 
party manufactures parts of components of a final product.43 N early  
4 percent are the type of co-production in which each party 
specializes in part of the manufacturing product and then exchanges 
units in order to complete each other's range of product (U.N. 1979, 
P. 22)
One of the oldest forms of cooperation, which is closely linked 
with the transfer of technology, comes next: supply of plants and
43 Co-production may be distinguished from sub-contracting by the more 
egalitarian nature o f the relation established between the partners. "It 
includes determining the components o f a final product, drawing up 
specifications for these components and distribution of this production 
among the co-operating enterprises, each partner periodically specifying 
the volume and nature of its needs in components." (U.N. 1979), p. 9)
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equipment (17.4%) mainly in return for the resultant products. This 
form is then closely followed by joint ventures and contractual 
ventures in any of the following countries: Eastern European
countries, DCs and LDCs (16.9%). The other forms of agreements play 
a more modest role, (See Table (38)), especially licensing and 
subcontracting which are among the original forms of cooperations. 
Such a breakdown, however, does not reflect the small number of 
joint ventures which exist in Eastern European countries (in 1981 
about 99 J/Vs existed in all Eastern Europe).44
5.5.2. A ttractive F eatures of ICAs:
For the Eastern European countries the most important feature 
of ICAs is the import of Western technology. "This transfer of
technology function is the m ajor consideration underlying the
Eastern em phasis on cooperative relationships and is repeatedly 
stressed in official statements and legislative enactments on the
subject." (McMillan 1977, P. 1193) In Bulgaria, for instance, the 
Minister of Foreign Trade said that by increasing contact with the 
West, Bulgaria hopes ”to raise the scientific and technological level of 
its production, improve the quality of its goods. . . . "  (Herold and 
Kazlov 1983, P. 34) In regards to the establishment of mixed
A number o f reasons have been cited by Western and Eastern economists 
for the lack o f Western firms' interest in participation in joint ventures. 
(McMillan 1981, p. 61) ascribes such lack of interest to "difficulties of 
integrating jointly owned, and necessarily more autonomous enterprises 
into centrally administrated economies."
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companies in Hungary, an Eastern source reported that "the principal 
task of 'these companies' is to promote scientific and technical 
progress." (cited Herold and Kozlov 1983, P. 34)
ICAs are not perceived by East European countries as a simple 
vehicle for acquisition of technology, because technology may in 
many cases be purchased or leased through a trade transaction. 
Indeed, it is possible to acquire the whole production system, from 
feasibility studies to construction of plants through the market.
"A cooperation agreement may also include these elements, but 
it extends possible 'packages' beyond the acquisition of a 
complete engineering system to the creation of a reinforcing 
system of technical and commercial linkages, extending into the 
future and creating the possibility of continuing access to 
partner technology" (McMillan 1977, p 1195)
It is this aspect of "continuity" which most interests the East
European countries. Furthermore, these countries hope, by involving
the Western partner in the operation and commercial application of
transferred technology, to acquire those technologies which are not
usually available through trade transactions. More than anything
else, however, Eastern European countries wish to create the
possibility of assimilation of the W estern partner's technological
capability through ICAs. (Ibid, p 1193)
The self-financing character of the majority of East-West ICAs
is another important aspect of these deals which appeals to Eastern
European countries. According to Carl McMillan (1977), there exists
an implicit and an explicit aspect of self-financing in such deals. For
example, he argues the production specialization automatically leads
to self-financing, because it generate some hard currency earnings
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which usually offset the hard currency expenditures associated with 
the contract. The explicit aspect of self-financing of ICAs, on the 
other hand, is the one which is stated in the term of the contract. 
Consequently "the com pensatory provisions of a cooperation 
agreement shift the burden of financing to the Western firm." The 
East European countries' pressure to enter into such arrangements 
stems from their belief that the Western partner could arrange hard- 
currency financing more easily than the Eastern European country 
could. These countries' interest in the explicit aspect of self- 
financing of ICAs is reinforced by their hard-currency indebtedness. 
According to P. Hanson (1978, P. 138), for this reason East European 
planners favor ICAs which guarantee hard-currency export sales and 
"usually veto schemes that do not."
Table (39) is extracted from Carleton Sample, and represents 
the component elements of 218 East-West ICAs (Each agreement is 
composed of a number of elements). This sample clearly indicates 
the East European countries' attempt to use ICAs as a vehicle of 
transfer of technology. The elements directly related with transfer 
of technology include elements two through seven, as well as 
element number sixteen-joint research and development. 28.4% of 
agreements surveyed included sale of capital equipment, 20.2% of 
them included sale of complete plant; about 22% of these agreements 
embodied custom design of plant and equipment, and about two- 
thirds of them contained technical assistance (know-how). A 
separate calculation of the Carleton survey shows 75% of agreements
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surveyed contained at least one element closely related to the 
transfer of technology. (McMillan 1977, P. 1189)45
It is important to note that the Carleton survey indicates that a 
significant share (40-50% ) of the agreem ents constituted the 
arrangem ent for the paym ent of the capital and technology 
transferred in resultant or related products. (M cM illan 1977, 
P .1 1 8 8 )46 Although the Carleton survey is rather old, it does not 
lose its relevance, because it was conducted in a period of explosive 
growth of East-W est ICAs. In any event, the survey shows the 
Eastern European attempt to use ICAs as a means of acquiring 
Western technology without heavy burden on their reserves of hard 
currency.
Therefore, the evidence suggests that the Soviet Union and 
Eastern European countries use ICAs mainly to import Western 
technology. Despite ICAs’ attractive features and Eastern European 
countries’ interests in the importation of W estern technology, they 
are still far behind the 'semi-peripheral' countries of Brazil and 
Mexico. These two countries outpace Eastern Europe in almost all 
channels of technological imports. For instance, in terms of the 
purchase of disembodied technology-payments for patent and licence 
between 1972-79, Brazil and Mexico spent $3.1 billion and $2.1
45 The data on the Carleton survey is based on questionnaires completed by 
the Western firms located in fourteen different West European countries 
(including Japan). The survey was based on a sample of 218 agreements 
reported in McMillan (June 1976).
46 The survey by the secretariat of ECE reported in UNECE (1975) reached the 
same conclusion. The ECE study of 1975 was based on a sample of 207 
agreem ents.
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billion, respectively. In the same period of time, the combined 
expenditure of Czechoslovakia and Poland, "the largest spenders in 
Eastern Europe," was $84 million, only 9.9% of those of Brazil and 
Mexico. In terms of the transfer of embodied technology, by 1983 
Eastern Europe attracted about $64 million in foreign equity 
investment. By 1983, the amount of foreign direct investment in 
Brazil. Mexico and Argentina was well above $45 billion, more than 
700 times that of Eastern Europe. (Pozanski, 1986)
5i5.3. Geographic Distribution of ICAs:
The propitious economic and political climate in the early 
1970s which contributed to the expansion of East-W est trade was 
also equally helpful in the tremendous growth of East-West ICAs. 
According to McMillan's study (McMillan 1981, P. 56), every year 
between 1970-74, ICAs grew by 30%. The most active early 
participant in East-W est ICAs from the Western side was West 
Germany, followed by France, Italy and the United Kingdom. These 
countries are also the major partners in the East-West trade. (Herold 
and Kazlov 1983, P. 9) As of 1977, the position seemed to be 
unchanged (see table 40), and West Germany continued to be the 
most active Western country involved in the ICAs. Marer and Miller, 
discussing the U.S. firms' participation in ICAs, believe that as of 
1976 U.S. firms and their subsidiaries became heavily involved in 
East-West ICAs and no longer lagged significantly behind their West- 
European competitors. (Marer and Miller 1977, P. 24)
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Table (41) presents the relative position of different Western 
countries in the East-West ICAs at the end of the 1970s. The FRG 
continued to be the leading Western participant in the East-West 
ICAs, followed by France and the U.S.A. Obviously, between 1977 
and the end of the decade, while the relative share of France and 
Austria declined, that of Italy increased. The U.S. involvement in 
ICAs is underestimated because U.S. firm s participate indirectly 
through their subsidiaries in Western Europe. Marer-Miller estimate 
the share of U.S. firms and their affiliates in ICAs to be somewhere 
around 25% of all ICAs in force, which bring U.S. firms in parity with 
that of their West German counterparts. (Marer and Miller 1977, p. 
24)
On the East European side, the most active participants in East- 
West ICAs are the more reform-minded among them: Hungary and
Poland, followed at some distance by Romania; the U.S.S.R., 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the GDR tail behind. 47 (McMillan 1977, 
and McMillan 1981) According to McMillan's estimate, as Table (42) 
denotes, at the end of the 1970s the number of non-equity 
agreements between Eastern Europe and W est was 1367; about 33% 
of these agreements were signed by Hungary, 24% by Poland and 
21% by the Soviet Union. At the same period, 257 agreements with 
Western firms were in force in regard to joint projects in a third
47 If one, however, considers the general agreements or protocols with 
Western firms (i.e. establishing the intent to cooperate in broad areas o f  
cooperation, but not the specific aspects of progress), the Soviet Union 
steals the show from other Eastern European countries. Out o f 625 general 
agreements as o f end o f 1970, the Soviet Union received 406 of them, about 
64%.
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country; 30% of these agreements were signed by Hungary, 28% by 
Poland and 11% by Romania.
Table (43) shows the number of joint venture agreements 
between Eastern Europe and Western firms. Hungary, as of the end 
of 1981, had the largest number of joint ventures, followed by 
Romania and then Poland and Bulgaria. The existence of more joint 
ventures in the most reform oriented countries of East Europe 
supports M cM illan 's contention  th a t the m ain obstacle in 
establishm ent o f J/Vs in these countries is the difficulty of 
integrating a more autonomous entity into the economic systems 
dominated by central planning. (McMillan 1981, P. 61)
As these tables indicate, the Soviet Union, relative to the 
magnitude of its economy and foreign trade, has lagged behind other 
Eastern European countries as m easured by the num ber of 
agreements concluded. (McMillan 1981) The Soviet Union is also far 
behind the other Eastern European countries when one considers the 
East-W est joint ventures in developing countries (See Table (42)). 
However, in terms of the number o f East-W est joint ventures 
established in DCs, the Soviet Union occupied only the second place 
after Poland (See Table (44)), followed by Hungary and Romania. 
According to McMillan, the Soviet Union's participation concentrates 
mainly on "protocol agreem ents fo r technical and scientific 
cooperation. Com pensation agreem ents in raw  m aterials and 
semiprocessed goods, and jo in t companies in the West for the 
m arketing of Soviet exports." (M cM illan 1981, p. 62) The 
compensation agreements certainly play an important role in the
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Soviet Union. The Soviet Union uses compensation agreements in 
order to acquire equipment and technology necessary to develop 
Siberia as well as to expand production of certain high priority
industries. The Soviet Union counts on Siberia's untapped deposits of 
oil, coal, natural gas and metals to support the country's future
economic growth. The Soviet Union also uses compensation 
agreements to expand production of such industries as chemical 
fertilizers, petrochemicals, and ferrous and nonferrous m etals—"in 
which Soviet technology lags the West or in which expanded capacity 
is needed quickly." (Barclay 1979, p. 464) The compensation
agreements provide several advantages for the Soviet Union. They 
enable it to finance the purchase of W estern machinery and
equipment by long-term government backed credits with "very low 
real interest rates."48 Furthermore, compensation agreements reduce 
the Soviet Union's risk, because they guarantee long-term export 
markets, "providing protection from development in the W est that 
would otherwise reduce Soviet export earnings and hard currency 
reserves." (Barclay 1979, P. 465) The compensation agreements are 
therefore used by the Soviet Union to acquire Western technology, 
and guarantee the future availability of some im portant raw 
materials as well as oil and natural gas. Furthermore, in instances, 
they are used to earn hard currency, such as export of natural gas for
According to Barclay (1979), the average interest rate on these loans in the 
1970s was about 7%, roughly equal to inflation in world prices o f the 
products to be delivered by the Soviet Union as repayment.
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equipment and pipe in which the export earnings exceed the cost of
imported equipment and pipes.49
S um m ary : The most active participant in East-W est ICAs
from the Western side is West Germany, and from the Eastern side:
Hungary and Poland. The Soviet Union is mainly interested in
compensation agreements, since they enable it to acquire equipment
necessary to develop Siberia as well as to expand production of
certain high priority industries.
5*5,4, ICAs in D ifferent Branches o f Industry ;
Since 1973 several surveys have been undertaken by 'different 
researchers to outline the distribution of East-W est ICAs among 
different industrial branches. Among the first of such studies are 
those of UNECE (1975) and McMillan (1975). Both of these studies 
showed a high degree of concentration of these agreements in the 
m echanical eng ineering , transport equipm ent, and chem ical 
industries. (Hanson 1978, P. 131) Indeed, the studies found that 
between 36-42% of agreements in the samples studied fell into
The emphasis in this section is on the West-East flow o f know how and 
technology. Point needs to be added here that the research and 
development networks in East European countries do generate their own 
applied research results and they often include potentially worthwhile 
invention. According to Hanson, however, indigenous inventions "seem 
frequently to get stuck at that stage in the product cycle," mainly because 
in these countries there exists a "systematic weakness at the development 
and innovation stages.” Therefore, the Western partner to take the 
unutilized Eastern research results, "does the development, initial 
production and de-bugging and hands back an improved and commercially 
viable product." (Hanson 1978, p. 138-139)
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m achine building industries, followed by transport equipment, 
chemical and the electrical and electronics industries, each ranging 
between 9-15% of the agreements in the two samples. (McMillan 
1977, P. 1188) The studies, therefore, showed a high degree of 
emphasis on heavy industry and those branches of industries in 
which technological progress is of primary importance. (U.N. 1979, P. 
18) In fact, McMillan's study showed that over 70% of agreements 
surveyed involved producer goods industries, and the ECE study 
revealed that only 17% of agreements were identifiable as consumer 
oriented goods industries. (McMillan 1977, P. 1188)
As was mentioned earlier, McMillan did not include U.S. firms 
in his survey; Miller-Marer (1977),50 on the other hand, conducted a 
study of concentrating - only on the U.S. firms. Their findings are 
summarized in Table (45). Their study also demonstrates a high 
degree of emphasis on heavy industry, with chemical industries 
receiving the highest share of agreements (20.5%), followed by the 
machine building industry (18.7%). The electrical machinery, by 
receiving 14.1% of agreements, was third. Their findings reveal that 
all countries of Eastern Europe tend to use ICAs mainly in heavy 
industry. For example, in the Soviet Union only 12% of ICAs were 
related to consumer goods. In combined Eastern Europe, a slightly 
larger share (18%) of ICAs with the U.S. were in the consumer goods 
sector. (Marer and Miller 1977, P. 24)
They mailed questionnaires to 1068 U.S. corporations, and received a 
responce from 70% of these firms.
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Another study by the U.N. (1979)51 in 1978 shows the same 
degree of priority in regard to the distribution of East-West ICAs 
among different branches of industries, as was shown in M iller- 
M arer's study. They include respectively the chemical industry 
(26.1%), mechanical and machine tools (22.3%), and electrical 
equipment and electronics (17.5%) (See Table (46)). In general, these 
industries for which technological progress is of primary importance 
together accounted for about 84% of the cases studied. Light 
industry, agricultural and food industries and o ther industries 
occupy a much less important place, approximately 16% of the total.
A more recent study by McMillan (1981) indicates that 
although the high priority  industries still received the largest 
number of ICA s, there had been some changes in  terms of 
distribution of ICAs among them, (See Table (47)). Compared with 
the U.N. study of Table (46), electrical equipment and electronics 
receive the larger share of ICAs than mechanical engineering and 
m achine tools.52 Transport equipment ranked 4 in both studies. 
While in McMillan's study light industry plays a more important role 
than metallurgy, in the U.N.’s study it is metallurgy that ranks higher 
than light industry.
So far, the studies cited in this section have concentrated their 
samples on Eastern Europe in general, but it is important to find out 
how individual East European countries distribute ICAs among
51 The study is based on press infonnation, supplemented in some cases by 
data obtained through direct interviews with firms.
52 Probably due to the altered plan priorities.
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different branches of industry. As Table (48) denotes, the
mechanical industries and machine tools occupies first place in four 
countries: Bulgaria, Poland, German Democratic Republic and
Czechoslovakia. In the Soviet Union and Romania the chemical 
industry is in the first place with a share of 36.4% and 39.3%
respectively; in Hungary it is the electrical equipment and electronic 
industries which lead among other industries. The chemical industry 
occupies the second place in Czechoslovakia (33.3%), and in the 
German Democratic Republic (14.3), the same percentage as for 
transport equipment and for agriculture. Mechanical engineering 
and machine tools takes second place in the Soviet Union, and
transport equipment comes second in Romania. It is only in Bulgaria 
that agriculture and food industry occupies an important place and 
comes second (27.3%). It is clear, then, that this study confirms the 
previous studies' findings that Eastern European countries use ICAs 
primarily in heavy industry and in the high priority branches of
heavy industry in which technological progress is important. (U.N. 
1979, P.P.18-19)
Summary:
As was shown in the previous sections, East European countries 
view East-West ICAs as a means of acquiring Western technology on 
a continuous basis, and of easing hard currency problems by 
providing repayment to the Western partner in resultant products. 
Consequently, most of their emphasis on concluding such agreements 
is on these two aspects. It was also shown that the different studies
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conducted on the different periods of time all confirm that almost 
three-fourths of these agreements are concerned with producer 
goods industries in particular machine, building and chemical 
industries. These are all priority sectors, i.e.
"it is neither an accident nor the result of the workings of the 
'law' of comparative advantage [as the neo-classical economists 
argue] that the Soviet Union has negotiated a large number of 
ICAs in petrochemicals and fertilizers since 1970. Since the 
1960s, the economic plans have called for an emphasis on 
chemical production. If plan fulfillment requires an expansion 
which is im possible to attain (or if  attainm ent would 
unacceptably strain domestic resources), buy back ICAs can 
provide technology and equipment of high quality and in
requiste quantity, (emphasis added Herold and Kazlov 1982, P.
66) Furthermore, there is no indication that Eastern European 
concludes ICAs, in particular joint ventures, are for the sake of 
maximizing profit."
This is a claim made by some neo-classical economists and discussed
in the third chapter of this dissertation. A majority of these
agreements are used to modernize the industrial structure of East
European countries. There are, of course, some ICAs which are
primarily used in the development of exports such as gas for pipes in
the case of the Soviet Union.
5.5JL ICAs as Arena of East-W est Conflict:
Despite the advantages associated with ICAs, the goods shipped 
under these agreements only account for a small percentage of East- 
West trade turnover. (In 1975, for instance, such goods amounted to 
only 4-5 percent of total East-West trade turnover.) (Bornstein
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1979, P. 295) The reason for such a small percentage can be mainly 
attributed to the fact that virtually all aspects of ICAs from their 
initiation to their subsequent implementation are potential areas of 
c o n f l ic t .53 It is this aspect of East-West ICAs which is largely 
missing in the discussion of East European economists, especially the 
advocates of an export-oriented model of development54 These 
economists tend to emphasize, and at times exaggerate, the potential 
benefits of ICAs, and are inclined to ignore the problems associated 
with these agreements. For instance, while the East European 
countries seek to obtain the latest technology, W estern companies 
prefer to transfer standard or even aging technology. (Wilczynski 
1977) Moreover, while East Europeans are interested in acquiring 
capital intensive technology due to the shortage of labor in these 
countries, the West likes to sell labor intensive technology. (Bomstein 
1979, P. 295) In most cases, also the motivation of Western firms in 
entering ICAs is to increase their sales of goods and services, rather 
than to deepen the participation of the socialist partner in the actual 
operation. The evidence supporting this claim is the large number of 
licensing and turnkey contracts, "precisely those forms where the 
level of development of the participants diverges most,” concluded 
by both sides. (Herold and Kazlov 1983, P. 52) The two sides also 
often disagree on the specific varieties of models to be made and the 
standard of quality control. There are other problems, such as the
53 John B, Holt (1976, p. 77-78) provides a more or less comprehensive list of 
the areas of conflicts in East-West ICAs.
54 See appendix III
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insulation of East European countries and domestic prices from the 
world market which make it difficult to reach agreement on pricing 
of inputs and outputs. (Bomstein 1979, P. 295) It is therefore more 
rational to view ICAs not only as an arena of cooperation between 
East and West but at the same time as an arena of conflict between 
them. Existence of such conflict does not mean (as probably the 
dependency school would argue) that Eastern Europe will be always 
the loser by virtue of being intermediate countries. For example, 
concluding an East-W est industrial cooperation takes an unusually 
long period of time, sometimes even more than two years, almost 
three times longer than the normal time with a W est European 
customer. 55 (Hanson and Hill 1979, P. 59) During the period of 
negotation the E ast European production engineers find the 
opportunity to become extremely well-informed about technical 
details of technology involved in the agreement. Moreover, they 
have sufficient time to examine the details of similar technologies 
offered by other Western companies and eventually to "make the 
most rational purchasing decision in terms of their quality and 
output requirements." (Hanson and Hill 1979, P. 591) Furthermore, 
in the usual East European conditions of scarce hard currency, 
"extended proposal and negotiation times frequently "allow" them "to
This number is based on a survey of British companies selling machine 
tools to the Soviet Union. The time sometimes can be reduced when the 
smaller projects are under negotiation. A similar survey about operation of 
British chemical firms in the Soviet Union indicates 9-10 months' longer 
negotiating time compared with a typical Western client. (Ibid., p. 594)
The study, however, indicates that this length o f time could be somewhat 
reduced by development of mutual trust and understanding.
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receive extremely favorable commercial conditions, particularly if 
other capital goods markets were generally depressed." (Hanson and 
Hill 1979, P.591) The East Europeans' manner of negotiation, their 
emphasis on detailed specification of projects, and the unusual (on 
W estern standards) negotiation time, however, are considered by 
Western firms as drawbacks. (Herold and Kazlov 1983, P. 62)
The recognition of these potential conflicts and the attempt to 
resolve them a priori will assist in a more smooth operation of ICAs 
and consequently will aid in averting future, more serious losses. In 
contrast to the advocates of "export model of development" in East 
Europe, some of the Western authors have fully recognized these 
potential conflicts. J. Holt (1977), for instance, speaks of how U.S. 
agricultural and construction equipment industries use different 
techniques in their bargaining with the East, and consider the 
relative uniqueness of their technology as their strongest bargaining 
chips; or as Philip Hanson aptly puts it, the benefits to the East 
European countries and deriving from ICAs, of course cannot
"be expected to be available gratis. Insofar as some of the 
burden of risk associated with an investment project to Eastern 
Europe is shifted to a Western partner, e.g. by his entering into 
a forward commitment to purchase output from the project at 
an agreed price or according to an agreed price formula, it 
should be expected that something will be charged (in the 
terms of the cooperation agreement) for his risk bearing. The 
Eastern partner may be thought, then, as paying for his risk- 
aversion as well as for Western management or marketing 
expertise." (Hanson 1978, P. 138)
The Eastern European econom ists' stress on the benefits 
derived from East-West economic relations resembles one of the
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'm odern ization ' school argum ents p resented  ea rlie r in this 
dissertation. Similar to the modernization school, the East European 
econom ists seem  to m aintain that because the nature of 
modernization is identical for all societies, then the economic growth 
and consequently development of socialist countries can largely be 
sped up by an inflow of Western technology. This perspective 
largely ignores that technology and innovation are not neutral 
elements that can be simply acquired from one economic system and 
then be installed and used in a completely different economic 
system. For example, development of capital intensive and highly 
energy consum ing technology, even w ith W estern European 
standards, in the United States early in the turn of the century was 
due to the requirements of a growing economy rich in natural 
resources and capital but impoverished in terms of human resources. 
Adoption of such technology by a country with a large source of 
labor and insufficient capital would not be without any adverse 
consequences. Furthermore, the East European economists' optimistic 
perception of ICAs not only may lead to future losses, it also does not 
reflect the actual practice of ICAs. For exam ple, socialist 
governments frequently complain regarding their experiences with 
joint ventures. They for example argue that J/Vs actually aggravate 
a country's balance of payments problem, mainly because some 
Western firms sign J/V contracts to create "a captive client that
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would subsequently" import the W estern company's products.56 
The Western firms also usually want to establish a production facility 
that dominates the East European market, and have no interest in the 
export of joint venture's products to capitalist countries. (Herold and 
Kazlov 1983, P.P. 48-49) Dow Chemical apparently withdrew from a 
$1.2 billion basic petrochemicals complex in Eastern Europe because 
it feared poor results due to worldwide overcapacity of basic 
feedstock. (Herold and Kozlov 1983, P. 49)
Moreover, the function of ICAs as a means of acquiring 
appropriate technology has come under question recently by some 
critics of the ICAs critics. For instance, under ICAs with Massey 
Ferguson Ltd. and International Harvester, two tractor factories were 
built in Poland. These plants, representing an investment of $2.5 
billion, produce large tractors, when the Polish private farms are in 
need of smaller models. (Herold and Kozlov 1983, P. 50) In two 
other cases relating to the steel industry, Soviet engineers had 
developed a superior item of equipment, but instead foreign 
substitutues were acquired which were either more expensive or 
technically inferior. (Hanson 1983, P. 31) Similarly, in some cases 
related to the Soviet chemical industry, the domestically developed 
technology was unjustifiably neglected in favor of import of Western 
technology. (IHansonl983, P. 31)
Such a problem has apparently been at the origin of the Citroen-Oltuit 
joint venture dispute in Romania. Because Oltuit lacked the hard currency 
to purchase Citroen parts, the project came to a stand still by early 1983. 
(Herold and Kazlov 1983, p. 48)
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A Soviet author in criticizing the above problems wrote in 
Pravda "it is time to abandon the idea that 'there are no prophets in 
one's own fatherland.' It is also time to treat the state gold reserves 
carefully." (Hanson 1983, P. 32) To staunchly advocate ICAs without 
considering the possible adverse consequences would result in at 
minimum a loss in state treasury.
Furthermore, some doubt has been raised by the ICAs’ critics 
about the contribution of these agreements to increasing the 
productivity of these countries' industrial sector. For instance, case 
studies for the chemical, motor and gas transport industries reveal "a 
highly uncertain and possibly negligible role of imported Western 
technology in Soviet development since about 1960." ( Hanson 1983,
P. 43) And the case study of the Soviet chemical industry, an 
industry with heavy imports of Western technology, suggests that 
"labor productivity in imported plants" is typically two-thirds of that 
of West European labor productivity in similar plants. (Hanson 1983, 
P.42) Another set of case studies, which had attempted to find the 
extent to  which the transfer of technology had narrowed the 
technological gap and by inference the productivity gap between the 
Soviet Union and the West, indicated that there had been no clear, 
general reduction in observed Soviet lags behind the West in a broad 
selection of key technologies between the mid-1950s and the early 
1970s. (Hanson 1978, P. 29) Nevertheless, there have been case 
studies and econometric models which suggest the contribution of 
imported W estern technology to the Soviet Union's industrial 
development and its productivity has been great, but most of these
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studies have been criticized on different grounds.57 In general, 
Brainard (1979) makes a fairly correct statement in regard to the 
import of Western technology and its effects on the Soviet Union 
economy and by implication the rest of East European countries:
. . Western capital goods are typically allocated to priority 
sectors where their economic return may be very high due to 
their help in relieving critical bottlenecks. Such a role for 
W estern capital may help significantly in the settling of 
economic priorities and the timing of interrelated projects. 
Western capital may also help to raise the technological lead of 
specific industrial branches; the mineral fertilizer industry is a 
case in point. Apart from a limited number of such cases 
where the contribution may be very significant, the size of 
Western capital imports points to only a modest impact on the 
technological level of the overall economy. The same is true of 
the econom y's aggregate growth ra te —a positive though 
modest contribution.” (Brainard 1979, P. 100)
One exercise among a series of exercises conducted by Levine and
Green indicates that a 10% projected total W estern machinery
imports in 1975-1980 would generate a slight change in Soviet total
industrial output in 1980, from an index of 126.6 to 126.2 in the case
of reduction in such imports, and to 127 in the case of an increase
(1975=100). (108, 1. 28) Doubt has also been raised about the
contribution of Western technology to the expansion of exports to the
West. P. Hanson (1982), for instance, presents an assessment of the
performance of Polish, Hungarian, and Soviet economies during the
1970s in utilizing Western capital goods to raise exports to the West.
He relates the Western-imports intensity of investment in different
For some examples of these studies and their criticism see (Ibid. and 
Hanson 1978).
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branches of the economy and then relates them to the subsequent 
growth of exports to the W est from these branches. Using 
Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation, he finds that all o f these 
countries performed poorly in terms of increase in exports, though 
the Polish performance measures were worse than the other two.
Not all the problems associated with the ICAs could be
attributed to the Western firm s' attitudes. Eastern European
countries are also at fault in terms of implementation of some
unsuccessful ICAs. The "indigestion" problem is cited as one reason
for delay or complete standstill of some ICAs in Eastern Europe. The 
indigestion is caused by an acute shortage of labor and domestic 
machinery and equipment to supplement the imported machinery 
and by inadequacies of planning and management. (Brainared 1979, 
P. 103) These countries also in cases rejected the domestic 
technology unjustifiably in favor of imported one.58 In some Soviet 
press articles the decision for technology imports are argued to be 
w ell founded but they are criticized because they are badly 
implemented. For instance, one of these articles reported that the 
import of equipment and chemical reagents for the oil industry were 
abandoned as a result of negligence and corruption. (Hanson 1983, 
P.P. 32-33)
As John Holt aptly puts it
"to view ICAs as arena of conflict implies each potential conflict 
constitutes a potential cost, a sacrifice by one or both parties if 
agreement is to be achieved, a cost to be measured against
Examples were cited earlier in this chapter.
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perceivable benefits in order to assess the net benefit of the 
cooperation as a whole." (Holt 1976, P. 78)
The recognition of this sacrifice associated with ICAs which is largely 
missing in the discussion of East European economists, the advocates 
of export-led growth, the East European governments on the other 
hand seems to be more aware of the problems associated with ICAs, 
and it is reflected in the period of time that they spend in negotiation 
of different industrial cooperation agreements.
Some C oncluding R em arks:
My investigation reveals that East European countries use ICAs 
as a means of acquiring Western technology. They do not conclude 
that ICAs are used for the purpose of maximizing their profit, as 
some orthodox economists argue; rather, they engage in ICAs because 
of their belief that
the country’s historic destiny and the position of 
socialism in the present day would depend, in large 
measure, on how we act further. By making wide- 
scale use of the achievements of the scientific and 
technological revolution.” (Mikhail Gorbachev 
quoted in Cooper 1986, P. 317)
These countries mainly import Western technology in high-
priority sectors. In the case of the Soviet Union, the imported
technology is used in such sectors as oil, chemical, and gas where the 
government wants to raise an enterprise to a higher level on the
economic pyramid. (Cooper 1986, P. 320)
I believe it is wrong to view ICAs as only an arena of
cooperation between East and West, as a large number of Eastern
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European economists see them. It is more accurate to consider ICAs 
not only as an arena of cooperation but also as an arena of conflict 
between East and West. The existence of conflict does not 
immediately translate to Eastern European's countries' loss, or their 
dependency on the DCs, as probably the dependency school's 
proponents argue. Even the magnitude of ICAs and in particular the 
amount of direct foreign investment in Eastern Europe, especially 
when it is compared with those in Brazil and Mexico, cast some doubt
about the dependency of Eastern Europe on the West.
LLL M ELCs-anti E a s te rn  E w w g :
The ICAs directly link MNCs to the countries of Eastern Europe. 
Although not all Western partners in these agreements are MNCs, 
"their motivation are those characteristic of MNCs expanding their 
overseas operation within capitalist world economy, i.e., a search for 
markets for goods and technology, and/or lower costs of production." 
(Radice 1979, P. 45) The involvement of MNCs in Eastern Europe is 
considered by the dependency school to be an instrumental factor in 
integration and consequently dependency of these countries on the 
world market economy. It is important, therefore, to investigate,
even if  briefly, the degree of control that MNCs can exert in Eastern 
European economies and then attempt to construe whether these
corporations' operations in Eastern Europe are sim ilar to their 
operations in "semi-peripheral" capitalist countries.
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In addition to the fact that East-West ICAs account for only 5% 
of East-West trade turnover, itself not a significant amount, MNCs' 
direct investments in the majority of Eastern European countries are 
limited or not permitted at all, and at the end of 1981 the number of 
jointly owned and operated enterprises in all East European countries 
was 99 (See Table (43)). Except for these few joint ventures all other 
enterprises set up in collaboration with MNCs are totally owned and 
controlled by East European states. The operation of these
enterprises, including J/Vs, is as much a part of the overall plan of 
each country as any other domestic enterprise. (Szymanski (1982), 
P. 59) The MNCs’ economic impact is, therefore, lim ited, as 
Szymanski argues, "to their ability to participate or not participate, 
and to scope and extent of their participation." They can affect the 
rate of economic growth of these countries "slightly through 
providing high technology or slightly  deaccelerating it  by 
withdrawing." (Szymanski 1982, P. 59 and Szymanski 1981, P. 522)
The lim ited extent of MNCs* operations in East Europe is a 
contrast to their extensive activities in the "sem i-peripheral" 
capitalist countries. In Mexico, for instance, according to a study 
completed in 1970, of the 2040 companies with the largest incomes, 
foreign capital controlled 36% of the income of the largest 400 
companies. O f the largest 100 industrial firms, 47% belonged to 
foreigners. (Cockcroft 1983, P. 157) According to Cockcroft by 1970, 
U.S. based MNCs alone obtained the control of key sectors of the 
economy: they owned 57% of automotive manufacturing, 49% of
petroleum products and coke; 33% of paper and cellulouse; 76% of
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rubber; 53.6% of mining and metallugry; 72.2% of copper and 
aluminum; 100% of tobacco; 50% of industrial chemicals; 46.8% of 
food and beverages; 86.4% of chemicals and pharmaceuticals; 50% of 
electrical machinery; 52% of nonelectrical machinery; 64% of 
transportation equipment; 88% of computers and office equipment; 
53.4% of commerce; 38.9% of construction materials. (Cockcroft 1983, 
P. 158) These corporations, Cockcroft argues, are concentrated in 
more dynamic sectors of the economy and the "major contributiors to 
Mexico's high GNP growth rates in 1950s and 1960s." Evans and 
Gereffi (1982) observes a similar situation in Brazil. In 1972, for 
instance, 32% of food, 44% of textiles, 25% of metal fabrication, 22% 
of nonmetalic ores, 69% of chemicals, 100% of rubber, 74% of 
nonelectrical machinery, 84% of transporation and 50% of total 
manufacturing of the 300 largest manufacturing firms in Brazil were 
owned and controlled by foreigners. (Evans and Gereffi 1982, P. 
138) In sum, they argue in both Brazil and Mexico MNCs are not 
only concentrated in the leading industries, but w ithin these 
industries they are also predominant among the leading firms. The 
same point is raised by Baer (1983, P. 175) about Brazil. He points 
out that within the manufacturing sector, foreign investments were 
concentrated in those sectors which experienced the highest growth 
rates within the Brazilian economy. (See Table (49))
MNCs' control over key sectors of industries in Brazil and 
M exico makes these countries extrem ely vulnerable to these 
corporations' behavior, which in turn is determined by the changes 
in the world capitalist market. Especially if one considers that any
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major decision by a subsidiary of a MNC, in particular in regard to 
expansion or reduction of output, is not influenced only by the 
conditions of local markets, but also by the general conditions under 
which its parent company operates.
The effect of MNCs on the growth rate of the GNP in the semi­
peripheral capitalist countries is not limited to their control of the 
manufacturing sector. Their effect is enhanced through their control 
over these countries' exports and imports. According to Evans and 
Gereffi, in 1972, in both Brazil and Mexico, 85% of all manufactured 
exports were concentrated in just four industries: transportation
equipm ent, electrical m achinery, non-electrical m achinery and 
chemicals. These are, of course, among the most dynamic sectors of 
the manufacturing sector, and are largely owned by foreign interests. 
In all these industries, except chemicals, 80% of exports are 
accounted for by MNCs' intercompany sales. In the case of chemicals, 
55 to 65 percent of total exports are considered as intercompany 
sales. In other words, most of a MNCs exports are accounted for by 
sales to affiliates, and the percentage of these sales as a share of total 
exports has been generally increasing over time. (See Table (50)) 
Hence, one can easily confirm Evan and Gereffi's conclusion that 




Percentage of Exports that are Intercompany Sales
1960 1966 1972
Brazil 69 62 73
Mexico 56 75 82
Source: Evans and Gereffi (1982, P. 14)
"largely dependent on the willingness of the" parent company "to 
buy or allocate production from its Brazilian or Mexican subsidiary. 
This source of revenues becomes quite vulnerable in the event of a 
general slowdown in demand or oversupply." (Evans and Gereffi 
1982, P. 147) Furthermore, they argue that the Brazilian and 
Mexican involvement in building substantial manufacturing capacity, 
highly geared to exports, intensifies their vulnerability, in particular 
because many of these products are not "homogeneous commodities" 
that can be sold in many markets and specific marketing channels 
are required for their exports. "Since there is really only one 
customer for Pinto engines, the country that exports Pinto engines is 
in at least this sense more vulnerable than the one that exports 
coffee or silver." (Evans and Gereffi 1982, P. 149) Specialization and 
co-production also take place between Eastern European countries 
and Western firms'. However, the nature of such specializations is 
different in as much as they are based on agreements and generally 
all details of a deal including volume and price are specified in the
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agreement. This procedure is quite different from the one followed 
by an affiliate of MNCs in Brazil and/or Mexico, where, for example, 
it produces Pinto engines for which volume and price are determined 
by the parent company.
On the import side, the foreign owned corporations tend to 
"voraciously" gobble up imports and export much less than they 
import. According to the foreign trade department of the Bank of 
Brazil, the combination of 19 MNCs1 subsidiaries' deficits in 1977 was 
sufficient enough to create a trade gap of $661 million. (Evans and 
Gereffi 1982, P. 150)
MNCs are also important factors in the large indebtedness of 
'semi-peripheral' capitalist countries. A survey of the 50 largest 
firms in each ownership category in Brazil, state-owned, domestic 
firms and multinational reveals that MNCs are more in debt than 
either private Brazilian firms or state firms. Although a large part of 
Brazil's foreign debt in the 1970s is believed to be due to the 
borrowing by state enterprises, Table (51) at least can show that 
MNCs are also to be blamed because they borrowed substantial 
amounts. Such borrowing, according to Baer (Baer 1983, P. 189) is 
"another way of getting around profit restrictions . . .  as there are no 
restrictions on the payments of interest on foreign loans."
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Table (51)
Indebtedness of Domestic, Multinational, and State Firms
(Brazil)
50 Largest in Each Category
General Indebtedness as % of net assets
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Domestic firms 57.0 56.0 56.8 57.0 55.9
MNCs 60.9 57.8 63.7 62.4 52.5
State Firms 47.7 51.9 58.4 59.9 55.1
Source: From (Baer 1983, P. 191).
Certainly East European countries’ expansion of economic 
relations with Western countries, including MNCs, was instrumental 
in their increasing indebtedness to the West. However, their 
combined debt at its peak in 1980 was about $46 billion and they 
managed to bring it down to $33 billion in 1984. (Fulton, Jr. 1985, P. 
22) In 1978, Brazil alone owed $31 billion (Frieden 1981) which 
reached to $84 billion in December 1982 (Baer 1983, P. 164) and in 
1979 Mexico’s external debt was nearly $30 billion, (Frieden 1981) 
and (at the time of writing this dissertation) it appears neither one of 
these countries is likely to be successful in solving the problem of 
their external debt in the near future. In brief, then, while MNCs can 
only slightly influence the economic growth of Eastern European 
countries, their realm of influence in the "semi-peripheral" capitalist 
countries is much more extensive: they can directly affect the rate of
growth o f the GNP in particular through their control on the
378
manufacturing sectors as well as on imports and exports of these 
countries. Furthermore, by their contribution to the foreign-debt of 
'sem i-peripheral' capitalist countries, MNCs can influence major 
government policies, especially those related to consumption and 
investm ent.
It is generally perceived that the most important feature of 
East-W est ICAs for the East European countries is transfer of 
technology, although at the same time it is argued that such a feature 
raises the danger of "dependence" on the West. There is, however, a 
substantial difference between the possibility of "dependency" of 
Eastern European countries on the Western technology and that of 
'semi-peripheral' capitalist countries. The CMEA countries accounted 
for at least 80 percent of all researchers on the European continent 
and also for 53 percent of all spending by European countries on 
research and development. (Stepanov 1981, P. 48) These countries, 
therefore, primarily rely on their own scientific, engineering and 
research development, and the imported technology can only be 
considered as a marginal factor in their development. This situation 
is in a sharp contrast to what exists, for instance, in Brazil, where the 
rate of growth is prim arily a "product of jo in t technological 
agreem ents w ith transnationals." (Szym anski 1981, P. 522) 
According to Baer, the MNCs’ affiliates' expenditures on research and 
development in Brazil are relatively insignificant. They
"allocate about one-fifth the expenditures to research and 
development that their parents do . . .  if  multinationals 
allocated to research and development in Brazil the same 
proportion of local sales as they do in the United States,
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Brazilian expenditures would have been almost $150 million in
1972 instead of $30 million" (cited in Baer 1983, P. 192)
One should add that out of this amount a larger part probably is 
devoted to quality control than to development of new technology, 
because, although many MNCs maintain some kind of laboratories in 
the host countries, these labs are usually part of their quality control 
activities rather than part of their effort to engage in genuine 
technology development. (Baer 1983, P. 184)
According to Radice (1979), the following conclusions could be 
drawn from the expanding literature on the transfer of technology 
from DCs to LDCs. The application of technology involves a package 
of hardware and software, and decomposed elements of this package 
can only be transferred separately if the recipient of technology has 
the capacity to repackage these elements. Moreover, the recipient 
countries in order to avoid dependence on imported technology, must 
not only develop their technological capabilities, but also must avoid 
the packaged transfer of technology. Furthermore, a technology 
differs from a produced commodity in the sense that informational 
requirem ents of its m arket are in trinsically  unattainable and 
consequently its price can only be determined through bargaining 
between buyers and sellers. Given the above, Radice argues that: 
"Eastern bargaining pow er vis-a-v is MNCs is undoubtedly 
qualitatively greater than that of the typical southern technology 
recipient in terms of market possibilities, technology assessment 
capabilities, and the institu tional concentration of bargaining 
resources." Moreover, given the level of development of Eastern 
European countries, they are able to purchase "unpackaged"
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technology and to operate and reproduce specific technologies.
(Radice 1979, P. 46) Consequently, although Eastern European 
countries have chosen to purchase technology from the West, it is 
unlikely that they will become dependent on such technology 
transfer.
Radice also raises some more interesting points in regard to 
transfer of technology. He argues that
"technology cannot be isolated from the social relations of 
production, it does not in the last analysis determine those 
relations except at a very abstract level, and at the same time 
it is not something external to economic processes which can be 
chosen 'off the se lf  as production-function theory suggests. 
Thus . . .  no assumption can be made about the universal 
applicability of any given innovation system, such as that
characteristic of market economies.” (Radice 1979, P. 47)
However, given the present world conditions and the decisions of
socialist countries to acquire Western technology, one can add that
they have more possibility and potentiality to assimilate technology
successfully and to articulate it into related industries and direct it
toward the requirements of their economies.
MNCs are also usually blamed for some other difficulties facing
their weaker partners. For instance, MNCs are believed to inhibit the
development of local firms which do not have technological and
financial means to compete with these corporations. (Baer 1983, P.
185) This condition cannot be said to apply to the East European
countries' relations with MNCs, since these corporations’ activities are
lim ited by the contracts set forward by the Eastern European
countries and agreed to by MNCs. These corporations' method of
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entry into the host countries is also believed to contribute to the
displacement of local firms. In Brazil, for instance, in the early 1970s
over 60% of new manufacturing affiliates of U.S. MNCs were
established by acquisition of local existing firms as opposed to 
formation or reorganization.59 In Mexico, about three-quarters of 
U.S. MNCs entering affiliates were acquired rather than newly 
formed. (Evans and Gereffi 1982, P. 140) Some economists argue 
that such acquisitions are advantageous to Brazilian economy, since 
MNCs possess superior technology, permitting greater efficiency. A 
study of sixteen takeovers in Central America, however, shows that 
only in about one-half of the acquired firms some post-acquisition 
changes in production were made by MNCs. (Cited in Newfarmer 
1979) Newfarm er's study of the Brazilian electrical industry 
indicates the same trend. In fact, he argues that "many firms
acquired were technologically sophisticated prior to acquisition." 
(NewfarmeT 1979,P. 27) The displacement of the local firms, along 
with MNCs' concentration on the key sectors of industries ,tend "to 
transfer the decision-making focus concerning level of investment 
and production abroad." (Baer 1983, P. 185) One may not agree 
with this argument, but the point is that such a condition, which may 
be applicable to the "semi-peripheral" capitalist countries, is not 
relevant to the Eatem European countries.60
59 According to Newfarmer (1979), more than one-third of U.S. based MNCs 
established in Brazil to 1975 were acquisition.
60 For a brilliant study of the effects of stagflation on Eastern Europe see 
Portes 1980.
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In brief, although East European countries are to some degree 
amenable to the policies of the MNCs, the manners in which their 
economies are organized, i.e. centralized economic planning and 
monopoly of foreign trade, mitigate or/and totally eliminate the 
adverse effects of establishing close links with these corporations; 
these are the adverse effects which seems to be the inevitable 




lastera loropoaa Trad* with tfea Industrialized Wwt 
(in Million of US. Dollars)
1331 ism  iaaa
laporta ftgaJtot
USSS. 2.401 11,667 24,265*
Poland 027 5,266 6,137
Romania 672 1.697 3.625
GDJt. 1,061 3.022 5,662
Csacboaiafvakia 737 1,789 2.728
Hungary 584 1,754 3.120
Bulgaria 301 1,046 1.491
Total T673 26,671 47,075
ttporta to Wrrt
U^SJL 2.453 5,063 26,961*
Poland 996 2.956 5,344
Romania 514 1,450 3.055
GJJJt 927 2,309 5.153
Czadmiavakis 674 1,530 2.972
Hungary 507 1,203 2.645
Bulgaria 215 325 725
Total 6,286 17.836 46,878
•Sourco: inf. (1962).




Trends in East-West Trade
Eastern Europe imports from OECD Eastern Europe exports to OECD 
Percent Change Percent Change Percent Change Percent Change
Period in Volume in Prices in Volume in Prices
1975 20 32 4 6
1976 13 5 15 17
1977 -9 1 4 12
1976 9 17 1 14
1979 1 16 1 35
1960 3 12 -3 19




Geographic Distribution East European* Conntrles'lmports 
from the West (1940)
(Percent)
Bulgaria Czechoslovakia OCR Hungary Poland Romania
Canada 4 36 .35 .2 4.6 .4
U.SA. 10.5 6.5 19.6 2.4 H-3 10.5
Japan 4.2 2.2 57 33 36 4.2
Belgium/Luxembourg 3.9 2.6 53 2.3 2.4 39
Denmark .6 1.4 4.0 1.4 1.0 .6
France 11.1 57 U 2 73 13.2 11.1
West Germany 31.3 37.3 360 232 31.3
Italy 10.7 6.2 56 64 6.0 10.7
Netherlands 2-5 4.7 6.4 4.6 4.0 25
United Kingdom 5-1 6.6 6.9 5.0 10.9 51
Austria 7.7 6.3 95 12.0 7.4 7.7
Finland 1.0 1.4 3-6 2.9 1.0 1.0
Norway .2 .9 .9 .6 1.0 .2
Sweden 2.6 39 6.5 3.4 4.2 2.6
Switzerland 4.6 4.9 54 53 2.7 4.6
Spain 2.5 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 25
Australia .1 1.0 .7 .6 1.4 .1
100** 100 100 100 100 100
•Excluding the Soviet Union.
♦•Rows may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.
Source> Calcnlalprf frm (JO 1974
TAB LB (4)
G«ognpblc Distribution Best Huropean* Coun tries'Hxports 
to Ik* W**t (I960)
(Percent)
Bulgaria Czecboslavokia GDR Hungary Poland Romania
Canada 5 1.7 .4 .0 1.1 1.0
Japan 2.9 1.6 2.0 .6 1.1 2.0
Belgium/Luxembourg 3.0 25 7.2 1.3 3-6 1.2
Denmark .7 1.7 7.4 1.7 3-0 .4
Franc* 6.1 50 13.0 7.2 11.0 12.0
Wee t  Germany 235 34.4 37.2 26.0 27.7
Italy 334 0.6 I I 14.0 10.0 10.9
Motherland* 39 6.0 9.9 4.5 31 10.0
United Kingdom 4.4 6.7 10.3 3-7 05 4.7
Austria 6.0 14.9 03 12.5 4.5 33
Finland 2.3 2.6 4.4 2.1 50 •5
Norway .2 1.3 2.0 .9 2.7 .2
Sweden 1.0 32 16.4 35 52 1.9
Switzerland 3.2 30 2.0 3.7 2.7 1.1
Spain 34 1.4 2.2 .9 1.9 2.4
U.SA. 36 23 2.4 43 0.6 10.7
Australia 3 .7 •5 3 3 3
100** 100 100 100 100 100
•Excluding th* Soviet Union.
**Rows may not add up to 100 percent
Sourc*: Calculated from UH. (1004).
Table (3)
Soviet’s Major Western Trading 
Partners (1976)
(X) of Total Soviet Trade Turnover










Source: Bozek (1979), p. 511-
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T«M* (6)
ScocrapfeJc Dbtrltmttoa of tft* Strtrt Unioa's 
bporta aad Imports to tad from Um  Wort 
(1940)
P K C H t« (iap« itB ina  Porcoa t  of oxports to 
tb» Woafc a *  Woat




United Kingdom 6.1 5.4
Souk*: Competed from Coopor (1962).
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T«M* (7)






SovtotOnfen 42.1 30-0 40.7" 50.1
Poland 17.1 12.5 12.4 14.0
Gorman Dwaocratic Kopubtic* 6.6 6.4 6.0 6.2
Czodjoaiavalcia 11.7 0.0 12.2 7.4
Hungary 0.0 6.4 9.9 7.7Bwiwnto 9.1 7.7 11.1 9.0
Bulgaria 3.0 2-3 2.3 3-9
NxtwUog FJLG.
Socre*: (romEadar (1902), p. 333.
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Tabl* (9)
Brazil, M*xlco, V*n*zueJa and Argentina 9 
Trad* aa (X) *1 Total Trad* of 
Latlii America*
ImportB (la MtWQgOt V,S. DgUarai Exporta (in MilUogof U.S. Dollars)
1922
Th* Pour Coun trios 5,634 9,529
Latin Amorica 11,710 12,632
01) 73.7* 69.6*
i s n
Tbo Four CountrlM 29,902 23,633
Latin America 36,734 30,102
(X) 91.4* 75.5*
ISM
IB* Pour CountrlM 65,590 65,752
Latin Amtrlca 92,610 79,000
(*> 793* 92.6*
♦Latin America as is usod in UK. (1992).
Sourer Calculated from UK. (1992), UK. (1979) and UK. (1973).
I i l i r b  ( f  Selected Good* by LDCs i i i  Senri-Perlpberg trm  Cere la Mtlllaa a# U.S. M lir  
iH  Their h r n i t i i n  It llx  Total Imports of Those C it ilr lu  (ran Cere
1970 DO Eifom
IDC # Imports of primary floods 5611(178*) 1817(12.111)
I  DC# Imports of manufacturedgoods 24815(70,7*) 12801 (85.7*)
IDC# lolll Imports 31514 14931
Latin's Imports of prlmerpflcods 1284(15 3 * ) 215(5.6*)
Latin’s Import*of manufactured rods 8357(84.9*) 3515(97.7*)
Latin s total Imports 9042 3809
E.E.’s Import*of primary goods 971 (31* ) 557 (15*)
E.E.'o Imports af manufactured goods 3065 (75* ) 2807(79.9*)
E.E.'a Mol Imports 4066 3612
Canada
352(46 5 * ) 
398(S2.6*) 
756
96 (22* ) 
330(75.6*) 
436
33 (84* ) 






























USSR’s Imports Of prlmarygsods 431 (15* ) 149(6.6*) 92 (93*) 35 (29*) 5 (1 .4 * ) 89(100*)
USSR’s Imports of mamrfaetorsdfoods 2422 (84* ) 2004 (90*) 6 (6 .1 * ) 04(70.5*) 320 (96* ) 0 (0)
USSR’s total imports 2872 2226 98 119 341 89
Source; eelesietsd from U.N. ( 1982)
•Samt-partpharp bars ts used la ths da panda nop school's context and Inelsdss Eastern Enropa and Latin America Intermediate capitalist countries.
CNcr\m
tikU(IO)
InptHa irS t lK ld  Gee* fry LDCt iM  5 ia ^ P ir lp l« r |*  free* K  i  in MlVllea «f 11.3. Dellart 
iN  Their Pereenteft* i t  the Tntal Imperlt #f Tint* Caantriaa fr«n DCe
19-7.5 J t L  ClESfifi C*Md» _ UM Ju so  Austrtll* ind (lev Zestind
IOC dlroports of primary goods 17703 (16*) 6607 (12*)
LDCdlmports of menufectured goods 09232 (81*) 47335 (86*)
LDCdtotal Imports 110085 54790
litln s  Imports of primary goods 3772 (16*) 600 (5.8*)
Latin * imports of manofetored good*23432 (84X) 9460 (92*)
Utln'ototil Imports 27893 10269
E.E.t Import* of prlmorygoods 2407 (17*) 1510(12.1*)
E.E. * Import* of manufactured goods 11785(81.9*) 10869 (87*)
E C. * total Imports 14378 12466
USSR'* Import* Bfprtmorffiod* 2628(19.5*) 697 (7.5*)
USSR’*Import*ofm*nuf*etur*dgood»107B6(79.95l) 8506 (92*)
US9R * total Import* I34B3 9232
Store*: calculated from U.N. ( 1982)
"Semi-periphery hereto used In thodepindency echo*!'* context end Include* Esstorn Eurap* and Latin America Intsrmtdlatt eopltollst countries.
924 (47*) 7157(29.6*) 915(3.6*) 2165 (67X)
1019 (52*) 15388(63.8*) 23628(95.3*) 969 (30*)
1953 24122 24773 3231
196 (20*) 2380(17.4*) 79(2.9*) 102 (41*)
744(78.9*) 10400(76.2*) 2600(96.8*) 137 (55*)
942 13636 2685 247
186 (89* ) 637 (67*) 25(4 .3*) 107(75.8*)
21 (10* ) 305 (32*) 541 (94*) 2 5 0  7.7*)
208 946 574 141
359 (89*) 1160 (63*) 2 5 0 .5 * ) 386 (99*)
4 4 0 0 .9 * ) 670(36.5*) 1559(95.9*) 2 (.51*)





T ails ( I I )
Impart* *1 Select*! Cwti Ij LDC* n t S am i-Periphery* fram DC's la  U tlllaa af U.S. Dallars 
<H Tkelr Perceataya* ta  the Tatal Im parts af Thaaa C asatrtas fram  DCs
12BJ2 J f i -
LDCs'Importsef pHmtryyood* 41775 (17.9)
IKs'Importeaf mtnuftc1uredyioditB84l5 (80.7) 
Tatal Import I of t,oc» 233466
Litln * Importi if  primary yood* 9505 ( 1595)
manufactured food*: 49415 (82*)
Tatal Impart* of im In 59920
C.E.'*Import**fprimaryyoed* 6170 {21%)
E C.'* Import* of manufactured flood* 15986 (71*)














2094 (4 7 * ) 12485 
2372 154*) 31926 
4381 44930
805 (3 3 * ) 6832 
1582 (6 6 * ) 24097 
2392 31394
296 (64*) 




















USSR'* Impart* of primary flood* 
manuf*cter*d pood*
Tatal Impart* pf past
6393 (26*) 2842 (I6R ) 1145 (6 7 * ) 1085 (71* ) 101(3.6*)
17680 (72*) 14479 (63* ) 169 (1 2 * ) 424 [26*) 2607 (93*)












#S*m1-periphery hire 1* mad 1* the dependency school'* context ind Include* [**t*rn Eurep* end Latin America 1nt*rm*dlat* capitalist' countries. 




Tall* (1 2 )
Export* af Si Im M  Ooads I* I  DCs end Ssm l-Perlphery* la Cara la  Hflllaa af U.S. Dallara 
a id  Tkalr Percentages la  t l a  Talal Experts af Tbtaa Caaatrla* la Cara
15211 DCs Euroaa Canada JS& ifKID Austrill* and Nev Zetland
LDCdexports of primary goods 22276 (7411)13761 (615) 
LDC 4exports of manufactured goods 6937 (235) 3147(18.75) 
LDCd total exports 30090 16959
Latin'* exports ef primary goods 7596(76.55) 3516(75.55) 
Latin's exports af manufactured goods2056( 2 15 5 )  1128(24.25) 
Latin'* total exports 9668 4655
I.E.'* export* of primary goods 1972(45.65) 1657(46.65) 
E E 's exports of manufactured goods 2306(53.45) 2073(52.25) 
E.E.'a total exports 4316 3966
USSR's export* of primary goods 1576 1276
USSR's exports of manufacturad goods 730 578
USSR'* total exparta** 2716 2261
Source: calculated fram U.K. (1982)
364(65.55) 3737(595) 4444(545) 517(69.95)
189 (345) 2546(405) 779(14.85) 204(27.65)
555 6320 5235 739
416(96.75) 3023(79.75) 562(815) 10(71.45)
13 (35 ) 762(205) 135(18.85) 4(28.55)
432 3792 718 14
4 (7 5 ) 71(46.75) 31 3 0 3 .6 5 )
54(94.75) 80(52.65) 66 18(61.65)
57 152 22
3 22(34.35) 274 1
4 43(675) 106 12
6 64 379
•Seml-perlphary her* I* used In the context of depandancg school and Inetude* last Eurap* as vail as 'capltallat Intermediate’ 
countries.
••The Soviet (Men's laminations af export* of primary and manufactured goods do not add up to their tetri, probably because the 
exports of those commodities net reported by klad (SITE 9) were large In 1970.
E>r<rti af M k M  E n A  If L K i 1 1E Semt-Psrlpfeerg* I* DC'* fa  Million af U.S. Dollar* 
aa4 Thalr Percentages aa Tatal Ex parts af Tlaaa Caaatrlaa ta DC*
1975 PC? Europe Canada USA Janan Australia and New Zealand
LK s export* of prlmaru goods 109768(85*) 57365 (87.5*) 2280 (77.5*) 22539 (76*) 24532(91*) 1684(67.4*)
LK * exports of inanufectvred goods 18609 (14*) 7969 (12*) 650 (22*) 6759 (22.9*) 2285 (8.5*) 787 (31.5*)
LK a total exports 128767 65486 2940 29464 26862 2497
Latin's export* of prlfnarg goods 15585 (80.7*) 6035 (76.9) 1211 (90*) 7078 (83*) 1105 (79.9*) 15 (38*)
Latin's exports of manufactured goad* 3851 (19.9*) 1776 (22.6*) 134 (9.9*) 1402 (16*) 276 (19.9*) 25 (64*)
Latin'* total exports 19300 7840 1345 8510 1382 39
E E 's axport* of prtmarg goods 4909 (46*) 4417 (45*) 17 (13*) 242 (55.5*) 118 (63*) 5 (11.9*)
E.E.'* axporta of manafactarsd goods 5775 (54*) 5341 (54.5*) 110 (86*) IB9 (43*) 70 (37*) 37 (B8*)
E.E.'s total exports 10618 9790 128 436 187 42
USSR'* experts ef prtmarg good* 7445 (77.7*) 6500 (77*) 18 (40.9*) 06 (45*) 838 (90*) 3 (50*)
USSR's exports of manafactarsd goods 1793 (18.7*) 1576 (18*) 22 (50*) 104 (54*) 88 (9.4*) 3 (50*)
USSR'* total axport* 9582 8414 44 191 927 6
*Saml>p*rlpti*rg hara la aaad In tha h im  cantext aa tha depandsncg aehsal and Ineluda* Eastern European cauntrlaa and Latin A marie* intermediate 
capltaltat'caantrle*.




[ i f t r l i  i f  M n M  Si H s k« L N i iM  S anf-P arlpharp*  to DC'a to  H llllaa i f  U.S. Dallars 
and T h l r  Parcaatapaa to tha T tlal Exparta af Thaaa Caaatrlaa to DCa
1980 JSS_
LIC ^ exports of primary goods 291199(8251) 135824(9451)
LKloxports of manufactured pods 57559 (16.855) 24231 (1551) 












Ltttn's exports of primarp poods 41800 (8115)
Li tin's exports of manufactured pods 8453 (16.455) 4400 ( 20.915) 229 (9.215)
litln'a total axporit 51302 20953 2479
16515 ( 79.815) 2249(90.715) 19432(84.555) 2544 ( 6415)








EE.'o exports of primarp poods 8848 ( 4215) 8308 ( 43955) 17 (8.815) 367 (3215) 107
EE 'S sxporls of manofsctarsd poods 11687 (56.555) 10460 (55.315) 172 (09.615) 775 (67.755) 179




(BSR’s axpsrts af primarp poods 22423 (8355) 21155 (8315) 3
IBSR’s axporto af manafactarsd poods 3673 (13.655) 3185 (12.655) 34
USSR's total ox ports 26995 25225 46
50 (2115) 1161 (7955) 4 (28.511)
183 (78.555) 263 (17.955) 9 (6455)
233 1464 14
*5om1-por1phorp hors is usad la tha dspondsncp school's context and laeludsa Eastora Corapa and Latin America intormedtita capitalist' 
ceuntrtes.




Commodity Composition of Individual East 





Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Republic Hungary Poland Romania
o-----------— ------  2.6 37 59 4.9 54 4.5
1---------------------  A 5 1.4 .4 I .1
2---------------------  2.1 6.1 8.0 4.7 4.9 2.7
3---------------------  1.0 1.6 .1 .4 .1 34
4---------------------  .1 .7 5 .4 .4 .65--------------- ------  12.0 21.7 20.7 253 10.9 11.78---------------------  29.7 18.7 27.1 32.0 32.2 353
7--------------- ------  48.4 394 32.3 26.4 41.2 36.0
8---------------------  3.0 6.8 35 4.6 30 31
9--------------- ------  .7 1.1 .5 .6 1.7 5
Total**-------- ------  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5 to 8 ---------------- 931 86.6 836 685 87.3 66.1
’ Include exports of Canada and Japan to CMEA (6), resulting In probable biasing of tbe percentages 
by less than one percentage point Excludes Federal Republic of Germany-German Democratic Republic 
trade.
**Columns may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
Source: from (Wolf 1977, p. 1048).
Table (16)
Commodity Composition of Individual last




Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Republic Hungary Poland Romania
o---------------------  2.6 43 7.5 4.4 57 31l „ „ -------- --------  5 3 1.6 3 .2 .1
2------------- --------  2.4 6.2 9.2 50 52 2.73------------- --------  10 13 3 .4 1.0 1.74------------- --------  .2 .4 .6 3 .7 55------------- — . . . .  n o 19.9 167 23.0 14.4 12.3
6------------- --------  30.4 163 29.3 27.5 27.2 31.27------------- --------  40.0 41.1 260 325 40.6 43.6
6------------- --------  4.9 6.6 3.0 55 37 4.2
9------------- --------  1.1 1.3 1.7 1.2 1.1 .7
Total*------- --------  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5 to »------- --------  923 659 79.0 07.5 66.1 913
♦Columns map not add to 100 percent due to rounding. 
Source: from Bureau of East-West Trade (1979).
Commodity Composition of Individual East




Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Republic Hungary Poland Romania
SITC:
o------------- -------- .4 65 113 4.0 16.6 941------------- -------- 2.6 3 2.1 3 .4 32------------- --------  5.7 7.1 9.4 7.0 5.7 56
3------------- ..........  13 13 1.2 1.6 1.1 10.44------------- -------- .1 05 .01 03 .04 .035------------- -------- 7.7 10.6 16.9 11.9 4.4 33
6------------- -------- 16.3 29.4 232 22.2 245 21.4
7------------- --------  537 36.0 30.0 40.5 39.0 40.4
6------------- --------  9.1 7.0 45 10.2 43 7.79------------- --------  2.0 1.2 .9 1.6 1.4 .9
Total**------ -------- 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5 to 6 ---------------  67.3 632 74.6 64.6 72.2 72.6
•Not Including trade with FRG.
♦•columns may not add to 100 percentdue to rounding.
Source: Calculated from UJ1.( 1964).
Table (IS) 400
List of High Technology Items
7151 Machine tools for metal
7192 Pumps and centrifuges
7266 Electrical machinery, n.e.s.
72952 Electrical measuring and control instruments
71992 Cock, valves, etc.
6619 Measuring and control instruments, n.e.s.
7249 Telecommunications equipment 
(end. TV & radio receivers)
7143 Statistical machines (punch card 
or tape)
71954 Parts and accessories for machine 
tools
73592 Special purpose vessels 
(incl. submersible vessels)
7293 Tubes, transistors, photocells, etc.
7197 Ball, roller or needleroller bearings






691U Gramophones, tape recorders, etc. 
(Ind. videorecorders)
6613 Optical instruments
71142 Jet and gas turbines for aircraft
7341 Aircraft, heavier than air
7142 Calculating machines (incl. 
computer parts)
6611 Optical elements
72911 Primary batteries and cells
7297 Electron and proton accelerators
66161 Image reactors
7117 Nuclear reactors




Commodity Composition of Individual Bast 





Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Republic Hungary Poland Romania
SITC:
o------ --------- -----  29.1 62 15-1 32.5 137 16.6
1---------------- -----  11.6 .4 1.4 .6 .6
2---------------- -----  6.4 11.4 75 9.1 10.4 7.6
3---------------- 1.9 14.3 6.6 2.1 37.0 20.6
4---------------- -----  1.0 3 .6 I 3 335---------------- 52 6.6 16.6 7.0 36 4.6
6---------------- -----  162 26.9 17.1 16.2 136 16.5
7---------------- 9.1 15-5 165 62 113 6.3
6---------------- -----  12.4 14.6 17.3 20.6 93 22.6
9---------------- 50 1.6 •3 2.6 .4
Total**--------- -----  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5 to 8---------------- 44.9 636 697 52.2 36.0 50.4
♦include exports of Council of Mututal Economic Assistance (6) to Canada and Japan, resulting In probable biasing of the 
percentages by less than 1 percent point Excludes Federal Republic of Germany—German Democratic Republic trade. 
♦♦Columns may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
Source: from (Wolf 1977, p. 1046).
Commodity Composition of Individual Bast




0-................ --------  24.4 6.8
1------------- --------  9.9 .4
2------------- --------  7.3 13.9
3------------- --------  4.0 11.0
4------------- --------  .0 .2
5------------ ---------  51 756------------- --------  27.0 299
7------------- --------  0.1 137
0------------- --------  12.0 151
9------------- --------  1,2 1.7
Total**--------------- 100.0 100.0
5 to 0---------------- 53.4 67.8
•Not including trade with FUG.
••Columns may not add to 100 percent due to roi
Source: from Bureau of Bast*West Trade (1979).
German
Democratic*
Republic Hungary Poland Romania
5.4 26.8 14.7 10.6
0 1.2 .7 .8
8.7 9.1 10.6 50
7.4 4.9 250 21.4
5 15 .4 33
135 7.8 39 52
22.9 18.2 156 21.3
20.0 9.8 17.0 6.9
20.7 20.6 10.4 25,0
.8 1.0 1.4 .4
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
77.9 56.4 485 58.1
Commodity Composition of Individual Bast




Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Republic* Hungary Poland Romania
SITC:
o---------------- .......  14.0 4.0 4.1 2.2 10.1 6.4
1---------------- — -  4.7 3 .03 13 .3 5
2---------------- -----  7.4 150 4.4 0.6 11.3 4.13---------------- -----  24.3 20.5 230 73 22.9 42.1
4------ --------- -----  .2 .1 .9 1.4 .07 .2
5---------------- —  05 04 14.1 97 4.1 3.3
6---------------- -----  10.0 25 19.4 17.6 22.6 14.97---------------- -----  7.7 10.7 15.0 90 135 4.2
0---------------- -----  11.7 13.0 17.2 20.4 10.1 230
9---------------- 2.3 1.0 .7 13 1.3 .67
Total**--------- -----  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5 to 0---------- -----  40.2 501 60.4 500 516 46.0
•Not Including trade with FRG.
**Column« may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.




Commodity Pattern of USSR Trad# with D m lo p t i  Capitalist Conntrlas 
(total exports and imports, respectively -  100)
Exports Imports
1965 1970 1975 1977 1960 1965 1970 1975 1977 1960
Food, beverages and tobacco 5.9 53 16 1.6 6 232 61 17.0 136 21.6
Raw materials 36.6 344 250 199 10.7 10.0 4.9 3-2 4.6 4.1
Mineral fuels 26.2 334 540 56-5 71 0.1 0.2 03 0.4 5
Chemicals 2.3 32 39 6.0 25 12.3 10.1 7.6 69 12.4
Manufactured goods classified
chiefly by materials 22 9 166 9.6 11.6 6.3* 17.2 27.7 306 26.1 34. *
Machinery and transportation
equipment 1.9 36 4.4 31 2.6 326 40.0 36.6 391 26.2
Miscellaneous manufactured
articles 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.6 — 3-7 65 36 4.4
Commodities and transactions
not classified according
to kind 0.2 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Note: The columns do not always add up to 100, because of rounding.
Source: For 1965*1977 from Roves (1979), for 1960 calculated from UN. (1962). 




GoocrapMc OMiibvttoa of Sooiot Foroiga Trad*
(S of total tndo)
1965
Eiporte Imports
1970 1975 I960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Eastern Europo 56 53 47 42 56 57 41 43
DCs 18 19 26 32 20 24 36 35
LDCs 15 18 14 14 11 11 11 11
Sourer From Coopor (1442), p. 460.
406
T«M* (24)
■»port SpartiHntton la Soaiat Union 
Satectad Prodact 
(1960-1976)
■UttonaaMetoat euMeaaar ailUoa metric tons thousand 
metric too*






net xx/Q M t S / Q cetx/Q xx/Q xx/Q
I960 4.0* 20X .4* 20* 18* 52*
1965 6.3* 27S ■3* 25* 15* 57*
1970 9. IS 24* 2% 29* 23* 74*
1975 52% 26* 2.4* 23* 21* 61*
1976 6.6S 2#* 4.4* 22* 20* 51*
Note; Q * domestic output
x-stmptonports
xx ■ wnbodM in rotated exports (♦ simpla exports) 
M » simpie import 
MX - embodied in rotated imports (• simple imports) 
a etx -x -M
net xx«xr-MM (net embodied exports)
Sourer lromCDoban 1979, p. 372-373)
Table (23)
Export Specialization in Soviet Union 
Selected Products 
(1960-1976)





1960 — 12 5 11
1965 22 16 12 32
1970 22 12 6 44
1975 25 9 5 40
Note: Q * domestic output
x - simple exports
xx - embodied in related exports (+ simple exports) 
M » simple import 
MM - embodied in related imports (+ simple imports) 
netx*x-M
net xx « xx - MM (net embodied exports)
Source: (from Dohan 1979, p. 374).
408
ToMo (26)
Sortot Uoios food Im ports 
(ttNHSttOM)
■ im -13&S. oazQ. JSflS
Cotfoo U 19.1 41.5 49-3
Coco* boost 122 59.1 99.9 126.9
Too 57 22.6 202 70.9
Row Sugar — 1467.6 3003-3 3939.
Rico 39.8 501.1 322.9 694.
Fruit & Frosft Borrios 3-1 334.9 6793 995-1
Eggs (fflillloa) 355 1132 602.3 737.
Sourer (Azov 1992, p. 41).
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TtM* (20)






1931 667 *66 53*
1950 1310 262 2IX
1955 2755 633 30X
I960 5066 1507 29X
1965 7253 2423 33X
1970 10556 3706 35*
1975 26670 6666 33*
1977 30097 11269 37X









































Chemical Induatrg Timber, Paper,and 







Source: Extracted from (DoAan 1979, p. 386-87).
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TaMo (30)
Ssvtet Imports or liKttaary sad 










Imports at star* 
ol donmtic mschinory 
ims&MSt in tiio 
following y««r 
(poromt)
1955 104 140 2.0
1956 139 100 2.4
1957 120 166 1.0
1950 123 150 1.6
1959 177 227 2 2
1960 310 393 34
1961 390 472 3.6
1962 436 510 3-6
1963 402 467 2.0
1964 409 561 3-2
1965 366 421 22
1966 395 436 22
1967 457 499 2.4
1960 639 721 32
1969 009 966 3-0
1970 905 913 3-4
197! 040 796 2.0
1972 1,126 959 3.0
1973 1.574 1,091 3-2
1974 2,094 U16 3.4
1975 4.104 2,207 5-6
1976 4,259 2,262 5-5*
1977 4,571 ILL ILL
Soares: (Hanson 1970, p. 22).
412
TiMsC*!)
Do— tic Prodactbm of Soms lad u triss v ia  
Largs Imports of Mwtiiwry from DCs
Papsr &C*Unks» BqnlpoMOtfx Equipment for Sbosmaking
Q-Val M-Val Q-Val M-Val Q-Val M-Val Q-Val M-Val
I960 20 33 200 167 126 a 15 n
1965 42 37 330 167 199 a 14 a
1970 94 91 339 216 300 75 25 13
1975 135 150 576 636 436 272 27 49
1976 144 213 623 1132 462 309 27 47
1977 156 250 667 1722 a 296 a 40
Q -Output In domestic pricM.
M » Imports ia foreign trad* routes.
Soares: Dofcsn(1979),p. 301.
TABU (32)
Exports of StB cW  Good* by Soai-Portpfeory 
to LDCa (ia mUlioa of Dollars) aad 




Primary Good* 1252 (92 X) 206 (15*) 469 (17X)
Manufactured Goods 101 ( 7X) 1029 (76X) 1226 (45*)
Total* >355 1345 2664
iazs
Primary Goods 4239 (66X) 709 (24X) 1467 (24X)
Manufactnr*d Goods 666 (13%) 2941 (60X) 2066 (34%)
Total* 4666 3657 5966
i M
Primary Good* 9655 (6IX) 1749 (2IX) 3643 (25X)
Mi mrfactnradGoods 2199 (l&X) 6403 (76*) 4006 (29X)
Total* 12067 9196 14033
*rofel does not add op to summation of categories of primary and manufactured goods 
do* to extustoo of SITC 9.
Sourer. Calculated from OH. (1962).
TABU (33)
Impacts of Sslsctsd Goods Bp Somi-Poripborp 
from LDCs'Ua millfcwi a( O j. DoUscs) sad tM r  





























(06*) 2470 (07X) 4101 (03*)
( 7X) 365 (12X) 717 (14X)
2039 4021
(07X) 4613 (9IX) 6347 (67X)
(11*) 416 ( OX) 030 (11*)
5055 7237
*Total doss not add up to gntnmattai ol primary and manufactured goods duo to
«Ktustoao(snC9.
Sower Calculated from (021.1902).
Table (34) 415
Commodity Group Breakdown of the East European 
Countries' and DC s1 Imports from LDCs 
(in Percent of Total Imports)
East Europe Soviet Union DCs
1SZ 5
SITC 0 and 1 20.6 560 9-5
SITC 2 and 4 29.0 14.0 7.0
SITC 3 37.0 14.0 66.0
SITC 5 1.0 2.7 1.0
SITC 7 .6 .5 2.0
SITC 6 and 6 10.6 11.6 11.0
19.60
SITC 0 and 1 164 61.0 6.0
SITC 2 and 4 19.4 14.0 5.5
SITC 3 53 3 12.0 70.7
SITC 5 .6 1.0 1.1
SITC 7 .2 .4 3-5
SITC 6 and 6 7.0 9.9 12.0
Note: Totals do not add up to 100* due to omission of SITC 9. 
Source: Calculated from UN. (1962).
Table (35)
Commodity Group Breakdown of the East European 
Countries' and DC's Imports to LDCs 
(in Percent of Total Exports)
East Europe Soviet Union DCs
1915.
SITC 0 and 1 14.2 65 112
SITC 2 and 4 3-4 4.5 3 5
SITC 3 1.6 11.6 1.2
SITC 5 12.0 32 9.2
SITC 7 39.9 24.5 45-9
SITC 6 and 6 26.0 7.1 25 8
1SL80
SITC 0 and 1 15.I 4.0 10.6
SITC 2 and 4 4.4 3 3 4.4
SITC 3 1.6 16.5 2.5
SITC 5 11.3 1-9 10.4
SITC 7 37.7 22.9 42.4
SITC 6 and 6 29.0 4.2 27.6
Note: Totals do not add up to 100$ due to o m iss io n  of 
SITC 9.









while thoea involving more 
produced
sub-assemblies of a similar degree 
Joint Venture in a Third World Country 
and profit in the venture.
Joint Vantura in a Socialist Country 
Source: Prom (Harold and Kaztov (19A3J, p.
(371
xssof ICAs
AO types ol contracts where ttta 
supply baa significant on-sit* 
installation or supervision 
responsibilities for the supplied
Supply of tacbnology and/or 
procaas for faas or product 
o w  a parted of tJxoa.
Transfar of supplier's patast 
fights, design & manufacturing 
techniques for particular produces).
Whan tb* Wastara firm usually 
provides tba technical kaow- 
- how and somatiinas machinery 
to cover its product shortage*.
a. Vartieal co-productlon, with 
on* partaar producing relatively 
simple components or materials
advanced tactmology ara 
b by tb* other, often using inputs
from former.
b. Horizontal co-production, wbara 
each partner producer components/
or sophistication.
Co-owners of capital, co­




Percentage Breakdown of ICAs in 
Different Forms
1973
Co-production and specializations 
Delivery of plant or equipment 
Joint ventures:
Involving marketing only (3.6*)
Involving production, m arket and R and D (6.3*) 
Tripartite co-operations 
Licensing
Joint tending or Joint projects 
Sub-contracting










Component Elements of 2 Id ICAs Surveyed* 
Carleton Study
 %
1. Managerial Services 6.7
2. Capital equipment sale 25.4
3. Complete plant sale 20.2
4. Custom design of plant/equipment 22.9
5. Training of East personnel 46.6
6. Technical assistance (know how) 60.1
7. License 47.2
5. Supply of parts and components to Eastern Europe 52.6
9. Supply of parts and components to West for
production in West 46.8
10. Supply of parts and components to West for marketing
in West 39.9
11. Production specialization, same end product 19.3
12. Production specialization, full line of goods 55
13- Quality control 25.2
14. Coordination of marketing/servicing 31.2
15. Joint projects in 3rd country 24.3
16. Joint research and development 23.9
♦Survey conducted in 1975.
Source: from (McMillan 1977, p. 1190).
Table (40)




Share in  ICAs







Source: Paliwoda (1961), p. 104.
Table (41)
Major Western Participants in ICAs 
End of 1970s 
% Share in ICA
West Germany more than 25$
France more than 10$
U.SA. more than 10$
Italy more than 10$
United Kingdom between 5 - 6$
Austria between 5 - 6$
japan between 5 -6 $
Sweden between 5 -6 $
Source: (McMillan 1961, p. 62).
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Agraamaots vrftli WaatarnFlnns 









































*TU»w agraamants fall wrtbin two broad typac l. Compansation agraamants; 2. Co- 
production, production staring, product specialization and subcontracting.




Joint Ventures Agreement Between East Europe ana
Western Firms
1922 1923. 1971 1975. 1926 197Z 19Z6. 1979. 19.6Q 19.6.
Bulgaria - - - - - - - - _ 1
Hungary - 2 4 4 4 5 6 6 6
Poland - - - - - 1 1 1 1
Romania* 3 4 5 7 9 7 6 6 6
♦Plus one more not further identifiable (General M aritime Co.) 




Rast-Waat Joint Vanturaa ia t te  V at 
aad LDCa 
i i t f tk t  « t  of Om 1970*
IMmated nmnbar Parent of Subtotal
















Source: McfcflHan 19ftl,p. 5fl).
Table (45) 425
Breakdown of ICAs between U.S. and Hast Europe 
by Different Industries 







Textile, lumber, paper, print 23 4.7
Chemical, drugs, rubbers
plastic, glass 99 20.5
Metals 22 4-5
Machinery excluding electric 90 16.7
Machinery & equipment electric 66 14.1
Transport equipment 24 4.9
Transport, communication 6 1.2
Finance, hotels and other 27 56





Source: from (Marer and Miller 1977, p. 23) 
Total does not add up to 100 due to rounding.
Table (46)
Percentage breakdown of ICAs by Industry
(1976)
Chemical Industry 26.1$
Mechnical engineering and machine tools 22.3
Electrical equipment and electronics 17.5
Transport equipment 9.6
Metallurgy 6.3
Light Industry 6 3




Source: (UH. 1979, p. 19).
Table (47) 427
Percentage Breakdown of ICAs by Industry
(I960)
Chemical Industry 24AX
Electrical equipment and electronics 16.1




Food and agriculture 6.1
Other industries 5.4
100.00
Source: McMillan (1981), p.63
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8
TeH* (4 8 )
ladaatrtao ' S k trw  la  Iha Tatol Namber «f ICAa, v lth  Braatdava I f  Caaatrg
1978










Bui yard — — 9.1 45.5 18.2 27.3 —
Hungary 14.5 2.6 11.0 17.1 32.9 5.3 11.8 3.9
Poland 16.7 7.4 9.3 27.8 14.9 5.6 13. 5.6
OCR 14.5 — 14.3 57.2 — 14.3 — __
Romani* 39.3 10.7 21.4 10.7 10.7 _ 7 1
Czachoalovakl* 33.3 — 11.1 44.4 11.1 _ __
Jovial Untan 36.4 13.2 5.4 20.2 12.4 2.3 6 2 3.9
Source: (U.N. 1979, p. 20).
I
Table (49) 429
Brazil Sectoral Growth Rates
1971-74 1975-80
Nonmetallic minerals 11.6 7.8
Metal products 7.1 9.9
Machinery 7.1
Electrical machinery 19.6 6.5
Transport equipment 22.1 4.4
Paper and products 6.7 7.7
Rubber 12.0 59
Chemical and pharmaceuticals 15-2 8-7
Textiles, clothing 3-9 4.5
Source: (Baer (1983), p. 1??)-
CHAPTER VI
tf.1. SOME CONCLUDING. REMARKS
Throughout this dissertation, I have attempted to show that 
none of the schools, approaches, presented here are successful in 
devising a 'theory' of East-West economic relations. For instance, the 
dependency school, which criticizes the neo-classical school for not 
incorportating into its analysis of underdevelopment an account of 
socio-political differences which exist among LDCs and DCs, when it 
comes to analysis of East-West economic interaction falls into the 
same trap. Frank and Wallerstein, for example, lose sight of the fact 
that the organization institution prone work of trade in the Soviet 
Union is different from that of the capitalist countries,1 and this 
country is, to a large exrent, able to protect itself from the harmful 
effects of economic interactions with the West. The dependency 
school, however, more than any other schools, approaches, discussed 
here is successful in pinpointing, and warning against, the problems, 
or perils, which such economic interactions may entail for the 
socialist countries.
The Eastern European economists' approach lies at the other 
end of the spectrum. This approach correctly emphasizes the 
differences in the socio-economic conditions of capitalist and socialist 
countries. In contrast to the dependency school, however, it fails to
4 3 1
grasp, or to assign enough weight to the problems associated with the 
East-West economic interactions. The Eastern European economists' 
approach tends to stress the harmonious aspects of these relations, 
and to downplay the areas of potential conflicts.. Consequently, in 
contrast to the dependency school, it believes East-West economic 
relations will be highly beneficial to the socialist countries.
The dependency school and the Eastern European economists' 
approach produce some argum ents which are p lausible in 
understanding of East-West economic relations. However, it is more 
difficult to evaluate the neo-classical school's contributions to such an 
understanding. On the one hand, some of the non-theoretical authors 
in this tradition have presented schemes which take into account the 
differences in the institutional frameworks of trade in the socialist 
and capitalist countries. For example, Franklin D. Holzman2 perhaps 
more than any other orthodox authors, demonstrates a profound 
understanding of such institutional differences3 As a result, his 
w orks are valuable in com prehending E ast-W est econom ic 
interactions. On the other hand, most of the 'theoretical' neo-classical 
economists, by employing a pareto optimal marginal analysis in the 
investigation of the socialist countries' trade and investm ent
1 A point which I will disscuss further shortly.
2 Although the orthodox economists credit Holzman as the first author who has attempted 
to theoretically evaluate the Soviet Union’s trade behavior, they also criticize him for 
not being 'theoretical' enough. (See Chapter II) Based on my knowledge, however, 
Holzman has not so far attempted to employ marginal analysis in the investigation of 
East-West economic interaction. Therefore, I do not categorize him as a "theoretical 
neo-classical" economist.
3 See in particular Holzman (1983).
4 32
behaviors, have produced some of the least relevant theses. Their 
theses are irrelevant, not because they do not 'fit fact,' but because 
they violate their own principles. This occurs because the pareto 
optimal marginal rules are presumably the necessary conditions for 
the optimum in the perfectly competitive market economy.
From the beginning I have stated that my goal is by bringing 
these schools together and pinpointing their problems, to contribute 
to both a better understanding of East-West economic relations and 
to devising a possible 'theory' of such interaction. My research 
indicates that such a theory should consider at least the following 
points.
Historically, one motive for establishm ent o f state foreign 
monopoly and the emergence o f the autarkic model of development 
in countries of Eastern Europe was to insulate the domestic economy 
and the planning process from the uncertainties of the world market. 
Accordingly, it seems valid to ask whether or not the increased 
contact between these countries and the West has increased their 
vulnerability to the changes in the capitalist world. Surely, the 
economic crisis, inflation, and monetary problems of the capitalist 
world are not without effect on the economies of the East European 
countries, as was the case during the stagflation of the early 1970s 
which certainly contributed to the balance of payments difficulties of 
some East European countries.4 Beyond its impact upon the balance
4 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion, for a study o f the effects of 
stagflation on the Eastern Europe see Portes (1980).
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of payment, with expanded economic relations, changes in the world 
market prices (e.g. oil) will to some degree influence indirectly the 
investment and consumption decisions of these countries. (Portes 
1980) The overall impact of such price changes would be further 
enhanced inasmuch as world prices are employed in intra-CMEA 
trade. (Bomstein 1979, pp. 304-5) More importantly, however, the 
increasd East-W est economic interaction makes the process of 
planning more difficult, because foreign trade becomes less amenable 
to prediction and planning. (Nyiri 1982,, p. 23)
There exist, however, varying degrees of vulnerability among 
the centrally planned economies to the changes in the capitalist 
world market. While a large, resource rich country such as the 
Soviet Union enjoys the option of autarky and the ability to maintain 
a high degree of independence, the smaller countries of Eastern 
Europe are much more in need of economic relations with the West. 
As Pasztor (1980)'s calculation indicates, whereas Hungary, for 
instance, in 1978 imported about 28% if its national income from the 
non-Socialist countries, the highest percent among East European 
countries, the Soviet Union imported 3.3% of its national income from 
the non-socialist countries. Hence, the degree of susceptibility of 
Hungary to the changes of the world market is much higher than that 
of the Soviet Union.
The admission that East European countries are to some degree 
vulnerable to the changes in the capitalist world market is not 
synonymous with accepting the dependency schools' argument that
4 3 4
these countries are a functional part of the capitalist world market 
and their logic of development is determined by the forces of the 
capitalist market. To accept the dependency school's contention and 
to place Eastern European countries within the confines of the 
capitalist world economy means overlooking the differences in goals 
and institutions of these two different economics systems. It 
furthermore means ignoring the tension which exists between the 
logic of market and the logic of plan. It is a mistake, for instance, to 
believe that the Soviet import of Western technology and machinery 
is for the purpose of producing commodities which are competitive 
on the world market and then exporting them in order to make 
profit. The Soviet Union acquires Western technology, equipment 
and machinery all as factors accelerating the development of the 
domestic forces of production and "spurring the imagination of 
designers," even if  after a few years or decades Soviet products 
appear on the Western markets. (Kozma 1982, p. 30)
In short, while the foreign trade of East European countries is 
subject to external influences, it cannot be understood in terms of the 
logic of the capitalist world market. In addition to the fact that East- 
West economic relations only account for a small percentage of social 
products in majority of these countries,5 because of the foreign 
trade monopoly and central planning nature of these societies, the 
im pacts originating outside cannot assert them selves directly,
With the exception of Hungary and probably Romania.
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immediately and particularly without lim itations in the domestic 
economic process. In contrast to the capitalist countries, rising 
foreign price levels in East Europe do not penetrate immediately into 
domestic producer and consumer prices, hence affecting the level of 
incomes and demand. At the same time, changes in export prices do 
not affect branches producing for exports and consequently affect 
the level of income and employment. (Simai 1977, p. 3 and Portes, 
1980) The inability of external forces to directly and immediately 
affect the domestic process of East European countries should be 
sought in the organization of foreign trade in these countries. For 
example, in the Soviet Union, foreign trade is conducted by state 
trading corporations, each specializing in import and export of a 
particular product over which they have a complete monopoly. 
Profitability plays no role in the conduct of these corporations whose 
operations are tightly controlled by the ministry of foreign trade. 
Such control is exerted through detailed plans for volume and prices 
of imports and exports. The trading corporations based on plan 
specifications purchase goods at prevailing domestic prices and then 
export them at the prevailing world market price. Similarly, these 
corporations purchase goods for import at world market prices and 
then sell them to domestic enterprises at the prevailing internal 
prices. The differences between either comes or goes to the Soviet 
state reserves. Neither the enterprises whose products end up in the 
world market, nor those who receive goods produced outside the 
country, have any interest in or knowledge of world market prices,
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because these prices in no way directly affect the income or 
employment levels of these enterprises. (Szymanski 1981, p. 522, 
Szymanski 1982, p. 64 and Holzman 1983) Therefore, the 
application of government economic policy enables mitigation of 
external effects. (Simai 1977, p. 3)
The state plan for foreign trade determines the amount and 
kind of goods which are necessary to "domestic production beyond 
expected domestic resources." (Szymanski 1981, p. 522) The role of 
export, then, is simply to cover the costs of imports. The planners 
examine domestic production to locate these products that "are either 
likely to be produced in excess of domestic requirements, or can 
easily be expanded" in order to choose goods for exports. (Ibid., p. 
522) Although as was mentioned previously, most items which are 
imported from the West are machinery and equipment, and imports 
in a way are used as a "vehicle of expansion drive," foreign trade is 
not carried on based on the principles of comparative advantages. 
Moreover, any attempt by the Western powers to completely isolate 
the East European countries at worst w ill lead to slightly 
deaccelerating the economic development of these countries, because 
they mainly rely on their own collective and individual economic 
resources and reciprocal trade of CMEA countries accounts for 
approxim ately th ree-fifth s of th e ir ex ternal trade turnover. 
(Stepanov 1981) The employment of government policies enables 
these countries to distribute losses due to the change in international 
economic conditions in accordance with the hierarchy of economic
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policy objectives. (Simai 1977, p. 3) Such action may lead to 
abandonment or postponement of an economic policy, but does not 
imply the "dependency" of these countries to international economic 
developm ent.
The examination of the recent trends in the East European 
countries rejects Stalin's contention that these countries are isolated 
from the capitalist market is no longer valid. Eastern Europe is not 
isolated from the world market and is in fact to some degree 
vulnerable to its effects. More importantly, these countries may 
respond to the capitalist market forces, but they are not governed by 
them. In their interaction with the capitalist countries, Eastern 
Europe's trade and investment decisions are not determined by the 
logic of world market, though to some extent they may b e ' affected; 
their products are not produced for the sake of making profit, but as 
a means for obtaining desired use values. Moreover, although one 
can concede that the Eastern European economies are weaker than 
those of DCs, they do not exhibit the characteristics of the 
dependency school’s semi-peripheral states, because the state foreign 
trade monopoly and centralized economic planning mediate the 
adverse effects of the world market. In other words, they eliminate 
or reduce "dependency." (p. 35)
At this point one may wonder, given the problem  of 
vulnerability, what is the best foreign trade strategy for the 
transitional societies in general? This is a difficult question and I do 
not feel in a position to even attempt to answer it, but there are
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some points that I would like to outline. While autarky was 
historically necessary in the context of "construction of socialism" in 
one country industrialization, it has become more evident that the 
continuation of that policy for smaller, less resources abundant 
countries of Eastern Europe is not possible. Until these societies 
become technologically in pace with the DCs and intra-bloc trade 
expands to a point that meets all their requirements, trade with 
capitalist countries will continue. If this is true, the challenge faced 
by East European countries is to devise a foreign trade model which 
can increase their export capacity, reduce their vulnerability to 
ex ternal fo rces, and at the sam e tim e enhance economic 
developm ent. Any particular approach, export-oriented model, 
import led growth, etc. must be evaluated in terms of its relative 
costs and benefits with respect to the above criteria. There is no one 
path , because there exists a great d iv ersity of resources.
potentialities, and level of development among these countries. It is
precisely the recognition and emphasis on the specificity of economic 
and institutional conditions of Eastern European countries which is 
m issing in the discussion of the schools presented here.6 Any 
attempt to construct a 'theory' of economic relations between the 
East and the West must recognize these specificities. Such a 'theory' 
by placing economic analysis within the social and political contexts
6 In a now classic article, Palma (1978) raises the same criticism of some of the 
dependency school's authors.
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of these societies will be able to explain with more percision the 





A nother group of neo-classical econom ists who have 
em phasized the organizational aspect of the socialist countries' 
foreign trade. Brada and Jackson (1978) for example1 , employ the 
"normative theory of orgaization" in their study of foreign trade 
organizations of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). 
They start by arguing that "traditional theory of foreign trade under 
capitalism explains the behavior of firms as the result of interplay 
between" the character of competition among firms, prices and 
profits. (Brada and Jackson 1978, P. 294) What they believe is 
lacking in the traditional approach is "an analysis of the internal 
organization of trading unit." (Brada and Jackson 1978, P. 295) 
This, they believe, is true for the organizations performing under 
conditions of planned economy. "(A)n organization facing a given 
com petitive environment, price or planning inform ation, and 
incentive system will perform its assigned tasks differently under 
differing forms of internal organization." Furthermore, "if the 
internal organization is appropriate to one type of environment, it 
may prove to be inappropriate should the organization seek to 
operate in a different environment." This latter point, they argue, is 
a problem facing both "capitalist and socialist organizations" which 
have extended their operations to the international sphere. (Brada
1 Hewett (1974) has also studied the effect of organization on the behavior of 
centrally planned economies.
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and Jackson 1978, P. 295) They then proceed to survey the forms of 
organization employed by large American firms, Japanese trading 
companies and the countries of Eastern Europe, and try to evaluate 
their development based on the "normative theory of organization."
In the case of centrally planned economies, Brada and Jackson 
d istinguish  three d istinct developm ents in the foreign trade 
organization of these countries. They argue that until the reforms 
of the 1960's, the Ministry of Foreign Trade purchased products 
from branch ministries for export. This organizational structure was 
quite appropriate for the needs ofthese countries at the time. 
Because the bulk of foreign trade of Eastern European countries was 
with each other. In this form of trade, the volume and composition 
of com m odities were determ ined through bila teral agreem ent 
between the Foreign Trade Ministries of the countries. Moreover, 
the agreed upon prices were maintained for a period of a year or 
longer. "Since prices are fixed and trade flows determined by 
protocol, there is no marketing for the Ministry of Foreign Trade" 
(Brada and Jackson 1978, P. 311) and noneed to make any attempt 
to establish a direct line between producers and exporters.
Brada and Jackson believe that although the traditional form of 
organization of trade in Eastern Europe "may have been appropriate 
for the conduct of intra-CM EA trade, it precluded optim al 
responsiveness to, and export performance on, Western markets." 
(Brada and Jackson 1978, P. 312) Nevertheless they argue for th 
follow ing reasons such form of organization was the most 
appropriate even in dealing with Western countries. First of all, not 
only the volume of exports to the West was low, but the exports
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mainly consisted of raw materals and foodstuff, for which few 
interactions between direct producers and exports are required. 
Moreover, "linking the activity of domestic enterprises directly and 
autom atically to world-market developments is inconsistent with 
detailed central planning of domestic economic activity, to say 
nothing of the planning of foreign trade and the balance of 
payments." (Brada and Jackson 1978, P. 312) Furthermore, the 
shortage of experts who have direct knowledge of Western markets 
and business practice was another factor in the endurance of the 
traditional form of foreign trade organization which was viewed as 
the best way of "making full use of the existing cadres of foreign 
trade officials." (Brada and Jackson 1978, P. 313)
Despite these considerations in the favor of the traditional 
form, by the late 1960's a series of reforms in the organization of 
foreign trade was conducted. According to Brada and Jackson, there 
had been some economic developments which demanded some 
changes in the foreign trade organizations. More specifically, there 
was an increas in trade with the West, and the share of 
manufacturing in exports was growing. In the new system a number 
o f large integrated production units called associations were 
established. Domestically, these associations were given greater 
freedom in making productio and investment decisions. Globally, 
the industrial association and sometimes individuals enterprises 
were granted the right to engage directly in foreign trade 
departments were established within associations and individual 
enterprises. Brada and Jackson believe that such a pattern of 
organizational change is consistent with their theory that: "Global
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structures arose exactly in those areas where th net benefit of the 
new structure appeared to be greatest and where the deficiencies 
of the old form of organization appeared to be the most 
conspicuous." (Bradaa and Jackson 1978, P. 315)2
In Brada and Jackson's account, despite the "conceptual 
correctness" of foreign trade reforms in the late 1960's and the 
establishment of a global form of organization, in the early 1970's 
there was a move towar reenacting greater centralization of foreign 
trade. The reasons for such a move, according to Brada and Jackson, 
must be mainly sought in the development in the West. In the late 
1960's when the foreign trade reforms were implemented, the 
international markets for both goods and currency had been stable 
for some time. Consequently, for th architect of reforms the linking, 
of international markets to the domestic enterprises migh have 
appeared quite simple. In the early 1970's the situation on the 
international markets changed. The collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system, and the problems of recycling OPEC foreign-exchange 
earnings led to a chaoti international monetary situation. Also 
worldwide inflation and recession in much of the capitalish world 
created disorder in the international product market. These 
situations severly limited the abilities of the newly-established 
foreign trade departments and associations to keep up with the 
developments in the West. "The rapid and automatic response to 
external developments that characterizes the global organization
2 According to Brada and Jackson: "The greatest increase occurred in the
number o f export organiztion dealing with machinery, transport equipment, 
and manufactured consumer goods, the total of such organization doubling 
between 1968 and 1972." (Ibid., P. 315)
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turned from an advantage to a liability in these unsettled 
circumstances." (Brada and Jackson 1978, P. 36) No wonder that 
the idea of increasing the role of the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
gained so much support among the central authorities.
Brada and Jackson conclude that the organizational response to 
the problem of creating a direct link betwee exporters of certain 
products such as machinery to consumer has been similar in all 
econom ic system s. The actual benefits and costs o such 
organizational changes have been different in these economic 
systems. In the socialist counties, for example, the world-wide 
inflation and shortages of the early seventies resulted in large wind­
fall profits and lossesfor individual exporting enterprises with 
consequent pressure on domestic equilibrium, particularly because 
the change in organization had been accompanied by granting more 
autonomy to these enterprises in regards to such domestic affairs as 
pricing and investment decisions
APPENDIX n
Mathematical Explanation of Brada's Model
Let's start with Brada's general model, in which a joint venture 
is located in an Eastern European country and produces one output 
Q, with the use of m inputs (X) provided by the Western partner:
X= ( X i  Xm ), and n inputs (Y) purchased domestically: Y=(Yi, Y
n). The production function is then: Q=F(Xi, ...Xm- Y i,....Y n). The 
output is sold at fixed price P. The inputs X and Y are acquired by 
the respective partners at constant per unit costs Cj(i=l,....,m ) and 
Cj (j=l,....,n) The price actually paid by the joint venture for iinput 
(Y) is Wj = Cj (j=l,...,n). Furthermore, the host government allows the 
Western partner to appropriate a fixed share S of the firm’s 
accounting profit, which is
n  = P . Q - V X - WY
where VX = X Vi .X i and WY -  X W j. Yj 
W
In the case of Rumania, Brada argues that the Rumanian 
government as the owner of all factors of production derives its 
profits not only from its share of joint venture profits but also from 
sales of inputs to the joint venture. As a result in the country the 
profit of joint ventures dominated by the Rumanian government can 
be shown by the following:
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Ilj.v. = £  (Wj - Cj ) Yj + PQ - VX - WY
The maximization of total profit under this condition requires:
1. differentiating with respect to X. 
P Q x -V
2. differentiating with respect to Y. 
(Wj - C j ) + PQy
The joint venture's maximizing conditions are clearly different from 
those desired by either partner in maximizing its own profit.1 Thus 
Brada concludes "to the extent that each -------------------
1 The Western partner wants to maximize
II -  2  (Vi - Ci) X i + S(PQ - VX - WY) (1)
1*1
where II* is the total profit accuring to the Eastern partner. The first order
condition for (1) is to differentiate it with respect to Xi and Yj (profit 
maximizing conditions) imply:
PQxi -  Vi - (v i - c i/ s ) and PQ yi = Wj
with Qxi and Qyj representing the partial derivatives o f  Q with respect to Xi 
and Yj respectively.
A similar exercise with respect to (2) generates the resource conditions 
desired by the Eastern Partner.
W j-Cj
PQxi= VI PQ yi = W i - ____
1-S
The two sets o f  conditions for factor allocation are clearly different and are 
different from those of joint ventures (see Svejan and Smith 1982)
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partner seeks to negotiate the resource allocation which maximizes 
his profits, the joint venture will have a lower level of total profits to 
share between the partners." (Brada 1977, P. 173)
The Hungarian situation is different. Most joint ventures 
in Hungary engage in trade activ ities, exporting a product 
manufactured in Hungary. According to Brada, since in Hungary 
there are at least partly functioning markets, there is no reason "to 
anticipate that Hungarian inputs to joint venture will be excessively 
over priced. Furthermore, the Hungarian partner has no particular 
interest in the benefits that over payment for such inputs could 
provide to the Hungarian suppliers of inputs." (Brada 1977, P, 174) 
Brada assumes the price at which the Hungarian partner supplies the 
product to the joint venture will be fixed at the contract price of P; 
the joint venture sells the product at fixed price P. The Western 
partner also accrues some costs as a result of distribution and sales 
of the product which is a function of the volume of sales:
D = D(Q)
where D is the distribution cost. The Western partner's profit is then:
n =  X {(P - P') Q - D (Q)}
This profit is maximized when:
P - P' = Da
The volume of sales, according to him must also be the 
volume of production of the Hungarian partner, whose profit comes 
not only from a share of jo int venture profits but also from 
producing the product sold by the venture. Assum- ing the costs of
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production depend on Q, then C = C (Q). The Hungarian partner's 
profit is:
II* = (1 - S) {(P - p') Q - d (Q)} + P'Q - C (Q)
The profit will be maximized when:
an* /3Q  = (1 - S)(P - P' - D ) + F  - C = 0 (3)
Brada argues that if the price at which the joint venture 
sells the product P1 is set by negotiation at C , the marginal cost of 
production, the equation (3) will reduce to: P - P' = Dq
Then, there is no disagreement between the partners 
regarding the operation o f joint venture. Consequently Brada 
believes there exists the possibility that Hungarian joint venture will 
be a "relatively efficient user of resources and untroubled by 
conflicts over resource allocation between two parties." (Brada 1977, 
P. 175)
In Yugoslavia the situation is different. The Western 
partner wants the joint venture to maximize the following profit 
function:
II  = S (PQ - VX - WY)2 
Because in Yugoslavia markets exist, Brada believes that 
as in the case of Hungary, there is little possibility for Yugoslav 
partner or for any other source in Yugoslavia to distort the prices of
2 The first order profit maximizing conditions arc PQx = Vi and PQy =Wy
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inputs utilized by the joint venture. He assumes that prices of such 
inputs are held constant at their cost of production. Thus he argues 
"the existence of markets for inputs of both partners resolve one of 
the fun- damental conflicts evident in the Rumanian joint venture." 
(Brada 1977, P. 177)
He however argues that the conflicts between partners 
continue to exist due to the "differences in property right." In 
contrast to the capitalist firms which seek to maximize profits, the 
Yugoslav firm is interested in maximizing income per worker. The 
income per worker is equal to wage rate plus profit per worker. Let's 
assume L represents the Yugoslavia labor input to the joint venture, 
W i the wagerate and the joint venture total profits; the income per 
worker is:
> I = [(1 - S)/ L ]+ Wi (4) 3
It is the Yugoslavia intention to maximize equation (4). The first 
order profit maximizing conditions are:
a i /a x i = [(1-S) /  l ] (p q  x - W i) = o p q x = Wi
9I/3Yj = (1 - S) (PQl - Wi ) - [(1- S)/L](PQ - VX - WY) = 0
3 Where II = PQ - VX - WY.
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PQl = W i + (PQ - VX - WY)/L
Brada argues the Yugoslav workers utilize the same rules 
as the W estern partner for determining the employment of non­
labor input. However they seek different levels of employment for 
the labor input. It is at this point that the conflicts between two 
partners arise.4
Brada, after presenting his models, arrives at the 
following conclusions: "In all three cases, differences in property
rights between the two participants in the East- West joint venture 
may create conflicts of interest. The narrowest the scope of property 
rights of the socialist partner, the greater the availability of market­
generated information on the true value of socialist inputs, the more 
circumscribed this area of conflict appears to be." (Brada 1977, P. 
180)
Sveinar and Sm iths Model:
In their model, the parties act as if  maximizing the weighted product 
of their utilities:
Max U = Igw  ujfD
where Uw and U d are the utility functions of the Western and 
domestic partner, respectively, Xw is the bargaining power of the 
Western partner and Xd the bargaining power of the domestic
4 The Yugoslav worker-managers wish to allocate non-labor input so that 
the value of the marginal product equals the input price. But in the case 
of labor input they wish to equate the value o f the marginal product of 
labor to the actual income per worker.
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partner. As they believe it is the relative power which matters, it 
is convenient to assume Xd  = 1- X where 0£ X and Xd = 1- X. The 
utility function then can be written as:
U = I® UO-V) (l)
In the case of Rumania they take each partner's utility 
to be identical with their profit function. Assuming the Western 
partner's profit function to be:
n  = I  (Vi - Ci ) X j + S(PQ - Vi X i - Wj Yj)
(using the same notations which were used in analysis of Brada's 
model)
The Rumainan partner's profit function is:
I T  = S  (Wj - C j) Y j+ (1 - S)(PQ - Vi X i - WjY j) 
Substituting n  and IT* in equation (1) we get the following:3 
U = 11*11* <1-* ) =( (Vi -c i)Xi +S(PQ-ViXi -Wj Yj ))*
((Wj-Cj)Yj+(PQ-ViXi-WjYj))(l-lr >
3 This equation differs slightly from what they have actually used in their 
article.
4 5 3
The maximization of the above equation will lead according to their 
calculations:
PQxi = Q
PQ yj = Cj
which means that 'marginal value' of each input equals the 
corresponding per unit cost of input. (Svejnar and Smith 1982, P. 
159)
A EP E N E IX —I I I
E xport O rien ted  Model o f D evelopm ent
The cornerstone of the export-oriented model is intensification 
of the socialist countries' participation in the international division of 
labor and adamant opposition to the policy of inward-looking 
development. About the latter point, the proponents of the model in 
fact argue what makes the export-oriented development topical in 
CMEA countries today is the concept of import substitution, more 
exactly, the conception which declares the fundamental task of 
economic policy is to satisfy the need of these countries primarily 
from internal resources. This conception dominated the Eastern 
European countries' economic policy for decades and proved to be 
unsuccessful under the condition where the sources of extensive 
growth had been exhausted. Under this condition, there remain no 
other sources of development than to increasing productivity and 
improving efficiency. The Eastern European economists argue that 
the import-substitution policy in practice never was limited to only 
imports of machinery from capitalist countries. It indeed usually 
entailed a growing need for material imports; in other words the 
im port-substitution development turned out to be in fact very 
import-intensive. (Koves 1978, P.P. 115-117) All this would be no 
problem, if there were enough exports to counter balance them, but 
these countries have never paid enough attention to development of 
exports aimed at the Western markets. It is this lack of attention 
that the export-oriented model of development intends to overcome. 
"The Eastern European countries give up their long lasting tradition
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of im port-substitution, and switch over to the export-oriented 
growth model, all other factors of economic policy must be 
subordinate to this task." (Csaba 1983, P. 69)
The proponents of the export-oriented model of development 
believe that the Eastern European countries must realize that at a 
time when the improvement of efficiency is the only way of 
economic development, to m anufacture everything economically 
dom estically is neither possible nor necessary even within the 
framework of a large community. (Csaba 1983, P .117) In this 
context the domestic productive factors must be engaged only in 
selected areas, where the volume of production in each of these areas 
is large. The goods are then produced not only for the domestic 
market but also sometimes mainly for the foreign markets. (Rosati 
1979, P. 55)
Therefore the proponents of the model suggest an intensive 
participation in the international division of labor. They argue such a 
participation is not a passive process but it involves a series of 
consciously directed, continuous activities: It means the formation of
an export structure in accordance with the natural advantage of the 
country, while considering the tendencies of the international 
markets. (Veress 1974, P. 342) According to the Eastern European 
economists, the specialization in the selected areas alone will not 
bring any advantage if "the relations of prices (costs)" internally and 
externally  are identical, and if  the costs o f production are 
proportional to the scale of output. Fortunately, they maintain that 
because of differences in "productive factors, natural conditions, and 
historical processes of development" in particular countries there
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exist consideration "different relations of prices and costs." Thanks 
to this phenomenon, "rational specialization makes it possible to 
achieve sig n ifican t advan tages” from partic ipation  in the 
international division of labor. (Rosati 1979, P. 55)
As a resu lt of the "rational specialization," a country 
participating in the international division of labor can gain more 
goods and services than it can gain by using its resources within a 
closed economy. The country's needs are satisfied by products that 
are less expensive and of better quality. Low costs result from the 
fact that goods are produced where the costs of production are the 
lowest and also from an appropriately large scale of activity. The 
large scale of production in turn allows the use of the latest 
technology, and consequently production of goods of high quality. 
Another factor contributing to production of goods of high quality is 
the fact that specialization enables the country to concentrate its 
research and development only on selected areas and obtain the 
better results. (Rosati 1979, P.P. 55-56)
Specialization and the export oriented model of course entails 
an active import policy, because in the case of products that a 
country can't profitably produce, whose development is constrained 
by limited resources or markets, it must follow a deliberate strategy 
of imports. (Veress 1974, P. 342) The increase in imports from the 
West is important also for two other reasons: 1. Because of
requirements of periods of intensive development;1 2. Because of 
requirements of integration of the CMEA countries. Therefore both
1 The argument is similar to what was presented earlier in the chapter 
three.
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the domestic development in individual Eastern European countries 
and cooperation plans among them necessitates increased Western 
imports. (Koves 1978, P. 118)
On the latter point, it is argued that due to the high import 
contents of exports of some Eastern European countries (i.e. Hungary) 
to other socialist countries, even those socialist countries that have so 
far tried to orient themselves only to the socialist markets, have 
been forced to im port considerably from the West, although 
indirectly. (Koves 1978, P. 118),(Koves 1981, P. 56) There are two 
alternative waysto meet the increased import requirement, either by 
a rapid growth of exports or by running more deeply into debts. 
(Veress 1974, P. 347) The proponents of the export-oriented model, 
however, prefer the first alternative, partly because the credit 
relations between East and West are primarly motivated by political 
and ideological views, which make reliance upon Western credits 
undesirable. (Czerkawski 1982, P. 77) Furthermore it is believed 
that the im ports can not be financed by credits for ever; 
consequently there must be a considerable acceleration of exports to 
the West as a basic condition for maintaining a high rate of imports. 
(Tabaczynski 1981, P. 99)
The CMEA countries must however rationalize their imports 
and increase the efficiency of their use. For example N. Shomelev 
(1979) argues that according to some estimates not less than 15 
percent of the imports of the Eastern European countries belong to 
the category of forced imports. These are first of all imports of 
machines which are produced at acceptable technological standards 
in CMGA countries. But which, due to the overstrained domestic plan
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an insufficient consideration of mutual requirements, are chronically 
underproduced in these countries. In addition, in the CMEA 
coun tries reserves o f un installed  im portan t equipm ent are 
increasing. Such reserves naturally do not yield any export returns. 
(Shmelev 1979, P. 319) Eastern European countries' endeavours to 
overcome these shortcomings will be of tremendous benefit to their 
balance of payments.
The basic problem is recognized to be the fact that for a long 
time too wide a range of products has been produced in and exported 
from CMEA countries. (Veress 1974, P. 345) The export-oriented 
model therefore suggests that the economic policy decisions must be 
supported that select on the basis of external economic requirements 
those industries, plants and activities which produce efficient 
products saleable on the world markets. At the same time those 
industries which are 'only' capable of imports substitution, and those 
which produce costly goods or obsolete goods must be given less 
support, or the ir production  m ust be to ta lly  term inated. 
Furthermore the enterprises which export more at advantageous 
conditions m ust receive more investm ent resources, and be 
encouraged. (Bognar 1976, P. 231), (Simai 1977, P. 9) and (Kozma 
1972, P.P. 26-7)
The specialization and export-oriented model is recommended 
for all the Eastern European countries, but it is considered a must 
policy for the medium and the smaller countries of Eastern Europe. 
It is believed that in the medium and small countries, an effective 
development of forces of production without a dynamic foreign trade 
and more intensive participation in the international division of labor
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is impossible. (Veress 1974, P. 336) A. Koves (Koves 1975) for 
instance argues that the small Eastern European countries are highly 
foreign trade sensitive; im ports are needed no t only for the 
development of the economy but also for the mere operation of the 
ec o n o m y .2 For this reason Koves argues that the growth must be 
export-oriented. (Koves 1975, P. 317) Similarly E. Tabaczynski 
(1981, P. 108) argues that a medium sized country like Poland also 
needs to specialize and adopt the export-oriented model, because it 
cannot afford to produce all kinds of different products either for the 
Eastern or for the Western markets.
There is however a group of the export-oriented model's 
supporters who strongly believes that this model will be successful 
only if  it is implemented within the framework of CMEA countries' 
integration. (Bogomolov 1979c, P. 307) "No doubt, the problem 
number one in the field of economic connection with the non-socialist 
world is the extent of our 'export expansion'. Here we are facing 
common tasks, and combination of efforts on a collective basis right 
in th is field is the m ost im portant and, w hat is m ore, an 
indispensable precondition for common success." (Bognar 1979, P.
307) And, under the present conditions, and particularly in the long 
run, a more and more active participation of CMEA countries in the 
international d iv ision  of labor by way of specialization and 
cooperation of production acquires special importance for their
2 The import elasticity of the Hungarian economy according to Bognar 
(1976) is very high. Assuming the planned growth rate to be 5 - 6 
percent per year, imports must increase by at least 9 - 1 0  percent 
annually. (Ibid., p. 238)
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accelerated and intensive economic growth. (Bogomolov 1979c, P.
308) and (Shmelev 1979, P. 317)
They argue the significance of specialization and export- 
expansion within the framework of CMEA cooperation is further 
enhanced when one considers the difficulties which emerge as a 
result of intensification of the economic relations with the West. The 
difficulties include a growing technical and technological dependence 
of a number of important branches of industry, appearance of a 
double standard of quality in the economic exchange in different 
geographic directions, creation of stocks of equipment with different 
characteristics, parallel developm ent of some production, etc. 
(Bogomolov 1979c, P. 309) It is argued however that such 
difficulties will be considerably reduced when the collaboration with 
the West takes place under the conditions and requirements of long­
term CMEA cooperation. "Experience indicates that cooperative 
collaboration with the capitalist countries brings on the whole the 
necessary results only in cases when it is carried out in a purposeful 
and close coordination with the tasks of expanding socialist economic 
integration." (Bogomolov 1979c, P.309) In terms of imports from 
the West, it is argued that "our import pattern [must] be changed in 
favour of buying complete equipments, manufacturing licenses and 
technological know how, concentrating at the same time on those 
fields where there are domestic production and developm ent 
traditions and where advantageous participation in the CMEA 
division of labour is feasible." (Kozma 1974, P. 23) It is further 
argued that even today there exists the possibility of taking over 
advanced Western technology, adapting it and exchanging it between
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countries within the CMEA region. (Kozina 1974, P. 24) Such action 
is in particular important as far as the rationalization of imports is 
concerned.
Some of the export-oriented model of development's adherents 
believe not only that Eastern European countries must be specialized 
in production of selected products, but that they also must 
concentrate their exports on selected markets. When the products 
are exported to too many markets, it is not possible to put 
substantial forces either on marketing or to consumers' services 
which would ensure Eastern European countries' competitiveness. 
(Veress 1974, P. 346) The market concentration is especially 
significant for those products such as automobiles for which the 
question of service and spare parts is of paramount importance. 
(Tabaczynski 1981, P. 108) There are those economists who on the 
other hand believe that Eastern European countries must produce 
those kinds of goods which can be sold on every market; and they 
suggest that the level of technology in the socialist countries must 
reach a level which can produce goods capable of satisfying the 
specific needs of different markets. (Mandel and Muller 1974, P. 40) 
Regardless of whether the target must be a selected market or many 
markets, the importance of marketing activities must be recognized. 
It is generally believed that getting better access to Western markets 
is necessary to promote Eastern Europe’s exports; and the better 
access to Western market can only be achieved through sophisticated 
marketing activities. (Bognar 1979, P. 13) It is further argued that 
since Eastern European countries for a long period of time have 
ignored marketing, they must now put a considerable effort into
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im proving the ir m arketing ac tiv ities including  organization, 
distribution and promotional aspects of selling on the W estern 
markets. They must also enlarge their distributional networks, and 
expand their advertisem ents, (Kossut 1981, P.P. 112-113) and 
encourage those types of investments which attempt to improve "the 
esteem" of Eastern European products on the world markets. (Bognar 
1976, P. 230)
The export-oriented model does not lose sight of the 
importance of agricultural exports. The proponents of the model 
admit "an old truth in economics" that after a country has attained a 
certain nutritional level, the elasticity of demand for agricultural 
products in that country is lower than that for industrial products. 
However, they argue that the Eastern European countries must take 
advantage of the fact that elasticities of agricultural products are 
different in various regions of the world. (Bognar 1979, P. 239) Or 
as B. Kadar argues the development of agriculture in Eastern Europe 
should be directed towards special products instead of mass 
products, because the market for mass products is practically 
saturated in the non-socialist countries, and their price is low. On the 
other hand K adar asserts that the in ternationalization  "of 
nourishment” and the shift in demand of "social groups in the higher 
income brackets" in the DCs towards the special products of other 
countries; along with the intensification of income differentiation in 
DCs have created an excellent opportunity for production and exports 
of special products (Kadar 1983, P.P. 306-7) At any rate, the export- 
oriented model does not limit specialization and export concentration 
only to the realm of industry; rather it is a comprehensive program
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which covers every aspect of economic activities; and it supports 
every policy which helps to improve export potential of the Eastern 
European economies.
For instance E. Tabaczynski believes the Industrial Cooperation 
agreements between East and West are important insofar as they 
help Eastern European countries on the choice and marketing of 
specialized products, because ICAs enable these countries to 
concentrate on research and investment outlays on specific products 
and to rely on the technical experiences and subdeliveries of the 
Western partner. A. Voinov (1975) also advocates ICA, which 
encourages specialization which in turn promotes product quality. 
Tabaczynski also highly regards joint ventures because "[t]his is the 
new direction of promising development for the future specialization 
of our industry. It should stimulate our managers to take further 
steps toward concentration and specialization of production and the 
further elimination of unnecessary production items.1' (Tabaczynski 
1981, P. 103) Because the joint-venture operations depend on the 
quality of joint-m anagem ents (including the Eastern European 
management), and in the cases where products are produced for the 
Western markets such operations depend on how quickly they react 
to the changes in market situation. This condition provides excellent 
learning possibility  for the Eastern European managers, and 
preapares them for the task of export specialization because one of 
the most important factors for the success of the export-oriented 
model is considered to be the capability of adaptation to the 
requirements of market demands. The importance of the adaptation 
to differentiated demands is further enhanced, when the weight of
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manufactured goods in particular consumer goods in the structure of 
exports is considerable.
The ICAs are in general praised not only because their long-run 
and self-financing character make them profitable from the point of 
view of balance of payments, but also because they stimulate the 
expansion of trade of individual commodity groups and consequently 
contribute to raising the level of specialization. (Bogomolov 1979c, 
P.P. 308-309)
The export-oriented model's adherents furtherm ore believe 
that only a thoroughgoing reform in the system and central planning 
of the Eastern European countries will guarantee the success of their 
p o licy .3 It is not possible to be integrated into the world economy 
with an economic system "which was devised to an applied for 
implenting an inward-looking strategy in a huge country with vast 
extensive resources." (Csaba 1983, P. 20)4 The export-oriented 
model requires decision making and freedom  of action at the 
enterprise level.5 The improvement of the export structure should 
start with a better utilization o f existing production equipment, 
improvement of the quality of products for export, and the widening 
or narrowing down the assortment o f goods; in addition it cannot be 
separated from a better organization of sales and the assessment of
3 The details o f their suggested reforms are far beyond the scope o f this
chapter. For an indication about such reforms see (Mandel and 
Muller 1974) for example.
4 Even the Soviet Union, they argue, today is not in a position of
enjoying possession o f unlimited natural resources.
5 Such freedom o f action must be accompanied by linking the activities
o f these enterprises to the world market. For most enterprises 
incentive alone is not enough to encourage them to take necessary 
actions; in most cases pressure, in the form of world market effects, 
is needed to provoke action. (Bognar 1979, p. 14)
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market demand, which all require decision making at the enterprise 
level. (Koves 1979, P.P. 334-35) It is believed that the enterprises, 
if permitted, can more efficiently study Western consumer’s habits, 
their consumption structure and their way of life and consequently 
show quick reaction to any changes which they may observe. 
Furthermore, it is argued that historically in Eastern Europe the 
centrally decided productive investments have almost exclusively 
been made with the aim o f import substitution or of increasing 
exports to other socialist countries. "It follows from their character 
that in most cases they could contribute only a little to exports to 
capitalist countries that require a high degree of flexibility from 
producers." (cited in Koves 1978, P. 113) It is for a combination of 
the above reasons that the export-oriented model demands a 
thoroughgoing reform in the system of centrally planned economy.
The supporters of the export-oriented model are aware of the 
problem which may arise as a result of the adoption of their model, 
that is the problem of increasing the vulnerability of Eastern Europe 
to the changes in the world economy. However they believe the 
advantages of th e ir m odel will prevail, and outw eigh its 
disadvantages. In principle, they maintain that Eastern Europe can 
continue to plan production on the basis of the size and needs of the 
home market, and try to export the surplus only for the purpose of 
acquiring the indispensable imports. Such a policy, however, is a 
dangerous road to follow, because it "restrains the development of 
the forces of production to the dimensions of one country and 
through it renounces the advantageous of the economies of scale and 
also exploitation of possibilities of stemming from the division of
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labor." (Veress 1974, P.P. 342-43) Furthermore, it may state that 
w ithout specialization and narrowing down the structure of 
production, giving up autarky, the economic development of Eastern 
European countries will basically remain extensive. Since the sources 
of extensive development in these countries have been exhausted, 
the continuation of the policy of extensive development will cause 
Eastern Europe to lag behind the advanced capitalist countries, and in 
the hierarchy of the international division of labor they will have to 
be satisfied with an even more modest place than that of the present. 
(Pasztor 1980, P. 91)
A. Koves asserts that if the export-oriented development is 
discarded, Eastern European countries have to give up the boosting of 
their imports from the West. Without funds provided by the export 
of goods it is unrealistic to believe that Eastern Europe can continue 
to import from the West, and the West will continue to provide 
additional financial means to support Eastern Europe's demands for 
imports. Without Western imports of machinery the desire to reduce 
technological backwardness is hardly realistic, and the increase of 
internal CMEA trade will also be in jeopardy.6 "If Eastern Europe 
renounces the export-oriented development, then sooner or later, the 
implementation of all the economic plans and tasks in which Western
6 M. Mandel and J. Muller (1974, p. 37) raise the same issue: "the 
necessity of implementing an export-oriented economic policy is 
first of all justified by the fact that this is the only way to bring 
about a more intensive cooperation between the economies of the 
socialist countries. In the long run, we can develop the socialist 
relations vitally important for us only if the economy is able to 
produce--in accordance with the requirements o f export 
orientation-competitive goods willingly bought by our most 
important natural partners, the socialist countries."
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imports play a considerable role would be endangered. The 
consequences would be slow technological and econom ic 
development, stagnation of the standard of living, preservation or 
widening of the technological gap separating the CMEA countries 
from the more advanced countries, and the long-range production of 
the current export pattern." (Koves 1981, P. 130) and (Krasznai and 
Laki 1982, P. 57)?
The export-oriented model on the other hand on the basis of 
expedient specialization and the requirements of the international 
division of labor will guarantee the raising of technological standards, 
economic efficiency, and the [raising of] standard of living in the 
CMEA countries. (Krasznai and Laki 1982, P 31) However, the 
export-oriented development, some argue, is not a smooth process 
and "can be approached only in the long run and gradually. . 
(Mandel and Muller 1974, P. 39) Consequently, in general export 
specialization in engineering and in other branches of manufacturing 
is considered to be highly desirable. (Shmelev 1979, P. 38) It is 
realized such a task is a prolonged process and its completion is 
beyond the 1980s. Meanwhile in order to provide enough resources 
and contribute to achieving such a task the volume and efficiency of 
traditional exports of CMEA countries must be increased. (Shmelev
7 Koves believes 'the probability of such type of withdrawal cannot be 
completely precluded today if  the world political conditions o f East- 
West trade change unfavorably—especially if  the deterioration in 
the international situation were accompanied by worsening 
balance-of-payment difficulties. But we must be aware that this 
would be a step backward, which beside being unjustifiable from the 
point o f view o f economic development, would throw back the 
economic and social development o f CMEA countries enormously." 
(Koves 1981, p. 130) also (Krasznai and Laki 1982, p. 62)"
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1979, P. 318) However it is emphasized that the concentration on 
traditional exports is only of short-term nature, partly because 
internally it is impossible to continue with the traditional pattern of 
trade, i.e. to import the finished products and to export the raw 
materials. The structure of production in the socialist countries has 
changed drastically and they manufacture a growing volume of 
finished products and consume an increasing share of their own raw 
materials and energy; consequently it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to export raw materials. (Nyiri 1982, P. 19) In the case of 
the Soviet Union for instance Koves (1979, P. 333) argues it is 
important for this country to find ways and methods enabling it to 
export manufacturing goods, because the Soviet Union, one of the 
major exporters of oil and raw materials, these days finds it difficult 
to increase the production of these products to a sufficient amount to 
cover both the domestic needs and allocate some for exports. In the 
short-run however Koves argues that it has no choice but to sell to 
the Western countries raw materials and in particular oil and natural 
gas in order to increase its receipts from its exports, and support the 
restructuring of the economy towards production and exports of 
manufacturing goods.
There are some Eastern European economists who believe that 
the export specialization on manufacturing goods is not sufficient. 
They speak of exports of "technical cultures." By [the] "technical 
cultures" they imply undertaking "the development of complete 
systems and their introduction into the economies of our partners. 
For this frees them not only from production but also from the whole 
or a great part of systems design and organization." (Kozma 1974, P.
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25) For example in Hungary they speak of development of health 
culture which includes: the organization system of health network;
health systems; development, design and production of medical 
instruments; design and furnishing of hospitals and sanatoria, etc. It 
is argued that "'selling* of the technical cultural multiplies the 
efficiency of external economic connections, be it the whole culture 
or some larger interrelated parts of it, precisely because they relieve 
the importing partners of organization and adaptation troubles." 
(Kozma 1974, P.P. 25-26)
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